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Keywords = theological voluntarism

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16 pages, 262 KB  
Article
Mediated Morality as a Middle Position in Understanding the Relation between God and Morality
by Amund Tobias Måge Areklett and Atle Ottesen Søvik
Religions 2023, 14(8), 1074; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14081074 - 21 Aug 2023
Viewed by 2629
Abstract
How should we understand the relation between God and morality? This article aims to address this question by constructing a theistic metaethical theory informed by postphenomenological mediation theory. According to postphenomenological mediation theory, properties and values are not independent entities but are instead [...] Read more.
How should we understand the relation between God and morality? This article aims to address this question by constructing a theistic metaethical theory informed by postphenomenological mediation theory. According to postphenomenological mediation theory, properties and values are not independent entities but are instead mutually constituted through the relationships that they participate in. By emphasizing relationships and understanding goodness as harmony, the theory allows God and creation to jointly constitute goodness. This alternative theory is compared to the metaethical theories proposed by Robert M. Adams and Mark C. Murphy, which represent the two primary strands of theistic metaethics: theological voluntarism and natural law theory, respectively. The alternative theory exhibits certain advantages and resolves some of the issues found in Adams’ and Murphy’s theories. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Morality without God: Reality or Illusion?)
13 pages, 251 KB  
Article
Theological Utilitarianism, Supervenience, and Intrinsic Value
by Matthew Alexander Flannagan
Religions 2023, 14(3), 413; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14030413 - 17 Mar 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 5329
Abstract
Erik Wielenberg has argued that robust realism can account for the “common-sense moral belief” that “some things distinct from God are intrinsically good”. By contrast, theological stateism cannot account for this belief. Hence, robust realism has a theoretical advantage over all forms of [...] Read more.
Erik Wielenberg has argued that robust realism can account for the “common-sense moral belief” that “some things distinct from God are intrinsically good”. By contrast, theological stateism cannot account for this belief. Hence, robust realism has a theoretical advantage over all forms of theological stateism. This article criticizes Wielenberg’s argument. Wielenberg distinguishes between R and D-supervenience. The coherence of Wielenberg’s robust realism depends upon this distinction. I argue that this distinction undermines his critique of theological stateism. I will make three points. First, once you utilize the distinction between R and D-supervenience, his argument for the incompatibility of theological stateism and intrinsic value fails. Second, theological stateism is compatible with intrinsic value. The historical example of theological utilitarianism, expounded by thinkers George Berkeley and William Paley, shows someone can accept that moral properties simultaneously R supervene upon God’s will and D supervene upon the natural properties of actions. Third, robust realism and theological stateism are in the same boat regarding intrinsic value once we distinguish between R and D-supervenience. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue God and Ethics)
11 pages, 222 KB  
Article
God’s Will as the Foundation of Morality: A Medieval Historical Perspective
by Janine Idziak
Religions 2021, 12(5), 362; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12050362 - 19 May 2021
Viewed by 4719
Abstract
Theological voluntarism places the foundation of morality in the will of God. The formulation of such a thesis warrants further refinement. Different formulations of theological voluntarism were put forward in medieval philosophical theology involving the relation of God’s will to the divine intellect [...] Read more.
Theological voluntarism places the foundation of morality in the will of God. The formulation of such a thesis warrants further refinement. Different formulations of theological voluntarism were put forward in medieval philosophical theology involving the relation of God’s will to the divine intellect (reason) in determining ethical status. The fourteenth century Franciscan Andrew of Neufchateau maintained a purely voluntaristic theory in which it is God’s will alone (and not the divine intellect) that determines ethical status. Subsequently Pierre d’Ailly worked with a divine will which is identical with the divine intellect in a strong sense while still maintaining that it is properly assigned to the divine will to be an obligatory law. Later, Jean Gerson, a student of Pierre d’Ailly, spoke explicitly of God’s will and reason together as involved in God’s activity in the ethical realm. In this paper, we set out these three different formulations of theological voluntarism, tracing the evolution of medieval formulations of theological voluntarism. Although the paper is historical in nature, we conclude with some reflections on how contemporary philosophers and theologians interested in theological voluntarism might profit from study of this historical literature. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue God, Ethics, and Christian Traditions)
8 pages, 192 KB  
Article
Does Darwall’s Morality of Accountability Require Moral Realism? (And Would It Be Strengthened by Adding God to the Story?)
by C. Stephen Evans
Religions 2021, 12(3), 187; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12030187 - 11 Mar 2021
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 4048
Abstract
Stephen Darwall has developed an account of moral obligations as grounded in “second-personal reasons,” which was developed in conversation with early modern “theological voluntarists” who were divine command theorists. For Darwall, morality does not require accountability to God; humans as autonomous moral agents [...] Read more.
Stephen Darwall has developed an account of moral obligations as grounded in “second-personal reasons,” which was developed in conversation with early modern “theological voluntarists” who were divine command theorists. For Darwall, morality does not require accountability to God; humans as autonomous moral agents are the source of moral obligations. In this paper, I try to show that Darwall is vulnerable to some objections made against divine command theories. There are responses Darwall could make that have parallels to those given by divine command theorists. However, those responses require moral realism, while Darwall’s project is often seen as being inspired by metaethical constructivism. Finally, I suggest that Darwall’s view could be further strengthened by the addition of God to the story. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue God, Ethics, and Christian Traditions)
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