Search Results (36)

This review provides a systematic critique of the debate between two paradigms in the philosophy of mind—the Naturalist–Externalist Research Program (NERP) and the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program (PIRP)—with particular focus on Uriah Kriegel’s reconciliation project. Following Kriegel’s view, attention is given to rational agents’ awareness of their mental states—a key issue since most current artificial intelligence systems aim to model rational thinking and action. Naturalist accounts derive mental content from brain activity and environmental interaction, emphasizing a constitutive dependence of the former on the latter. In contrast, phenomenological theories assert that the object of mental states is an internal semblance presented to the subject. Within this framework, I maintain that Kriegel attempts to naturalize mental content within the framework of a Same Order theory, but this limits his ability to demonstrate that intentionality is grounded in consciousness in the sense of the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. Compounding this issue, the idea that the mind arises from manipulating representations has been challenged by dynamical approaches to cognitive science, yet advanced representational models persist, often simulating phenomenological qualities through forms of internal data organization. Methodologically, the approach is primarily comparative and reconstructive, focusing on the structural tensions and theoretical commitments that distinguish NERP and PIRP. Full article

Communal Reverie, a group practice designed to facilitate the cultivation of collective imaginal attunement, has been framed a “collective wisdom technology.” It draws significant influence from the philosophy and practical protocols informing Collective Presencing, a modality of “we-space” practice developed by Ria Baeck. It is further informed by philosophical, mystical, and psychological traditions that advance various conceptions concerning the autonomous imagination’s value, both as a source of knowledge and a crucial element in transformative practice. Communal Reverie, to my present knowledge, is a distinctive practice modality insofar as it applies the technique of sourcing in service of a collective modality of imaginal encounter. The aspirations guiding the continual refinement of Communal Reverie’s theoretical and practical foundations are informed, most fundamentally, by thought traditions emphasizing engagement with the imaginal as a means toward advancing the evolutionary emergence of a modality of consciousness capable of assuming a co-creative and participatory role in relationship with transrational influences of a spiritual nature. The achievement of such participation may, furthermore, entail fundamental transformations in the phenomenal experience of both selfhood and time. Full article

Drawing upon a meticulous delineation of pure consciousness’s fundamental and necessary features—including unstructuredness, maximal simplicity, selflessness, awareness as such, zero-perspective, and the absence of specific phenomenal qualities—this article asserts that a full-fledged experience of pure consciousness is attainable within the psychedelic state. Critically, this psychedelic manifestation is argued to be phenomenologically indistinguishable in its core properties from pure consciousness accessed via meditative practices. Consequently, this finding not only problematizes, but actually directly refutes Metzinger’s thesis, which posits meditation as the sole “best and most natural candidate” for achieving pure consciousness. Moreover, this work champions a soft phenomenological perennialism. This perspective navigates a middle ground between rigid perennialism and radical constructivism, underscoring the identical phenomenological core shared by all pure consciousness experiences, including those induced by psychedelics. This exploration further posits that psychedelic pure consciousness experiences can yield significant epistemic insights into the fundamental nature of consciousness, the self, and reality. Beyond this, a systematic phenomenology of pure consciousness is demonstrated to offer profound contributions to our understanding of certain religious–spiritual concepts such as God. Nonetheless, while acknowledging naturalistic critiques, a significant caveat is issued: extreme caution is warranted regarding religious–spiritual interpretations gleaned from such phenomenologies. Ultimately, the paper underscores the burgeoning importance of a spiritual naturalistic interpretation of pure consciousness. Full article

In this conceptual review, we explore how alterations in the configuration and expression of the three core aspects of experiential Selfhood—‘Self,’ ‘Me’, and ‘I’—both reflect and shape an individual’s susceptibility to neuropsychopathology. Drawing on empirical neurophenomenological evidence and theoretical insights, we examine a range of psychiatric and neurological disorders through the lens of the Selfhood triumvirate. Our findings indicate that, despite variations in the expression of Selfhood aspects across different pathologies, their proportional configuration remains remarkably stable in most conditions, with the ‘Self’ aspect consistently dominant, followed by the ‘Me’ aspect, and finally the ‘I’ aspect. This stability suggests a fundamental neurophenomenological hierarchy in Selfhood organization, which seems to be disrupted only in extreme cases such as vegetative (unresponsive) states and also schizophrenia. Ultimately, we propose that all neuropsychopathologies are best understood as disorders of Selfhood, where disruptions in the dynamic balance and configuration of the ‘Self’, ‘Me’, and ‘I’ aspects accompany neurophenomenological manifestations in distinct dysfunctions and pathologies. Full article

Theories of consciousness grounded in neuroscience must explain the phenomenal binding problem, e.g., how micro-units of information are combined to create the macro-scale conscious experience common to human phenomenology. An example is how single ‘pixels’ of a visual scene are experienced as a single holistic image in the ‘mind’s eye’, rather than as individual, separate, and massively parallel experiences, corresponding perhaps to individual neuron activations, neural ensembles, or foveal saccades, any of which could conceivably deliver identical functionality from an information processing point of view. There are multiple contested candidate solutions to the phenomenal binding problem. This paper explores how the metaphysical infrastructure of Integrated Information Theory (IIT) v4.0 can provide a distinctive solution. The solution—that particular entities aggregable from multiple units (‘complexes’) define existence—might work in a static picture, but introduces issues in a dynamic system. We ask what happens to our phenomenal self as the main complex moves around a biological neural network. Our account of conscious entities developing through time leads to an apparent dilemma for IIT theorists between non-local entity transitions and contiguous selves: the ‘dynamic entity evolution problem’. As well as specifying the dilemma, we describe three ways IIT might dissolve the dilemma before it gains traction. Clarifying IIT’s position on the phenomenal binding problem, potentially underpinned with novel empirical or theoretical research, helps researchers understand IIT and assess its plausibility. We see our paper as contributing to IIT’s current research emphasis on the shift from static to dynamic analysis. Full article

In recent decades, the debate on consciousness has been conditioned by the idea of bottom-up emergence, which has influenced scientific research and raised a few obstacles to any attempt to bridge the explanatory gap. The analysis and explanation of vision conducted according to the accredited methodologies of scientific research in terms of physical stimuli, objectivity, methods, and explanation has encountered the resistance of subjective experience. Moreover, original Gestalt research into vision has generally been merged with cognitive neuroscience. Experimental phenomenology, building on the legacy of Gestalt psychology, has obtained new results in the fields of amodal contours and color stratifications, light perception, figurality, space, so-called perceptual illusions, and subjective space and time. Notwithstanding the outcomes and the impulse given to neuroscientific analyses, the research carried out around these phenomena has never directly confronted the issue of what it means to be conscious or, in other words, the nature of consciousness as self-referentiality. Research has tended to focus on the percept. Therefore, explaining the non-detachability of parts in subjective experience risks becoming a sort of impossible achievement, similar to that of Baron Munchausen, who succeeds in escaping unharmed from this quicksand by pulling himself out by his hair. This paper addresses how to analyze seeing as an undivided whole by discussing several basic dimensions of phenomenal consciousness on an experimental basis and suggesting an alternative way of escaping this quicksand. This mind-set reversal also sheds light on the organization and dependence relationships between phenomenology, psychophysics, and neuroscience. Full article

Somatosensory tactile experience is a key aspect of our interaction with the environment. It is involved in object manipulation, in the planning and control of actions and, in its affective components, in the relationships with other individuals. It is also a foundational component of body awareness. An intriguing aspect of sensory perception in general and tactile perception in particular is the way in which stimulation comes to consciousness. Indeed, although being aware of something seems a rather self-evident and monolithic aspect of our mental states, sensory awareness may be in fact modulated by many different processes that impact on the mere stimulation of the skin, including the way in which we perceive our bodies as belonging to us. In this review, we first took into consideration the pathological conditions of absence of phenomenal experience of touch, in the presence of implicit processing, as initial models for understanding the neural bases of conscious tactile experience. Subsequently, we discussed cases of tactile illusions both in normal subjects and in brain-damaged patients which help to understand which high-order processes impact tactile awareness. Finally, we discussed the observations reported in the review in light of some influential models of touch and body representation. Full article

The question of what generates conscious experience has mesmerized thinkers since the dawn of humanity, yet its origins remain a mystery. The topic of consciousness has gained traction in recent years, thanks to the development of large language models that now arguably pass the Turing test, an operational test for intelligence. However, intelligence and consciousness are not related in obvious ways, as anyone who suffers from a bad toothache can attest—pain generates intense feelings and absorbs all our conscious awareness, yet nothing particularly intelligent is going on. In the hard sciences, this topic is frequently met with skepticism because, to date, no protocol to measure the content or intensity of conscious experiences in an observer-independent manner has been agreed upon. Here, we present a novel proposal: Conscious experience arises whenever a quantum mechanical superposition forms. Our proposal has several implications: First, it suggests that the structure of the superposition determines the qualia of the experience. Second, quantum entanglement naturally solves the binding problem, ensuring the unity of phenomenal experience. Finally, a moment of agency may coincide with the formation of a superposition state. We outline a research program to experimentally test our conjecture via a sequence of quantum biology experiments. Applying these ideas opens up the possibility of expanding human conscious experience through brain–quantum computer interfaces. Full article

The concept of the brain’s own time and space is central to many models and theories that aim to explain how the brain generates consciousness. For example, the temporo-spatial theory of consciousness postulates that the brain implements its own inner time and space for conscious processing of the outside world. Furthermore, our perception and cognition of time and space can be different from actual time and space. This study presents a mechanistic model of mutually connected processes that encode phenomenal representations of space and time. The model is used to elaborate the binding mechanism between two sets of processes representing internal space and time, respectively. Further, a stochastic version of the model is developed to investigate the interplay between binding strength and noise. Spectral entropy is used to characterize noise effects on the systems of interacting processes when the binding strength between them is varied. The stochastic modeling results reveal that the spectral entropy values for strongly bound systems are similar to those for weakly bound or even decoupled systems. Thus, the analysis performed in this study allows us to conclude that the binding mechanism is noise-resilient. Full article

The Nibbānasukha-sutta contains Sāriputta’s statement that the pleasure (sukha) of nibbāna lies in the fact that nothing is experienced (vedayita). This statement may be seen as complementary to the proclamation in the Kaḷāra-sutta that all that is experienced is unpleasant (dukkha). In this paper, I attempt to reconstruct the ideas serving as a philosophical backdrop to these radical and seemingly counterintuitive claims. I use a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, re-examining several key Nikāya passages, as well as drawing on modern cognitive science and philosophy of mind. I suggest that vedayita and the closely related concept of the five khandhas (and in particular viññāṇa) refer to various aspects of the type of consciousness whose content is phenomenal, introspectable, reportable and may be integrated into memory. I suggest that such consciousness is not a constant feature of our being engaged in the world and that its absence does not entail insentience or being incognizant. I hypothesize that a relatively low frequency of occurrences of such consciousness in the states known as absorption or flow contributes to their pleasurable nature and the altered sense of the passage of time and selfhood. I attempt to explain how the presence or absence of such consciousness is related to the states of dukkha or sukha, with particular focus on the role played by saṅkhāra. I also discuss the limits of introspection as a means of understanding what exactly makes experiences pleasurable or painful, and consider the possibility of non-introspectable forms of pleasure. In conclusion, I suggest that psychological transformation in early Buddhism is connected with a radical change of perspective, which involves no longer identifying with one’s own consciousness. Full article

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory’s most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just “operational”. However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT’s idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT’s idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT’s realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one’s own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues. Full article

It has been shown that three-dimensional self-assembled multicellular structures derived from human pluripotent stem cells show electrical activity similar to EEG. More recently, neurons were successfully embedded in digital game worlds. The biologically inspired neural network (BNN), expressing human cortical cells, was able to show internal modification and learn the task at hand (predicting the trajectory of a digital ball while moving a digital paddle). In other words, the system allowed to read motor information and write sensory data into cell cultures. In this article, we discuss Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) theories, and their capacity to predict or even allow for consciousness in a BNN. We found that Information Integration Theory (IIT) is the only NCC that offers the possibility for a BNN to show consciousness, since the Φ value in the BNN is >0. In other words, the recording of real-time neural activity responding to environmental stimuli. IIT argues that any system capable of integrating information will have some degree of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that the pattern of activity appearing in the BNN, with increased density of sensory information leading to better performance, implies that the BNN could be conscious. This may have profound implications from a psychological, philosophical, and ethical perspective. Full article

Consciousness and intelligence are properties that can be misunderstood as necessarily dependent. The term artificial intelligence and the kind of problems it managed to solve in recent years has been shown as an argument to establish that machines experience some sort of consciousness. Following Russell’s analogy, if a machine can do what a conscious human being does, the likelihood that the machine is conscious increases. However, the social implications of this analogy are catastrophic. Concretely, if rights are given to entities that can solve the kind of problems that a neurotypical person can, does the machine have potentially more rights than a person that has a disability? For example, the autistic syndrome disorder spectrum can make a person unable to solve the kind of problems that a machine solves. We believe the obvious answer is no, as problem-solving does not imply consciousness. Consequently, we will argue in this paper how phenomenal consciousness, at least, cannot be modeled by computational intelligence and why machines do not possess phenomenal consciousness, although they can potentially develop a higher computational intelligence than human beings. In order to do so, we try to formulate an objective measure of computational intelligence and study how it presents in human beings, animals, and machines. Analogously, we study phenomenal consciousness as a dichotomous variable and how it is distributed in humans, animals, and machines. Full article

Human brain organoids provide a remarkable opportunity to model prenatal human brain biology in vitro by recapitulating features of in utero molecular, cellular and systems biology. An ethical concern peculiar to human brain organoids is whether they are or could become capable of supporting sentience through the experience of pain or pleasure and/or consciousness, including higher cognitive abilities such as self-awareness. Identifying the presence of these traits is complicated by several factors, beginning with consciousness—which is a highly contested concept among neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers and so there is no agreed definition. Secondly, given human brain organoids are disembodied, there is no practical way to identify evidence of consciousness as we might in humans or animals. What would count as evidence of organoid consciousness is an emerging area of research. To address concerns about consciousness and human brain organoids, in this paper we clarify the morally relevant aspects of human consciousness, phenomenal experience and embodied development and explore the empirical basis of consciousness to develop a defensible framework for informed decision-making on the moral significance and utility of brain organoids, which can also guide regulation and future research of these novel biological systems. Full article

In the last 20 years, several contributions have been published on what concerns the conceptual and empirical connections between self-processes. However, only a limited number of publications addressed the viability of those processes to characterize mental health in neurotypical subjects with a normative pattern of neurodevelopment. Furthermore, even fewer experiments focused explicitly on the complexity of studying neurotypical phenomenal data. On the one hand, this normative pattern is commonly associated with mental health and a multifaceted self-concept and well-being. On the other hand, well-being is often related to a healthy cognitive life. However, how such intricate and complex relation between self-processes is established in neurotypical subjects requires further evidence. The novelty of this work is thus studying the first-person experience, which is correlated with the mental events aroused by a cognitive behavioral intervention. The prior methodology that led to the complete characterization of a neurotypical sample was already published by the authors, although the materials, the methods, the sample screening, and the sample size study required further explanation and exploration. This paper’s innovation is hence the phenomenological assessment of subjects’ self-regulation, which is used for mental health profiling, providing the basis for subsequent molecular typing. For that matter, a convenience sample of 128 (19–25-year-old) neurotypical young adults, healthy university students at the University of Lisbon, non-medicated and with no serious, uncontrolled, or chronic diseases, are characterized according to their cognitive functioning and self-concept. The procedure comprised (i) a mental status examination (psychological assessment) and (ii) a psychological intervention, i.e., a single cognitive behavioral intervention (intervention protocol). The psychological assessment was a standardized and structured clinical interview, which comprised the use of 4 psychological scales complementary to the classical Mental Status Examination (MSE). The intervention protocol applied a combined exercise of psychophysical training and autobiographical-self memory-recalling. The results permitted identifying and isolating four different subgroups (self awareness, self consciousness, reflective self, and pre-reflective self) in neurotypical subjects with discrete self-processes. The outcome of this study is screening four different aspects of self-reflection and the isolation between various forms of self-directed attention and their interconnections in these four mental health strata. The practical implication of this study is to fulfill an a priori pre-molecular assessment of self-regulation with separate cognitive characteristics. The reliability of these mental strata, their distinct neurophysiology, and discrete molecular fingerprint will be tested in a future publication by in silico characterization, total protein profiling, and simultaneous immunodetection of the neuropeptide and neuroimmune response of the same participants. Full article