Search Results (5)

Honesty is essential for both individual development and the functioning of society. Although prior research has identified various factors that shape honest behavior, relatively little is known about whether adolescents’ honesty can be influenced by subtle morality-related cues, particularly among adolescents. The present study investigated whether exposure to verbal and visual morality-related cues would increase honest behavior in middle school students. Two behavioral experiments were conducted, each with 120 middle school students (aged 13–18) as participants. In Experiment 1, participants completed a Chinese idiom -unscrambling task with either the ethics-related or neutral characters. In Experiment 2, participants completed a visual cuing task involving either moral exemplar images or neutral images. In both experiments, honest behaviors were assessed via self-reported outcomes in a computerized coin-tossing task. Across both experiments, participants primed with morality-related words (Experiment 1) or moral exemplars (Experiment 2) demonstrated significantly more honest behavior in the coin toss task than those in the control group. These findings suggest that subtle verbal and visual morality-related cues can increase honest behavior in adolescents. The present study provides behavioral evidence that morality-related cues may shape honesty-related responding in adolescence and offers practical implications for promoting moral development through subtle contextual influences. Full article

The present study examines the extent to which models of honesty predict the magnitude of current or future self-serving assessment of performance in Middle Eastern students, a population often neglected in the extant literature. Specifically, the study asks whether Middle Eastern students’ predictions regarding future performance rectify prior self-serving inflated assessment, thereby restoring honesty, or glorify it through enhanced optimism, thereby discounting prior dishonesty. In this study, students believed that their self-assessment of performance would be either anonymous, allowing them to cheat, or identifiable. Before self-assessment, participants were exposed to reminders of honesty or dishonesty (i.e., priming conditions) or neutral reminders (i.e., the control condition). In agreement with the self-concept maintenance model and evidence of earlier studies conducted in the Western world, students inflated their self-assessments very little, and even less when presented with either secular or religious reminders of honesty. However, reminders were ineffective on participants’ predictions of future performance, which were biased in favor of optimism. The study offers concrete evidence on the presumed generality of a theoretical model of ethical conduct while it also adds evidence on its limitations. Full article

Fairness is a key expectation in social interactions. Its violation leads to adverse reactions, including non-cooperation and dishonesty. The present study aimed to examine how (1) fair (unfair) treatment may drive cooperation (defection) and honesty (self-serving dishonesty), (2) dishonesty primes further moral disengagement and reduced cooperation, and (3) dishonesty weakens (substitutes) the effect of fairness on cooperation. The prisoner’s dilemma (Experiment 1 and 2) and die-rolling task (Experiment 2) were employed for capturing cooperation and dishonest behaviors, respectively. To manipulate perceived unfairness, participants were randomly assigned to play the prisoner’s dilemma game, where players either choose more cooperation (fair condition) or defection (unfair condition). Results of Experiment 1 (n = 102) suggested that participants perceive higher unfairness and behave less cooperatively when the other player primarily chooses defection. Results of Exp. 2 (n = 240) (a) confirmed Exp. 1 results, (b) showed that players in the unfair condition also show more self-serving dishonest behavior, and (c) that dishonest behavior weakens the effect of fairness on cooperation. Together, these results extended previous work by highlighting the self-serving lies when the opponent is fair trigger higher cooperation, presumably as a means to alleviate self-reflective moral emotions or restore justice. Full article

The objective of this present study is to use choice experiments and an extensive cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to investigate the feasibility of installing two advanced water treatments in Cheongju waterworks in South Korea. The study uses latent class attribute non-attendance models in a choice experiment setting in order to estimate the benefits of the two water treatments. Moreover, it explores strategies to mitigate potential hypothetical bias as this has been the strongest criticism brought to stated preference methods to date. Hypothetical bias is the difference between what people state in a survey they would be willing to pay and what they would actually pay in a real situation. The study employs cheap talk with a budget constraint reminder and honesty priming with the latter showing more evidence of reducing potential hypothetical bias. The lower bound of the median WTP (willingness to pay) for installing a new advanced water treatment system is approximately $2 US/month, similar to the average expenditures for bottled water per household in South Korea. These lower bounds were found using bootstrapping and simulations. The CBA shows that one of the two treatments, granular activated carbon is more robust to sensitivity analyses, making this the recommendation of the study. Full article

We report results from a large online randomised tax experiment in Guatemala. The trial involves short messages and choices presented to taxpayers as part of a CAPTCHA pop-up window immediately before they file a tax return, with the aim of priming honest declarations. In total our sample includes 627,242 taxpayers and 3,232,430 tax declarations made over four months. Treatments include: honesty declaration; information about public goods; information about penalties for dishonesty, questions allowing a taxpayer to choose which public good they think tax money should be spent on; or questions allowing a taxpayer to state a view on the penalty for not declaring honestly. We find no impact of any of these treatments on the average amount of tax declared. We discuss potential causes for this null effect and implications for ‘online nudges’ around honesty priming. Full article