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Keywords = cubic Pell equation

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16 pages, 321 KB  
Article
An Improved Attack on the RSA Variant Based on Cubic Pell Equation
by Mohammed Rahmani, Abderrahmane Nitaj, Abdelhamid Tadmori and Mhammed Ziane
Cryptography 2025, 9(2), 40; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography9020040 - 6 Jun 2025
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2057
Abstract
In this paper, we present a novel method to solve trivariate polynomial modular equations of the form x(y2+Ay+B)+z0 (mod e). Our approach integrates Coppersmith’s method [...] Read more.
In this paper, we present a novel method to solve trivariate polynomial modular equations of the form x(y2+Ay+B)+z0 (mod e). Our approach integrates Coppersmith’s method with lattice basis reduction to efficiently solve the former equation. Several variants of RSA are based on the cubic Pell equation x3+fy3+f2z33fxyz1 (mod N), where f is a cubic nonresidue modulus N=pq. In these variants, the public exponent e and the private exponent d satisfy ed1 (mod ψ(N)) with ψ(N)=p2+p+1q2+q+1. Moreover, d can be written in the form dv0z0 (mod ψ(N)) with any z0 satisfying gcd(z0,ψ(N))=1. In this paper, we apply our method to attack the variants when dv0z0 (mod ψ(N)) and when |z0| and |v0| are suitably small. We also show that our method significantly improves the bounds of the private exponents d of the previous attacks on the variants, particularly in the scenario of small private exponents and in the scenarios where partial information about the primes is available. Full article
12 pages, 305 KB  
Article
Cryptanalysis of RSA-Variant Cryptosystem Generated by Potential Rogue CA Methodology
by Zahari Mahad, Muhammad Rezal Kamel Ariffin, Amir Hamzah Abd. Ghafar and Nur Raidah Salim
Symmetry 2022, 14(8), 1498; https://doi.org/10.3390/sym14081498 - 22 Jul 2022
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 2149
Abstract
Rogue certificate authorities (RCA) are third-party entities that intentionally produce key pairs that satisfy publicly known security requirements but contain weaknesses only known to the RCA. This work analyses the Murru–Saettone RSA variant scheme that obtains its key pair from a potential RCA [...] Read more.
Rogue certificate authorities (RCA) are third-party entities that intentionally produce key pairs that satisfy publicly known security requirements but contain weaknesses only known to the RCA. This work analyses the Murru–Saettone RSA variant scheme that obtains its key pair from a potential RCA methodology. The Murru–Saettone scheme is based on the cubic Pell equation x3+ry3+r2z33rxyz=1. The public, e, and private, d key generation process uses the secret parameter ψ=(p2+p+1)(q2+q+1) in place of the standard Euler–phi function ϕ(N)=(p1)(q1), where ed1(modψ). We prove that, upon obtaining an approximation of ψ, we are able to identify the provided key pair that was maliciously provided even if the private key d size is approximate to ψ. In fact, we are able to factor the modulus N=pq. Full article
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