Sign in to use this feature.

Years

Between: -

Subjects

remove_circle_outline

Journals

Article Types

Countries / Regions

Search Results (5)

Search Parameters:
Keywords = Roman Stoicism

Order results
Result details
Results per page
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:
17 pages, 366 KB  
Article
Deo Parere Libertas Est: Stoic Echoes in Wittgenstein’s Conception of Destiny
by Begoña Ramón Cámara
Religions 2026, 17(1), 26; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17010026 - 25 Dec 2025
Viewed by 756
Abstract
My aim in this paper is to examine some aspects of the relationship between the concepts of God, destiny, and happiness in Wittgenstein’s writings. The analysis is done—to use an expression of the philosopher’s own—by contrast with and against the background of Roman [...] Read more.
My aim in this paper is to examine some aspects of the relationship between the concepts of God, destiny, and happiness in Wittgenstein’s writings. The analysis is done—to use an expression of the philosopher’s own—by contrast with and against the background of Roman Stoicism’s views on this matter, mainly Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. The different uses of the concept of God that appeared in their texts are analysed, and the relationship between the notions of destiny, self-sufficiency, and happiness is clarified. Several similarities between Wittgenstein and Roman Stoics are traced, among others, those relating to the sense of the principle of distinction between what depends on oneself and what does not, the primacy of inner life as an absolute alternative to the impossible mastery of the world of facts, and the ideas of a serene acceptance of adversity and of happiness as peace of mind. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
20 pages, 327 KB  
Article
The Greek Philosophical Sources in Cicero’s De Fato
by Pedro José Grande Sánchez
Religions 2025, 16(7), 824; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16070824 - 24 Jun 2025
Viewed by 3125
Abstract
Cicero’s treatise De Fato, written during the political crisis of the Roman Republic, is a fundamental work for understanding the development of philosophical thought on fate and free will in antiquity. Influenced by Academic Skepticism, Cicero aimed to critically examine the positions [...] Read more.
Cicero’s treatise De Fato, written during the political crisis of the Roman Republic, is a fundamental work for understanding the development of philosophical thought on fate and free will in antiquity. Influenced by Academic Skepticism, Cicero aimed to critically examine the positions of the major Greek philosophical schools, such as Stoicism and Epicureanism, regarding causality and the determination of future events. The concept of fate, however, was not only a philosophical matter but also a religious one in antiquity, deeply intertwined with practices such as divination and the belief in the gods’ influence over the cosmos. This study explores the historical and philosophical context in which De Fato emerged, as well as the Greek sources that shaped Cicero’s arguments. It analyzes the debate between the Stoics and Epicureans on fate, highlighting how Cicero adopts, adapts, and critiques their ideas. Additionally, it examines the structure and method of his work, identifying the three main approaches—physical, logical, and ethical—that he employs to address the question of fate. Finally, this study considers how Cicero’s treatment of fate reflects not only philosophical but also religious concerns, especially regarding human freedom and the divine role in shaping the future. The enduring influence of De Fato on philosophical tradition and its relevance to contemporary discussions on human freedom is also considered. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fate in Ancient Greek Philosophy and Religion)
21 pages, 413 KB  
Article
Love’s Limits in Paul of Tarsus and Seneca the Younger
by Brendan Case
Religions 2024, 15(10), 1169; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15101169 - 25 Sep 2024
Viewed by 2915
Abstract
This paper argues that we can get a better grip on the divergences and convergences between Paul and Seneca on the ethics of love than those on offer in the large and growing literature comparing the two by distinguishing their attitudes to two [...] Read more.
This paper argues that we can get a better grip on the divergences and convergences between Paul and Seneca on the ethics of love than those on offer in the large and growing literature comparing the two by distinguishing their attitudes to two broad and conceptually distinct families of love, which Tyler VanderWeele has described as “contributory love” (which desires that the good of the beloved be promoted for its own sake) and “unitive love” (which regards the beloved as a good to be enjoyed in one’s own life). I argue that debates over whether Seneca and Paul had the more universal ethic of neighbor love are largely a distraction; the two are fundamentally in agreement about the scope of love, although Paul’s thinking in this area is shaped in fundamental ways by his conviction that the whole cosmos is defined to be eventually and finally united and so conformed to the resurrected and glorified Christ. Rather, Paul’s true difference from Seneca on the ethics of love lies instead in the importance he affords to unitive love; for Paul, the flourishing life does not consist simply in virtuous activity but also requires appropriate union with one’s beloveds, paradigmatically with God in Christ and with Christ’s body, the church. Seneca and Paul would each have accepted Sigmund Freud’s observation that “we are never so defenseless against suffering as when we love”. Seneca, however, would have taken it as a caution against attachments to anything whose loss might cause us to suffer, while Paul, by contrast, would have taken it as a statement of our condemnation to suffering “in this present evil age” (Gal. 1:4), in which we must love what we will inevitably lose. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Religions and Theologies)
15 pages, 497 KB  
Article
A Stoic Reading of Internal Obedience in Romans 1:18–2:29
by Laurie A. Wilson and Isaac D. Blois
Religions 2023, 14(5), 579; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14050579 - 26 Apr 2023
Viewed by 4200
Abstract
Romans 1:18-2:29 connects with Stoic philosophy in a way that would be unmistakable to a Gentile audience. While acknowledging the Hellenistic tone of the passage, this paper focuses on the Stoic elements of natural law that were broadly recognized in Rome. Particularly, Cicero’s [...] Read more.
Romans 1:18-2:29 connects with Stoic philosophy in a way that would be unmistakable to a Gentile audience. While acknowledging the Hellenistic tone of the passage, this paper focuses on the Stoic elements of natural law that were broadly recognized in Rome. Particularly, Cicero’s speeches, rhetorical handbooks, and philosophical treatises provide a comprehensive account of the connections between Hellenistic philosophy and Roman law and declamation. Although no direct evidence exists to show that Paul had read Cicero, these texts reveal the culture of the Roman Christians to whom Paul was writing. Key concepts of natural law appear in Romans that contextualize Paul’s message on internal obedience in 2:27-29, although he reworks them. Paul emphasizes spirit ‘πνεῦμα’ as the generating force of obedience. Two interpretations of πνεῦμα echo Stoic perspectives as the intent opposed to the letter of the law and as the inward motivation of the person obeying the law. The third interpretation as a foreshadowing of the Holy Spirit would be new for Paul’s Roman audience. This paper demonstrates that by incorporating Stoic elements on natural law, Paul presents the central significance of internal obedience in a way that would be understandable to his Christ-believing auditors and readers in Rome. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Biblical Texts and Traditions: Paul’s Letters)
14 pages, 795 KB  
Article
Education for the Sustainable Global Citizen: What Can We Learn from Stoic Philosophy and Freirean Environmental Pedagogies?
by Kai Whiting, Leonidas Konstantakos, Greg Misiaszek, Edward Simpson and Luis Gabriel Carmona
Educ. Sci. 2018, 8(4), 204; https://doi.org/10.3390/educsci8040204 - 19 Nov 2018
Cited by 25 | Viewed by 17437
Abstract
In support of sustainable development, the United Nations (UN) launched its Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) with the aims of accelerating progress towards universal access to education, good quality learning and the fostering of global citizenship. This paper explores how and to what [...] Read more.
In support of sustainable development, the United Nations (UN) launched its Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) with the aims of accelerating progress towards universal access to education, good quality learning and the fostering of global citizenship. This paper explores how and to what extent Stoic virtue ethics and critical Freirean ecopedagogies can advance the UN’s vision for progressive educational systems with transformative societal effects. We propose an integrated solution that provides ecopedagogical concepts a more robust philosophical foundation whilst also offering Stoicism additional tools to tackle 21st-century problems, such as climate change and environmental degradation. The result of the paper is the preliminary theoretical underpinnings of an educational framework that encompasses planetary-level concerns and offers a fuller expression of the terms “sustainable development” and “global citizen”. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Back to TopTop