Search Results (4)

In a traditional electronic auction, the centralized auctioneer and decentralized bidders are in an asymmetric structure, where the auctioneer has more ability to decide the auction result. This asymmetric auction structure is not fair to the participants and not suitable for data auctions in the Internet of Things (IoT). The blockchain-based auction system, with participant equality and fairness, is typically symmetrical and particularly suitable for IoT data sharing. However, when applied to IoT data sharing in reality, it faces privacy and efficiency problems. In this context, how to guarantee privacy and break the inherent performance bottleneck of blockchain is still a major challenge. In this paper, a consensus-based distributed auction scheme is proposed for data sharing, which enforces privacy preservation and collusion resistance. A reverse auction-based decentralized data trading model is introduced to solve the trust problem without a centralized auctioneer, where bidders reach consensus on the auction result. Specifically, we devise a differentially private auction mechanism to incentivize data owners to participate in data sharing. An effective hybrid consensus algorithm is constructed among bidders to reach consensus on the auction result with improved security and efficiency. Theoretical analysis shows that the proposed scheme ensures the properties of privacy preservation, incentive compatibility and collusion resistance. Experimental results reveal that the proposed mechanism guarantees the data sharing efficiency and has certain scalability. Full article

With the development of e-commerce, the electronic auction is attracting the attention of many people. Many Internet companies, such as eBay and Yahoo!, have launched online auction systems. Many researchers have studied the security problems of electronic auction systems, but few of them are multi-attribute-based. In 2014, Shi proposed a provable secure, sealed-bid, and multi-attribute auction protocol based on the semi-honest model. We evaluated this protocol and found that it has some design weaknesses and is vulnerable to the illegal operations of buyers, which results in unfairness. In this paper, we improved this protocol by replacing the Paillier’s cryptosystem with the elliptic curve discrete (ECC), and we designed a novel, online, and multi-attribute reverse-auction system using the semi-honest model. In our system, sellers’ identities are not revealed to the buyers, and the buyers cannot conduct illegal operations that may compromise the fairness of the auction. Full article

The innovation of construction procurement by means of electronic reverse auctions is a controversial subject of discussion among both researchers and practitioners. This paper consolidates and critically discusses current knowledge concerning the adoption and use of electronic reverse auctions in the light of specific features of the construction industry. A systematic literature review has been employed to select papers indexed in Scopus and Web of Science databases. The findings of the study indicate that studies are addressing especially five main areas, i.e., suitability of electronic reverse auction (eRA) for construction tenders, related drivers and barriers, ethical considerations, savings potential and bidding behavior, and bid distribution. Accordingly, the authors are suggesting three directions in which future research should focus on mutual interaction of electronic reverse auctions and long-term effects on construction project outcomes. Full article

The impact of reverse auction adoption has been a very important issue recently and is the subject of many studies. We are extending research results in the field of empirical studies by examining problems with reliability of methods for cost savings calculation of electronic reverse auction adoption in business processes. Reliability of savings proclamation in research studies or promotional materials is crucial for understanding real impact, benchmarking studies or comparison of several auction strategies from different auction environments. From our experience and empirical examinations, the problem for savings calculations is based on reliability and suitability of comparative or sometimes called expected price as the core factor for savings calculations when comparing with winning price. Our empirical study was based on real data from 1198 reverse auctions in Slovak commercial sector. On the base of our study, the most frequent strategy for electronic reverse auction adoption is multi-phase auction with first phase using sealed bid format. We have identified that reliability of using comparative prices as parameter for cost savings calculations vary according to different auction situations or settings and number of participants, auction volume and ratio of new participants are very sensitive for the reliability of savings calculations. Full article