Search Results (85)

This article defends the idea that evil is a notion dependent on social and cultural judgment, and that in our societies, it implies the idea of free will. There is no metaphysics of evil, but rather an anthropology, a myriad of specifically human incidences linked to situations, to good or evil intentions, to specific relationships such as wars, torture, violence, rape, cruelty, abuse, and so on. Their consequences involve suffering and death, sometimes deliberately. The anthropological question of evil differs from a metaphysical conception of human nature. Full article

This article studies the Histoire critique de Jésus Christ (1770), anonymously published by the German-French atheist Paul d’Holbach, who edited, expanded, and radicalized an anonymous clandestine manuscript concerning the life of Jesus and the beginnings of his religious movement. The article analyzes how d’Holbach’s book mocks the figure of Christ, portraying the new faith as a fraudulent enterprise full of false miracles and human weaknesses. In a work where irony, humor, and ridicule are constantly used as narrative strategies, the demonological world provides opportunities for displaying multiple corrosive arguments against Christianity. After reviewing d’Holbach’s philosophical position against the existence of demons, the article studies how the devils’ role in Christian theodicy, the notion of demonic possession, and Christ’s exorcisms are ridiculed in Histoire critique as examples of irrationality, fraud, and superstition. In addition, the article will point to a contemporary debate influencing d’Holbach’s views on what he saw as the connected territories of demonology, credulity, and religious fanaticism: the controversy surrounding the 18th century convulsionnaires of Saint-Médard. This heterodox religious movement, characterized by belief in a holy man and miraculous cures, proved invaluable to d’Holbach, who maliciously compared this episode to the beginnings of the Christian movement. Full article

As an extension of the Problem of Evil, the Problem of Hell poses further difficulties for the theodicy and eschatology of Western theist religions. This Problem of Hell, which presumes a transcendent divine entity, is, however, less applicable to an Eastern religious tradition like Buddhism. As a non-theist religion, Buddhism is not centered on an overpowering God but is predicated on the doctrine of kamma. Hell in Buddhism is conceived as one of the rebirth realms in the saṃsāra where beings are driven to by the force of their kamma. This kamma-based conception of hell has its own unique features, especially with regard to retribution and salvation. It also has a unique problem. As the doctrine of kamma is commonly understood as an endorsement of free will, it appears to conflict with another Buddhist doctrine, namely that of dependent origination, which is often interpreted as suggesting a deterministic worldview. This tension between doctrines of kamma and dependent origination is also known as the Buddhist free will problem, as it involves the controversy over the metaphysics of free will. Based on the Pāli scriptures, the essay tries to propose a compatibilist solution to the problem, defending kamma for the Buddhist hell. Full article

According to the free will theodicy of hell, the damned agent freely chooses to suffer in hell, or equivalently, to reject God. Against this view, Thomas Talbott argues that it is impossible for the agent to freely reject God because doing so is not rational. The aim of this essay is to critically respond to Talbott’s argument that it is not rational to reject God, rather than offering a full defense of the free will theodicy of hell itself. Drawing on recent work on rationality, I argue that not only does Talbott’s argument commit the fallacy of equivocation, but its two premises are also indefensible. I also explain what the reasons are for rejecting God: when the agent’s happiness consists of an incoherent combination of attitudes, it is both structurally and substantively rational for her to reject God. Full article

This article uses two case studies to promote the idea that British evangelicalism is sometimes marked by the denial of inconvenient facts. First, it takes a critical look at the apologetic impulse to explain away the problems that Scripture sometimes presents and to deny their affective dimensions. Second, it considers some of the abuse scandals of recent years and the way in which the evangelical church has tended to respond by covering them up and silencing the voices of accusers. This response appears to be motivated by the fear of quenching what appear to be successful ministries or of tarnishing the reputation of the church. The common theme that these examples share is that they are motivated by the instinct to present the gospel in the best possible light, but this appears to stem from an unarticulated functional atheism that does not truly trust God’s people to the Spirit. As a remedy, two linked practices are proposed, drawing on the work of Eugene Peterson and Cheryl Bridges-Johns. These are Sabbath-keeping as a means of rediscovering the primacy of God’s presence and work; and the re-enchantment of Scripture by means of a Pentecost imaginary, which offers the possibility for the transrational. Full article

This article aims to offer Yi Kwangsu’s The Heartless (Mujŏng, 1917), the first modern Korean novel, as an emblem of hybrid religiosity in colonial modernity that sheds light on an ambivalent alterity in the problem of hell in non-Western cultures. To the extent that the problem of hell in Christianity pertains to the question of why God allows evil to exist eternally, God’s omnipotent authority with justice and fairness beyond the grave is placed at the center of the inquiry into the ultimate standard of moral goodness the religious feasibility of which justifies the existence of sinners suffering eternal damnation in hell. But the co-existence of the omnipotent God and unrepentant sinners is not always questioned in the religiosity of hell in non-Western cultures. The Christian imaginary of hell in non-Western cultures often demarcates the question of God’s sovereignty from the sufferings of sinners in the problem of hell. Based on these observations, this article will investigate Yi’s narratives of hell in The Heartless, which are associated with Christianity but intertwined with his ethical demands for shaping a new individuality beyond the traditional hybrid religiosity of hell. Specifically, first, we will show that Yi’s Christian imaginary of hell is reformulated through the traditional imaginaries of hell in which, regardless of the existence of God’s sovereignty over the created order, the sufferings of sinners in hell function to secure social norms and orders. In doing so, we claim that the Christian imaginary of hell in The Heartless is relegated to a rhetorical means to beget the need for the self-awakening of the inner-self through which individual desires can be freed from the influences of Confucian morality as well as Christian theodicy. Second, in comparison with Lu Xun’s sympathetic relocation of Christian spirituality within the traditional Chinese imaginaries of hell in his longing for modern subjectivity, we explore Yi’s hybrid religiosity within colonial modernity, the vitality of which cannot be confined within the simple dichotomy between Western and non-Western cultures. At this juncture, the upshot of Yi’s hybrid religiosity within colonial modernity is that the theodicy of hell in Christianity can be displaced and thereby disenfranchised from the centrality of the search for a new individuality. Full article

This study examines how Ibn Arabi’s metaphysics can address key challenges in the contemporary philosophical debate on the problem of evil. John Mackie famously argues that the existence of an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil, suggesting that theism must relinquish one of these divine attributes to resolve this contradiction. Alvin Plantinga, through his Free Will Defense, demonstrates that no logical contradiction undermines the coherence of the theistic conception of God. Although Mackie concedes this point, he contends that Plantinga’s defense does not sufficiently explain why God permits evil. With the resolution of the logical problem of evil, the evidential problem has gained prominence in the theistic debate, where Plantinga’s defense remains inadequate. While Plantinga invites theists to explore potential theological reasons for God’s allowance of evil, he acknowledges that this approach may not yield strong philosophical results. In contrast, Ibn Arabi’s metaphysical framework offers a more comprehensive solution. By integrating ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics to establish a coherent relationship between God, the universe, and humanity, Ibn Arabi renders Mackie’s logical critique irrelevant. Furthermore, his approach fills the gaps left by Plantinga’s defense, offering a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between God and evil. Full article

This paper argues that reflections on evil and its origin formed part of philosophical inquiry already in the times of the Presocratics. It considers only those thinkers whose contribution to the issue may be characterised as noteworthy: Anaximander, the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, and the Atomists. It is undeniable that none of the Presocratics presented an articulate theory of evil or a theodicy; therefore, the suggestions presented here are bound to remain conjectural. Still, it is my conviction that their fragments contain significant ideas related to evil’s origins. Insofar as they turned their attention to the problem of evil, the Presocratics displayed the following tendencies: (a) they declined to ascribe the existence of evil to the will of the gods. Instead, (b) the emergence of badness was seen as instigated by the disruption of the primeval harmony (Anaximander), or (c) coeval opposed principles in constant struggle for dominance were posited, one of which was the cause of good, the other of evil (Pythagoreans and Empedocles). (d) Attempts were made to make good’s existence dependent on the existence of evil or to declare the latter illusory (Heraclitus and Parmenides). (e) Emphasis was placed on the moral agents’ personal responsibility for badness (Democritus). Full article

In this paper, I propose a defence against the problem of evil. This defence does not involve either free will or soul-making, but, rather, is intended as a replacement for the traditional theodicies. The defence will have two components: firstly, a proposal for why a good God would not intervene to eliminate the evil (natural or moral) in the world; and second, a proposal for why a good God would need to allow evil to exist in the world in the first place. I identify four desiderata for defences against the problem of evil and I argue that this new defence achieves all of these at least as well as traditional defences involving free will and/or soul-making. Full article

The main aim of this paper is to provide an account of Leibniz’s engagement with the doctrine of cosmic dualism in his Theodicy, i.e., the view that there are two distinct fundamental principles that are responsible for the existence of the created world, one good and the other evil. Leibniz’s discussion is primarily a response to arguments in favour of cosmic dualism that he finds in the writings of Pierre Bayle. However, in addition, he presents a genealogical argument that appears to be intended to provide reasons to reject the view. The paper also contains a critical discussion of Leibniz’s case, and finishes by drawing attention to some issues which arise that are worthy of further consideration. Full article

Throughout his correspondence and writings, Leibniz made a number of passing references to the religion of the Mohammadans (Islam) and to several Islamic commentators. Recent literature on these references has placed them in the context of Leibniz’s political and historical interests that largely reflect his Eurocentric prejudices. The purpose of this paper is to extract a more detailed and systematic view of Leibniz’s knowledge of and interest in the religion, through Leibniz’s remarks on Islam in relation to Christian doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, through the commentary of Maimonides and the Christian Averroists, and through a (partly speculative) comparison of three types of theodicy. The paper concludes that while Leibniz knew very little about Islam’s actual doctrines, and that he was subject to the prejudicial views of his time, he understood Islam, as he did Christianity, as largely in conformity with natural (rational) religion. At the same time, his interest in its specific doctrines was primarily instrumental, that is, as correctives to certain abusive practices and misunderstandings persisting within Christianity, which could then explain for him why Islam prevailed in the East. Full article

Leibniz’s jurisprudence and theory of natural law, which began development as early as the 1660s, has implications for his mature theodicy. In this essay, it is shown that based on an analysis of a few key jurisprudential texts, the Nova Methodus (1666), the Elementa Juris Naturalis (1670–1671), and the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus (1693), Leibniz developed the legal term ‘obligatio’ from Roman Law and the Spanish Jesuit traditions, but that his usage shifted at different stages of his life. Nevertheless, these views are compatible and provide a grounding for his philosophical optimism. It is further shown that Leibniz took the concept of obligatio to provide something like legal standing (locus standi or klagebefugnis) so that rational minds can undergo the theodicean project, that is, because God has obligations to substances, they can seek an explanation for their suffering from God. And because human reason is analogous to divine reason, according to Leibniz, God provides the explanation that the actual world is the best possible world. The goal, then, is to prove that we should take Leibniz’s insights into jurisprudence more seriously, at least in part, because they help to explain his philosophical optimism. Full article

This paper aims to illustrate the dialogues on the issues of theodicy in late Ming Fujian. The Catholicism that entered China in the late Ming dynasty had a competitive relationship with indigenous religions in terms of their meaning systems. Catholicism emphasized the omniscience, omnibenevolence, and omnipotence of God, which created tensions and contradictions with the reality of phenomena such as the suffering of good people and the existence of evil. In the late Ming period, scholars, believers, and missionaries in the Fujian region engaged in deep exchanges and dialogues on theodicy, reflecting the significant attention and consideration given to the problem of evil. This paper first analyzes the dialogues on theodicy between the Fujian scholar Ye Xianggao (1559–1627) and the missionary Giulio Aleni (1582–1649). Next, it explores the discussions on the problem of evil between ordinary believers in the Fujian region and Giulio Aleni in their daily lives. Finally, it examines how anti-Catholics used the problem of evil to criticize Catholicism, and it also identifies the characteristics and impacts of Catholic theodicy in the late Ming and early Qing periods. Full article

This article builds on and supplements an earlier one in this journal about theodicy. It focuses on species extinctions and on the possible role of humanity as fallible co-creators. Christopher Southgate has suggested that co-creators might shoulder the task of curtailing extinctions. In appraising this view, I distinguish between extinctions resulting from evolution, which humans have limited power to reverse, but which are held to be indispensable for the evolution of complexity, consciousness and self-consciousness, and those caused by humanity itself, which humans should reduce, even if they cannot be halted. Human creativity, however, extends further to the development of skills, trades, the arts and literature. Church Fathers, such as Ambrose, Theodoret and Cosmas Indicopleustes, held that God left the creation incomplete so that humanity could enhance it; certainly, human creativity has introduced agriculture, navigation, technology and culture, adding to the value of the world. Granted belief in creation, this can be understood as co-creation. Granted the value that humanity continues to add to the world, the belief that such creativity flows from the creator’s overall plan emerges as a coherent one. Full article

Since the second half of the 20th century, missiology has continued to elevate Missio Dei to a topic of the highest importance in theology. According to Missio Dei, the salvific mission is more theocentric than anthropocentric in that its actuality is wholly rooted in the nature of God. However, much work remains to be conducted to evaluate and reconcile the modern interpretation of the Missio Dei and its predecessor theological doctrines, to avoid illogicalities. Consequently, the responsibility to identify any discrepancies in the systematic knowledge of the Missio Dei falls on the broad shoulders of theology in general, but of missiology in particular. In keeping with this unavoidable intellectual duty, this article interrogates the literature on modern theodicies to improve the conceptualization of the Missio Dei and missionary God in the context of evil and human suffering. The inter-comparative analysis of the biblical Job serves to relate divine perfection and human suffering within process theodicy. Consequently, the intellectual enterprise of this work, with all its shortcomings, not only illuminates another facet of Missio Dei but also motivates further investigation to reconcile mission Dei with the reality of evil, free will, and human suffering. Full article