The Ontology of Virtual Objects in David Chalmers’ Concept of Virtual Realism

Abstract

This article examines the ontological status of virtual objects in light of contemporary philosophical debates on virtual reality (VR). The main point of departure is an analysis of David Chalmers’ concept of “virtual realism”, which argues that virtual objects can be considered real because they meet fundamental criteria of reality such as existence, causal power, and non-illusoriness. Chalmers rejects positions that treat virtual objects as fictions or illusions, emphasizing their ability to elicit real effects and shape users’ experiences. Chalmers suggests an ontological equivalence between physical and virtual objects, raising questions about the nature of reality and the criteria for attributing it in the context of dynamic technological changes. In this work, I propose an alternative approach to the ontology of virtual objects, situating them within Karl Popper’s World III. Unlike traditional views that emphasize the digital nature of virtual objects, this perspective treats them as immaterial yet perceptible entities that acquire an autonomous status through their role in intersubjective and cultural processes. This approach refines the debate by offering a framework that distinguishes virtual objects from both physical and purely abstract entities. I argue that virtual objects, though immaterial, can be recognized as real entities due to their ability to generate real perceptual, emotional, and cognitive effects. This approach expands traditional understandings of ontology, offering new perspectives on the nature of reality in a digital context.

1. Introduction

Contemporary philosophical research increasingly focuses on issues related to virtual realities, which have become an integral part of the rapidly evolving digital world. Virtual reality (VR), as an interactive, computer-generated environment, not only transforms our approach to technology but also provokes fundamental questions about the nature of reality itself. In this context, understanding how virtual objects—immaterial by nature—can be integrated into the broader ontological discourse, which has traditionally concentrated on material entities, becomes crucial.

The primary philosophical problem associated with virtual objects is determining their ontological status. Can they be regarded as real entities if their existence relies on digital processes and their effects are confined to the virtual domain? A key starting point in this debate is David Chalmers’ concept of “virtual realism”, which argues that virtual objects can be considered real because they meet specific criteria of reality, such as causal power, independence from the mind, and the ability to generate authentic user experiences.

However, the debate about the status of virtual objects extends far beyond simply accepting or rejecting this proposition. It touches upon a much broader philosophical landscape, encompassing questions about the nature of existence, the boundaries between reality and fiction, and the role of technology in shaping contemporary ontology. A particularly significant issue is understanding how virtual objects, despite their immaterial nature, can exert real effects in the physical world, influencing human perception, emotions, and cognition.

The debate on virtual realism revolves around whether virtual objects should be considered real and, if so, in what sense. Chalmers’ approach equates virtual objects with digital entities rooted in computational processes, but this perspective raises ontological concerns. Should virtual objects be categorized alongside physical objects, or do they require a different ontological framework? This paper argues that Karl Popper’s notion of World III provides a more precise way to conceptualize virtual objects: as immaterial yet perceptually accessible entities that are distinct from both physical and purely abstract objects. This approach clarifies their ontological status and avoids the pitfalls of both fictionalism and digital reductionism.

This article seeks to provide a critical analysis and further development of the concept of virtual realism in light of contemporary philosophical debates. The author proposes an alternative approach to the ontology of virtual objects, grounded in the processes of their autonomization and public functionality within the digital communicative space. This perspective enables a rethinking of virtual entities as integral elements of modern culture and reality, transcending classical understandings of ontology.

By addressing the question of the status of virtual objects, this article contributes to the broader tradition of philosophical inquiry into ontology while opening new directions for reflection that take into account the dynamic technological and cultural changes of the 21st century. This study also aims to bring to light critical questions about the future of the relationship between the digital and physical worlds and their potential interdependence in shaping modern structures of reality.

2. Assumptions of Virtual Realism

David Chalmers, widely known for his work on the problem of consciousness and challenges associated with materialistic reductionism, has become a significant figure in the discussion on virtual reality. His works such as “The Virtual and the Real” (2017) [1], “The Virtual as the Digital” (2019) [2], and “The Matrix as Metaphysics” (2005) [3] are pivotal. His book, “Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy” (2022) [4], develops the thesis on the ontological equivalence of virtual and physical reality. According to him, virtual worlds are not merely false or imagined constructions but are real, alternative digital realities coexisting with physical reality [4] (p. 35).

David Chalmers defines virtual reality as an “interactive, computer-generated space” [4] (p. 470) characterized by immersion and interactivity. In his works, particularly in [4] and [1], he argues for what he terms “virtual realism”, claiming that “virtual reality is real”. This means that objects within virtual reality genuinely exist. As Chalmers emphasizes, his thesis transcends the psychological experiences of digital technology users, addressing the ontological question concerning the reality status of virtual spaces.

David Chalmers distinguishes virtual realism from virtual fictionalism, which regards virtual objects as fictional, akin to literary characters or objects within fictional narratives. According to virtual realism, virtual objects are real digital entities “rooted” in computational processes and data structures. For instance, virtual avatars, buildings, or tools are not perceived as illusions but as entities that exist within a specific digital context.

Chalmers presents [4] (see Chapter 6, 10) a set of criteria that allow us to determine whether an object can be considered real. This list includes the following: (1) Existence—the object should actually exist as an entity within a certain ontological system and not be just a fiction or an illusion; (2) causal power—the object must be able to cause effects and influence other elements of reality, both virtual and physical; (3) mind independence—the existence of the object should not depend solely on the subjective belief of the user, but should result from stable, repeatable mechanisms of functioning of a given reality; (4) lack of illusoriness—the object should be ontologically real in its context, and not just a simulation or perceptual illusion; and (5) authenticity in its kind—the object should be perceived as real and functional within its own ontology, e.g., a “virtual sword” can be a real weapon in a given virtual world. According to Chalmers, many elements of virtual realities satisfy these criteria—they are causally effective, rooted in digital data, and recognized by users as real within the context of their functionality in the virtual world.

Chalmers emphasizes that virtual realities are not merely simulations or illusions. In [4], he develops the hypothesis that virtual worlds can be just as meaningful as physical worlds. Thanks to their immersion and interactivity, users can fully engage with these spaces, raising the question of whether life in a virtual world could be as valuable as life in the physical one. He argues that virtual experiences, as long as they meet the criteria of authenticity and immersion, can hold equivalent ethical and existential value to experiences in the physical world.

According to Chalmers, not all of the reality criteria he proposed are necessary for recognizing a given entity as real. It may suffice to refer to one or several of these criteria, depending on the ontological context. In his [4] framework, Chalmers presents a vision of reality as a structure that encompasses both physical and virtual spaces, along with their objects, considering them integral components of reality. In this sense, virtual reality not only complements but also expands our traditional conception of physical reality.

A key aspect of this concept is the development of the thesis of “virtual digitalism”, which posits that virtual objects differ from physical objects in their composition—they are based not on physical atoms but on “digital atoms”, or bits [2] (pp. 455–456). Virtual objects are rooted in the computational processes of computers, which serve as their ontological foundation. Chalmers emphasizes that the computer, as a higher-order operating system, creates virtual entities, yet their reality is no less authentic because of this. According to this theory, virtual objects are constituted by data structures, but they cannot be fully reduced to those structures.

This perspective challenges traditional distinctions between the physical and virtual, suggesting that virtual entities hold an independent, authentic status within the broader framework of reality, provided they are grounded in computational processes and recognized as functionally significant within their context [2] (p. 455).

Virtual Objects as Digital Entities

David Chalmers elaborates on his concept of virtual realism (see: [5]), which rests on four fundamental principles. First, virtual objects genuinely exist, meaning they are real within their own ontological context. Second, events occurring within virtual reality possess an authentic character and cannot be reduced merely to fiction or deemed unreal. Third, virtual experiences are not illusory, which excludes treating them as deceptions or perceptual errors. Finally, Chalmers asserts that virtual experiences are equivalent in value and significance to experiences in physical reality, emphasizing their importance in human experience [1] (p. 310).

Virtual reality, as defined by Chalmers, refers to immersive and interactive environments generated by computers. Immersion provides the user with a specific perceptual experience, including a sense of presence within a given environment, while interactivity enables influence over the virtual space and engagement in dynamic interactions with its elements. The foundation for generating such environments lies in computational processes, which create data that are processed by the user’s senses, enabling perceptual experience.

Based on this framework, Chalmers defines a virtual object as any element within a virtual space that can be perceived sensorially and interacted with. Examples of such objects include virtual machines, chairs, or buildings. Virtual objects, as products of computational processes occurring within computers, constitute informational data structures and are recognized as digital entities.

This characterization underscores that virtual objects, though different in composition from physical objects, hold an ontological status grounded in their computational foundation. Their existence as digital structures does not diminish their reality but situates them as integral components of the broader conception of reality, where physical and virtual elements coexist and interact meaningfully.

Based on this definition, Chalmers formulates an argument for equating virtual objects with digital objects. First, virtual objects possess causal powers, meaning they can affect other virtual objects, users, and their actions. Second, it is specifically digital objects that serve as the carriers of these causal powers, which implies that only they can be identified with virtual entities. Chalmers points out that virtual objects are physical realizations of (or are grounded in) specific data structures, which emphasizes their dependence on a material computer substrate [1] (pp. 317, 456).

This identification is grounded in the view that the causal efficacy of virtual objects—whether in facilitating user interactions, shaping virtual environments, or producing perceptual and experiential effects—derives from their underlying computational basis. Consequently, digital structures, as the ontological foundation of virtual objects, are not merely abstract representations but are integral to their existence and functionality. By aligning virtual objects with digital data structures, Chalmers reinforces the notion that virtual reality is a domain of real, causally potent entities embedded within computational systems.

Using the causal argument, David Chalmers seeks to refute the position known as virtual fictionalism. According to this view, virtual objects are merely fictional entities existing in unreal virtual worlds. Consequently, the experiences of virtual reality users are treated as unreal, and their value is reduced to subjective impressions. Proponents of fictionalism reject Chalmers’ argument by questioning the fundamental assumption regarding the causal power of virtual objects. In their view, virtual objects influence users only in a manner analogous to literary fictional characters, which affect readers through mechanisms of imagination rather than as real entities with genuine capacity to affect the physical world.

To counter this critique, Chalmers introduces an additional argument, which posits that during interactions with virtual reality, the user perceives only virtual objects, which constitute the direct causal basis of their perceptual experiences. In the context of virtual reality, it is digital objects that serve as the carriers of these experiences because the computational processes underlying them generate data that are processed by the user’s senses. Based on this reasoning, Chalmers concludes that virtual objects should be identified with digital objects [1] (p. 317).

This argument underscores that the causal efficacy of virtual objects is not merely analogous to that of fictional entities but is grounded in their ability to directly generate perceptual and experiential effects. Unlike fictional characters, which rely on imagination for their influence, virtual objects operate as real, causally active entities embedded in computational processes. Thus, Chalmers defends virtual realism by asserting the ontological authenticity and causal significance of digital objects within virtual reality.

Fictionalists might respond to Chalmers’ argumentation by claiming that virtual objects perceived by users are merely a specific form of “hallucination”—perceptions that do not correspond to actually existing entities. This interpretation is supported by an illusionist perspective, which holds that users of virtual reality perceive virtual objects as possessing properties typical of real-world objects, such as colors, shapes, or spatial locations. However, illusionists argue that virtual objects do not, in fact, possess these characteristics. From their perspective, the perception of such objects is based on an illusion generated by technological mechanisms designed to produce sensory impressions. Consequently, virtual experiences are viewed as illusory, leading to the conclusion that virtual objects cannot be considered real in an ontological sense.

In confronting this critique, Chalmers seeks to defend the ontological status of virtual objects by arguing that, despite their digital nature, they possess reality and value within the ontology of virtual reality. Rather than viewing virtual objects as illusory, Chalmers suggests that they should be understood as real entities within their own context. He emphasizes that virtual reality constitutes an autonomous ontological domain, where digital data structures function as objects capable of exerting real influence on users and other elements within the virtual environment.

Chalmers contends that this perspective allows for a redefinition of the status of virtual objects, granting them a full-fledged ontological dimension rather than relegating them to the status of illusions or imaginative constructs. By acknowledging the causal efficacy and immersive engagement of virtual objects within their digital framework, Chalmers challenges the illusionist stance and asserts that virtual objects, though distinct from physical entities, are no less real within their unique ontological context [1] (p. 334).

Chalmers, in order to refute the charge that VR perception is illusory, uses the analogy of a mirror reflection. If someone does not realize they are looking at their own reflection, they may experience a spatial illusion—mistaking the mirror image for a real object in the physical world. However, once the observer understands that it is merely a mirror, the illusion disappears. Similarly, in VR, an informed user does not treat virtual objects as physical entities but recognizes that they operate within a “different” order of reality. As a result, perception in VR is not illusory but rather a special form of experience, contingent on the user’s knowledge and attitude.

A more complex aspect of the problem of virtual realism is the interpretation of the properties attributed to virtual objects. An example is a virtual flower that is perceived by the user as red, while the digital one, subject to data structures, cannot determine in what way the physical properties are active. Chalmers points out, however, that the digital object is not red in the physical sense; instead, the virtual flower is “red” in a virtual way.

A key element of his argument is the redefinition of the effects of “being red” in the context of virtual reality. Traditionally, red is defined as an object that has been hit by reflectors that have fallen on light waves that have struck red in the observer. Chalmers, however, works on the basis of the material foundations on which their functional functionality is based. It can be defined as the ability to evoke a phenomenal experience under normal perceptual conditions. In this sense, the virtual flower can be accessed as red, causing a perception of frequency in the user in a specific virtual environment.

Chalmers’ proposal, consistent with the functionalist application to properties, is applied to the recognition that properties do not have to be rooted in a function framework to perform their function in the perceptual system. The redness of the virtual flower does not apply to the characteristics of digital objects but to its capabilities to generate phenomenal radio effects in the user’s conditions with a virtual interface. Other phenomena that are virtual are not related to physical phenomena but perform a contact function within the user’s perceptual experiences.

On the other hand, the digital object corresponding to the virtual red flower is not red in the physical sense, as it does not produce the experience of redness under normal perceptual conditions. Data structures, being invisible to the human eye, cannot generate the phenomenal experience of redness. However, when this digital object is observed through a virtual reality headset, it can be considered red in the virtual sense, because under such conditions, it generates the experience of redness in accordance with the norms of perception specific to the virtual environment.

In this way, Chalmers suggests that the properties of virtual objects, such as “being red”, should be analyzed in the context of their functional role and the specific nature of perception within virtual reality, which differs from perception in the physical world.

According to Chalmers’ reasoning, for every property X, there may exist a corresponding virtual digital property X that fulfills the same function as the non-digital property X. In some cases, it may even be argued that virtual properties are identical to real properties. For instance, virtual “being a library” is actual “being a library”, and a virtual calculator is an actual calculator. To better understand this intuition, it is helpful to refer to Chalmers’ earlier works, where he develops his concept of functionalism.

The digital object corresponding to the virtual red flower is not red in the physical sense, as it does not produce the phenomenal experience of redness under standard perceptual conditions. Data structures, as abstract elements of computational processes, remain invisible to the human eye and cannot directly generate sensory experiences. However, when such a digital object is processed and presented in a virtual reality environment through a VR headset, it can be attributed “redness” in the virtual sense. In this context, the digital object generates an experience of redness that aligns with the perceptual norms established within the virtual environment.

Chalmers argues that the properties of virtual objects, such as “being red”, should be analyzed in terms of their functional role and the specific nature of virtual perception, which fundamentally differs from perception in the physical world. The virtual property of an object thus lies in its ability to generate appropriate phenomenal experiences within the virtual environment, even if such a property does not exist at the physical level. In this way, Chalmers’ functionalism allows for the attribution of real properties to virtual objects within their specific ontological context.

According to Chalmers’ reasoning, for every property X in the physical world, there may exist a corresponding virtual digital property X′ that fulfills an analogous function to the physical property X. In some cases, Chalmers suggests that virtual properties and real properties may even be identical. For instance, “being a library” in a virtual environment can be regarded as actual “being a library” because it serves the same function in the virtual system as a library does in the physical world. Similarly, a virtual calculator is a real calculator because it performs the same computational function, regardless of whether its form is digital or material.

The foundation of Chalmers’ concept is the principle of organizational invariance, which states that certain properties of objects or systems, based on their causal topology, remain unchanged as long as their causal organization is preserved. This principle implies that if changes occur within an object or system without disrupting its internal causal structure, its key properties remain invariant. For example, the property of “being a calculator” depends solely on the causal organization of the elements that constitute the object. Consequently, a virtual calculator, whose causal organization is equivalent to that of a physical calculator, can also be considered a calculator.

Chalmers argues that the principle of organizational invariance allows the properties of virtual objects to be equated with those of their physical counterparts, provided their causal topology—i.e., the way elements of the system interact with one another—remains identical. On this basis, virtual objects, such as calculators or other elements of virtual reality, can be regarded as real in both a functional and ontological sense. The functional equivalence between a virtual and a physical object means that the differences between them are merely a matter of implementation, not ontology.

A key issue arising from the application of this principle is whether a virtual object can possess phenomenal properties, such as subjective experiences. Chalmers, in developing his theory of consciousness, argues that phenomenal properties, also known as “qualia”, are directly tied to the causal organization of a system. According to the principle of organizational invariance, if the causal structure of a system remains unchanged, its phenomenal properties should also be preserved, regardless of the system’s physical realization.

In the context of consciousness, Chalmers contends that subjective experiences arise from a specific arrangement of causal relationships within a system. This means that if a virtual object has a causal structure equivalent to that of a physical system capable of generating consciousness, it could, in principle, also possess phenomenal properties. This position leads to a deeper exploration of the relationship between the functional organization of a system and the emergence of consciousness, and it implies the possibility of attributing phenomenal properties to virtual entities under appropriate conditions.

Transferring the principle of organizational invariance to the realm of virtual objects, the question arises whether virtual structures that follow the causal organization of physical objects can also be carriers of phenomenal experiences. In other words, whether virtual objects that act as digital data structures but maintain functional and causal identity with their physical counterparts have the potential to generate subjective experiences both in users and within more advanced systems such as artificial intelligence. Chalmers develops this idea, arguing that phenomenal properties do not arise from the physical substrate itself, but rather from the specific causal organization of the system and the relations among its elements. This means that the essence of subjective experiences is their functional foundations, not the specific physical form of their realization. According to this theory, a digital structure that faithfully reproduces the causal organization of a system capable of consciousness has the potential to act as a substrate for phenomenal properties [6] (p. 248).

Thus, Chalmers opens up the possibility of theoretically assigning phenomenal properties to virtual objects that, although existing as information data, are able to fulfill the same causal functions as their physical counterparts. For example, virtual objects in a simulation environment could, in an appropriately designed system, trigger not only sensory perception in users but also influence more complex states of consciousness. However, this issue remains open and requires further philosophical and interdisciplinary research, including neurobiology, computer science, and the theory of artificial intelligence. The key challenge remains to understand whether and under what conditions digital structures can function as carriers of consciousness, and what ontological implications result from such an assumption. This discussion leads to fundamental questions about the nature of consciousness, its relation to a material substrate, and the possibility of its realization in systems based on digital technology.

3. Critical Analysis of David Chalmers’ Concept of Virtual Realism

Chalmers’ concept has evolved with successive debates on the status of virtual objects. Initially, it was criticized for not distinguishing simulation from reality sufficiently (e.g., [7]), and then accusations of ontological inflation were raised. Chalmers [2] tried to answer these accusations, but his position still leaves many open questions—most notably about the criteria for distinguishing virtual objects from fiction and their autonomy from the digital structure.

So far, the criticism of Chalmers has focused mainly on the issue of the reality of virtual objects and their ontological status in relation to physical objects. However, as subsequent debates have shown [8,9,10], these arguments do not fully resolve the problem of the ontological autonomy of virtual objects. In this analysis, I develop these doubts by examining whether Chalmers’ proposal really avoids the risk of ontological inflation and whether his conception of virtual reality is sufficiently justified in the light of contemporary research. Chalmers postulates that virtual reality is a fully-fledged form of reality, and virtual objects are as real as digital objects. However, this approach is highly controversial. The first important problem is the issue of defining virtual objects and their properties [9]. Chalmers defines virtual objects as data structures embedded in computational processes that produce specific sensory experiences in users. Critics such as Beisbart and Juul note that data structures are abstract in themselves and do not have causal power in the traditional sense (Virtual Realism). Chalmers [2] in response to earlier criticisms of the ontology of virtual objects argued that their reality stems from their ability to generate cognitive and emotional effects. Instead of treating them as fictions, he suggests that their interactivity and persistence in the digital world should be taken into account. However, his approach still raises doubts—are user interaction and experience sufficient for an object to be considered real? This way of defining properties seems too simplistic and insufficient to justify the ontological reality of these objects [9].

The second key problem is the distinction between simulation and fiction, which remains unclear in Chalmers’ account. The author maintains that virtual objects are real because of their causal structure, while objects in simulations are merely fictional. However, critics point out that the boundary between these categories is largely arbitrary. Both virtual and simulated objects exist as data structures and are subject to computational processes. Beisbart points out that many scientific simulations, such as galaxy models, share the same features that Chalmers attributes to virtual objects. Therefore, if we assume that objects in VR are real, then simulated objects should be considered equally real, leading to an unjustified proliferation of digital entities [7].

Critics argue that a better approach is fictionalism, according to which virtual objects are similar to literary or theatrical characters—they exist within established rules and conventions. This approach avoids the necessity of considering them real in an ontological sense while recognizing their importance as representational elements of virtual environments. An example is the virtual cat in VR, which, although allowing for interaction, does not have the same features as a real cat, and its ontological status remains limited to the virtual world. The third problem is the issue of the excessive number of entities resulting from Chalmers’ theory. Beisbart points to the mechanism of the “slippery slope”, according to which considering objects in VR as real forces the extension of the same logic to all digital objects, including those present in scientific simulations. This leads to ontological inflation, in which every element of the computer model could be considered real. Such a proliferation of digital entities not only complicates the image of reality but also contradicts the principle of ontological economy, according to which the number of entities should be minimized when explaining reality [7].

An additional source of controversy is Chalmers’ identification of virtual objects with digital objects. Critics note that digital objects, such as data in computer memory, have physical representations in electronic circuits, but they are not identical to virtual objects, which exist in the space of interpretation and experience of the user. A digital object is material in a technological sense but not in the way that a physical object in the real world is. This difference undermines the identification of virtual objects with their digital foundations [10].

Another important issue is the role of immersion in defining virtual reality. Chalmers argues that immersion in VR makes these experiences non-illusory. However, critics emphasize that immersion is primarily a technological illusion that does not change the ontological status of virtual environments. VR worlds are products of human creativity and technology, which limits their “authenticity” compared to physical reality [11,12].

An analysis of Chalmers’ views on the relationship between physical and virtual reality and his interpretation of structure and causality seems to indicate several methodological and philosophical problems. First, Chalmers combines two separate concepts in his analysis of causal structure: structure as an internal arrangement of elements and causality as a relation between objects. Nevertheless, an object’s internal structure is not always devoid of causality—in many cases, interactions between parts contribute to the causal capacities of the whole (e.g., in biological or mechanical systems). The problem is that Chalmers seems to treat structure as a purely descriptive set of relations, without taking into account its potential causal effects. It is therefore worth specifying in what sense the structure of virtual objects is supposed to have or not have causal capacities of its own. Structure, in the classical sense, concerns the internal structure of an object, its components, and the relations between them. Causality, on the other hand, refers to causal relations that are asymmetrical in nature and occur between objects, not within their internal structure. The claim that the structure of an object is based on causal relations seems to be wrong, because causality, due to its dynamic and asymmetrical nature, would threaten the stability of the object’s structure.

Chalmers further complicates this issue by mixing the concepts of interactions (symmetric) and causality (asymmetric). His claim that “Physical reality can be characterized by its causal structure: the patterns of interaction between physical objects, and their effects on our experience” [1] introduces significant ambiguities. In this view, structure is no longer understood as the internal structure of an object, but is reduced to external relations between objects and their effects on our experience. However, interactions and causality are different categories: the former assume reciprocity and equivalence, the latter asymmetry and hierarchy. The confusion of these concepts leads to ambiguities in the definition of both physical and virtual reality.

A further problem in Chalmers’ considerations is his account of virtual reality. He claims that “digital objects in general are characterized by their patterns of interaction, which is ultimately a matter of causal structure” (The Virtual and the Real). Chalmers’ definition of virtual reality could be made more precise. His concept of reality as an ‘organized pattern of interaction’ is broad and could refer to any dynamic system, both physical and virtual. It would be useful to point out what features distinguish virtual reality from other interactive systems. As a result, his remarks on the structure of virtual reality seem to lack depth and are limited to truisms.

The issue of the ontological status of virtual reality is another point that remains unclear. Chalmers claims that “virtual reality is not a second-class reality” [1] (p. 350), but his argument on this point is relatively sparse. He does not specify by what criteria one might judge ‘classes’ of reality—whether ontological (independent existence), epistemic (knowable), or pragmatic (use value). It is worth developing a discussion here about whether his criteria of reality also include relational and practical aspects that may be of significant importance to VR users. He then admits that “it may be a second-level reality, in that it is contained within physical reality and realized by processes in the physical world, but this need not make it less real or less valuable” [1] (p. 350). This suggests that virtual reality is ontologically dependent on physical reality, which implies a lower status for the former. Nevertheless, Chalmers does not provide any explanation as to why ontological dependence should automatically lower the reality of virtual reality.

His declarations regarding the changing status of virtual reality over time become even more unclear. He states that “in the short term, of course, virtual realities may be inferior to physical realities in all sorts of respects (while perhaps beginning to be superior in other respects). But even in the short term, virtual reality may be real, non-illusory, and valuable. In the long term, and in principle, virtual reality may well be on a par with physical reality” [1] (p. 350). This type of argument suggests that the ontological status of virtual reality changes over time, which seems inconsistent with the classical understanding of ontology, which assumes the objectivity of being regardless of subjective perceptions or changes in human habit. Assuming that the reality of virtual reality becomes increasingly “real” as a result of our habits seems to be an ill-considered attempt to reconcile ontology with epistemology.

Despite the problems pointed out, it must be admitted that Chalmers’ argument makes a significant contribution to the debate on the ontology of virtual objects. Chalmers attempts to establish virtual reality as ontologically equivalent to physical reality, but his argument requires refinement. His conception could benefit from a more detailed consideration of the relation between the ontological status of virtual and physical objects, rather than treating them as equivalent on the basis of the general structure of interaction.

The Process of Objectification of Virtual Objects as the Foundation of Their Reality

David Chalmers, in developing his concept of virtual realism, posits that virtual objects can be regarded as real. The condition for their reality is the fulfillment of specific criteria, such as causal power, authenticity, and the ability to influence other users as well as objects in their environment. While this thesis is groundbreaking, it leaves many questions unanswered, particularly concerning the mechanisms through which virtual objects become independent entities within the structure of reality.

At this juncture, Karl Popper’s concept of the three worlds offers additional insights that help fill these gaps, complementing Chalmers’ analysis. Karl Popper defines World III as a space of objective knowledge, arguments, hypotheses, and logical relations between them. These are creations of the human mind, which after their creation acquire a certain autonomy—they can be studied, evaluated, and developed independently of their creators. Popper clearly distinguishes World III from World I (physical reality) and World II (consciousness and subjective experiences). Importantly, the objects of World III are not material, but function in an intersubjective way, i.e., they can be shared and analyzed by different people within a common cognitive space. This autonomy of the “third world” serves as a valuable tool for understanding how virtual entities, though initially created by developers, can emancipate themselves from their authors, becoming elements of a shared cultural reality. Given the limitations of Chalmers’ framework, the question arises: how can we account for virtual objects in a way that acknowledges both their lack of physical substance and their real effects on users? Popper’s World III offers a compelling alternative, as it accommodates entities that are neither purely material nor entirely subjective. In what follows, I explore how situating virtual objects within World III resolves the ontological ambiguities present in Chalmers’ virtual realism.

4. An Outline Inspired by Karl Popper’s Theory of the Third World

The existence and creation of virtual objects can be explained based on Karl Popper’s concept of the three worlds, albeit by adopting only selected elements of this theory and some of its resulting conclusions. In particular, drawing on Popper’s ideas, it is possible to illustrate how virtual objects can exist objectively, i.e., independently of the person who created a given computer program. Karl Popper developed his concept of the three worlds to explain the process of objectifying and autonomizing knowledge, which initially arises as a subjective creation of an individual, being a collection of their mental states [13] (pp. 104, 148–150, 209).

Applying this concept to virtual objects requires taking into account the difference between classical World III objects (e.g., hypotheses) and virtual objects. Hypotheses are abstract—they cannot be seen or experienced sensually. In contrast, virtual objects, although immaterial, are perceptible sensually (we can see a virtual dog, move it, and even interact with it). This indicates that virtual objects are different from purely abstract World III entities and require a new immaterial ontology that takes into account their interactive and perceptible character. By analogy with Popper’s theory, it can be argued that virtual objects gradually gain autonomy from their creator—they cease to be their private, subjective work and enter the public sphere, becoming accessible to any users. The crucial question is whether virtual objects are grounded in physical reality. Chalmers argues that they are ‘grounded’ in the material infrastructure of computers. In my approach, I consider that although virtual objects require a material medium (a computer or a server), their ontological status is not dependent on physical realization—their existence is functionally and relationally determined, not materially. This means that their ontology is not the same as that of physical objects but requires a new category: immaterial but sensorily accessible objects.

During the design and creation phase, these objects are closely tied to the individual perception and consciousness of their author or authors, which gives them a subjective character and indicates their origin as a result of individual creativity. At this stage, virtual entities exist in a conceptual form, as products of subjective imagination and intellectual creative work.

At the moment the creative process is completed and the result is made available to a broader audience, these objects enter the realm of intersubjective communication. This means they are subjected to processes of perception, interpretation, and negotiation of meanings within the social community that uses, analyzes, or adapts them in various cultural contexts. This process of intersubjective exchange allows these objects to begin functioning within collective consciousness, becoming part of a shared socio-cultural space.

In the course of transmitting content into collective consciousness, a process of objectification takes place. This involves the detachment of these creations from their original author or group of authors. As a result, they lose their initial status as elements of the creator’s exclusive, private property and transform into entities functioning in the public domain. This process grants them an objective character, meaning they can be perceived, utilized, and reinterpreted by diverse social groups, independent of the creator’s original intentions or assumptions.

Through these transformations, virtual entities achieve the status of elements of cultural reality. In this context, they become immaterial objects that, although lacking a physical form, function as fully-fledged metaphysical cultural entities. Their existence depends on the social space in which they are received and on the cultural mechanisms that assign them specific meanings and values. In this way, virtual objects transcend the boundaries of subjective creativity and become a lasting component of the intersubjective socio-cultural reality, influencing the functioning and development of contemporary culture.

The described intuition is based on the belief that the more virtual worlds resemble physical reality, the more they strengthen the impression of existence while simultaneously diminishing the sense of their unreality. This impression, referred to here as the “appearance of existence”, arises from the similarity of virtual entities to objects in the material world that humans are familiar with and have experienced. For example, realistic representations of space, physical phenomena, or human interactions in digital environments increase the subjective sense that these worlds are “real” or function in a manner akin to material reality.

However, the idea of similarity or the impression of realism does not alter the actual ontological status of these worlds. Virtuality, while close to reality in terms of form or sensation, remains fundamentally different in its mode of existence. Virtual worlds, even if they precisely mimic physical structures or phenomena, remain immaterial constructs based on code and digital simulations. In other words, their high degree of realism does not modify their “mode of nonexistence” in a material sense, just as unrealistic imagination does not change their “mode of existence”.

Similarly, imagination—while playing a key role in the creation of virtual worlds—does not determine their ontological status. Imagination is a mental capacity of humans, enabling the creation and representation of things that do not exist in the material world. However, it cannot be reasonably attributed to the power to alter the foundations of being for virtual worlds from an ontological perspective. Virtual worlds, regardless of whether they arise from imagination or emulate physical reality, remain entities functioning in a digital space, whose characteristics and existence depend on technological infrastructure rather than imagination itself.

The key aspect, therefore, is distinguishing between human perception of virtual reality and its actual ontological status. While imagination and appearances influence the subjective experience of virtual worlds, they do not alter the fundamental difference between virtual and material existence. Thus, any intuitions arising from similarities to the physical world merely enhance the subjective credibility of virtual worlds, without affecting their ontological nature.

The history of philosophy provides a rich spectrum of concepts that go beyond a materialistic understanding of reality, postulating the existence of various immaterial objects. Among the most significant examples of this kind are Platonic ideas, which function as eternal and perfect archetypes of things, accessible only to intellectual, not sensory, cognition. Similarly, in the religious–philosophical tradition, divine beings are recognized as transcendental entities that surpass the material world.

Concepts of immaterial objects also take various forms in metaphysical approaches to the human mind. For example, in Cartesian mind–body dualism, the mind (res cogitans) is considered immaterial and independent of the body (res extensa), giving it a distinct mode of existence. Likewise, in the Christian philosophical tradition, the human soul is understood as an immaterial entity capable of surviving the death of the body, further emphasizing its difference from physical entities.

Spinoza, in his monistic framework, develops the idea of monads as fundamental, self-sufficient entities that are immaterial and constitute the essence of reality in its infinite diversity. In the cultural tradition, on the other hand, immaterial cultural creations—such as values, norms, or symbolic systems—are recognized as objects existing according to principles different from those of material entities. They exist within social consciousness and interpersonal relationships rather than as objects with physical properties.

If one adopts a philosophical perspective distinct from common beliefs and reductionist materialism, reality appears as complex and multidimensional. Beyond material objects, it encompasses immaterial entities characterized by modes of existence that transcend physical properties. These diverse modes of being point to the necessity of embracing a broader ontological perspective, in which the physical world represents only one of the possible manifestations of reality.

The multidimensionality of reality also implies that material categories are insufficient to fully grasp all forms of being. Immaterial objects, although lacking physical presence, are real in other ways—they may exist as ideals, values, relationships, or creations of thought. In this context, philosophy not only broadens the scope of reflection on reality but also highlights the plurality of ways in which entities can exist, revealing the profound complexity of the world and human cognition.

Virtual worlds, like other creations of human imagination and creativity—such as literary characters, works of art, or elements of folklore—can be regarded as objects whose existence is inseparably linked to the creative activity of their authors. Their ontological status is grounded in their ability to influence human consciousness, both on an individual and collective level. Consequently, they contribute to two fundamental spheres of reality: the private, immanent realm of individual experiences and sensations and the public, intersubjective cultural space, where they become part of collective heritage and social practices.

The primary criterion of their existence is precisely this ability to influence—both momentarily and enduringly. Virtual worlds affect human perception, shaping individual consciousness through the experiences they offer, while simultaneously impacting culture as a whole by altering norms, values, and forms of social expression. For instance, the influence of video games extends beyond providing immersive individual experiences; they introduce new ways of thinking, communicating, and organizing society, serving as an artistic, technological, and social medium all at once.

Moreover, their influence is not merely transient. Virtual worlds have the capacity to shape culture permanently by introducing new patterns of thought, behavioral models, and symbols that can permeate into the non-virtual reality. This mechanism operates particularly intensively when participants in virtual worlds begin to incorporate observed principles and structures from those worlds into their daily lives. Such processes can lead to a blending of the boundaries between physical and virtual realities, which, in turn, impacts the perception of reality as a whole.

In philosophical tradition, reality is understood as a complex structure composed of various orders of being, each characterized by a distinct mode of existence. The key difference between my proposal and Chalmers’ concept is that I treat virtual objects as immaterial but at the same time sensorially accessible, which goes beyond the classical approach to World III. Chalmers claims that virtual objects are real because they meet certain functional criteria of reality. However, his approach does not distinguish them from physical objects in a sufficient way—it reduces them to ‘real digital objects’. My proposal is more precise: virtual objects are real not because they are ‘digital’, but because they exist as elements of interactive and perceptual experience, although they do not have physical substance. This approach allows us to better explain their ontological difference and to capture their specific status in relation to physical and abstract objects. Their reality stems from their belonging to the realm of intangible culture, which encompasses diverse products of human creativity, such as values, ideas, art, social norms, and symbolic systems.

The criterion for the existence of virtual worlds is not based on their physical presence but rather on their ability to generate effects in the mental and social spheres. Their impact is realized immaterially, primarily through intersubjective communication, which enables the exchange of experiences, ideas, and meanings among individuals. Virtual worlds, as products of digital technology, use computer programs as a medium that facilitates their creation, interaction, and dissemination within the cultural space.

The mode of existence of virtual worlds corresponds to that of intangible cultural objects, such as literary works, music, ideas, or social norms. A common feature of these entities is their immateriality and their capacity to exist within both individual and collective consciousness, which grants them the status of real entities, even though they lack physical substance. In this sense, virtual worlds become a part of the domain of culture, whose existence depends on creative activity, the perception of its audience, and communicative mechanisms that allow for the transmission of meanings and values.

It is worth emphasizing that virtual worlds, like other intangible cultural objects, have a relational character. This means their existence is largely defined by how they interact with human consciousness and how they shape the social sphere. For example, virtual environments such as video games, virtual reality (VR) spaces, or social media platforms not only provide new experiences but also transform norms and social structures that influence the functioning of physical reality.

In this view, virtual worlds do not merely reflect material reality but also complement it, creating new conditions for existence, interaction, and creativity. Their mode of existence is characteristic of cultural entities that, while lacking physical presence, are real in terms of their consequences and impacts, as well as their capacity to shape consciousness and transform the way we perceive reality as a whole. Virtual worlds thus align with a broad ontological tradition that acknowledges the existence of diverse immaterial orders of being, which together constitute the complex structure of human experiential reality.

The Ontological Status of Virtual Objects

The ontology of virtual worlds proposed herein is based on the assumption of the existence of two distinct ontological categories, which constitute fundamental aspects of reality: the universe of immaterial virtual worlds and the material world, which is a necessary element of this system. According to this concept, the material world serves as an anchor for virtual worlds, providing the foundation upon which they can be created, developed, and experienced by humans. Without material infrastructure—such as computer hardware, technological networks, or physical interactions between users—immaterial virtual worlds could neither exist in their current form nor influence human consciousness.

Corresponding to these two ontological categories, there are two different modes of existence that define the nature of objects belonging to each category. The first mode pertains to material objects, which possess physical presence and can be experienced through the senses. These objects exist independently of human perception and consciousness, functioning within the framework of space and time, in accordance with the laws of physics. The second mode pertains to immaterial objects, which are creations of human creativity and culture. This category includes both virtual worlds and other products of intangible culture, such as musical works, ideas, etc. These objects exist in a different way—their existence is not based on physical substance but rather on interaction with human consciousness and on processes of communication and the transmission of meanings. Their mode of existence is therefore relational, as it depends on human intellectual activity, perception, and the ability to interact with other participants in culture.

Virtual worlds occupy a specific position in this ontology. As immaterial entities, they are closely tied to culture, and their existence is defined by their ability to influence individual and collective consciousness. At the same time, they are inextricably linked to the material world, which enables their creation, storage, and sharing.

In this preliminary concept, the ontology of virtual worlds does not reduce them merely to technological dependencies but emphasizes their autonomy as distinct cultural entities. Their immaterial mode of existence is distinguished by the capacity to create new spaces of meaning and experience that co-constitute cultural reality. At the same time, the material foundation, while essential, does not fully define their nature, as they acquire their ultimate ontological shape within human consciousness and through intersubjective communication.

In ontological terms, the key condition that objects and worlds must meet is their objectivity, defined as anti-subjectivity, meaning independence from the creating subject. Objectivity denotes the ability of entities to exist and function independently of the intentions, perceptions, or consciousness of their creator. In the case of virtual worlds and objects, although they are initially the result of human creativity and dependent on the process of their creation, a process of objectification occurs that allows them to become independent from their creator.

The process of objectification involves virtual objects, which initially exist solely within the immanent sphere of individual consciousness (the creator), becoming accessible in the public domain through their transmission to other subjects. Once shared in the social sphere, they cease to be elements of exclusively subjective experiences and begin to exist as part of a shared cultural reality. In this sense, they gain the status of public property, as their reception, reinterpretation, and use by the collective consciousness of a community imbue them with new meanings that extend beyond the intentions of the original creator.

It is worth emphasizing that Popper treated his worlds as epistemological categories, not ontological ones—his concept focuses on the mode of existence and objectification of knowledge (e.g., theories, language, and intellectual works) rather than on the ontological foundations of reality as such. Transposing inspiration from Popper’s concept into the ontology of virtual worlds requires acknowledging the difference in perspective. In a metaphysical sense, the process of objectification pertains not only to cognitive content but also to the ontological status of virtual creations. Virtual worlds, although initially subjective, acquire a reality independent of the creator’s original consciousness through their relational character, presence in intersubjective communication, and ability to influence human consciousness. In this way, they are shifted from the order of individual immanence into the realm of shared, objective cultural reality.

As a result, virtual worlds can be recognized as autonomous immaterial entities that function as part of a broader cultural reality. Their objectivity does not consist of physical presence but rather their capacity to exert a lasting influence on culture and collective consciousness. Thus, the process of objectification of virtual worlds fits into a long philosophical tradition of reflection on the modes of existence of human mental creations, broadening the horizons of metaphysics to include new forms of being associated with the development of technology and the digital cultural sphere [14].