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Background:
Systematic Review

Insights on Payment for Environmental Services in Fisheries: A Systematic Review

by
Laura Develey
* and
Leandra Regina Gonçalves
Institute of Marine Sciences, Federal University of São Paulo, Santos 11070-100, Brazil
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Coasts 2025, 5(2), 20; https://doi.org/10.3390/coasts5020020
Submission received: 30 March 2025 / Revised: 7 May 2025 / Accepted: 4 June 2025 / Published: 6 June 2025
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Abstract

:
In the context of the prevailing environmental crisis, one innovative approach with the potential to promote inclusive conservation is payment for environmental services (PES). While numerous studies have documented the efficacy of PES in terrestrial ecosystems, mechanisms tailored to marine ecosystems remain relatively unexplored. The objective of this article is to conduct a systematic literature review to identify the essential components of a PES mechanism for fisheries and to map the lessons, challenges, and opportunities associated with it. Three databases were explored: Web of Science, ScienceDirect, and Scopus. Using Boolean operators, we searched for articles containing the following terms in the title, abstract, and/or keywords: “payment for ecosystem services” AND “fish*” and “payment for environmental services” AND “fish*”. Twenty-six articles focusing in depth on PES in the context of fisheries were identified. The results indicate that PES is a tool that can reconcile conservation and social objectives while offering numerous benefits for fisheries management. Nevertheless, it is imperative to meticulously evaluate the circumstances under which PES can meaningfully contribute to the inclusive conservation of marine and coastal ecosystems rather than assuming that it is a universal policy panacea.

1. Introduction

Marine fisheries play an important role in the global economy, generating employment and income and contributing to the food security of various communities [1,2]. On the other hand, poor management of this resource has led to the depletion of fish stocks to unsustainable biological levels [3,4]. For small-scale fisheries, which account for more than half of all catches and employ about 90% of the entire fishing sector [5], the scenario of declining stocks is even more alarming; as they are extremely dependent on fishing resources, any action that minimizes the potential catch and increases the time spent on this activity causes great socioeconomic damage to fishers [6].
From a social-ecological perspective, which considers social and ecological systems and their interdependence [7], the changes and impacts should not be viewed in a simplistic manner based on cause-and-effect relationships [8] but rather as cumulative and synergistic [9]. For example, communities with highly dependent relationships with natural resources, such as fishing communities, suffer significantly from the impacts, which increases the level of food insecurity and generates a range of other vulnerabilities [5,6,10].
In this scenario of high social-ecological complexity, it is necessary to adopt management mechanisms and integrated institutional arrangements that can promote more equitable and sustainable pathways [11]. Rigid management approaches have been shown to be ineffective, and strategies that address this complexity are needed [12,13]. The literature suggests that management mechanisms that include participation [14,15,16,17] and that incorporate both scientific and traditional knowledge [18,19,20] in transdisciplinary and co-construction dynamics [13,21,22] are potentially effective.
In the context of proposing novel mechanisms to advance on an inclusive conservation [23,24], incentive-based instruments such as payments for environmental services (PES) may emerge as a potential tool to support socio-environmental conservation efforts [25,26,27]. PES is generally defined as a transfer of resources between social actors that aims to create incentives to align collective and/or individual decisions with social interests in natural resource management [28]. These initiatives may involve the cooperation of different actors, compensate communities for losses, generate an alternative source of income, and involve local actors as protagonists in the solutions [29,30,31].
The increasing use of PES mechanisms gives rise to significant inquiries regarding their implementation and efficacy. Initiatives that lack well-defined criteria and are not adapted to local contexts often become panaceas—apparently simple solutions that disseminate readily but contribute minimally to enhancing the system as a whole [32,33]. To avoid such pitfalls, it is therefore essential to take into account the socio-ecological complexity and adapt mechanisms to local specificities [34,35].
Successful examples of PES in terrestrial environments are well documented in the literature [36,37,38], while PES mechanisms targeting marine environments have been less studied and mainly focused on experiences with blue carbon and mangroves [30,39,40,41].
Fisheries management varies widely across regions, shaped by differences in governance, enforcement capacity, and socioeconomic conditions. In many Global North contexts, well-established systems, such as quota-based regimes and individual transferable rights, help manage access and control overexploitation [42]. In contrast, small-scale fisheries in the Global South often operate under informal or customary tenure, face limited enforcement, and are marked by high dependence on fishing for livelihoods [43]. In these settings, overfishing is frequently the result of structural vulnerability rather than intentional resource depletion. Traditional top-down regulations can be difficult to implement or socially disruptive, highlighting the need for complementary, incentive-based approaches. PES schemes—though widely applied in terrestrial ecosystems—remain relatively underexplored in fisheries. This paper responds to this gap by reviewing the literature on PES mechanisms in the fisheries sector, with particular attention on the contexts in which they are proposed, the problems they aim to address, and their potential to support more inclusive and sustainable management. It is important to emphasize that our goal was not to evaluate whether the documented mechanisms meet all PES criteria but rather to organize and synthesize the findings reported by the identified studies.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Data Source and Search Strategy

The systematic review was conducted according to the criteria of the PRISMA protocol [44]. Three databases were explored: Web of Science, ScienceDirect, and Scopus. Using Boolean operators, we searched for articles containing the following terms in the title, abstract, and/or keywords: “payment for ecosystem services” AND “fish*” and “payment for environmental services” AND “fish*”. As it was not possible to search ScienceDirect with the term “fish*”, only “fish” was used. The selection of articles was not limited to a specific time period, and the searches were conducted on 12 January 2024.
The terms “environmental” and “ecosystem” were selected for the searches because they are frequently used synonymously in the literature [45,46]. Derissen and Latacz-Lohmann (2013) [47] proposed the exclusive use of the term “environmental” due to the fact that payments are made for conservation activities, necessitating human intervention, and “payment for ecosystem services” is redundant.
To capture gray literature and additional relevant studies in this evolving field, a supplementary search s was conducted in Google Scholar. Unlike the other databases, Google Scholar provides limited filtering and advanced search functionalities. Therefore, to reduce irrelevant results and to effectively target literature addressing artisanal fishing—a critical aspect of our review—a narrower search strategy was necessary.
We used the terms “payment for environmental services” AND “artisanal fishing” and “pagamentos por serviços ambientais” AND “pesca artesanal”. This tailored approach allowed us to include a broader spectrum of literature, particularly from non-traditional academic sources, and ensured that relevant studies were not overlooked. As a result of the different search strategy, the results from Google Scholar appear in the PRISMA diagram as “Identification of studies by other methods” (Figure 1). Also, the selection of articles was not limited to a specific time period, and the searches were conducted on 12 January 2024.

2.2. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

The review of the results was conducted in accordance with the following inclusion criteria: empirical articles addressing a case study on PES or conceptual articles on PES mechanisms for fisheries. The exclusion criteria were as follows: inaccessible full texts (“no access”), mentioning PES only as a management recommendation (“Not focused on PES”) or not addressing a PES mechanism in the context of fisheries (“Not related”), and exploring the valuation of ecosystem services (“Valuation”).

2.3. Study Selection Process

Following a thorough search for relevant articles, the documents were entered into Rayyan, a common tool used for systematic reviews. The initial phase of the article selection process entailed the exclusion of duplicates. Subsequently, the titles, abstracts, and keywords of the remaining articles were examined, and those that did not align with the research scope were excluded. Following this process, the selected materials were compiled in a Microsoft® Excel® spreadsheet (title and access link) with the markers “include”, “exclude”, and “doubt” and then read in full. Materials that did not meet the inclusion criteria were excluded, and to reduce potential bias, L.G. reviewed the materials marked “doubt”. This process resulted in the selection of 26 articles.

2.4. Data Extraction and Analysis

Each of these 26 studies was carefully analyzed and recorded in a Microsoft® Excel® spreadsheet extracting information relating to the title, year and journal of publication, the study area, the environmental service provided, whether the situation was hypothetical or in practice in the study area, type of benefit granted (monetary or not), financing and the method used to calculate the benefit. It also drew from the literature opportunities, challenges, and lessons learned that could be used in other experiments to implement marine PES.

3. Results and Discussion

A total of twenty-six articles were identified that addressed PES schemes for fisheries in depth. These included one oral presentation abstract, one technical document, two e-books, three chapters, and nineteen articles (Table A1). The low number of returns was anticipated and reinforces the fact that the field of study is still under development, with few studies examining PES mechanisms for fisheries. Almost all of the studies focused on small-scale fisheries (n = 25), with the exception of [48], which explored bycatch reduction in industrial fisheries as a potential PES mechanism.
In terms of geographical context, we considered the location of the research, whether based on hypothetical or actual models. The countries identified were Brazil, Bangladesh, Colombia, the Philippines, Mexico, Indonesia, France, Fiji, Chile, and Tanzania (Figure 2). Two of the articles did not focus on a specific area of study because they were theoretical works: [49], which discussed the concept of multifunctionality for fisheries, and [48], which provided policy tools to reduce bycatch from a global perspective. Consequently, these studies were not associated with any specific country.
The prevalence of countries from the Global South in PES studies is a finding consistent with the literature [38,50,51]. Pattanayak et al. (2010) [50] identified two possible reasons why developing countries may provide a special test for PES mechanisms: weak governance and high poverty rates. Weak governance can make it difficult to adopt other regulatory measures, as in the case of command-and-control legislation; in such contexts, PES programs may offer a viable strategy for mitigating the perceived burdens of imposed restrictive measures, employing a “carrot and stick” approach [52,53,54,55].
The uneven distribution of PES experiments across the Global South and Global North can be partly explained by structural differences in fisheries governance. In many Global North countries, access to fish stocks is regulated through rights-based instruments such as individual transferable quotas (ITQs), and subsidy frameworks often restrict direct financial compensation for reduced fishing activity, limiting the scope for PES-style mechanisms. Conversely, in the Global South, fisheries management frequently involves small-scale and artisanal actors operating under informal or customary access rights, where enforcement is weaker and regulatory approaches may lack local legitimacy. In such contexts, PES schemes are explored as a way to compensate for new restrictions (e.g., fishing closures) or to incentivize sustainable practices through non-traditional, flexible institutional arrangements [56]. This helps explain why many PES initiatives are hypothetical or experimental and why their implementation often blends market logic with development and poverty alleviation goals, which are a need to the Global South countries and to the small-scale fisheries [57].
Among the studies analyzed, fourteen proposed PES mechanisms that provide payments in the scenario of restrictive measures, such as the establishment of closed fishing areas (“stick”), where the payment (“carrot”) serves as compensation for the restrictions imposed on the livelihood activities of the actors involved [58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70]. Although this approach might initially appear to be a reactive compensation strategy—addressing losses from conservation measures—rather than a traditional proactive, market-based PES program, it incorporates key elements of the PES framework by emphasizing positive incentives to achieve conservation outcomes.
In evaluating these measures, Booth et al. (2023) [71] found that actors perceive punitive measures, such as fines resulting from violations of command-and-control regulations, as unfair, whereas positive incentive schemes like PES are viewed more favorably. Moreover, as demonstrated in the co-management context by [61], these rewards can also be interpreted as incentives for actors to participate in management, ultimately fostering collaboration rather than adversarial relationships. Thus, while the compensation schemes identified here differ in their reactive nature and reliance on non-market-based instruments from conventional PES programs, they still contribute to conservation outcomes and provide valuable lessons for the design of future PES experiments.
In the context of high poverty rates, several studies have linked PES mechanisms to poverty reduction by providing an additional, secure source of income that can foster regional development [31,72,73,74]. Although fishers already earn revenue from fishing, PES schemes are proposed to address the market failures associated with the positive and negative externalities of fishing. For example, unsustainable practices such as overfishing can lead to long-term ecological degradation that, in turn, threatens future fishing income. By compensating fishers, PES payments help offset these potential losses while promoting sustainable resource management. This additional income is particularly valuable for vulnerable communities involved in small-scale fisheries [6,75]; consequently, the implementation of programs that facilitate the stewardship of fishery resources while concurrently addressing poverty alleviation represents a crucial avenue for consideration. Among the studies reviewed, Begossi et al. (2011) [61] cited PES payments as a source of income that, although lower than fishing income, is secure and predictable. Moreover, Barr and Mourato (2009) [59] pointed out that, even with significant income from fishing in areas of high productivity, in future scenarios of greater environmental degradation that reduce fishing potential, PES is a positive tool to consider. It is important to note that, while PES payments may contribute to poverty alleviation, their primary objective is to incentivize the conservation of fishery resources [73,76]. Furthermore, their seeming attractiveness as a win-win solution reinforces the importance of understanding the potential contexts and conditions of PES before assuming them to be political panaceas, as miraculous solutions that are effective in all contexts [32,34,77].
It is important to consider the potential challenges and limitations associated with implementing PES schemes in the context of poverty alleviation within fisheries. One notable concern is the risk of unequal benefit distribution, where more influential or wealthier community members may capture a disproportionate share of the benefits, thereby exacerbating existing inequalities [78]. Ensuring equitable access and participation requires careful design and inclusive governance structures that actively involve marginalized groups in decision-making processes.

3.1. Key Elements for Marine PES

Before analyzing the specific components of PES design, it is important to clarify the main challenges that these mechanisms aim to address. In small-scale fisheries, overexploitation is often driven by structural vulnerabilities, including the absence of viable livelihood alternatives, insecure tenure, and limited enforcement capacity [56]. Traditional command-and-control approaches may impose burdens on communities without offering viable support or incentives for sustainable behavior [79]. PES schemes offer an opportunity to align individual and collective interests by compensating for positive environmental actions, such as reduced fishing effort, the adoption of sustainable practices, or participation in monitoring [80]. These mechanisms are particularly relevant in contexts where market failures, governance gaps, and social inequalities converge, making conventional regulation insufficient [80].
As expected, when analyzing the classification of studies as practical or hypothetical, there were mostly hypothetical models (n = 17). The lack of practical examples was also noted by [52], again reinforcing the necessity for further investigation and documentation in this field of research. The authors pointed out that too much focus on theory can overshadow some of the possibilities of implementing less than perfect PES, which can be exacerbated by the definition of PES schemes as “genuine” and PES-like, leading to high theoretical expectations that are not always met [28]. There is therefore a gap between theory and practice, which was also observed by [81], that does not occur in terrestrial PES schemes, where there are well-established agendas and international funding mechanisms drive the development of numerous projects, including reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) and the Warsaw framework [38,82]. In addition, marine coastal ecosystems have some peculiarities that distinguish them from terrestrial ecosystems, such as the high mobility of their elements [61] and the uncertain definition of “property” [52], which further increases the complexity of program design.
These gaps may justify two elements that were not fully addressed in the papers and are directly related to practice: financing and benefit calculation. With regard to financing, nineteen articles addressed the issue, but in the majority of cases, only a recommendation was provided (Figure 3). Only the papers by [59,67,83] delved deeper into the topic and explored the possibility of funding from tourism taxes, using the contingent valuation methodology, which calculates the maximum willingness to pay of the users of the ecosystem service—in this case, tourists—and the minimum compensation that the beneficiaries (fishers) would be willing to receive for the service provided. This methodology is commonly used to assess the financial viability of PES programs [84]. Other works on the subject, also hypothetical, pointed to some proposals for financing, such as adjustment of conditions of conduct (“Termos de Ajuste de Conduta”) in the case of Brazil [61,80], compensation for polluting companies [71,85,86,87], and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or government subsidies [88,89]. For practical work, the following funding is cited: Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF), which is a partnership between the government of Bangladesh and the World Food Program (WFP); in Brazil and the Philippines, the funders are private companies willing to buy the fish at a price above market value; and in Colombia, the funder is the NGO Conservation International.
Financing is a critical issue for many conservation instruments and has also been identified as a barrier to their management [74,90,91]. The viability of PES programs depends on consistent and sufficient financial flows in the short and long term to ensure sustainable change [30,52,71]. In addition, financing is highly dependent on the local context, both on a geographical scale and on the “buyers” of environmental services, who can organize themselves in different ways and present themselves through government agencies, private companies, and NGOs, among others [26,92]. Therefore, exploring the feasibility and different possible institutional arrangements is the first step towards a financial plan [26,91,92].
The sustainability and long-term viability of PES programs and the dependence on external funding sources can render these schemes vulnerable to economic fluctuations and shifts in political priorities. Integrating PES initiatives with broader development and conservation strategies can help enhance resilience and ensure that environmental and socioeconomic gains are maintained over time [53]. Additionally, incorporating local and traditional knowledge into the design and implementation of PES programs can improve their effectiveness and cultural relevance, fostering greater community ownership and commitment to resource stewardship.
Regarding the calculation of benefits, only nine presented the method used, with contingent valuation being the most common form (n = 5) [59,60,67,71,83]. Other studies also mentioned the opportunity cost (n = 4) [65,69,86,93], an economic concept that arises when the decision maker forgoes a benefit when making a choice and is relevant in determining the extent to which the payment is attractive to the beneficiaries [94]. This aspect was not explored in depth in the studies, but was cited by Gurney et al. (2021) [65] as being perceived as less fair by the participants involved in the case study; one of the justifications provided was the intangible value lost by giving up fishing.
The calculation of benefits also includes the choice of the type of payment. In this sense, the models were classified as monetary (n = 13) when they involve a direct cash transfer to the beneficiaries or non-monetary (n = 4), which, in the fisheries scenario, can take the form of support for specific community objectives, such as building infrastructure (schools and community centers), equipment for sustainable practices (nets and wildlife exclusion devices), courses, and training, or direct transfer of non-monetary goods, as in the Bangladesh model, where the beneficiaries receive a certain amount of grain (Figure 3). Sorice et al. (2018) [69] pointed out that the economic factor is not the only determinant of participants’ acceptance of the program, as social and cultural factors have a strong influence, so it is extremely important to look at the different possibilities of the benefits provided and thus also consider non-monetary benefits.
In addition to the type of payment, the duration of transfers can vary between programs. In some cases, transfers occur for a specific period, as in the case of monitoring activities during months of fishing restrictions [61,80]. In other instances, transfers are continuous, as in the case of the adoption of sustainable practices [71,83,88]. These differences may vary according to the contract established between actors [92], which must be flexible given the complexity of social-ecological systems [48].
The amount to be paid to beneficiaries and the type of payment are of great consequence, as they can serve to enhance or diminish the appeal of the program [65,69]. It is thus evident that the selection of these elements should be based on a number of factors. First, payments—if monetary—must not create perverse incentives, as high values can attract more people into the sector and increase pressure on fish stocks while also increasing transaction costs [54,71,88]. Another essential point is the importance of ensuring a fair and equitable distribution of benefits by accessing users’ perceptions during the planning and evaluation processes of initiatives [30,64,65]. In this sense, it is interesting to note that the selection of monetary payments is perceived as “gender-sensitive” [71], given the prevalence of women in post-fishing roles in the fisheries sector [5]. Conversely, the direct beneficiaries and registrants of PES programs are predominantly male. Therefore, the distribution of cash payments to a single gender would serve to reinforce the existing patterns of inequality. It is therefore important to also consider non-monetary payments in order to achieve a fairer and more equal distribution of benefits [71,95].
The environmental services identified in the review were as follows: monitoring services (n = 5); knowledge exchange with management (n = 1); adoption of sustainable practices (n = 9) (changes in net mesh, capture of mature individuals, reduction of elasmobranch catch, and reduction of bycatch); and restriction of fishing area (n = 9) (Figure 3). Among these, the monitoring and knowledge exchange services are the only ones that involve fishers in management, which, according to the literature, is an effective way to sustain programs and reduce conflict [62], even though these services are presented to beneficiaries in the fishing area restriction scenario. The environmental service “restriction of fishing area” is due to the combination of command–control regulations, such as the establishment of fishing restriction zones, with market-based incentive mechanisms, the PES, which, as discussed above, presents itself as a “carrot and stick” approach. In this scenario, as posited by [49], the compensation is not the result of a voluntary transaction: the loss of a portion of their income sources obligates fishers to accept compensation, which raises questions about the voluntary nature of their participation.

3.2. Challenges

The context of fisheries presents a number of particularities that give rise to a variety of obstacles for implementing and evaluating PES schemes. Among the challenges that have been identified are the emergence of conflicts [67,80], distrust in institutions [48,60,67], undesirable behavioral changes [71,88,89], the difficulty of monitoring [66,71,93], and the high cost [48,59,60,64,86,88,96] (Figure 4).
The heterogeneity of the fisheries sector, coupled with the diversity of actors involved in the design, implementation, and management of the schemes, gives rise to disparate visions and interests throughout the process, which can heighten the potential for conflict [67,80]. Furthermore, as previously discussed, PES schemes may emerge in the context of existing command-and-control regulations, thus creating the possibility of prior tensions between actors. In this regard, the literature underscores the significance of local diagnostic assessments and the incorporation of participants’ expectations, thereby reducing potential tensions [67,71,92].
Another aspect of the conflict mentioned as a challenge is the mistrust of institutions, which can be observed both in the relationship of financing through tourism fees, questioning the transparency of the use of the resource, and in the relationship between “buyers” and “beneficiaries”, since proposing contracts with new, unknown actors can generate some resistance [67,83]. In the Brazilian context, it is essential to consider the historical tensions between the government and traditional communities. Since the 1950s and 1960s, access to shared spaces and resources has been significantly constrained by urban and industrial expansion projects, many of which were government-led or sponsored by government-affiliated entities [97]. Thus, even today, there is great mistrust on the part of traditional fishers towards government actions [98]. Trust is crucial for building spaces for dialogue and the legitimacy and credibility of institutions and is reported to be a prerequisite for collaboration and knowledge exchange [99,100]. Therefore, it is expected that long-term PES schemes will work on building trusting relationships throughout the process, which can be enhanced in adaptive co-management processes [15,101].
In terms of undesirable behavioral changes, there are both issues related to the distribution of benefits, such as the gender inequality mentioned above [71], and issues related to fishing activity, as high incentives may attract more people to the sector, increasing pressure on ecosystem services [88,89]. Therefore, being aware of such possibilities can facilitate the implementation of effective planning strategies, thereby reducing the likelihood of adverse consequences.
The monitoring of marine coastal ecosystems is a challenging task due to the high mobility of elements within these ecosystems and the necessity for expensive, specialized equipment such as boats and GPS devices. This phenomenon is not exclusive to PES programs, as it has also been observed in other forms of management, such as the establishment of marine protected areas [90]. In light of the shared challenge, regional alliances and national monitoring systems can facilitate the process if collaboration is encouraged [102,103].
In addition to the financial outlay required for equipment and monitoring, the high investment cited as a challenge may also be attributed to the necessity for research, stakeholder consultation, institution building, legal aspects, and data collection [48,59,60,64,86,88,96], and this challenge may limit the implementation of PES programs. Wunder et al. (2008) [74] analyzed that, despite the high initial costs associated with the implementation of the instrument, the recurrent costs are relatively low, and the contextual dynamics can influence the performance of the instrument, so the program should be observed over time and that metrics should be created for the economic, social, and environmental variables in order to facilitate an assessment of the cost-effectiveness [25,104].
Yet, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are also essential to assess the actual impacts of PES schemes on both poverty reduction and environmental conservation. Robust assessment frameworks can identify unintended consequences, facilitate adaptive management, and provide evidence to inform policy refinements [105]. Furthermore, addressing external factors such as market access, infrastructure development, and education is crucial, as these elements significantly influence the success of PES initiatives and their ability to contribute meaningfully to poverty alleviation.

3.3. Opportunities

The opportunities identified through the literature review were reducing poverty and food insecurity [59,61,80], generating new data [59,87,96], and collaboration [60,62,66,70,83,106] (Figure 5).
The alleviation of poverty and food insecurity resulting from the introduction of supplementary income sources and/or the diversification of fishing activities (such as monitoring activities) can represent a significant secondary objective for PES schemes, particularly when the beneficiaries include communities facing vulnerability, as previously discussed [6,31,72,73,74,75]. Nevertheless, it is of the utmost importance to exercise caution throughout the design and implementation phases to guarantee that the conservation objective of these initiatives remains intact [73,76].
The generation of novel data on both socioeconomic and environmental dimensions is a potential outcome of diagnostic and monitoring instruments, which play a pivotal role in the conceptualization and assessment of PES. The production of new data on socioeconomic aspects, related to the profile of program beneficiaries, and environmental aspects, related to the ecosystem services managed, are opportunities that arise from diagnostic and monitoring tools, which are important components for PES design and monitoring [30,92,93]. Furthermore, data are often scarce in small-scale fisheries, underscoring the value of collaborative and participatory approaches to fisheries management [102,103].
Another opportunity identified by the review is cooperation between different sectors, such as fisheries and tourism for the financing of PES schemes, as exemplified by [83], and regional cooperation. As these are highly mobile elements and the establishment of spatial boundaries is not always sufficient, partnerships can facilitate the expansion of programs to other regions. A case in point is the program cited by [70], which targets a species found and marketed in Bangladesh, as well as in India and Myanmar. In addition, collaboration can also help strengthen management systems, as it allows for the building of trust and promotes learning among stakeholders, thereby increasing the transparency of processes [107,108].

3.4. Lessons Learned

Finally, the lessons learned from the literature were the importance of accessing the local context, thus ensuring models that are meaningful to the realities of the actors [65,67,69,71]; following the principles of transparency, equity, and justice, thus increasing the success of the social and environmental components of the programs [49,67,71,83]; valuing participatory processes and constant feedback, creating spaces for dialogue, increasing transparency and trust, and promoting the scalability of programs [58,65,69,71,93]; and the importance of having efficient institutional arrangements to ensure the clear and effective management of agreements [66,70,80], as well as the indispensability of resources to achieve sustainable transformations [60,64,66] (Figure 6).
An analysis of these experiences reveals a convergence with the perspective of adaptive co-management. Adaptive co-management combines the dynamic learning characteristics of adaptive management with the cooperative and collaborative characteristics of co-management [17] and is understood here as the process by which institutional arrangements and ecological knowledge are tested and revised in a dynamic, continuous, and self-organized process of learning by doing [13,109]. This management process starts from the premise that social-ecological systems are constantly changing [13], so that the pursuit of sustainability is less about certainty in planning and control and more about continuous learning and adaptation to an ever-changing world [12].
Among the key components of this strategy are a focus on integrating different knowledge systems, with the collective and institutional learning process being paramount, collaboration and power sharing between different hierarchical levels, and management flexibility [101,110]. In addition, understanding the local context is extremely important for the adaptation process [111]. Potential outcomes of this approach include greater recognition of the different needs and power arrangements among stakeholders, the formation of horizontal and vertical linkages and networks that promote trust building and social learning, and a greater capacity of resource management organizations to respond equitably and efficiently to complex socio-environmental problems [15,101,112].
Between the converging elements identified from the literature review and the elements proposed by adaptive co-management, the following stand out: the need for local context, participation, and feedback, and in the expected outcomes of this management approach, such as the formation of horizontal and vertical linkages and networks that promote trust building and social learning, as well as efficient institutional arrangements [15,101,109,111,112]. In this scenario, just as the combination of command–control regulations with PES mechanisms has been observed in the literature, there is an opportunity to explore new forms of fisheries management that is equitable and resilient, thus combining adaptive co-management processes with PES mechanisms (Figure 7).
However, the integration of these approaches also presents challenges. For instance, balancing the goals of conservation with poverty alleviation in PES schemes requires careful consideration to avoid unintended negative consequences, such as increasing inequality or creating perverse incentives [74]. Similarly, the participatory nature of adaptive co-management can be time-consuming and may require significant investment in capacity building, which can be a barrier in resource-poor settings [101].
Overall, this figure highlights the importance of adopting a holistic approach that combines the strengths of both adaptive co-management and PES schemes. By doing so, fisheries management can become more resilient, equitable, and effective in achieving both conservation and socioeconomic objectives.
Lastly, fostering strong institutional support and enabling policy environments is fundamental for the effective implementation of PES programs. Clear legal frameworks, transparent property rights, and supportive governmental policies can enhance program legitimacy and encourage broader participation from various stakeholders, including private sector actors and non-governmental organizations [113]. Collaborative approaches that involve multiple stakeholders can also help in aligning conservation goals with socioeconomic development objectives, promoting more holistic and sustainable outcomes.

4. Conclusions

The implementation of payment for ecosystem services schemes in the fisheries sector presents a range of challenges, each rooted in the unique characteristics of this context. One of the primary obstacles is the potential for conflicts to arise, stemming from the diverse interests and perspectives of the actors involved in the design, implementation, and management of these schemes. The literature emphasizes the importance of conducting local diagnostic assessments and incorporating participants’ expectations to mitigate these tensions and foster smoother implementation.
This review underscores the potential of PES strategies as a transformative tool for the conservation of marine and coastal ecosystems and the sustainability of fisheries while also addressing the dimensions of justice and equity. Despite the limited number of practical studies, especially in the context of small-scale fisheries and in countries of the Global South, the examples analyzed indicate the viability and effectiveness of these mechanisms in combining economic incentives with environmental conservation while simultaneously providing substantial socioeconomic benefits to local communities. Consequently, mapping such initiatives is of paramount importance to bridge the gap between theory and practice.
The evidence demonstrates that, despite the existence of challenges such as mistrust in institutions, the high mobility of marine resources, and barriers to financing and monitoring, there are potential avenues for enhancing and expanding PES programs. The incorporation of adaptive and participatory approaches may prove an effective means of not only overcoming some of the aforementioned barriers but also of promoting more effective and resilient management.
To further address these challenges, it is important to consider the integration of PES schemes into broader policy frameworks. Aligning PES initiatives with other policies and plans can enhance their coherence and impact. This integration also helps avoid potential conflicts with existing regulations and ensures that PES programs complement rather than compete with other conservation and development efforts.
Looking at the opportunities, it is clear that PES mechanisms can make a significant contribution to fisheries management, and even to reducing inequality and poverty, if they are implemented in a manner that considers the specific local context and involves active participation throughout the design, implementation, and monitoring phases.
It is also imperative to consider the social and cultural aspects in PES strategies, as they significantly influence the acceptance and success of programs. The integration of traditional and scientific knowledge, together with continuous and transparent engagement with local communities, can improve the effectiveness of initiatives and ensure a more equitable distribution of benefits.
Lessons learned point to the importance of adapting PES programs to local specificities. This entails the use of precise diagnostic tools that consider the heterogeneity of conditions and needs within fishing communities. These approaches must be designed to be inclusive, equitable, and based on co-management, with a particular emphasis on continuous learning and adaptation. These elements are already present and well established within the existing literature on adaptive co-management.
Finally, institutional coordination and governance are critical to the effective implementation of PES schemes. Strong institutional coordination across multiple levels of government and between different sectors is necessary to overcome governance challenges and enable opportunities. Building robust governance frameworks that facilitate collaboration, transparency, and accountability is essential for ensuring the success of PES schemes and achieving their intended environmental and social outcomes.
As this article is based on a systematic literature review, the results are general insights from different case studies from different contexts, and it is further recommended that future studies expand their research on PES in the context of different types of fisheries, with a particular focus on documenting case studies and exploring ways of financing and calculating benefits. Additionally, future studies will be beneficial in trying to move more from theory to practice; therefore, the PES for marine environments is more consolidated. Finally, although PES is presented as a tool that can reconcile conservation and social objectives and has many positive possibilities for fisheries management, it is essential to carefully consider the conditions under which PES can make a significant contribution to the conservation of marine and coastal ecosystems rather than assuming that it is a universal policy panacea.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization: L.D. and L.R.G.; Methodology: L.D. and L.R.G.; Writing—original draft preparation: L.D.; Writing—review and editing: L.D. and L.R.G. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research was funded by Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) grant (88887.921022/2023-00). Additionally, the “Nós da Ação” Project, under which this study was conducted, received funding from the Fundação Grupo O Boticário.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The authors confirm that the data supporting the findings of this study are available within the article The review was not registered.

Acknowledgments

During the preparation of this manuscript, the authors used DeepL for translation and providing grammar checking. The authors have reviewed and edited the output and take full responsibility for the content of this publication.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest. The funders had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of the data; in the writing of the manuscript; or in the decision to publish the results.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
PESPayment for Environmental Services
REDD+Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
NGONon-Governmental Organization
VGFVulnerable Group Feeding
WFPWorld Food Program

Appendix A

Table A1. References and Key Elements.
Table A1. References and Key Elements.
ReferenceTypeCountryPractical or HypotheticalFinancingCalculationBenefitEnvironmental ServiceTarget Species
[59]ArticleMexicoHypotheticalTourismContingent ValuationMonetaryRestriction of fishing area-
[60]ArticleTanzaniaHypothetical-Contingent ValuationMonetaryRestriction of fishing area-
[80]Oral presentation abstractBrazilHypotheticalConduct Adjustment Agreements--MonitoringCommercially important species
[61]ArticleBrazilHypotheticalConduct Adjustment AgreementsOpportunity costMonetaryMonitoring-
[63]ArticleBrazilHypothetical--MonetaryRestriction of fishing areaCommercially important species (e.g., Centropomus parallelus, Epinephelus marginatus, Scomberomorus cavalla, Lutjanus synagris)
[62]ArticleBrazilHypothetical---MonitoringSpecies used for consumption or commerce
[58]Technical DocumentBangladeshPracticalVulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)-Non-MonetaryRestriction of fishing areaTenualosa ilisha
[83]ArticleIndonesiaHypotheticalTourismContingent ValuationMonetaryAdoption of sustainable practicesSphyrna spp., Rhynchobatus spp., Mobulid spp.
[71]ArticleIndonesiaHypotheticalPolluting companies; Tourism; Funds for marine conservationContingent ValuationMonetary and Non-MonetaryAdoption of sustainable practicesSphyrna spp., Rhynchobatus spp.
[88]ArticleIndonesiaHypotheticalGovernment Agencies; NGO-MonetaryAdoption of sustainable practicesAprion virescens, Lutjanus vitta
[64]ArticleFranceHypothetical---Knowledge exchange with management-
[65]ArticleFijiHypothetical--MonetaryRestriction of fishing area; Involvement in management-
[85]ChapterBrazilHypotheticalPublic funds; Polluting companies--Adoption of sustainable practices; MonitoringArapaima gigas
[96]E-bookPhilippinesPracticalPrivate companies-MonetaryAdoption of sustainable practicesOctopus
[66]ArticleBangladeshPracticalVulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)-Non-MonetaryRestriction of fishing areaTenualosa ilisha
[48]ArticleTheoretical approach
[67]ArticleBrazilHypotheticalTourismContingent ValuationMonetaryRestriction of fishing areaSharks: Carcharhinus perezi, Ginglymostoma cirratum, Negaprion brevirostris, Galeocerdo cuvier, Carcharhinus falciformis
[93]ArticleColombiaPracticalNGOOpportunity costMonetary and Non-MonetaryAdoption of sustainable practicesArapaima gigas; Osteoglossum bicirrhosum
[49]ArticleTheoretical
[86]ArticleColombiaHypotheticalPolluting companiesOpportunity costMonetaryAdoption of sustainable practicesCommercially important species (e.g., Prochilodus magdalenae; Centropomus undecimalis; Mugil incilis; Megalops atlanticus)
[68]ArticleBangladeshPracticalVulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)-Non-MonetaryRestriction of fishing areaTenualosa ilisha
[89]ChapterMexicoHypotheticalGovernment Agencies-MonetaryAdoption of sustainable practices-
[106]E-bookBrazilPracticalPrivate companies-MonetaryAdoption of sustainable practicesCommercially important species
[87]ArticleBrazilHypotheticalPolluting companies--MonitoringPontoporia blainvillei
[69]ArticleChileHypothetical-Opportunity costMonetaryRestriction of fishing areaCommercially important species (e.g., Concholepas concholepas)
[70]ChapterBangladeshPracticalVulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)-Non-MonetaryRestriction of fishing areaTenualosa ilisha

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Figure 1. PRISMA flow diagram.
Figure 1. PRISMA flow diagram.
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Figure 2. Map showing the distribution of countries in the studies analyzed.
Figure 2. Map showing the distribution of countries in the studies analyzed.
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Figure 3. Financing, type of payment, and environmental services identified from the PES fisheries literature. The numbers in each box indicate the number of identified articles (e.g., monetary, n = 13; non-monetary, n = 4).
Figure 3. Financing, type of payment, and environmental services identified from the PES fisheries literature. The numbers in each box indicate the number of identified articles (e.g., monetary, n = 13; non-monetary, n = 4).
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Figure 4. Challenges for implementing and evaluating PES schemes: undesirable behavioral changes [71,88,89]; distrust in institutions [48,60,67]; high costs [48,59,60,64,86,88,96]; conflicts [67,80]; monitoring [66,71,93].
Figure 4. Challenges for implementing and evaluating PES schemes: undesirable behavioral changes [71,88,89]; distrust in institutions [48,60,67]; high costs [48,59,60,64,86,88,96]; conflicts [67,80]; monitoring [66,71,93].
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Figure 5. Opportunities identified from the PES fisheries literature: generating new data [59,87,96]; reducing poverty and food insecurity [59,61,80]; collaboration [60,62,66,70,83,106].
Figure 5. Opportunities identified from the PES fisheries literature: generating new data [59,87,96]; reducing poverty and food insecurity [59,61,80]; collaboration [60,62,66,70,83,106].
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Figure 6. Lessons learned from the PES fisheries literature: engagement and feedback [58,65,69,71,93]; effective institutional arrangements [66,70,80]; resources [60,64,66]; transparency, equity and justice [49,67,71,83]; local context [65,67,69,71].
Figure 6. Lessons learned from the PES fisheries literature: engagement and feedback [58,65,69,71,93]; effective institutional arrangements [66,70,80]; resources [60,64,66]; transparency, equity and justice [49,67,71,83]; local context [65,67,69,71].
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Figure 7. Convergence between adaptive co-management and lessons from the PES fisheries literature.
Figure 7. Convergence between adaptive co-management and lessons from the PES fisheries literature.
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Develey, L.; Gonçalves, L.R. Insights on Payment for Environmental Services in Fisheries: A Systematic Review. Coasts 2025, 5, 20. https://doi.org/10.3390/coasts5020020

AMA Style

Develey L, Gonçalves LR. Insights on Payment for Environmental Services in Fisheries: A Systematic Review. Coasts. 2025; 5(2):20. https://doi.org/10.3390/coasts5020020

Chicago/Turabian Style

Develey, Laura, and Leandra Regina Gonçalves. 2025. "Insights on Payment for Environmental Services in Fisheries: A Systematic Review" Coasts 5, no. 2: 20. https://doi.org/10.3390/coasts5020020

APA Style

Develey, L., & Gonçalves, L. R. (2025). Insights on Payment for Environmental Services in Fisheries: A Systematic Review. Coasts, 5(2), 20. https://doi.org/10.3390/coasts5020020

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