Psychological Injuries in the DSM-5: Courting Troubles
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. The DSM-5 and Its Discontents
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Earlier Criticisms of the DSM-5
| Criticism | Explanation |
| General Criticisms | |
| Medical model | Medical models consider mental health conditions as residing in an individual’s biological, brain-based, or physiological abnormalities. Interventions are biomedical, like medication or surgery related to the (presumed) medical etiology of the conditions. This contrasts with more biopsychosocial or social/societal models of disability. Moreover, etiology is rarely known for psychiatric disorders, unlike for strictly medical ones. |
| Big Pharma | “Big Pharma” is a disparaging term used for the undue influence, based on profit motive that the pharmaceutical industry has on the mental health field, from research on diagnostic disorders to the disorders included in the psychiatric classification manuals. Big Pharma is seen as contributing to the over-medicalization of mental health conditions, including dissemination of potentially misleading information and over-prescription of medications. |
| Working groups | The DSM iterations are products of working groups constituted by expert researchers and clinicians in specified fields related to the chapters in the manuals. The members are mostly psychiatrists (as well as psychologists), and they are required to declare conflicts of interest. However, the concern is that members receive grants from Big Pharma to conduct the research, and that the latter even might employ ghost writers. Working groups are criticized for lacking transparency, in documentation used and in decision making. |
| Clinical utility | Clinical utility in psychiatric classification systems refers to the practical help the systems offer to clinicians in real-world settings. For example, if the systems are too complex and research-focused such that clinicians cannot use them easily enough, this will lead to problems in diagnosis, treatment planning, and clinical care. However, if research addressing diagnostic and clinical questions is ignored in favor of clinical utility, the same problems arise. |
| Evidence-based | Mental health diagnostic manuals strive to include diagnoses of mental disorders that are supported by clinical research. They construct symptom lists that are based on research evidence for each diagnosis; otherwise, they include proposals for new diagnoses in appendices so that research can continue. That said, different psychiatric classification manuals will include different versions of the same disorder and even different disorders. Clinical utility can take primacy over research considerations. |
| Categorical | In psychiatric classification, the categorical approach considers disorders distinct, qualitatively different, and separate with clear boundaries, while the dimensional approach considers disorders as existing on a continuum of different degrees of severity. The uniquely dimensional approach is more quantitative than qualitative, but this makes it difficult to determine diagnostic clinical cut-offs. The DSM-5 arranged separate categorical disorders on dimensional spectra (e.g., in autism). |
| Comorbidities | Psychiatric classification manuals struggle with the question of co-morbidities. Diagnostic manuals, like the DSM, are criticized for facility in diagnosing multiple disorders in the patient. Diagnostic categories are rampant, diagnostic categories overlap, diagnostic criteria are too broad, symptoms overlap across disorders, diagnostic thresholds have been lowered, and clinicians cannot conduct comprehensive differentiating assessments in the limited time available with each patient. |
| Reliability | Psychometric reliability in mental health diagnostic manuals refers to the degree of inter-clinician agreement in field trials for each psychiatric condition diagnosed. Over the same category of cases, are the diagnoses agreed upon by independent, trained clinicians? For the DSM-5, reliability did not arrive at acceptable limits for some diagnoses, including depression and antisocial personality disorder, even after the criteria for levels of kappa interrater agreement were adjusted downward. |
| Validity | In mental health diagnosis, psychometric validity refers to whether a diagnosis is accurately, validly, or correctly representing the condition it is meant to represent. This depends on whether the diagnosis has been adequately constructed. Also, it depends on how its validity has been demonstrated, for example, with respect to potential causes, treatment response, and stability despite demographic and cultural variation. Certain critical disorders in the DSM-5 have been criticized in these regards, including personality disorders. |
| Aforensic | By definition, psychiatric disorder classification manuals are constructed for clinical and research purposes, with little attention paid to their forensic use. The DSM-IV took better care in this regard, compared to the DSM-5 (Young, 2016) [11]. Forensic work requires that expert witnesses use replicable valid procedures to arrive at opinions that are probative rather than prejudicial, aiding the trier of fact. The main issues in these regards are reviewed next. |
| Forensic Criticisms of the DSM-5 in Young (2016) [11] and its Cited Sources | |
| Vetting | The DSM working groups did not engage in vetting the drafts of the DSM-5, when compared to procedures followed for the DSM-IV. |
| Wording | The wording of the symptoms in the DSM-5 is not always tight and unambiguous. |
| Loopholes | The description of some categories in the DSM-5 leaves loopholes that can be exploited forensically. |
| Lowering the bar | The threshold criteria for some disorders have been lowered, allowing for increased diagnoses of the disorders. |
| Diagnostic inflation | This has led to an increase in the diagnoses given to individuals, as in comorbidities, as well as an increase in prevalence of some disorders. |
| Diagnostic overlap | Part of the reason is that the diagnoses have symptom overlap, conceptual overlap, and the same lowering of the diagnostic bar. |
| Assessment | Clinicians might diagnose without full-scale assessment, which lowers reliability and validity. |
| Preexisting | Clinicians do not typically determine whether diagnoses reflect in any way pre-existing stressors, vulnerabilities, or diagnosed disorders. |
| Causation | Generally, clinicians typically do not investigate causation behind diagnoses sufficiently for forensic needs, e.g., negligent accidents. |
| PTSD | There are hundreds of thousands of ways an individual might express a symptom profile consistent with PTSD, making it not very useful as a label that captures the patient’s specific experience. Wording ambiguities/imprecisions/omissions risk missing valid PTSD diagnoses or over-diagnosing it, harming plaintiffs or defendants, respectively. |
| Chronic pain | Referring to chronic pain with the label of somatic symptom disorder (SSD), as in the DSM-5, risks undervaluing the pain experience contributing to its functional impairments. Referring to chronic pain as pain disorder, as in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR), risks overvaluing the physical injury component of the condition. The former risk potentially harms plaintiffs; the latter risk potentially harms defendants. |
| Neuro-cognitive Disorder (NCD) | There are mild and major classes of NCD in the DSM-5, but no moderate class, which leads to shunting moderate cases into the mild class. This would not be problematic for MTBI/concussion, but is quite problematic for moderate TBI, which risks undervaluing such cases in court. |
| Malingering | Malingering is not well defined in the DSM-5, with its red flags, in particular, being problematic [74]. |
| Daubert (1993)/Frye (1929) | Forensic evidence needs to meet standards of good as opposed to poor or junk science, aside from having general acceptance. The DSM-5 was not constructed forensically. Further, some critical diagnoses can be questioned in court, e.g., for reliability or validity. |
| Case law | Case law indicates that expert witness testimony on the DSM-5 is considered for admissibility on a case-by-case basis (Freckelton, 2023) [75]. As far as is known, case law has not found that refers to criticisms or admissibility issues with respect to the DSM-5 for the three major psychological injury conditions. Ferranti (2015) [64] reported case law that involved criticism of the DSM-IV-TR [65]. |
2.3. Recent Criticisms of the DSM-5
3. Alternative Systems to the DSM-5
| System | Description |
| DSM-5 | The DSM-5 is the latest version of the American Psychiatric Association’s psychiatric classification system of diagnosable mental disorders. It is considered the standard reference in North America. For each of its disorders, it provides specific diagnostic criteria. The list of symptoms for each diagnostic category is arranged into separate clusters, with a specified amount of symptoms required in each cluster (polythetic). There are over 300 mental health diagnoses in the DSM, some arranged on spectra (e.g., autism). |
| ICD-11 | The ICD-11 includes a revised comprehensive module on mental, behavioral, and neurodevelopmental disorders (MBNDs). As with the DSM-5, the ICD-11 provides a structured classification system for MBND conditions. It is the standard reference for mental health professionals globally for use across different countries and languages [4], with ongoing research [81]. It provides detailed descriptions and diagnostic criteria for each disorder. It is not as detailed as the DSM-5. |
| RDoC | The RDoC is a framework for mental health and psychopathology developed by the American National Institute of Health [6,82]. It considers basic human neurobehavioral functioning and its development in an environmental context, but in practice focuses on neuroscience/neurobiology. Its domains are meant to be studied along the full range of functioning from normal to abnormal. It focuses on different sources of variables (units of analysis, for instance, behavioral, physiological, and self-report data). |
| HiTOP | The RDoC is not the product of institutional initiatives but is researcher-driven. It considers mental health in terms of continua or dimensions rather than discrete categories. Further, mental health reflects a hierarchical structure, with the top level having broader spectra (e.g., internalizing, externalizing (further divided into disinhibited and antagonistic), thought disorder) and the bottom level having more specific symptom clusters and traits. |
| Networks | The network approach to mental disorders focuses on symptoms and their interconnections without focusing on presumed top-down latent variables that they are presumed to reflect. In addition, the symptoms (nodes) are considered interconnected links (edges), and their interactions are considered to form causal systems, with symptoms influencing others to manifest. Centrality refers to the influence a symptom has within the system, and some symptoms are considered causal drivers of others. |
| Biopsychosocial | The biopsychosocial model describes the influence of, and interaction among, multiple factors on behavior and mental health. Examples—Biological: genetic predisposition, brain structure, and function, physiology of the individual, e.g., the stress response. Psychological: intelligence, personality (temperament) emotions, thoughts, behaviors, motivation, and coping. Social: family, peers, culture, socioeconomic status, and environmental factors (e.g., see Fayed et al., 2020; Young, 2016) [11,83]. |
| Relational | A relational psychiatric mental disorder classification system proposes placing disorders in their relational and environmental context, rather than considering disorders as uniquely within the individual [84,85]. In the present view, relational mental disorders should not be conceived as secondary to individual disorders; rather, they should characterize all disorders, although there are specific primary mental health disorders related to family/romantic couples. |
| Clinical staging | This refers to specifying steps in a dynamic progression of mental disorder, rather than statically describing symptoms [86,87]. Stages-0: At risk, not yet expressing symptoms or seeking help. 0a: [as proposed by the present author, based on the dynamic change model [88] Oscillating between absence/presence of mild-to-moderate symptoms/functional impairments]. 1: Mild-to-moderate symptoms or functional impairments. 2: Discrete disorder(s). 3: Recurrent/persistent. 4: Severe, persistent/unremitting. |
| Psychodynamic (PDM) | The psychodynamic psychiatric classification system, the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual, 3rd ed. (PDM, Lingiardi & McWilliams, 2025) [89] emphasizes understanding of the underlying dynamics of mental experience and personality, focusing on a person’s unique developmental history, context, personality patterns, interpersonal relationships, and internal mental world (subjective experience and perceptions, unconscious processes), rather than only on observable symptoms. |
| Developmental (DC: 0–5) | The Diagnostic Classification of Mental Health and Developmental Disorders of Infancy and Early Childhood [90,91] is a developmental psychiatric classification manual specifically for diagnosing mental health and developmental disorders in infants and young children (birth through age 5). It includes a five-axis system—clinical disorders, relational context, medical conditions, stressors, and emotional development. |
| Note. DSM = Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed., text rev.). ICD-11 = International Classification of Diseases for Mortality and Morbidity Statistics (11th Revision). RDoC = Research Domain Criteria. HiTOP = Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology. | |
4. Psychological Injuries
| Proposal | Explanation |
| Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) | |
| Eight-dimensional model, with CPTSD criteria added consistent with DSM-5, ICD-11 | The DSM-5’s 20 symptoms are organized into four symptom clusters. The research points to a 7-factor model of PTSD, covering its 20 symptoms; adding a factor for the dissociative subtypes suggests an 8-factor model [123]. CPTSD refers to PTSD from long-term adverse experiences, which needs to be included in the PTSD factors in a forensic diagnostic procedure. This approach produces a 9-factor/cluster PTSD model. All factors/clusters should have core symptoms noted for the diagnosis. |
| Organized as a symptom checklist | PTSD symptoms should be expressed in the first person so that the symptom lists can be used as checklists or self-report questionnaires by patients, aside from the clinician determining the presence of the symptoms. This paper presents a novel 25-item PTSD questionnaire paraphrased after DSM-5 and ICD-11 items that is organized into 9 factors, with patient or clinical scoring on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = never; 2 = rare; 3 = sometimes; 4 = often; and 5 = very often). |
| Note. CPTSD = Complex PTSD. | |
| Chronic Pain | |
| Considers the complications of chronic pain | Young (2013b) [34] argued that instead of attempting to diagnose chronic pain from a psychological perspective, it is more important to indicate the extent of complications occasioned by the chronic pain. The DSM-IV used categories of pain conditions without and without a psychological component, and the DSM-5 removed pain as a primary focus in considering it a somatic symptom disorder (with predominant pain). Young’s formulation considered the extensive effects of chronic pain rather than specifically its symptomology. |
| Avoids the DSM-5 SSD with predominant pain | The SSD formulation implies that there is a psychological component that is important in the causal matrix of the pain condition, which is the case. However, this can be used against the victim in that it could be argued that the patient’s pain experience is partly due to the exacerbatory effects of the person’s psychology rather than the incident at issue. The SSD formulation can be used in the sense of a medically unexplained condition, contributing to blaming the victim. |
| Somatic Symptom Disorder (SSD) With Predominant Post Concussion-like Symptoms | |
| Considers Persistent post-concussion syndrome (PPCS) | Although SSD is not the best way of approaching a diagnosis for chronic pain, it works well when considering the long-term effects of MTBI/concussion. The latter normally dissipates in days to weeks, if not months, but cases persist and become heavily psychological in origin and focus. This led Young (2020) [124] to propose that PPCS is an SSD, with predominant post-concussion-like symptoms. The cognitive, emotional, and behavioral overfocus on its symptoms is consistent with SSD. The condition formulated in these regards reduces the patient’s overwhelming belief that they have brain damage that could be serious and opens their condition to focused psychological treatments. |
| Avoids Neurocognitive disorder (NCD) | In the present formulation, MTBI/concussion is not a neurocognitive disorder; it is a psychological one. In the DSM-5, applying the mild NCD class to MTBI/concussion would be the usual procedure, but that condition should be reserved for genuine neurocognitive disorder as ascertained in comprehensive neurological/neuropsychological assessment. Young (2020) [124] considered PPCS a biopsychosocial condition in which the original cerebral insult did not persist but set the stage for other biopsychosocial factors to propagate and maintain concussion-like symptoms. |
| Cross-Diagnostic Considerations | |
| Polytrauma | The incident or context at issue might elicit comorbidities involving all three major psychological injuries—chronic pain, MTBI/concussion, and PTSD. Their interaction complicates and more deeply ingrains the disorders, making them more difficult to treat. Polytrauma like this makes it more difficult to assess the examinee; diagnose the disorders; understand their core, driving symptoms; understand their functional effects and impairments; and propose targeted treatment modalities. |
| Adds a forensic module | The clinician should determine to the possible causation and whether malingering or related attributions seem involved, while supporting the opinion with irrefutable evidence. Forensically, the court needs to be certain that the clinician tried to specify the origin of the PTSD, e.g., the traumatic stressor, and whether other independent causal factors are involved, e.g., pre-existing, independent peri-traumatic, or independent post-traumatic. The module refers to degree of negative response bias or presentation, including those of feigning and malingering, which go beyond exaggeration. |
| Consistent with the biopsychosocial model | The biopsychosocial model seeks influences and causes related to multifactorial processes that are involved in normal and abnormal behavior. Working from this perspective helps the forensic mental health assessor understand the role of the index incident in relation to other factors in the causation of the disorder at hand. Young (2008) referred to the forensic biopsychosocial model in this regard [125]. |
| Consistent with the sensitization model | Young, Thielen, et al. (2025c) [126] proposed, for the first time, an integrated model across the three major psychological injuries (chronic pain, PTSD, and MTBI/concussion). They posited that, in all three conditions, sensitization takes place, involving reciprocal symptom-exacerbatory interaction between central and peripheral sensitization. The locus and nature of the peripheral interaction differ across the conditions (respectively, reception, sensation, and perception, with all three involving conception/cognition). |
| Clusters and Symptoms | DSM Symptoms Description, with ICD-11 Symptom Equivalences 1 |
|---|---|
| 1. Intrusive memories 1 |
|
| 2. Recurrent nightmares 1 | I get repeated unpleasant or disturbing dreams (nightmares) related to what happened that bother me (distress me) in the content of the dreams, their emotions, or both |
| 3. Dissociative reactions/flashbacks 1 | I get sudden experiences or feelings as if what had happened is actually happening again, or I am acting as if it were actually happening again. These experiences include things like getting flashbacks, or memories of what had happened, or even a complete loss of awareness of my immediate surroundings, which is called dissociation |
| 4. Heightened emotional reactivity to signals 1 | I ger intense or lengthy emotional bothers or upsets whenever I get even one reminder of as little as one aspect of what happened. I get this whether the reminder is either internal in the body (e.g., reacting to a flashback) or external to the body (e.g., seeing something that brings it back in my mind) |
| 5. Physiological reactivity to reminders | I get marked (which means strong) reactions (e.g., a panicky reaction, heart pounding, trouble breathing, sweating) to something that reminded of what happened. I get this whether the reminders are internal in the body (e.g., reacting to a flashback) or external to the body (e.g., seeing something that brings it back in my mind) |
| 6. Avoids reminders (thoughts/feelings/memories) |
|
| 7. Avoids external reminders 1 | I avoid (or try to avoid) reminders that are external (a person, place, conversation, activity, object, situation) that could make me emotionally upset or distressed in my memories, thoughts, or feelings about what happened |
| 8. Inability to recall important aspects (“amnesia”) 1 |
|
| 9. Persistent heightened negative beliefs | I get strong negative beliefs or expectations (something that I expect) that either keep coming into my mind (persist) or that are clearly exaggerated. These negative thoughts could be about myself, about other people, or about the world (e.g., for me: being bad, the nervous system is destroyed; for others: they are trustworthy, or the whole world is dangerous) |
| 10. Persistent self/other blame | I get distorted (twisted) thoughts that keep coming back (persist) to the point that I blame myself either for what happened or for what happened after it, or I blame other people this way |
| 11. Persistent negative emotional state | I get strong negative feelings or emotional reactions that keep coming back to me (they persist). These emotions could be fear, anger, horror, guilt, or shame |
| 12. Marked loss of interest |
|
| 13. Detachment | I experience feeling very distant, or apart, cut off, or removed from people (I feel estranged) |
| 14. Restricted positive affect |
|
| 15. Irritability/anger 1 | BI do show behavior such as outbursts, feeling especially irritable or angry, and this happens for no or little reason (which means they occur without provocation). When I feel irritability or anger this way, I can express it either verbally or physically, and I can do so either toward objects or toward people |
| 16. Reckless/Self destructive | I behave in ways that involve either taking more risks (being reckless) or behaving in ways that are harmful to me (that are self destructive) |
| 17. Hypervigilance |
|
| 18. Exaggerated startle 1 | I startled easily and strongly or get so jumpy (that is, in ways that are exaggerated) |
| 19. Difficulty concentrating 1 |
|
| 20. Sleep disturbance 1 | Disturbed sleep. This means I experience a problem in either falling or staying asleep, or I get restless sleep |
| 21. Depersonalization |
|
| 22. Derealization | I get repeated experiences that are lengthy (persist) of my surroundings feeling unreal (or like a dream, distorted, or distant from me) [but not because I was under the influence of a substance, such as alcohol, or had a medical problem, such as a brain seizure] |
| 23. Affective Dysregulation 1 |
|
| 24. Negative Self-Concept 1 | I have a negative view of myself, which includes getting feelings of being worthless or being ashamed of myself |
| 25. Disturbed Relationships 1 | I have difficulty creating and keeping healthy social relationships, including experiencing difficulty feeling close to other people |
| Scoring Grid: Combined PTSD/Complex PTSD Symptoms. |
| Item 1 1. never __ 2. rare __ 3. sometimes __ 4. often __ 5. very often __. |
| Item 2 1. never __ 2. rare __ 3. sometimes __ 4. often __ 5. very often __. |
| Etc. |
| Criterion | Explanation |
|---|---|
| I. Apparent Authentic Biopsychosocial Presentation/Causation | |
| A. | Pain in one or more anatomical sites is distressing and is the predominant focus of the clinical presentation |
| B. | The pain causes clinically significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning (post-pain onset complications) |
| C. | Psychological factors are judged to have an important role in the onset, severity, exacerbation, or maintenance of the pain (excessive, persistent, maladaptive thoughts, feelings, or behaviors), as manifested by at least two of the following: excessive, persistent, maladaptive thoughts about the symptom seriousness; never __ 2. rare __ 3. sometimes __ 4. often __ 5. very often __ excessive, persistent, maladaptive anxiety, depression, or frustration, about the experienced pain and its perceived consequences; never __ 2. rare __ 3. sometimes __ 4. often __ 5. very often __ excessive, persistent, maladaptive time, effort, and energy expended about them never __ 2. rare __ 3. sometimes __ 4. often __ 5. very often __ |
| D. | The symptom or deficit is not intentionally produced or feigned (as in Factitious Disorder or Malingering) |
| E. | The pain is not better accounted for by another disorder |
| Specifiers | Duration: Acute: <3 months; Transitional Chronic: ≥3 months; Persistent Chronic: ≥6 months |
| Severity: Specify below Mild: Consider not diagnosing SSD as clinical, given its manageability at this level Moderate: Consider diagnosing SSD as a feature or sub-syndromally, although even this level is hard to manage Severe: This level is definitely SSD Reported: Symptoms ___ Distress ___ Impairment ___ | |
| Criterion | Explanation |
|---|---|
| |
| A | Post-concussion-like symptoms [as in the Note below to the table on the Symptoms] are distressing and are the predominant focus of the clinical presentation |
| B | The symptoms cause clinically significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning (post-symptom onset complications) |
| C | Psychological factors are judged to have an important role in the onset, severity, exacerbation, or maintenance of the symptoms (excessive, persistent, maladaptive thoughts, feelings, or behaviors), as manifested by at least two of the following: excessive, persistent, maladaptive thoughts about the symptom seriousness; never __ 2. rare __ 3. sometimes __ 4. often __ 5. very often __ excessive, persistent, maladaptive anxiety, depression, or frustration about the experienced pain and its perceived consequences; never __ 2. rare __ 3. sometimes __ 4. often __ 5. very often __ excessive, persistent, maladaptive time, effort, and energy expended about them never __ 2. rare __ 3. sometimes __ 4. often __ 5. very often __ |
| D | Social/ecological/environmental factors are judged to possibly have an important role in the onset, severity, exacerbation, or maintenance of the symptoms (excessive, persistent, maladaptive thoughts, feelings, or behaviors), as manifested by at least one of the following: (a) family dynamics involved, e.g., encouraging the sick role (b) social support lacking, socially isolated or withdrawing (c) institutional support perceived as lacking, e.g., by the workplace, third party payors, the court or related venues, health professionals involved; a sense of injustice or even undue entitlement in consequence |
| E | The symptoms or deficits are not intentionally produced or feigned (as in Factitious Disorder or Malingering) |
| F | The symptoms are not better accounted for by another disorder |
| |
| A | Duration: Acute: <3 months; Transitional Chronic: ≥3 months; Persistent Chronic: ≥6 months |
| B | Severity: Specify below Mild: Consider not diagnosing SSD as clinical, given its manageability at this level Moderate: Consider diagnosing SSD as a feature or sub-syndromally, although even this level is hard to manage Severe: This level is definitely SSD Reported: Symptoms ____ Distress ____ Impairment ____ |
| |
| A | If Confusing or Complicated Presentation/Causation, Specify Degree of Feigning, if any None ____ Minor exaggeration ____ Gross exaggeration ____ Deliberate feigning (motivation not evident) ____ More than that: Outright malingering for monetary or other secondary gain ____ |
| B | Specify Source of Confusion, if any: □ Can be fully explained by pre-existing factors (e.g., psychopathology) □ Pre-existing factors exacerbate the symptoms □ Post-onset factors exacerbate the symptoms (e.g., family, work, litigation, distress) □ Incidental factors exacerbate the symptoms (e.g., death in family, societal unrest) |
| C | Specify Certainty of These Ratings Unsure ____ Some information ____ Clear information ____ |
| A | Note. All terms and qualifiers that could be ambiguous or contentious must be attributed only if clearly evidenced and documented and go beyond the minimal/mild and, if applicable, the moderate range, as the case may be, for example: (a) Excessive and persistent psychological factors in the symptom experience; (b) Severe symptoms/distress/impairment; (c) Gross exaggeration/malingering; and (d) Pre-existing and post-onset factors, as well as any extraneous factors (e.g., an unrelated death of a loved one) |
5. Discussion
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
| Concept | Explanation |
|---|---|
| General Considerations | |
| Theoretical base | The three major psychological injuries (chronic pain, PTSD, and MTBI/concussion) have more in common than being primary conditions with concomitant functional impairments elicited by negligent or otherwise compensable injuries. In particular, they are all considered biopsychosocial in origin, and they occur in tandem in polytrauma. Beyond that, they cohere in symptom expression by having, at their base, a sensitization that includes a dynamic interplay of central and peripheral sensitization. |
| Advantages | By specifying explicitly the major symptoms in each of the major psychological injuries in revised versions, along with presenting their core and driving symptoms, the forensic assessor can avoid some of the pitfalls in the standard DSM-5 (and ICD-11) psychiatric disorder classification systems. Because the proposed module includes symptom lists for the three conditions, speaking to network and biopsychosocial models, while addressing the RDoC and HiTOP ones, it suggests a viable forensic option with a clear research agenda. |
| Addresses limitations | That said, the proposed psychological injury forensic module has not been piloted in assessments nor tested for its reliability and validity. In this sense, it constitutes, at best, a useful adjunct to standard mental health assessment practices that point to complementary diagnostic options that are forensically oriented. Used alone, it will not stand up to court admissibility challenges nor cross-examination. |
| Operationali-zation | The module consists of four specific components that are clearly and specifically described (chronic pain, PTSD, MTBI/concussion, forensic module), which will allow for investigation of their psychometric properties (reliability, validity). Moreover, they can be studied for their construct validity by pairing them in research with similar diagnostic lists, such as the DSM-5 and ICD-11 diagnostic formulations, and similar assessment tools, such as the PCL-5 in the case of the PTSD component of the module. |
| Identifies core symptoms/drivers | The present revision of PTSD symptoms relies heavily on extant nosology in the DSM-5 and ICD-11. However, it has added some elements, including combining those symptoms, separating them into empirically supported clusters, and specifying core symptoms within each cluster. The criteria for the latter choices were empirically and logically defined. As for the other psychological injuries for chronic pain and MTBI/concussion, the symptom criteria were based on the SSD protocol, but they were modified slightly in wording. Each one of the three symptoms can be specified on a five-point Likert scale according to the present formulation, and future research can determine which scale number in diverse populations and contexts, including forensically, for each condition is core. Network research can provide another perspective on which symptoms drive others causally. |
| Applications | |
| Assessment | The proposed formulations for the three psychological injuries can be added complements to standard forensic assessment procedures. Generally, all three provide numerical quantification of the symptoms associated with the conditions. They can serve in creating viable, psychometrically researched questionnaires to complement other instruments used in the field. In their current state, absent that, they can be used as clinical office symptom-report questionnaires that can be filled in by the patient/examinee or the administering professional. The forensic module can be used for all three proposed psychological injury questionnaires, once more bringing added value to the assessment to complement other forensic assessment procedures. |
| Court | The court considers the scientific quality of evidence submitted in testimony/reports, for example, evaluating whether the evidence is admissible as good as opposed to poor or junk science. Prudent use of the four modules presently proposed can provide new perspective and quantitative data on the three psychological injuries at issue. That said, the forensic assessor should acknowledge their limitations and indicate the limited added value they bring until future research establishes their reliability and validity. |
| Integrating other approaches | The DSM-5 and ICD-11 should be the primary source for diagnostic formulation in forensic cases, with their limits identified. The present four modules should be used only as adjuncts. The PTSD questionnaire is the first one that integrates the DSM-5 and ICD-11 approaches. The chronic pain and MTBI/concussion formulations are new to the field, and, here, they are reframed in the SSD frame. All three psychological conditions herein formulated are considered biopsychosocial conditions subject to network analysis. The RDoC and HiTOP approaches can be researched for their possible additions to the present forensic four-component module once all the components are fully researched and shown as clinically useful. |
| Research directions | The presently proposed four-component forensic psychological injury module can serve as a useful adjunct in forensic assessment but also as a guide how to revise the DSM-5 and ICD-11, especially toward making them more forensically sensitive and usable. Before that perspective can be applied in earnest this way, it needs ongoing programmatic research in the way described. This should be undertaken, initially, to develop a final version of each component and, then, to test them for their reliability and validity in diverse contexts and with diverse populations. The DSMs and ICDs are not meant to be forensic documents, per se, but they are used in forensic assessments. The field can improve their research base and clinical utility by refining and empirically testing the present four-component forensic psychological injury module in the ways described. |
| Training, policy, advocacy | In its current state, at a minimum, the present four-component forensic psychological injury module can be used in forensic mental health education, placements, and continuing education, and expert witness medicolegal assessments as adjuncts. The DSM-5 and ICD-11 working groups for upcoming revisions can use it to improve the general forensic sensitivity and usability of their manuals. Once properly finalized, the four components of the module can be used as primary assessment tools in forensic mental health assessments, with the field educating about and advocating for their use, given their potential to increase accuracy and fairness in judicial decisions. |
| Terms | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Psychological injury | Psychological injuries take place as a result of negligent events, such as motor vehicle accidents (MVAs) or workplace injuries. The primary diagnostic injuries include PTSD, chronic pain, and MTBI/concussion. Other psychological injuries that could be related to the index incident include major depression, generalized anxiety, adjustment disorder, specific phobia, other trauma conditions, sleep disorder, and moderate and severe TBI. Court actions include tort for lost income and future care costs and disability benefits claims (e.g., for military veterans) [9]. |
| Assessment | Forensic mental health assessors need to conduct comprehensive, scientifically informed, and impartial assessments. This includes examinee interviews, collateral consultations, record and document reviews, and administration of standardized tests. For forensic psychologists, the latter testing includes tests that assess examinee credibility or validity, such PVTs and SVTs. These types of tests provide evidence of gross symptom/functional impairment overreporting and neurocognitive test underperformance, respectively. |
| Gross inconsistencies | A major source of evidence in establishing examinee credibility relates to gross inconsistencies in the examinee profile, such as across different documents, behavior in session and outside it, and excessive self-reporting of improbable, absurd, and rare symptoms. Videorecorded evidence, as with the claimant found working while claiming disability, constitutes incontrovertible evidence of malingering. |
| Malingering/feigning | Malingering refers to the conscious gross exaggeration of symptoms or functional impairments for purposes of secondary gain, which refers to monetary compensation in the psychological injury context (e.g., in tort action) (for PTSD, see Boskovic et al., 2019; Matto et al., 2019; Sparr, 2017; and Young, 2017; and generally, see Svete et al., 2025, and Young, Erdodi et al., 2025d) [131,132,133,134,135,136]. Feigning also refers to deliberate fabrications in these regards, but the assessor does not have evidence of clear intent to fabricate for secondary, monetary gain. These opinions are offered only after examining the full examine profile and never just on the basis of test results alone. In terms of the base rate of invalid response set, which concerns failing a battery of PVTs or SVTs at standard thresholds in the field (e.g., 2 or more PVT fails, the rate has been found to be below 30% in a comprehensive literature review by Young, Erdodi et al., 2025d, and as found in studies since then; Rohling et al., 2024, Svete et al., 2025) [135,136,137] |
| Case example | JT was involved in a relatively minor MVA but immediately claimed an inability to work as his administrative job, claiming intense, untreatable pain, intense panic attacks at the mere sight of cars, and profound cognitive impairment. After one year of no improvement despite innumerable therapies, physical and psychological, the forensic psychiatrist found many inconsistencies in the file, including different reports of major symptoms and their effects, pain behaviors in the office but none as the examinee walked to his vehicle, and denial of past traumas evident in the medical record. The forensic psychologist found similar inconsistencies, and the examinee failed the SVTs and PVTs administered. |
| Psychological trauma reaction (PTSD) | TJ was in a traumatic MVA, requiring multiple surgeries before she was released after 2 months. She was highly medicated in her stay, but not right away. Her friends and boyfriend visited often, but the boyfriend eventually ended the relationship. She could not do her IT job, because of her physical and mental limitations, aside from her cognitive ones. She could not sleep well from her pains, aside from having nightmares, and experienced multiple flashbacks in the day. She was diagnosed with a mild TBI/concussion, getting headaches and brain fog. Her physical and psychological therapies helped somewhat, but she remained petrified in the car, refusing to drive herself. She was diagnosed with PTSD, which remained 6 months after the accident. |
| Chronic pain | Her pains never really subsided, and this was the primary reason for her functional impairments. Physically, she had to walk with a cane, and she needed a walker and crutches when released from the hospital. She needed a wheelchair in the hospital. She was poorly medicated before her surgery, partly accounting for her persistent pain experience. Currently, she is excessively worried about her injuries, chronic pain, and functional limitations and catastrophizes about them. She doctor-shops and consults Doctor Google much of her time. |
| Persistent Post-concussion syndrome (PPCS) | SPECT and MRI scans ruled out a brain bleed. She was conscious after the accident, but in shock and hardly recalled it. She exhibited multiple concussion symptoms, including dizziness, nausea, light sensitivity, concentration difficulties, memory issues, irritability, and her persistent brain fog. Stress aggravated her symptoms. She excessively focused on her maladaptive thoughts, emotions, and cognitive problems related to her concussion, which she considered a permanent brain injury. She began to give up any cognitive activity, such as reading or trying to follow conversations. |
| Causation/Pre-existing Comorbidities | TJ had a difficult childhood, having parents who were physically abusive. She began to remove herself mentally when her father hit her, which was frequent. She left home at 16, and she slept in shelters through family services. She became a teenage mother, but persisted in her studies, getting a community college IT diploma. This led to her employment before her MVA. The forensic mental health assessor verified TJ’s account of her pre-accident psychological stressors, vulnerabilities, and disorders and deemed them contributory but not primary in a causation analysis. The legal tests examined included the material contributions test and the but-for test, both of which found the accident to have contributed causally beyond the de minimus range and resulted in psychological effects that would not be present without the accident having taken place. |
| Forensic Psychological Injury Module Helps | TJ’s medicolegal neuropsychological assessor was trained in the psychological injury forensic module. She assessed TJ using multiple tests and diagnosed TJ using the DSM-5, resulting in diagnoses of PTSD, SSD with predominant pain, and mild neurocognitive disorder for the cognitive effects of her MTBI/concussion. The four-component forensic psychological injury module gave further insight into TJ’s mental state. The neuropsychologist learned that TJ’s PTSD was accompanied by CPTSD and poor sleep and that her flashbacks were drivers of other symptoms. She learned that TJ was especially worried about the physical, emotional, and cognitive limitations caused by the accident. She surmounted all her early adversities and was doing well before the accident, although there was residual mistrust in her dating life and she lacked some social and emotional regulation skills. That said, the psychologist clearly referred to the MVA as the predominant cause of the psychological effects of the MVA, with TJ’s pre-accident depression, which required psychotherapy and medication during her teen years, as a contributing but not primary cause. In her report written for court, the neuropsychologists used some of the quantitative data provided by the forensic module’s three instruments. The primary care physician received a copy of the report, and he began using the module’s instruments in his own assessments of psychologically injured patients. The neuropsychologist joined a research team working to validate the module’s components. |
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| Template for Stress Dysregulation Disorder |
|---|
|
| (a) Acute Stressor/Trigger/Trauma. An immediate event such as a motor vehicle accident or natural disaster |
| (b) Chronic Stressor/Trigger/Trauma. An ongoing trauma or a past one with lingering effects |
| (c) General Presenting Problem. Endless possibilities described by the patient(s) |
|
| (B1) Core (higher-order, top-down) |
| 1. Reaction |
| i. Immediate/Tonic/Short term (e.g., peritraumatic) |
| (a) Hyper-react/greatly emote. For example, fight or flight, scream/rage, catastrophize |
| (b) Hypo-react/no reaction. For example, freeze, put on a shell, confusion/shock/in a fog/dazed; dissociate (includes reports of dissociative amnesia, and depersonalization/derealization) |
| (c) Delayed |
| ii. Phasic/Long term |
| (a) Constant reaction |
| (b) Variable, off and on |
| 2. Executive Function (EF). |
| For example, problems in inhibition, self-control, reward management, working memory (also called updating), goal orientation/intentionality, motivation/purposefulness, decision making, cognitive flexibility/shifting set, problem-solving, planning/organizing, monitoring. |
| 3. Biobehavioral/Neurovegetative function. |
| For example, problems in sleep, fatigue, eating habits, sexual drive, pain/headaches. |
| (a) Hyper. For example, excessive sleep, nightmares, mania includes excess energy, inflated self-esteem, hyper goal orientation, overeating, stomach/digestion issues, dizziness, hypersexual, hypersensitivity, muscle tension/pain/headaches/pressure in the head. |
| (b) Hypo. For example, poor sleep, low energy, poor appetite, lost sexual drive, hyposensitivity. |
| 4. Experiential/Existential (for self/other factors). |
| (a) OTHER: For example, distrust of others/world, different in relating to others/humanity, paranoia. |
| (b) SELF: For example, loss of identity/meaning, don’t feel the same person anymore or feel changed on the inside (personality change), negative self-esteem (e.g., worthlessness, helplessness, hopelessness, giving up), lost self-confidence, changed life story/narrative or world view. |
| 5. Coping |
| For example, unstable, disorganized; poor coping, poor social support; leading to being overwhelmed. |
| (B2) Consequences (lower-order, bottom-up) |
| 6. Physiological. |
| (a) Hyper. For example, panic, hyper-arousal, exaggerated startling. |
| (b) Hypo. For example, no reaction despite an expected fight or flight response/panic. |
| 7. Behavioral. |
| (a) Hyper. For example, argumentative, out of character behavior, motor agitation or restlessness/retardation or slowing, substance abuse/addiction, destructive/risky behavior, distress at reminders and reliving; endless checking/repetitions/preoccupations. |
| (b) Hypo. For example, avoidance, stopping pleasurable activities, social isolation. |
| 8. Cognitive. |
| (a) Hyper. For example, mind racing, trying to suppress thoughts and can’t, ruminate, reminders are salient, hyper-vigilant, narrowed hyper-focusing/appraising, recurrent thoughts of death or dying. |
| (b) Hypo. For example, can’t focus, can’t concentrate, mind wandering, distracted, slow/delayed responsivity, can’t think rationally anymore; avoiding distressing thoughts, memories (and feelings). |
| 9. Emotional/Affective. |
| (a) Hyper. For example, a lot of negative affect, especially anxiety, depression, irritability, fear, blame, guilt, shame. |
| (b) Hypo. For example, blunted affect, flat affect. |
| 10. Social/Relational. |
| (a) Hyper. For example, don’t want to be alone, over-dependent, loss of social control, disturbed social behavior. |
| (b) Hypo. For example, withdrawn, detached, distant, abandoning, numb, aloof, estranged. |
| 11. Language/Communication. |
| (a) Hyper. For example, can’t stop talking, interrupting, can’t follow/lose track, disputing, very tangential, disordered speech. |
| (b) Hypo. For example, word finding difficulties, short answers, avoiding or little listening, cutting off communication, articulation disruption/slurring. |
| 12. Other. |
| For example, extreme or quite inappropriate reactions, such as psychotic reactions (hallucinations, delusions, catatonia); suicidal ideation, gestures, and attempts; and/or homicidal or violent ideation, actions. |
|
| For example, dysfunctions in ADLs, work, school, parenting, interpersonal relations. |
|
| For example, age, sex, life roles, medications, over-medicating. |
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Young, G. Psychological Injuries in the DSM-5: Courting Troubles. Psychiatry Int. 2026, 7, 4. https://doi.org/10.3390/psychiatryint7010004
Young G. Psychological Injuries in the DSM-5: Courting Troubles. Psychiatry International. 2026; 7(1):4. https://doi.org/10.3390/psychiatryint7010004
Chicago/Turabian StyleYoung, Gerald. 2026. "Psychological Injuries in the DSM-5: Courting Troubles" Psychiatry International 7, no. 1: 4. https://doi.org/10.3390/psychiatryint7010004
APA StyleYoung, G. (2026). Psychological Injuries in the DSM-5: Courting Troubles. Psychiatry International, 7(1), 4. https://doi.org/10.3390/psychiatryint7010004
