Social Media and the Journalist–Source Relationship: How Digital Death Knocks Might Exacerbate Moral Injury

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This in is an interesting topic on media reports on the death of famous people, and how this has changed in modern day of social media. It relates to the ethics of using social media as sources for news stories, and the mental health for members of a profession.  

The text could benefit from a clearer definition of the concepts used, and a clearer explanation of how the data collection and data analysis were conducted, and a more concise presentation of findings.

 

Abstract:

Methods could be mentioned in the abstract.

Introduction:

The injury part can be clarified. Physical injury – is this due to violent attacks? How do they sustain the injuries? Also, the concept of moral injury is unclear – is this something they inflict upon themselves, or just in the eyes of others?

The method is unclear. This needs to be explained earlier, it makes it easier to understand what the paper is trying to convey.

The death knock is mentioned several times, but it should be explained earlier exactly what this is. The first part of the death knock seems to be when journalists take direct contact with the family of the deceased, but in the digital version it seems like they don’t contact the families at all, but rely on other sources.  

 Page 3,111-114: Where do they draw the line here when it comes to celebrity news? The utilitarian ethical code can be elaborated.

RQs are clearly formulated.

 

Methodology

In the introduction it is stated that the methodology is a quantitative survey and qualitative interviews with no further explanation. It could be clearer explained here what the data consist of, and how they shed light on the topic.

In the methodology section the survey should be better explained. What did you ask about, how did you recruit journalists, and so on. And who got recruited for the qualitative interviews. A more active language would make this section easier to follow, instead on phrasings like “the surveyed journalists”. Now this section moves a bit back and forth between the two methods. It would be easier to follow the logic if they were presented separately.

Findings:

It is unclear which findings are from the survey, and which are from the interviews. The methodology section does not say much about how the data were analyzed, except for a short mention that thematic analysis was used.

The methodology section and finding section should be re-arranged with this in mind. Present a clear summary of the findings from the survey, and use the data from the interviews to elaborate in depth.

 

Language:

The grammar and wording are good, but some of the long sentences can be difficult to follow for a non-native English speaker.  

Author Response

Comment 1: This in is an interesting topic on media reports on the death of famous people, and how this has changed in modern day of social media. It relates to the ethics of using social media as sources for news stories, and the mental health for members of a profession.   

Response 1: Thank you for that generous comment. I just seek to clarify that the death knock relates to ordinary people as much as famous people.

Comment 2: The text could benefit from a clearer definition of the concepts used, and a clearer explanation of how the data collection and data analysis were conducted, and a more concise presentation of findings. 

Response 2: Agreed. I have addressed each point raised here as they related to specific comments below.

Comment 3: Methods could be mentioned in the abstract. 

Response 3: Yes, I have now mentioned methods in the abstract. (Lines 7-8)

Comment 4: The injury part can be clarified. Physical injury – is this due to violent attacks? How do they sustain the injuries?  

Response 4: I have explained that physical injury is rare but can occur when bereaved family members lash out at journalists they perceive are intruding. (Lines 35-36)

Comment 5: Also, the concept of moral injury is unclear – is this something they inflict upon themselves, or just in the eyes of others? 

Response 5: I have explained that moral injury is something that is felt by the journalist, not in the eyes of others. (Line 42)

Comment 6: The method is unclear. This needs to be explained earlier, it makes it easier to understand what the paper is trying to convey. 

Response 6: I have more clearly outlined the method. (Line 71-75)

Comment 7: The death knock is mentioned several times, but it should be explained earlier exactly what this is. The first part of the death knock seems to be when journalists take direct contact with the family of the deceased, but in the digital version it seems like they don’t contact the families at all, but rely on other sources. 

Response 7: I have clarified that the death knock (direct contact) has now largely given way to the digital death knock (reliance on social media). (Lines 25-28)

Comment 8: Page 3,111-114: Where do they draw the line here when it comes to celebrity news?  

Response 8: I have clarified that decision making will take into account whether the deceased or their family court celebrity or exhibit notoriety, as opposed to being just 'ordinary people'. (Now lines120-121)

Comment 9: The utilitarian ethical code can be elaborated. 

Response 9: Following comments from another reviewer, I have reworked sections that refer to utilitarian and deontological (duty-based) parts of journalism codes, so I hope this will now be clearer to this reviewer as well. I have not highlighted particular lines here, as it occurs throughout, so I hope that is sufficient.

Comment 10: In the introduction it is stated that the methodology is a quantitative survey and qualitative interviews with no further explanation. It could be clearer explained here what the data consist of, and how they shed light on the topic. 

Response 10: Thank you. I agree the methodology needs to be better explained, and I believe I have done that in my revision. I have also better explained what data consist of and how they shed light on the topic. See specifics below.

Comment 11: In the methodology section the survey should be better explained. What did you ask about, how did you recruit journalists, and so on. 

Response 11: Yes, I have more fully explained the survey's content and the process of recruiting participants. (Lines 308-317)

Comment 12: And who got recruited for the qualitative interviews.

Response 12: I have explained how interview recruitment occurred. (Line 325-329)

Comment 13: A more active language would make this section easier to follow, instead on phrasings like “the surveyed journalists”.

Response 13: Thank you, I agree. I have tried to be more active in my language.

Comment 14: Now this section moves a bit back and forth between the two methods. It would be easier to follow the logic if they were presented separately. 

Response 14:  I agree. I have separated the methods, and explained further on that data from both methods was analysed simultaneously. (Lines 343-360)

Comment 15: 

It is unclear which findings are from the survey, and which are from the interviews. The methodology section does not say much about how the data were analyzed, except for a short mention that thematic analysis was used. 

 The methodology section and finding section should be re-arranged with this in mind. Present a clear summary of the findings from the survey, and use the data from the interviews to elaborate in depth. 

Response 15: I have answered these two comments together. I have explained that data from the survey and interviews were analysed together and expanded on the thematic coding used. 

Given that was my approach, I won't be able to explain data from the survey separately to the interviews, and will therefore not be able to restructure this section.

However, I believe my approach has been clarified successfully. (Lines 305-366)

Comment 16: The grammar and wording are good, but some of the long sentences can be difficult to follow for a non-native English speaker.  

Response 16: Thank you. I had not fully considered the experience of the non-native English speaker, and have been conscious of writing shorter and clearer sentences in my final edit.

 

 

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This is a strong contribution to the scholarship on journalistic ethics and the examination of a particular journalistic practice. The article is based on robust data. The following revisions would improve the article before publication.

The name of the company TikTok shouldn’t have a space in it.

It is unclear in introduction (page 1, like 36-37), whether the practice of death knocks or the practice of *digital* death knocks increases journalists’ risk of moral injury.

Line 113-114, I might opt for “sacrificed in favor of” or “sacrificed for” rather than “at the altar of,” which seems a bit misplaced.

Line 130, the mention of the results here could be left to later in the paper

Line 173, 178-181 sudden change in font should be corrected

Since the methodology frames the journalist-source relationship as a function of the ethical framework, perhaps it would make sense to re-order those sections such that the ethical discussion comes first and the journalist-source relationship section can be more directly tied to that framework.

The connection between the ethical framework and moral injury could be more fully developed. It appears a bit suddenly and almost appears as an afterthought or kind of assumption. A more complete explanation of the relationship would be helpful.

Line 291-293 While I actually appreciate that the author didn’t spend inordinate amounts of space explaining the sample breakdown in detail, a few key statistics to demonstrate the claimed representativeness of the sample would be helpful.

Similarly, line 299, “extensive” experience could be represented with more specificity. How many years on average, or in the range?

Line 471-472, “a distinction is drawn between journalists who can be described as utilitarian (the greatest good for the greatest number) and journalists who can be described as Kantian (respect for persons)” but this distinction is not fully explained; what is the evidence in the data for this distinction? In general, the results could be organized to more fully reflect this, if the author(s) has/have in fact identified a relationship between the journalists’ ethical orientation and their attitudes and behaviors. This happens a bit at the end, on page 11 and then in the conclusion, but could be more systematically presented in the findings.

Author Response

Comment 1: This is a strong contribution to the scholarship on journalistic ethics and the examination of a particular journalistic practice. The article is based on robust data. The following revisions would improve the article before publication.

Response 1: Thank you for this generous feedback. I address the revisions below.

Comment 2: The name of the company TikTok shouldn’t have a space in it. 

Response 2: Thank you for picking up this error; I have corrected it. (Line 31)

Comment 3: It is unclear in introduction (page 1, like 36-37), whether the practice of death knocks or the practice of *digital* death knocks increases journalists’ risk of moral injury. 

Response 3: I have been clearer to explain that there is a risk of moral injury from death knock practice per se, but that risk is increased with digital death knock practice. I have also been clearer about why that is. (Now at line 43-46)

Comment 4: Line 113-114, I might opt for “sacrificed in favor of” or “sacrificed for” rather than “at the altar of,” which seems a bit misplaced

Response 4: I have removed this reference. 

Comment 5: Line 130, the mention of the results here could be left to later in the paper 

Response 5: I have removed this reference to results.

Comment 6:  Line 173, 178-181 sudden change in font should be corrected 

Response 6: Thank you for observing. It should be correct now.

Comment 7: Since the methodology frames the journalist-source relationship as a function of the ethical framework, perhaps it would make sense to re-order those sections such that the ethical discussion comes first and the journalist-source relationship section can be more directly tied to that framework. 

Response 7: Based on feedback from another reviewer, I have substantially rewritten these sections under one heading (Lines 224-292). I hope this presents the arguments more clearly.

Comment 8: The connection between the ethical framework and moral injury could be more fully developed. It appears a bit suddenly and almost appears as an afterthought or kind of assumption. A more complete explanation of the relationship would be helpful. 

Response 8: I hope in rewriting the section above that this has become clearer.

Comment 9: Line 291-293 While I actually appreciate that the author didn’t spend inordinate amounts of space explaining the sample breakdown in detail, a few key statistics to demonstrate the claimed representativeness of the sample would be helpful. 

Response 9: Thank you for this observation. I have included some key statistics, and could also provide a table if you think that would be helpful. (Lines 314-324).

Comment 10: Similarly, line 299, “extensive” experience could be represented with more specificity. How many years on average, or in the range? 

Response 10: Yes, I have added in some detail. (329-331)

Comment 11: Line 471-472, “a distinction is drawn between journalists who can be described as utilitarian (the greatest good for the greatest number) and journalists who can be described as Kantian (respect for persons)” but this distinction is not fully explained; what is the evidence in the data for this distinction? In general, the results could be organized to more fully reflect this, if the author(s) has/have in fact identified a relationship between the journalists’ ethical orientation and their attitudes and behaviors. This happens a bit at the end, on page 11 and then in the conclusion, but could be more systematically presented in the findings. 

Response 11: Thank you for this valuable observation; it is line with a comment from another review asking me to more fully develop my understandings of ethical frameworks. I have made this clearer throughout the paper, adopting the term deontological (duty-based) rather than Kantian, and connecting utilitarianism and consequentialism. Further, I have clarified my understanding of codes that they are not entirely utilitarian, but actually deontological (duty-based) with some utilitarian sections. I hope this is clearer now.

I also make the point that I can't demonstrate this from my findings; rather it is my theorising. I have softened the language around my claim that 'a pattern emerges' to rather suggest a 'tendency'. This is reflected in the new heading (line 385) and the statement at line 513-516 "While a link cannot be demonstrated in this inquiry, analysis of data through the lens of moral injury theory raises the question of whether the journalist’s personal standpoint – their view of the journalist-source relationship and their underlying ethical framework – is a predictor of moral injury. While a pattern cannot be established, a tendency does emerge." 

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This is an interesting paper, exploring a challenging and underappreciated aspect of many journalists’ lives, and I think a version of it would certainly be publishable. However, I would like to see some changes to tighten up the use of terms from moral philosophy and to make the claims in the paper more precise.

The author does a good job of laying out the various ways in which social media can be used to supplement, or even effectively replace, the practice of the ‘death knock’. This was the strongest element of the paper and answered the first research question well.

My main concern is that in addressing the second and third research questions the author plays a bit fast and loose with the concepts of ‘utilitarianism’ and ‘Kantian ethics’, opening the door to some unhelpful confusion about their meaning and their relationship to existing codes of ethics. I would also like to see the author explore the idea of moral injury in a little more detail. I will explain these points in turn.

On p.3, the author states that “codes reflect a utilitarian ethical framework – the greatest good for the greatest number – which might justify an individual’s privacy to be sacrificed at the altar of public interest.” This is then asserted further down the page as well. However, it was not clear to me why this was supposed to the case. As the author goes on to explain, there are principled, non-consequentialist reasons for curtailing privacy, or setting it aside in certain circumstances where other considerations may be thought to have more weight, or even to trump it – the public interest may well be one such consideration. Many deontologists believe that conflicts (or apparent conflicts) of rights can be decided decisively in a principled fashion, and there is nothing at all inconsistent about rejecting the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number while holding that privacy is not an absolute right.

For instance, on p.11 the author cites a journalist who says that you can’t really say your privacy has been invaded because someone takes something from the public sphere, and presents this as an example of a utilitarian approach. But this is not at all obvious. This journalist could simply be saying that the right to privacy has limits, and that while someone might prefer not to have information that they themselves have made public shared widely, they have no moral claim against anyone doing this because either the right simply doesn’t apply in those circumstances, or they have actually waived it by putting the information in the public domain. If there is no claim right against another agent to refrain from performing some particular action, then a different claim against some other action cannot provide any moral protection. So, in this case there would simply be no conflict.

We could imagine other cases where the right to privacy has not been waived, but that the rights of others take priority because they are more important. Imagine that you have promised a friend to meet them for lunch, but on your way you come across a hit and run traffic accident. Almost all deontologists will agree that you should break your promise to save the life of the injured pedestrian, but this does not make them utilitarians.

It might help to be a bit clearer about your terms. Consequentialism is a family of moral theories that are all committed to the idea that what makes actions right or wrong is the goodness or badness of their consequences. Utilitarianism is a particular species of consequentialism which says that the relevant consequences are the generation of utility or disutility. There are then different accounts of what utility is. The most basic, and familiar, form of utilitarianism is hedonic utilitarianism which says that utility is pleasure and disutility is pain. Mill holds a version of this view. As you discuss it here, ‘Kantian ethics’ seems to refer to a different family of moral theories that argue that there are fundamental principles that make actions right or wrong, and that no matter how desirable the consequences of an action might be, they cannot override those principles. This family is what I’ve been calling deontology. It probably doesn’t matter in this context, but it might be worth noting somewhere that Kant himself is a big figure in deontological ethics, and has inspired many thinkers, but not many philosophers (or journalists for that matter) are, strictly speaking, Kantians all the way down the line.

So, one question that the author needs to address is why the reader should agree that all journalistic codes of ethics are essentially utilitarian. The four pillars framework mentioned on p.5, for example, seems, on the face of things, to have a more deontological flavour. Can/should those principles all be reduced to the one overarching principle of maximising utility? If so, then why? Were the authors all utilitarians? Do the codes state somewhere that everything they say is justified in accordance with the principle of utility? It seems more likely to me that codes of ethics are not really written with any particular moral theory in mind, and are instead intended to appeal to a wide range of views and values – that they are, in this respect, as muddled as the average person’s thinking on such deep philosophical questions. Since this claim about the utilitarian ethos of codes is not actually central to the author’s arguments in the paper it might just be simpler to drop it.

Another question that may require a bit more work is whether it really is the case that Kantian-minded journalists are at greater risk of moral injury than utilitarian-minded ones. There may be very good utilitarian reasons for getting valid consent and not publishing information against the wishes of family and friends, for example if the utility gained by the audience in reading a more compelling version of the story is outweighed by the negative experiences of the family and friends, and the general badness of the coarsening of society when it comes to disregarding the wishes of people who find themselves caught up in newsworthy events. Here’s another way of posing this question: what would you say to someone who objected that the key distinction here is not really between utilitarians and deontologists at all, but rather, as the interviewee on p.12 suggests, between those who care about ethics and those who don’t?

I also think the author should say more about moral injury itself. The implicit assumption seems to be that moral injury is always bad, but it is actually not obvious that this is true. If I do something morally wrong then I ought to feel bad about it. If I see that I’ve done wrong then the correct response is to feel guilt for my action, and, depending on the circumstances, perhaps even shame for being the kind of person who would do this wrong thing. It is, of course, regrettable that the wrong happened in the first place, but once it did, it would be even worse if the wrongdoer did not acknowledge the wrong and feel the appropriate moral emotions. In institutional betrayal the moral injury arises because the journalist is, to some degree, pressured or forced into committing a wrong. Now, not all pressure absolves us of responsibility, so depending on the circumstance it might still be right for the journalist to feel guilty, even if their editors and peers ought to feel guilty too.

So, I think it would be helpful if the author explained when we should worry about moral injury (as well as the original action which precipitates it), perhaps in particular cases of institutional betrayal, and distinguish that from a different point which is that the prevalence of moral injury here might just give us all reason to think again about how social media is now generally being used across the press when journalists are conducting death knocks.

I had a few more minor and specific queries which I will list:

P.6 it is unclear what you mean when you say that moral obligations do not depend on conduct. They are about conduct in the sense of actions. Whether or not they are discharged or violated will depend on conduct.

P.9 should “moral injury in journalists” be “moral injury to journalists”?

P.11 last paragraph before conclusion. It is not clear why this is a clash between utilitarian and Kantian ethics. Proponents of both might argue that commercial pressures are generating wrong behaviour.

Author Response

Comment 1: This is an interesting paper, exploring a challenging and underappreciated aspect of many journalists’ lives, and I think a version of it would certainly be publishable. However, I would like to see some changes to tighten up the use of terms from moral philosophy and to make the claims in the paper more precise. 

Response 2: Thank you for this valuable feedback. It constructively challenged me to improve my understanding of the terms I used from moral philosophy, which is clearly not by area of expertise, and make the claims more precise. I really value the time you have taken to offer such detailed advice. I address them in turn below.

Comment 2: The author does a good job of laying out the various ways in which social media can be used to supplement, or even effectively replace, the practice of the ‘death knock’. This was the strongest element of the paper and answered the first research question well. 

Response 2: Thank you for that positive feedback. I am pleased I have answered this question well.

Comment 3: My main concern is that in addressing the second and third research questions the author plays a bit fast and loose with the concepts of ‘utilitarianism’ and ‘Kantian ethics’, opening the door to some unhelpful confusion about their meaning and their relationship to existing codes of ethics. I would also like to see the author explore the idea of moral injury in a little more detail. I will explain these points in turn. 

Response 3: Your description of my 'fast and loose' approach certainly made me take stock. It was very valuable, and I now have a better understanding that I hope I have successfully conveyed throughout the paper. Clearly, I cannot attain your level of understanding in such a short time, but I hope to be clearer and more convincing in my arguments in this revision. See Lines 58-64, 125-127, 240-264, 273-292, 507-516, 641-642,669.

Comment 4: On p.3, the author states that “codes reflect a utilitarian ethical framework – the greatest good for the greatest number – which might justify an individual’s privacy to be sacrificed at the altar of public interest.” This is then asserted further down the page as well. However, it was not clear to me why this was supposed to the case. As the author goes on to explain, there are principled, non-consequentialist reasons for curtailing privacy, or setting it aside in certain circumstances where other considerations may be thought to have more weight, or even to trump it – the public interest may well be one such consideration. Many deontologists believe that conflicts (or apparent conflicts) of rights can be decided decisively in a principled fashion, and there is nothing at all inconsistent about rejecting the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number while holding that privacy is not an absolute right. 

Response 4: You are correct to observe it is not the case. Further research has helped me understand that codes are not, in fact, primarily utilitarian. but deontological (duty-based). However, they do have some utilitarian elements. The point I was trying to make, I now realise, was that within one code there can duties laid out, but in that same code there is a clause that requires you to balance those duties, and this is where utilitarian thinking comes in. In the case of the death knock, should I as a journalist respect personal privacy (as duty would have me do) or should I prioritise publication (as the balancing clause allows me to do). I hope this is more clearly explained in the paper in this revision. See Lines 120-127 especially.

Comment 5: For instance, on p.11 the author cites a journalist who says that you can’t really say your privacy has been invaded because someone takes something from the public sphere, and presents this as an example of a utilitarian approach. But this is not at all obvious. This journalist could simply be saying that the right to privacy has limits, and that while someone might prefer not to have information that they themselves have made public shared widely, they have no moral claim against anyone doing this because either the right simply doesn’t apply in those circumstances, or they have actually waived it by putting the information in the public domain. If there is no claim right against another agent to refrain from performing some particular action, then a different claim against some other action cannot provide any moral protection. So, in this case there would simply be no conflict. 

We could imagine other cases where the right to privacy has not been waived, but that the rights of others take priority because they are more important. Imagine that you have promised a friend to meet them for lunch, but on your way you come across a hit and run traffic accident. Almost all deontologists will agree that you should break your promise to save the life of the injured pedestrian, but this does not make them utilitarians. 

It might help to be a bit clearer about your terms.  

Response 5: I agree with you about the example of the broken promise. I suppose the point I am making is that the journalist's decision is not so clear-cut. Some journalists will have no trouble at all taking material from social media without seeking permission or giving much thought to how that might affect bereaved people. Their justification is that it is fair game because it is in the public sphere. Others will say that even though that information is in the public sphere, they should stop and consider the impact of publishing it. Both journalists can argue they are publishing in the public interest, but only one is genuinely weighing up whether they are causing harm to a bereaved family. I hope I have been clearer about this conundrum as the site of moral injury in the paper. See lines 258-264.

Comment 6:

Consequentialism is a family of moral theories that are all committed to the idea that what makes actions right or wrong is the goodness or badness of their consequences. Utilitarianism is a particular species of consequentialism which says that the relevant consequences are the generation of utility or disutility. There are then different accounts of what utility is. The most basic, and familiar, form of utilitarianism is hedonic utilitarianism which says that utility is pleasure and disutility is pain. Mill holds a version of this view.  

As you discuss it here, ‘Kantian ethics’ seems to refer to a different family of moral theories that argue that there are fundamental principles that make actions right or wrong, and that no matter how desirable the consequences of an action might be, they cannot override those principles. This family is what I’ve been calling deontology. It probably doesn’t matter in this context, but it might be worth noting somewhere that Kant himself is a big figure in deontological ethics, and has inspired many thinkers, but not many philosophers (or journalists for that matter) are, strictly speaking, Kantians all the way down the line. 

So, one question that the author needs to address is why the reader should agree that all journalistic codes of ethics are essentially utilitarian. The four pillars framework mentioned on p.5, for example, seems, on the face of things, to have a more deontological flavour. Can/should those principles all be reduced to the one overarching principle of maximising utility? If so, then why? Were the authors all utilitarians? Do the codes state somewhere that everything they say is justified in accordance with the principle of utility? It seems more likely to me that codes of ethics are not really written with any particular moral theory in mind, and are instead intended to appeal to a wide range of views and values – that they are, in this respect, as muddled as the average person’s thinking on such deep philosophical questions.  

Since this claim about the utilitarian ethos of codes is not actually central to the author’s arguments in the paper it might just be simpler to drop it. 

Response 6: Thank you for taking the time to help me understand these different ethical frameworks. I am no longer saying that codes are utilitarian. But I am saying they have utilitarian elements. (See 239-255)

Comment 7:  Another question that may require a bit more work is whether it really is the case that Kantian-minded journalists are at greater risk of moral injury than utilitarian-minded ones.  

Response 7: Yes, I do think they are. Their duty to their source is paramount. I make a differentiation between journalists who see their sources as a means to an end (utilitarian) and those who see their sources as an end in themselves (deontological). If the duty to the source trumps public interest, and the duty is breached, then the journalist who feels that duty most strongly will be most impacted. (Line 632-642)

Comment 8:  There may be very good utilitarian reasons for getting valid consent and not publishing information against the wishes of family and friends, for example if the utility gained by the audience in reading a more compelling version of the story is outweighed by the negative experiences of the family and friends, and the general badness of the coarsening of society when it comes to disregarding the wishes of people who find themselves caught up in newsworthy events. Here’s another way of posing this question: what would you say to someone who objected that the key distinction here is not really between utilitarians and deontologists at all, but rather, as the interviewee on p.12 suggests, between those who care about ethics and those who don’t? 

Response 8: I would say that remark about 'care' is an expression of duty. I have added a comment in to the text to further explain that position. In this comment, the interviewee’s use of the word ‘care’ refers to the journalist’s duty to their source, and whether it is prioritised or deprioritised in relation to the public interest. (Line 641-642)

Comment 9: 

I also think the author should say more about moral injury itself. The implicit assumption seems to be that moral injury is always bad, but it is actually not obvious that this is true.   

If I do something morally wrong then I ought to feel bad about it. If I see that I’ve done wrong then the correct response is to feel guilt for my action, and, depending on the circumstances, perhaps even shame for being the kind of person who would do this wrong thing. It is, of course, regrettable that the wrong happened in the first place, but once it did, it would be even worse if the wrongdoer did not acknowledge the wrong and feel the appropriate moral emotions. In institutional betrayal the moral injury arises because the journalist is, to some degree, pressured or forced into committing a wrong. Now, not all pressure absolves us of responsibility, so depending on the circumstance it might still be right for the journalist to feel guilty, even if their editors and peers ought to feel guilty too. 

Response 9:

Pressure may not resolve us of guilt, but if we continue to feel guilt and feel we lack agency to do anything about it, then that can cause harm. I am not sure I am convinced by the statement that not all moral injury is bad. I have certainly seen research where journalists who experienced PTSD had also experienced what Cait McMahon (2016) called post-traumatic growth, but I didn't find any evidence of that in my study. Their PTSD may not be moral injury. It may be something else. 

Comment 10: So, I think it would be helpful if the author explained when we should worry about moral injury (as well as the original action which precipitates it), perhaps in particular cases of institutional betrayal, and distinguish that from a different point which is that the prevalence of moral injury here might just give us all reason to think again about how social media is now generally being used across the press when journalists are conducting death knocks. 

Response 10: This is a great point and one I make in my doctoral thesis (which this paper is part of). I make the point that an ethical death knock is not one in which a journalist mines social media for material to use in their stories without regard for its impacts on the bereaved (their consent or control). It is quite possibly time for a recalibration of journalism ethics in regard to social media use and privacy, and I make this point in my thesis, and allude to it in the final lines of this paper. Safer death knocks for journalists will not be achieved by simply banning the most egregious practices (such as taking material from social media without permission) although this could be beneficial to all parties. Rather, a broader understanding of the impacts of practices on journalists and bereaved people may trigger an industry-wide recalibration of journalism ethics away from utilitarian thinking and more towards a deontological view (Lines 664-669)

Comment 11: P.6 it is unclear what you mean when you say that moral obligations do not depend on conduct. They are about conduct in the sense of actions. Whether or not they are discharged or violated will depend on conduct. 

Response 11: I have rewritten this section my better understanding of these ethical frameworks.

Comment 12: P.9 should “moral injury in journalists” be “moral injury to journalists”? 

Response 12: I think it could be either, but I am happy to change.

Comment 13: P.11 last paragraph before conclusion. It is not clear why this is a clash between utilitarian and Kantian ethics. Proponents of both might argue that commercial pressures are generating wrong behaviour. 

Response 13: I do now include a comment about commercial pressures (Line 263). But I hope the clash of ethical frameworks is made clearer with my inclusion of information in square brackets (Lines 273-281.

 

 

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Thank you for the thorough work. All my comments have been satisfactorily addressed. As to comment 15, the author replies:

“Response 15: I have answered these two comments together. I have explained that data from the survey and interviews were analysed together and expanded on the thematic coding used. 

Given that was my approach, I won't be able to explain data from the survey separately to the interviews, and will therefore not be able to restructure this section.»

 

I understand the reason for this choice. The methods section has been improved, so the results section is now much easier to understand. I agree that the results can be presented like this.