Muslim Working Women: The Effect of Cultural Values and Degree of Religiosity on the Centrality of Work, Family, and Other Life Domains

Abstract

The participation of Muslim women in the Israeli labor force is very low and stems from them being part of a traditional patriarchal society where women (especially religious ones) are still expected to be homemakers. Additionally, previous governmental policy decisions hindered a wide integration of Muslim women into the labor market. This study examined the centrality of life domains for Muslim women according to their religiosity degree. A questionnaire concerning the relative centrality of work, family, community, religion, and leisure was distributed among 219 Muslim working women. The findings show that work was more central for traditional women compared to secular and religious ones, but secular women ranked the centrality of family first and work second, similarly to the ranking in various Western countries. By contrast, traditional and religious women ranked work first and family second. Additionally, secular women ranked the centrality of leisure and community higher than traditional and religious women. The Israeli case is relevant in this regard because, similar to other Western countries, most Muslims in Israel form a distinct ethnic group, characterized by lower socioeconomic status and subject to political marginalization. The results have both theoretical and practical significance.

1. Introduction

Work and family are the two most dominant domains in people’s lives [1,2]. Adult life is characterized by the duality of the work–family interaction, the components of which are not always compatible. In addition, other life domains fill an individual’s life, such as leisure, community, and religion. The importance of these life domains is affected by gender, age, number of children, religiosity degree, etc. [1,3,4]. There are varied studies regarding immigrant Muslim women who undergo a slow process of integration into the Western labor market and the barriers hindering this process, including their degree of religiosity [5,6,7,8]. As far as we know, there are no studies regarding their life domain centrality (leisure, family, work, community, and religion) and the effect of the degree of religiosity and various demographic factors on these domains. The current study focuses on Muslim women, as, evidently, their labor market participation is low, and it offers a holistic view of their life domains. Moreover, the centrality of each life domain can come at the expense of other life domains (work vs. family, family vs. leisure, etc.).

Most religions, including the three main monotheistic religions, display well-defined attitudes toward gender roles [9,10]. There is a gap in the literature concerning the juxtaposition of work, religion, and gender, although it affects the attitudes and behaviors toward women, especially women in the workplace [11,12]. This lacuna is important in light of the fact that religious dictates regarding women and work may cause tensions between women’s personal preferences and society’s expectations regarding not only their occupational lives but also other life domains in which they may participate, such as leisure, family, and community [13,14,15,16].

The examination of the possible influences on the preferences of women toward various life domains may be seen as an example of intersectionality [17] in which multiple identities an individual may hold meld together to affect the reality in which the individual lives. The intersectionality literature has focused on the relationship between overlapping or intersecting social identities and their interface with systems of oppression and discrimination, especially toward women [5,6,8].

Improved understanding of the centrality of life domains for Muslim women became of interest in Western countries because of the large number of Muslim immigrants and refugees from Africa, Asia, and especially the Middle East to the EU. In the past decades, millions of Muslims from Morocco, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Iraq, and other countries have settled in Europe as migrant workers, most recently joined by millions of Arab refugees from Syria [18]. Integration of the Muslim populations into the labor markets is a marker of social integration. In addition to their religious identity, these immigrants have other identities, such as ethnicity, lower socioeconomic status (SES), and political marginalization. Thus, the immigrants form a distinct political ethno-class within the host country [6,7].

The Israeli case is relevant to other Western countries, since most Muslims within it represent a distinct ethnic group, characterized by lower SES and subjected to political marginalization. Nevertheless, as in Europe, they are partly (especially women) integrated into the labor market [6,7,19]; many multinational corporations with branches in Israel (e.g., Cisco, Google, IBM, Intel, and Microsoft) employ Muslims in large numbers. Modern Western organizations employ workers of different ethnicities and religions and must be sensitive to this diversity [20]. The diversity brought in by the Muslim ethnic group goes beyond religious customs and involves differences in work values and life domains [20,21,22]. Understanding and meeting the diverse needs and expectations of the Muslim minority can improve its integration into the labor market and into society and enhance their productivity and commitment [20,23].

As part of the sociology of work, the present study contributes to the area of work values of minority groups. Specifically, it addresses the associations between the level of religiosity and life domains such as work centrality of Muslim Arab women. This examination is needed because religious identity lies at the core of minority groups like the population studied [24,25] and has been identified as a substantial barrier to their labor market integration [6,19]. Thus, uncovering these associations may contribute to their economic inclusion.

The present study intends to fill these gaps and examine the relationship between religiosity and the attitudes of Israeli Muslim women toward various life domains (work, family, leisure, community, and religion) and the influence of other demographic factors on the centrality of these life domains. To achieve these goals, we first discuss the relationships between religion and work values, and in our case, the Islamic work ethic. Then, we focus on the Muslims in Israel (as an ethno-religious group) and their cultural values and review the state of Muslim women in their society and in the labor market. This review of the literature allows us to discuss what impact the degree of religiosity has on the centrality of life domains and develop hypotheses. Finally, this study intends to examine them and reach conclusions that will lead to a better understanding of the impact of the areas of life among Muslim women while referring to the level of religiosity. This way, we can refer to practical aspects regarding their work life and achieve the objectives of the research mentioned above.

2. Literature Review

Religion is a complicated and profound phenomenon. Different patterns of religious activity may reflect different affiliations and sources of social identity, as well as different elements of religion that have theoretical importance for how religious culture is enacted [26]. Religion has been a strong predictor of the nature of important life domains worldwide [27]. Religious faith provides a way of dealing with societal expectations vs. individual wishes, expectations, and activities, and it strongly affects the practical level of organizational and business procedures [28,29].

Like religion, work has always been a fundamental part of human existence and plays a key role in the lives of individuals [30,31]. Work is carried out within the framework of social norms and is influenced by them [32]. Interaction with these norms helps construct an ideal about how individuals should conduct themselves [33].

2.1. Islamic Work Ethic (IWE)

The Qur’an instructs the faithful to be involved and committed to work, which enables people to realize their goals. “This human being can have nothing but what is striven for” (Qur’an 53:39) [34]. The Prophet Mohammed preached that through hard work, sins will be absolved and that “no one eats better food than the one who eats out of his work”. He presented work as the highest form of worshipping God. Mohammed also emphasized that one should perform one’s work to the best of one’s ability. “God loves a person who learns precisely how to perform his work and does it right”. According to the Qur’an, work also has a social meaning by providing benefits for others. “The best people are those who benefit others” [34].

In Islam, there is a moral commitment to work, and any form of employment is acceptable, even if it is inferior to one’s capabilities [34,35]. Those who do not comply with this dictum can be chastised and excluded from the community because work is perceived as contributing to organizations and society at large [34,35]. Islamic society is not tolerant of individuals who are not willing to work and fail to fulfill their obligations to it [35]. The Islamic faith also stresses an obligation to create affluence [34].

Similar to the concept of Protestant work ethic (PWE) formulated by Weber [36], which was relevant for Western countries, Muslim researchers developed the concept of Islamic work ethic (IWE) [28,29]. The four dimensions of IWE include effort, competition, transparency, and morally responsible conduct in the workplace. The IWE extols individual effort to serve the self and society at large [28,37]. According to Ryan and Tipu [38], any study of work ethic in Muslim societies has to include the concept of IWE. By contrast, Linando et al. [37] argued that the IWE dimensions are incomplete and fail to measure distinct aspects of work ethic, such as work centrality, hard work, and leisure ethic, which are important issues in the contemporary workforce. The authors developed a Multidimensional Work Ethic Profile questionnaire for Muslim business students and found that work centrality and hard work achieved the highest scores, followed by self-reliance, wasted time, and leisure.

2.2. The Arab Muslim Minority in Israel

The Arab community in Israel comprises nearly two million people, amounting to about 20% of the total population. About 80% of Arab citizens of Israel are Muslims, alongside two smaller communities of Druze and Christians (roughly 9% each) [39].

The Muslims in Israel are an ethno-religious group, the same as Christians, Druze, and Jews. Smith [40] defines ethnicity as “named and self-defined human population sharing a myth of common ancestry, historical memories and elements of culture (often including a link with a territory) and measure of solidarity” (p. 172). Islam is a religion, but the Muslims according to this definition have another main identity as Arabs [23].

The Muslim society in Israel is undergoing a transition from a traditional to a modern society, but it is also affected by Arab societies in the surrounding countries. These processes have resulted in various representations of Islam within this society. Some members of the community follow clear Islamic lines represented mainly by the Islamic Movement; others practice Islam in more traditional ways; and a minority display secular leanings [41,42]. Unlike Jews in Israel, who display individualistic characteristics, Muslim Arabs are more conservative, value tradition, the welfare and safety of the group, and observe a rigid hierarchy with little individual autonomy, which are the characteristics of a collectivist society [43,44]. Schwartz [22] found that Arab Muslims in Israel were generally connected to the “conservatism” and “hierarchy” dimensions (associated with collectivism), similar to those in Muslim Arab countries. Muslims form a patriarchal community in which women have a marginal position. They are expected to get married and have children at a young age, while working and having an occupational career is largely not relevant, except for a minority within the minority [45,46].

Arab citizens of Israel have been integrated (especially men) into the economy of the state since its establishment. In the early days of statehood, they were integrated mostly in the margins of the labor market, in construction, agriculture, and blue-collar occupations in industry. Their limited inclusion was attributed mainly to low education levels, scant employment opportunities within Arab localities, and discriminatory practices of governments and employers. Over time, their educational levels improved substantially, and their employment rate increased, but still, they were employed mostly in lower status occupations, which Jews tended to shun [46,47].

The employment patterns of Arab women are significantly different from those of men. Only about 30% of Arab women are employed compared to roughly 70% of their Jewish counterparts and about 75% of Arab men (similar to the employment rate of Jewish men) [39]. Arab women’s limited employment is also manifest in the quality of the positions they fill and in low wages—approximately NIS 6700 compared to NIS 9600 for their Jewish counterparts and NIS 9100 for Arab men (2017 data, before the COVID-19 crisis). Representation in managerial positions reveals a similar picture: only 2% of Arab women hold such positions compared to 5.7% of their Jewish counterparts and 4.9% of Arab men [39].

A study examining trends in the education and employment of Arab youths from a gender perspective found that the rate of applying to higher education has risen greatly among Arab women between 2008 and 2013, up nearly 50% [48]. Although we expect higher education and modern attitudes to serve women’s integration into the Israeli labor market, evidence shows that only 57% of Arab women with an academic degree join the labor market compared to 74% of Jewish women [48].

There is a substantial variance in employment patterns between Arab women along religious lines. Christian women have higher employment rates (55%) and better positions, followed by Druze women (about 34%), and finally Muslim women (23%). There is also substantial diversity between Arab women in the quality of their positions, some having obtained quality positions in the areas of health and education, as well as in the high-tech industry. Acquisition of higher education is, in fact, an important step in the successful integration of Arab women [39].

Several sets of barriers explain Arab women’s limited labor market integration. These include the fact that most Arab towns and villages are located on a geographic periphery where there are fewer employment opportunities, and they are also due to the discriminatory hiring and promotion practices of employers and discriminatory government policies, such as limited development of labor opportunities in Arab localities [19]. Evidently, commuting is a significant barrier to integration because public transportation to and from Arab localities is scarce, and most Muslim women’s job opportunities are in low-paid positions that do not justify the purchase and maintenance of a private vehicle [49,50]. From the Arab women’s perspective, the common barriers include affiliation with lower SE segments of society, resulting in lower educational levels, and limited proficiency in Hebrew, daycare solutions for infants, and social networks, particularly with Jews [19,50].

Strong religious identity and traditional values have also been recognized as barriers to the integration of Muslim Arab women in the labor market. Miarri et al. [19] and Abu-Rabia Queider [51] examined a series of barriers explaining the low employment rates of Arab women and identified religiosity as one of them. After examining the employment patterns of Muslim and Christian Arab women, Yonay et al. [52] reached similar conclusions and found that the residential–religious environment affected the employment rates of Muslim Arab women.

2.3. Centrality and Ranking of Life Domains

Dubin et al. [14] contributed to the development of the study of life domains by examining the concept of work centrality or the degree of general importance attributed to work in one’s life at a given time. Work and family are the two dominant domains in people’s lives, and adult life is characterized by the work–family interaction [1,53]. Other life domains compete with work and family [15,16]. Following Dubin et al. [14], other researchers advanced the study of the relative value of work centrality vis à vis other life domains or roles, such as family, leisure, community, and religion [15,54].

Several studies have assessed how individuals viewed the relative centrality of various life domains, such as work, family, and other potentially important aspects of their lives. A pioneering study in this area was the “Meaning of Work” project [15]. In this eight-country comparative study, respondents from Belgium, Britain, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, and the US ranked family as the most important aspect of their lives before other life components, such as work, leisure, community, or religion, whereas respondents from Japan ranked work first before family. This rather unusual outcome—work before family—was also reported by Westwood and Lok [53] in their study based on data from the late 1990s in China. In all the countries surveyed above, respondents ranked leisure as the third most important component of their lives.

A second examination of the meaning of work was undertaken in Belgium, Germany, Israel, Japan, and the US in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This research yielded a similar pattern of rankings. In all of the countries examined, family was seen as the most important component of life. Work ranked second to family in all countries, except in Germany, where leisure was ranked second, followed by work [54].

The European Values Survey in the early 1990s [55] also found that work ranked second in importance after family in all 13 countries involved in the survey. More recent findings concerning professional employees in Germany, Poland, and Russia indicated that in all three countries, family centrality ranked first, followed by work, then leisure, with community and religion at the bottom [56].

Kuchinke et al. [57] reported a similar ranking regarding the relative centrality of family, work, and leisure for mid-level professional employees in eight countries on four continents (the US, Germany, Korea, Poland, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Brazil). Finally, Méda [16] found that family was the most important component in the hierarchy of life dimensions for people in European countries. Generally, work ranked second, higher than friends, religion, or politics, except in a few countries where leisure was deemed more important than work.

2.4. Relationship Between Life Domain Centrality and Religiosity Among Muslim Women in Israel

2.4.1. Work Centrality

Work centrality refers to the degree of general importance that working has in the life of the individual at all times [14,15]. Work centrality can be measured by comparing its importance with the relative importance of other life domains or roles, such as family, leisure, community, and religion. The procedure for this evaluation is complex but structured, involving self and work vs. self and other major life domains [15,58]. The Qur’an teaches that hard work and dedication to work is a virtue and a means to absolve one’s sins [59]. The IWE, as the Protestant work ethic, perceives laziness as a sin that causes failure in life, and it focuses on hard work as a way of worshipping God and fulfilling one’s purpose on earth [29,34,35,59]. Moreover, the Qur’an encourages people to acquire skills and new knowledge and praises those who strive to earn a living. The Islamic work ethic views dedication to work as a virtue [59]. In the days of the Prophet Muhammad, women worked in various jobs in their community, an example of which is Muhammad’s wife, Khadija, who was a successful merchant [8]. Later, in patriarchal Muslim societies, religious extremism (especially among Salafi communities) prohibited women from working in a variety of fields and directed them to focus on the family domain [60]. Indeed, a comparative study among Muslim countries found that labor market participation of Muslim women in Muslim countries, especially Arab ones, is very low. The main reasons are Arab patriarchal culture and the implementation of Muslim rules that restrict women’s participation in the labor market [61].

Most research involving Muslims shows a positive relationship between work centrality and religiosity. Elci [62] found a positive and significant association between the need for achievement, hard work, and religiosity among Turkish (mostly Muslim) MBA graduate students. Another study involving Turkish (mostly Muslim) university students found that devout people showed a stronger PWE than less religious ones, regardless of religious denomination [63]. Hayward and Kemmelmeier [26] compared the economic attitudes (based on Weber’s PWE) of different religions according to religiosity and found a positive correlation between religiosity and the perception of hard work among Muslims.

Furthermore, the World Values Survey (WVS) waves conducted among men and women in Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, found that in 2006, religiosity positively influenced IWE, but no such influence was found in the 2018 wave [37]. A recent study by Sharabi [44] found no influence of religiosity degree on work centrality among Muslims in Israel. Linando, et al. [37] suggested that the lack of a relationship between religiosity and work centrality in recent studies is an outcome of trends of globalization, secularism, and the new way in which Muslims learn their religion.

We conclude, therefore, that higher religiosity of Arab survey participants, specifically Arab women, leads to low labor force participation despite their increasing levels of educational attainment, a pattern that has been documented in other Arab and Muslim countries [19,64]. The Muslim minority in Israel is also influenced by the hegemonic Jewish culture, which is more individualistic, secular, global, and egalitarian regarding gender [46]. Furthermore, most of the above studies included a significantly higher percentage of men than women, and none of them investigated separately the effect of women’s level of religiosity on work centrality.

These factors led to the formulation of a zero hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1:

There will be no differences in the centrality of work between religious, traditional, and secular Muslim women.

2.4.2. Family Centrality

Since the emergence of Islam, there has been an ongoing process that restricted women from working in various occupations. Religious and patriarchal Muslim societies direct women to domestic duties, while men are the breadwinners [45,46]. In Israel, the Muslim society to some extent restricts women from joining the labor market, expecting them to focus on domestic family duties, especially in religious families [19,65].

Abu-Hasan-Nabwani and Sharabi [2] found that Arab women (mostly Muslims) experienced significantly more pronounced work–family conflict than their Jewish counterparts, and women with more children were more likely to experience conflict. Kulik and Rayyan [66] reported similar findings and found that Jewish women expressed more liberal gender-role attitudes and reported a more egalitarian division of domestic labor than their Muslim counterparts.

Given the positive relationship between religiosity degree and the number of children of Muslim women [67] (see also

Table 1. Demographic distribution (means and frequencies) by degree of religiosity.

	Secular	Traditional	Religious
Age (means)	33.6	36.5	34
Working hours (means)	35	33.9	30.5 a
Number of children (means)	1.3	2.1	2.7 a
Family status (%) b
Single	52.5	24.4	29.7
Married	47.5	75.6	70.3
Education (%) b
Secondary school and less	10	24.3	26.7
Postsecondary education	10.1	17.9	20.8
Bachelor’s degree	54.9	43.6	38.6
Higher than bachelor’s degree	25	14.1	13.9
Gross monthly income (%) b, c
<4000	17.4	15.4	33.7
4000–6600	30	32	33.6
6601–9200	30.1	33.3	27.7
>9200	22.5	19.2	5
Organizational status b
Worker	66.7	81.9	88.7
Manager	33.3	18.1	11.3

^a The F-test for differences between the groups regarding this demographic factor was significant (p < 0.05). ^b The chi-square test for differences between the groups regarding this demographic factor was significant (p < 0.05). ^c Gross monthly income in New Israeli Shekels (NIS).

), we can assume that this factor, in addition to patriarchal, traditional, and religious values, decreases their participation in the labor force. Therefore, we formulated the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2:

Family centrality will be highest among religious and lowest among secular Muslim women.

2.4.3. Leisure Centrality

Over the last three decades, research has shown a trend toward a decline in work centrality and work ethic in Western countries, together with a reduction in working hours, in parallel with the development of a leisure culture and leisure time activities [68,69,70]. Although the Muslim society in Israel is exposed to secular Western values, key differences exist between secular, traditional, and religious Muslims in the degree of exposure to Western leisure lifestyle and its acceptance, and religiosity is inversely related to such exposure and acceptance [71].

William and Mason [72] pointed out that according to Islamic tradition, various forms of leisure activities lie in the area between acceptable “Halal” (e.g., sports, vacations) and unacceptable “Haram” (e.g., drinking alcohol, gambling). The acceptable leisure activities of Muslim religious women are restricted compared to those of their traditional and especially secular counterparts because they must take place under gender segregation, wearing the “hijab” (headscarf) [71]. Furthermore, they are under patriarchal control and expected to be devoted to the family; therefore, their leisure activities are minimal [45,72]. According to Schwartz [22], leisure time activities serve more the need for change and individualism than conformity and conservation. Therefore, in religious communities, women are expected to be less interested in leisure time activities, which can come into conflict with their conservative outlook. Based on the above findings, the following hypothesis was formulated:

Hypothesis 3:

The higher the level of religiosity of Muslim women, the lower their leisure centrality.

2.4.4. Community Centrality

Triandis [73] defined “collectivism” as a social pattern based on closely connected individuals who regard themselves as part of a given collective (family, community, tribe, or nation). Several studies in Israel found that Muslims, as a collectivist society, ascribe higher importance to community and serving society than Jews, who are an individualistic society [58]. Several explanations have been suggested for this collectivist leaning, including profound extended family traditions (clans, tribes); strong place-based identity focused on the locality of residence; and being a discriminated minority, substantially different from the majority [24,25,74]. As a collective minority in Israel, Muslims are expected to identify more with their communities and be willing to serve them based on belonging and loyalty, especially because their relationship with the state of Israel and its institutions is shaped by mistrust and distancing [22]. Therefore, we can assume that secular Muslims identify more with the individualistic values of the Jewish society, whereas the more religious ones identify more with collectivist traditional values. Based on the above, the following hypothesis was put forward:

Hypothesis 4:

The importance of community will be highest among religious and lowest among secular Muslim women.

3. Method

3.1. The Sample

The questionnaires were distributed to a sample of Muslim working women in northern Israel, where most Muslim Arabs live. Participants worked in various jobs at different locations, mostly in the private sector but also in government. A Muslim student distributed the printed questionnaires at workplaces and at homes and collected them after the participants completed them.

There is wide discretion in the literature regarding the minimum effective sample size for ethnic minorities—a sample that will allow reliable statistical tests (ANOVA, regression analysis, etc.). Since sampling certain minorities is complicated (in our case, it is Muslim working women), it is possible for the minimal sample to comprise between 150 [75] and 200 [76] individuals, as long as efforts are undertaken to reflect the complexity of the social minority (in our case, religious, traditional, and secular women). Our final sample included 219 Muslim working women, all Arab citizens of Israel.

We have to take into consideration that, although this is a convenient sample, due to the proximity of the Arab localities in the north (as opposed to their dispersion in the center and in the south of the country), it is possible to obtain a more accurate and focused picture of the value differences between the women according to their level of religiosity. In addition, it is complicated to create a representative sample of working Muslims in general and working women in particular, since the ICBS [39] includes them in the statistics of the Arab population (with Christians and Druze). Furthermore, the percentage of Muslim women who join the labor market is the lowest (23%) among all the ethno-religious Arab groups [19]. Therefore, it is more complicated to reach them and obtain sufficient numbers of secular, traditional, and religious participants. According to the above constraints, our sample can represent this population to a certain degree.

In the sample of 219 Muslim working women, 40 were secular, 78 traditional, and 101 religious. They were between the ages of 18 and 59 (M = 34.83; SD = 8.21); 59.4% had postsecondary certificates or higher education degrees; and 67.6% were parents. Table 1 presents the distributions of demographic variables by degree of religiosity.

Secular women comprised the highest percentage of individuals who reported that they were single, and they had fewer children than traditional and especially religious women. Secular women worked longer hours, and a higher percentage of them were in managerial positions than was the case among traditional and especially religious women. Furthermore, religious women had the lowest educational level and income, while secular women had the highest educational level and income.

3.2. Measures

3.2.1. Centrality of Life Domains

The measure of life domain centrality used in the present study was based on the “Meaning of Work” questionnaire (MOW International Research Team, 1987) translated into Arabic and back-translated into English to verify accuracy. The relative centrality of work and other life domains was measured by the following item: Distribute a total of 100 points to signify the relative importance of the following domains in your life:

• Leisure (e.g., hobbies, sports, entertainment, and friendships);
• Community (e.g., volunteer organizations, trade unions, and political organizations);
• Work;
• Religion (e.g., religious activities and beliefs);
• Family.

The more points that are awarded to a certain area, the greater its perceived centrality compared to other life domains.

3.2.2. Degree of Religiosity

The way to measure the degree of religiosity is controversial, and there are different methods suggested by professional scholars. Hayward and Kemmelmeier [26] suggest looking at two elements: private religiousness (the importance of religion in one’s life) and public religiousness (the level of participation in public religious activities). Parboteeah et al. [21] suggest looking at three elements: cognitive, normative, and regulative, and Tarakeshwar et al. [27] suggest looking at four elements: denominational affiliation, frequency of church/temple attendance, frequency of prayer or meditation, and self-rated religiosity/spirituality.

In this study, respondents were asked the following: “How do you define your degree of religiousness: (a) Secular, (b) Traditional, (c) Religious” (self-rated religiosity). Among Muslims, this reflects the level of private and public religiousness. All religious and traditionalist Muslims believe in God (cognitive). While religious Muslims pray and attend the mosque on a daily basis (normative), the traditionalists do this less frequently. Secular Muslims do not attend or rarely attend mosque but often celebrate special holidays with the family (e.g., Eid Al-Fitr, Eid Al-Adha). Religious women dress modestly with a hijab (head covering); traditional women dress modestly without the hijab; and secular women dress like secular women in Western countries [77]. Therefore, these categories reflect the individual’s degree of religious observance and how closely the interviewee is associated with their religion.

To validate their answers, we also used El-Mansour’s [78] model to measure religiosity, specifically among Muslims, according to its five dimensions. All 10 questions regarding religiosity were ranked on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (very little/low) to 5 (very much/high). The clear independence of all five domains of religiosity was reflected in Cronbach’s alpha of 0.84. The first domain, basic religiosity, was represented by questions about the belief in Allah, Muhammad the Prophet, and the Qur’an as representing divine revelation and devotion expressed in the frequency of personal prayers and blessings. Questions in the second domain, central duties, focused on public prayer in mosques, fasting during Ramadan, willingness to undertake a pilgrimage to Mecca, observing halal (dietary requirements), and refraining from drinking alcohol. Questions about the third domain, experience, referred to the sense that Allah rewarded or punished individuals for specific deeds. The fourth domain, knowledge, was articulated through questions regarding proficiency in the Qur’an and the Sunna (the Prophet’s biography and sayings). Finally, orthopraxis included questions on inter-gender relations and listening to “inappropriate” music.

We performed an ANOVA test between the 10 questions (El-Mansour’s model) and the three levels of religiosity and found that they predict similarity significantly (p < 0.001) regarding all questions. Accordingly, we used the three-level religiosity scale in our study.

4. Results

The analysis of variance (ANOVA) of life domains (

Table 2. Means, rankings ^a of life domain centrality and ANOVA by degree of religiosity.

Life Domain Centrality		Secular			Traditional			Religious
		Mean	S.D.		Mean	S.D.		Mean	S.D.	F
Leisure	(3)	15.13 bc	10.77	(4)	10.83 b	7.62	(4)	10.50 b	9.65	3.91 *
Community	(4)	11.75 bc	8.29	(5)	6.28	7.09	(5)	8.02 b	8.22	6.42 **
Work	(2)	32.25 b	14.93	(1)	37.24 bc	12.78	(1)	31.31	16.69	3.61 *
Religion	(5)	5.63 c	6.62	(3)	11.68 c	7.70	(3)	20.42 bc	11.32	41.32 **
Family	(1)	35.13	17.63	(2)	34.15 b	14.60	(2)	29.94 bc	16.64	2.21 +

^a Rank order scale in parentheses from 1 (most central) to 5 (least central). ^b Indicates that the differences between the means of one life domain and the next one in the rank are significant (p < 0.05). ^c Indicates that the differences between the means of this group compared to the two others are significant (p < 0.05). ⁺ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001.

) indicates that there are significant differences between the groups. A significant multivariate difference was found for the centrality of life domains (F_(4,218) = 28.87, p < 0.01). Work centrality was most important for traditional and least important for religious and secular women, who were close to their religious counterparts. The differences were significant (F = 3.61, p < 0.05), contrary to our first hypothesis, which expected no differences to emerge between them.

Family centrality was lower among religious than among secular and traditional women (F = 2.21, p < 0.10). These findings do not support Hypothesis 2, according to which family centrality increases with the degree of religiosity. Hypothesis 3—holding that the more religious the women are, the lower their leisure centrality—was partially confirmed (F = 3.91, p < 0.05); secular women showed the highest leisure centrality, but their religious and traditional counterparts displayed similar levels. Contrary to Hypothesis 4, community centrality was highest among secular women and similar among traditional and religious ones (F = 6.42, p < 0.001). As expected, the centrality of religion rose with increasing levels of religiosity (means: 5.63, 11.68, and 20.42, respectively, F = 41.32, p < 0.001).

Secular women ranked the centrality of family first, work second, leisure third, and community fourth, whereas traditional and religious women ranked work first, family second, religion third, and leisure fourth. The above findings are presented in Figure 1.

Because there were wide demographic differences between the groups (see Table 1), a multiple linear regression analysis was conducted.

Table 3. Regression analysis (standardized beta) of life domain centrality by degree of religiosity and demographic variables.

Demographic Variables	Leisure	Community	Work	Religion	Family
	Secular
Age	0.00	−0.40 +	0.31	−0.34	−0.01
Family status a	−0.27	−0.69 **	0.05	−0.02	0.44 +
Number of children	−0.18	0.57 +	−0.29	0.29	0.05
Education level	−0.47 **	0.23	0.18	−0.43 *	0.21
Working hours	−0.22	0.03	0.60 ***	−0.38 *	−0.23
Occupational status b	0.01	−0.15	0.11	−0.12	0.01
Income	0.31	−0.03	−0.22	0.34	−0.12
R2	0.36	0.31	0.44	0.33	0.34
F	2.50 *	2.01 +	3.47 **	2.18 +	2.30 *
	Traditional
Age	−0.02	0.04	0.01	0.19	−0.13
Family status a	0.01	−0.03	−0.10	−0.05	0.21 +
Number of children	−0.07	−0.10	−0.25 +	−0.12	0.32 *
Education level	−0.29 +	−0.15	0.12	−0.31 *	0.26 +
Working hours	−0.15	−0.05	0.49 ***	−0.08	−0.28 *
Occupational status b	0.14	−0.05	−0.20 +	−0.24 +	0.27 *
Income	−0.08	0.01	0.21	0.12	−0.26
R2	0.15	0.05	0.37	0.17	0.40
F	1.58	0.43	5.31 ***	1.83 +	5.34 ***
	Religious
Age	0.05	−0.10	−0.07	0.11	0.01
Family status a	−0.27 *	−0.28 *	0.16	−0.06	0.20 +
Number of children	−0.09	0.06	−0.14	0.01	0.17
Education level	−0.03	−0.01	−0.13	−0.22 +	0.29 **
Working hours	−0.16	−0.13	0.53 ***	−0.25 +	−0.22 +
Occupational status b	0.01	−0.02	0.14	−0.10	−0.07
Income	0.02	0.10	−0.19	0.18	−0.02
R2	0.12	0.08	0.32	0.09	0.24
F	1.65	1.09	5.98 ***	1.20	5.29 ***

^a Family status: 1 = Single, 2 = Married. ^b Occupational status: 1 = Worker, 2 = Manager. + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

presents the effect of the demographic variables on the five central life domains according to religiosity degree. Overall, demographic variables had a partial ability to explain the life domains’ centrality. For all three groups, there was a positive correlation between work centrality and working hours; education level correlated negatively with religion centrality, and as expected, those who were married showed higher family centrality than those who were single.

Education level correlated negatively with leisure centrality only for secular and traditional women (β = −0.47, p < 0.01 and β = −0.29, p < 0.10, respectively). Working hours correlated negatively with religion centrality only for secular and religious women (β = −0.38, p < 0.05 and β = −0.25, p < 0.10, respectively), and women who were married showed higher community centrality than single women (β = −0.69, p < 0.01 and β = 0.28, p < 0.10, respectively). Community centrality was negatively affected by age (β = −0.40, p < 0.10) and positively affected by the number of children only for secular women (β = 0.57, p < 0.10). The number of children was negatively correlated with work centrality (β = −0.25, p < 0.10) and positively correlated with family centrality (β = 0.31, p < 0.05), and occupational status had a negative effect on work and religion centrality (β = −0.24, p < 0.10) and a positive effect on family centrality (β = 0.27, p < 0.05) only for traditional women. Furthermore, only among religious women, those who were married showed lower leisure centrality than single women (β = −0.27, p < 0.05).

5. Discussion

This study focused on the effect of gender norms and degree of religiosity of Muslim working women on their perceptions of the importance of life domains. These marginalized and understudied secular, traditional, and religious women have a high potential for affecting the economic future of every country they live in.

Work centrality was found to be higher among traditional women than among their counterparts, and the family centrality of religious women was slightly lower than that of secular and traditional ones. The centrality of leisure was higher among secular than among traditional or religious women. Secular women ranked the centrality of family first and work second, similar to the ranking of Jewish women in Israel [79] and to the ranking of women in various Western countries [16,56,57,68]. By contrast, traditional and religious women ranked work first and family second.

It seems that the great importance attached to work by Muslim women is related to their cultural and religious values and restrictions. First, Muslim patriarchal society restricts the degree to which traditional and religious women can join the labor market [19,65], and the lack of opportunities appears to increase the attractiveness of working life. Second, pursuing a working life and occupation is a means of achieving social status and prestige for Arabs in general; for Muslim women, it also fulfills other needs, such as serving as a source of economic power to influence family decisions, shape their destiny, and provide mobility and independence outside the traditional, patriarchal, and collectivist community [45,46]. Third, for a woman living in a conservative community that likely does not allow her to pursue leisure time activities, work can act as a source of satisfaction and self-fulfillment.

William and Mason [72] argued that the acceptability of leisure is often influenced by the dominant interpretation of Islam in the area concerned and the interaction between Islam and local cultural practices. Secular women appeared not to follow the Muslim sociocultural dictates and displayed more Westernized values, similar to Jewish women. This was also expressed in the fact that the centrality of leisure was higher among them than among traditional or religious women, ranking third, the same as Jewish Israeli society [58] and Western societies [16,57]. By contrast, traditional and religious women ranked leisure in fifth and last place, reflecting the perception that it is either “Haram” (everything that is officially forbidden by Islam) or socially inappropriate for a woman to pursue activities that promote individualism and self-fulfillment.

Unexpectedly, the centrality of the community was ranked higher by secular than by religious and traditional women. A possible explanation is that there may be a difference in the interpretation of the word “community”. In the questionnaire used in the present study, community referred to “volunteer organizations, professional organizations, and political organizations”, whereas in collectivist societies, community refers more to extended family, neighborhood, mosque, and village/town than to the organizations of society at large. Another possible explanation is that religious and traditional women are more focused on their homes and families than any outside activity. We must also take into consideration the fact that secular women had fewer children, and a higher percentage of them were unmarried than among traditional and religious women (see Table 1), which enabled them to participate more in community (and leisure) activities.

Naturally, religiosity correlated significantly with the centrality of religion, ranking last among secular respondents. The findings show that the centrality of leisure and community came at the expense of the centrality of religion. Additionally, the more educated the women were, the lower their religion centrality was, regardless of their religiosity degree, similar to Jewish women [3], and the more educated the secular and traditional women were, the lower their leisure centrality was.

6. Conclusions, Research Limitations, and Future Research

Although the present study did not measure the effect of “culture” or “mentality” (reflected in their opinions about gender roles and the social status of women and in the opinions of their husbands, parents, and the parents of their spouses) on labor market outcomes, we believe that the effect of religiosity (which we did examine) was correlated with the influence of cultural values [19]. Religiosity is a complex multidimensional phenomenon that can be interpreted individually and can also manifest in the labor market. Thus, religiosity may hinder integration into the labor market for some women because of restrictions imposed by a traditional and patriarchal culture, whereas it may encourage others to ignore their religious beliefs and practice a devotion that is not incompatible with joining the labor market.

The findings reveal that traditional women’s perceptions of life domains were more similar to those of religious than those of secular women. While secular women showed a Western orientation, traditional and religious women retained their traditional perceptions despite living in a modern Western Jewish society. Nevertheless, work was more important to them than domestic family duties, contrary to what one would expect in a patriarchal society. These women appear to be determined to find employment despite the cultural obstacles because a working life meets a variety of their needs, as noted above. An additional reason for these women to join the labor market is to achieve some freedom from the tight social supervision to which they are subjected in their residential environments.

In general, Muslim women’s participation in the labor market is very low among traditional and especially religious women [19,51]. Their high work centrality reflects unrealized human potential for the Israeli economy and that for any other economy that has a Muslim population. High work centrality is related to high work ethic, which translates into willingness to work hard, a desire for achievement, organizational involvement, commitment, and low turnover and absenteeism [26,46,62].

Religious Muslim women stand out because of their traditional clothing, which includes the hijab, whereas traditional and secular women have a Western appearance. This can cause discrimination of religious women and underestimation of their capabilities [7,77,80]. Effective diversity management practices can prevent these situations and enhance their integration and productivity in organizations and Western societies [20]. To encourage Muslim women to join organizations, it is necessary to understand their work values and needs, address the social norms and cultural barriers, and adjust the work environment accordingly.

The study has the following limitations: (a) A single-item measure for life domain centrality may not be optimal, but it has high test–retest reliability [81] and has been used in many studies worldwide [58]; (b) We used a small convenience sample of 219 Muslim working women, making an effort to reach a sufficient number of women from every group, but it is not a representative sample because of the constraints we explained in the sample section; (c) The generalization ability of the current study regarding other women in Muslim minority communities is limited due to their unique circumstances. On the one hand, they do share core characteristics with other Muslim minority communities (especially Arab Muslims), namely being marginalized politically and socioeconomically and holding traditional patriarchal values. On the other hand, there are substantial differences between them and other Muslim minority comminutions, e.g., being a native minority and one that is subjected to an active national conflict between their Arab Muslim identity and their state.

Future studies can examine the centrality of Muslim women’s life domains in more complicated models, including mediating variables, such as job satisfaction and demographic factors (children’s age, organizational status, spousal support, etc.). Of course, it is important to conduct similar studies among Muslim men as well. These suggestions and a combination of qualitative and quantitative research can provide a deeper understanding of the factors that influence the centrality of different life domains of Muslim women.