# Dependable Wireless System with Shortened Code Using Distance Information between Integrated Terminals

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## Abstract

**:**

## 1. Introduction

## 2. Related Works

## 3. Dependable Wireless System

#### 3.1. System Configuration

#### 3.2. Shortened Code

#### 3.3. Sharing Method of Shortened Information

## 4. Performance Evaluation and Discussion

#### 4.1. Secrecy Capacity

#### 4.2. Simulation Conditions

#### 4.3. Performance of Shortened RA Code

#### 4.4. Performance of UWB Ranging

#### 4.5. Performance Using Two RATs for Communication

#### 4.6. Performance Using Three RATs for Communication

## 5. Conclusions

- Though the shortened information length is the parameter which decides the wiretapping resistance and attack resistance, it is necessary to investigate optimization of the shortened information length and quantization technique, because it is also related to error resistance of distance information.
- It is necessary to examine the effect of the shortened information predicted by the cyberterrorist and the countermeasures and to analyze the performance limit and drawback.
- The evaluation assumes that RAT communication is completely lost due to the attack, but it is necessary to evaluate the actual attack pattern and the impact of attack resistance on each RAT.
- It is necessary to analyze performance degradation due to measured distance error or accuracy.
- It is necessary to examine the application to other codes, because large gain can be obtained by using powerful codes.
- Evaluation of dependability properties based on heuristic strategies such as “what-if analysis” and “robustness checking” are described in [2].
- Finally, an evaluation using a real system is necessary.

## Author Contributions

## Funding

## Conflicts of Interest

## References

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**Figure 1.**Proposed dependable wireless system. Integrated terminal uses multiple radio access technologies (RATs) such as cellular, ultra-wide band (UWB), Bluetooth, and wireless local area network (LAN) to communicate simultaneously.

**Figure 4.**Parity check matrix of systematic RA code. The column weight $q$ is 3, the row weight $r$ is 3.

**Figure 6.**Evaluated simulation model with one sender, one receiver and one cyberterrorist. The sender and the receiver can use up to three RATs for communication.

**Figure 7.**Bit error ratio (BER) characteristics of the receiver whose shortened information is known under the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel. The shortened information length $m$ using distance information is varied from 0 to 500.

**Figure 8.**Bit error ratio (BER) characteristics of the cyberterrorist whose shortened information is unknown under the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel. The shortened information length $m$ using distance information is varied from 0 to 500.

**Figure 9.**Evaluation result of measurement accuracy using Dacawave’s MDEK1001 Development Kit. The circle marks and the cross marks represent the installation position and the measurement position, respectively.

**Figure 10.**Characteristics of the mutual information versus the shortened information length when the sender and the receiver communicate using two RATs. The square marks indicate the mutual information between the sender and the receiver when one RAT cannot be used for communication due to an attack, and the cross marks indicate the mutual information between the sender and the cyberterrorist when one RAT is wiretapped.

**Figure 11.**Characteristics of the secrecy capacity versus the shortened information length when the sender and the receiver communicate using two RATs. The square marks, the circle marks and the cross marks indicate the secrecy capacity of the cyberterrorist attacking on two RATs, attacking on one RAT and wiretapping on one RAT, and wiretapping on two RATs, respectively.

**Figure 12.**Characteristics of the mutual information versus the shortened information length when the sender and the receiver communicate using three RATs. The circle marks and the square marks indicate the mutual information between the sender and receiver when two and one RAT(s) cannot be used for communication due to an attack, respectively. The triangle marks and the cross marks indicate the mutual information between the sender and the cyberterrorist when two and one RAT(s) are/is wiretapped, respectively.

**Figure 13.**Characteristics of the secrecy capacity versus the shortened information length when the sender and the receiver communicate using three RATs. The circle marks, the square marks, the triangle marks, and the cross marks indicate the secrecy capacity of the cyberterrorist attacking on three RATs, attacking on two RATs and wiretapping on one RAT, attacking on one RAT and wiretapping on two RATs, and wiretapping on three RATs, respectively.

Term/Symbol | Definition |
---|---|

Shortened information | Information to be removed after encoding |

Unencoded bits | Bit sequence containing the shortened information and information |

Column weight | Number of 1’s in column of information bits of the parity check matrix |

Row weight | Number of 1’s in row of information bits of the parity check matrix |

$k$ | Unencoded bit length |

$n$ | Codeword length |

$m$ | Shortened information length |

$t$ | Number of bits that can be decoded by decoder of ($n$, $k$) code |

$s$ | Number of bits that can be decoded by decoder of ($n-m$, $k-m$) shortened code without the shortened information |

$E$ | Efficiency of ($n$, $k$) code |

${E}_{y}$ | Efficiency of ($n-m$, $k-m$) shortened code when decoder uses the shortened information |

${E}_{z}$ | Efficiency of ($n-m$, $k-m$) shortened code when decoder does not use the shortened information |

$q$ | Column weight |

$r$ | Row weight |

Term/Symbol | Definition |
---|---|

Sender | Terminal sending information to the receiver |

Receiver | Terminal receiving information from the sender |

Cyberterrorist | Terminal that can be wiretapped and attacked simultaneously |

${C}_{y}$ | Channel capacity of the receiver under attack |

${C}_{z}$ | Channel capacity due to wiretapping by the cyberterrorist |

$C$ | Secrecy capacity |

$X$ | Random sequence sent by the sender $X=\left\{{x}_{1}=0,{x}_{2}=1\right\}$ |

$Y$ | Received sequence by the receiver under attack $Y=\left\{{y}_{1}=0,{y}_{2}=1\right\}$ |

$Z$ | Wiretapped sequence by the cyberterrorist $Z=\left\{{z}_{1}=0,{z}_{2}=1\right\}$ |

$D$ | Errors not corrected by decoder |

$H\left(X\right)$ | Entropy of $X$ |

$H\left(Y\right)$ | Entropy of $Y$ |

$H\left(Z\right)$ | Entropy of $Z$ |

$P\left({x}_{i}\right)$ | Probability of ${x}_{i}$ |

$P\left({y}_{i}\right)$ | Probability of ${y}_{i}$ |

$P\left({z}_{i}\right)$ | Probability of ${z}_{i}$ |

$I\left(X;Y\right)$ | Mutual information between $X$ and $Y$ |

$I\left(X;Z\right)$ | Mutual information between $X$ and $Z$ |

${P}_{ey}$ | Probability of different bits of $X$ and $Y$ |

${P}_{ez}$ | Probability of different bits of $X$ and $Z$ |

Parameter | Detail |
---|---|

Unencoded bit length ($k$) | 600 |

Codeword length ($n$) | 1200 |

Shortened information length ($m$) | 0~500 |

Column weight ($q$) | 3 |

Decoding algorithm | LogMAP |

Maximum number of repetitions | 100 |

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**MDPI and ACS Style**

Amezawa, Y.; Kohno, R.
Dependable Wireless System with Shortened Code Using Distance Information between Integrated Terminals. *Telecom* **2020**, *1*, 266-282.
https://doi.org/10.3390/telecom1030018

**AMA Style**

Amezawa Y, Kohno R.
Dependable Wireless System with Shortened Code Using Distance Information between Integrated Terminals. *Telecom*. 2020; 1(3):266-282.
https://doi.org/10.3390/telecom1030018

**Chicago/Turabian Style**

Amezawa, Yasuharu, and Ryuji Kohno.
2020. "Dependable Wireless System with Shortened Code Using Distance Information between Integrated Terminals" *Telecom* 1, no. 3: 266-282.
https://doi.org/10.3390/telecom1030018