1. Introduction
Traditional cryptography mechanisms protect sensitive data by the encryption of messages into cipher text, thereby preventing access by unauthenticated users. However, cipher texts generated with cryptography mechanisms exhibit a high degree of randomization, which can easily arouse the suspicion of adversaries (e.g., eavesdroppers, hackers, crackers, etc.) [
1]. In this case, more powerful decryption methods and mechanisms may be employed to crack randomized data streams, which can severely threaten the security of the information protected by the cryptography regime [
2]. In this scenario, covert communication which can be used to transmit sensitive information without being perceived attracts tremendous attention [
3].
In general, a transmitter can use covert communication to transmit sensitive data to legal receivers without the communication process being detected by malicious adversaries, which can provide a higher level of security to transmitters [
4]. In covert communication systems, covert information can be carried by normal messages and transmitted together with these normal messages to avoid being perceived by adversaries [
5]. Recently, covert communications have been intensively investigated in different scenarios. As an example, a covert communication system has been developed to conceal covert information in sound documents by utilizing sound information concealing systems [
6]. However, the covert rate of this system is significantly limited by the implementing software. Furthermore, a large amount of public data are required to carry a very small amount of covert information. To cope with this problem, the authors of [
7] proposed a system in which covert communication and secure transmission are jointly implemented in untrusted relaying networks by adopting a power allocation strategy. In this approach, there is a tradeoff between covertness and covert rate for covert communication systems. To increase the covert rate, multiple jammers have been introduced to the covert communication system [
8], where friendly relaying nodes operate as jammers to cooperatively interfere with the adversary in order to aid in the receipt of private information. However, the small capacity and high bit error rate (BER) limits the application of traditional covert communication systems (CCS).
Intelligent reflecting surfaces (IRS) have been introduced into CCS to improve the efficiency and reliability of systems [
9]. IRS, sometimes known as reconfigurable intelligent surfaces, is a low-cost technology that integrates a large number of passive reflecting units to intelligently adjust the reflected phase shift of signals in the environment [
10]. Recently, IRS has been gradually applied to wireless CCS to improve its performance. Initially, an IRS-based method was proposed to take advantage of the smart controlled surfaces to modify unforeseen propagation conditions that could reveal messages [
11]. The authors of [
12] proposed an IRS-aided CCS system and jointly optimized the data rate, transmitting power, and reflection matrix of the IRS. To reduce computational complexity, a low-complexity penalty-based successive convex approximation (SCA) algorithm was proposed in [
13] to jointly optimize the communication schedule and IRS reflection matrix. In [
14,
15], an IRS-aided CCS with multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) was proposed; high coupling was exploited for alternative optimization to find the optimal solution. Similarly, non-orthogonal multiple access methods were adopted in [
16,
17] to design an IRS-assisted CCS, exploiting the phase shift uncertainty of the IRS as a cover medium to hide the existence of covert transmission. A passive IRS-assisted CCS was proposed in [
18] to adjust the phase shifts of the IRS to align the phases of the received reflected signals while adjusting the reflection amplitude to satisfy the covert constraint. However, the covert information in IRS-assisted wireless CCS is vulnerable to adversaries.
To improve the security of wireless CCS, friendly nodes can be utilized to jam adversaries, as in [
19,
20]. Due to their fast deployment with flexible configurations and the presence of short-range line-of-sight links, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are frequently utilized as friendly nodes. A UAV equipped with a base station operates as a moving base station to provide comprehensive communication services. However, the exposure of the transmitted wireless signals to open space threatens the information security of communication systems that rely on UAVs [
21]. To reduce this security threat, a communication protocol was proposed in [
22] to ensure secure communication between UAVs and other UAVs as well as between UAV and ground users. For CCS, when the locations of legal users and monitors cannot be determined, the UAV can operate as a relaying node to deliver messages between the legal users covertly in order to avoid detection by monitors. In a pioneering work, a UAV-aided CCS was designed in [
23], where the UAV trajectory and transmit power for the UAV were alternately optimized to maximize the average covert rate. Based on this, Xu proposed a model for UAV-assisted CCS with multiple users [
24]. Similarly, the authors of [
25] developed a multi-user mmWave covert communication system wherein proper covert beam training and data transmission between legitimate parties was designed. In order to cope with the complex communication environment, in [
26] a UAV with multiple antennas was designed to jam the monitor in the CCS; this approach can account for multiple monitors colluding to listen to adjacent users. Similarly, Du proposed a multi-antenna UAV to assist a covert communication system, along with a power allocation algorithm that can be used to avoid detection from a monitor with multiple antennas [
27]. Owing to the substantial enhancements in performance obtained by combining UAVs and IRS, numerous frameworks incorporating these technologies have been proposed [
28,
29,
30]. However, the effective use of UAVs with IRS to design an efficient wireless covert communication system remains a challenging problem.
In this paper, we propose an IRS-assisted covert communication system with a friendly UAV, where the UAV can be utilized to reinforce message security and the IRS can be employed to improve the covert rate. Moreover, thanks to the high mobility of UAVs, the proposed CCS can be deployed in complex communication environments with various communication barriers, resulting in improved reliability. The contributions of this paper are listed as follows:
We propose an IRS-assisted covert communication system in which a UAV operates as a jammer to interfere with the monitor and reduce the detection rate.
We derive the minimum detection error probability (DEP) for the monitor by modeling the artificial noise (AN) power of the UAV as an uncertainty model, under the assumption that the coordinates of both the UAV and the transmitter are available.
We formulate the optimization problem to maximize the covert rate for a covert communication system by optimizing the trajectory and transmitting power of the UAV. Furthermore, we develop an iterative algorithm that uses the SCA and Dinkelbach methods to solve the optimization problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 describes the system model;
Section 3 formulates the optimization method, considering the goal of maximizing the covert rate for Bob;
Section 4 presents the optimal algorithm designed to solve the problem described in
Section 3; and
Section 5 presents the simulation results of the algorithm. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. System Model
Figure 1 demonstrates an IRS-assisted CCS with a transmitter and receiver for covert messages and a monitor. The transmitter of covert messages, which generally is a base station, is denoted as Alice in a typical CCS, while the receiver is denoted as Bob. The monitor, denoted as Willie, observes communications between Alice and Bob to determine whether there is a covert communication channel between them. Because a large volume of barriers exists in the surroundings, such as in a city with large buildings, the links between Alice and Bob and between Alice and Willie are not line-of-sight (LoS). In this case, we propose deploying IRS on the surfaces of buildings to relay messages from Alice to Bob. However, if Willie is located close to Bob, the received signal power of Willie increases with that of Bob when adopting the IRS, which enlarges the probability of Willie detecting covert communication between Alice and Bob. Thus, we adopt a UAV as a friendly node used by Alice to interfere with Willie’s attempts to detect covert communication between Alice and Bob. In the proposed system, Alice acts as the coordinator who controls the UAV and IRS by delivering the control command and collecting the running parameters. The covert communication system works as both a hacking tool and as an important mechanism for transmitting secret information such as private keys. Therefore, such covert communication systems have become a novel solution for network authentication, copyright protection, and cybercrime evidence-gathering.
The fades of the channels are respectively denoted as (Alice and IRS), (IRS and Bob), and (IRS and Willie). Let all nodes be in a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system, and let Alice, the IRS, Bob, and Willie be in the ground plane with a height of 0. Thus, their coordinates can be expressed as , , , and , respectively. Moreover, we assume here that the respective positions of Alice, the IRS, the UAV, Bob, and Willie are all known to each other. Because Willie knows the location of Bob, Willie’s location close to Bob leads to a significant increase in the detection rate of covert communication. Let the start and end coordinates of the UAV be and , respectively; the UAV flies from the start coordinate to the coordinate in finite time N, where and L is the length of a single time slot, allowing N to be divided into T intervals. Let H be the altitude of the UAV and M the number of IRS units. Changes in the flying altitude of the UAV change the power of the received jamming signals at Willie’s location, leading to different detection rates of covert communication. Here, denotes the maximum speed of the UAV, which may influence the covert rate of the system, and P denotes the transmission power of the base station.
We define
as the set of UAV coordinates; thus, letting
, we have
where
represents the position of the UAV in the
t-th time slot,
is the maximum speed of the UAV, and
.
In addition, the IRS consists of M reflecting elements. The phase shift and amplitude of the IRS in the t-th time slot are defined as a matrix , where . When the optimal amplitude is obtained, can be set as 1, allowing the diagonal matrix to be rewritten as .
2.1. Channel Model
In a practical system, due to the high altitude of the UAV the UAV-to-ground communications can be treated as line-of-sight (LOS) links. Therefore, we model the UAV-to-ground communication channel as a free-space path loss model, where the signal can propagate along a straight line without obstacles between the transmitter and the receiver. In this scenario, the gain of the channel between the UAV and Bob can be described as
Similarly, the channel gain between the UAV and Willie is
where
is the channel power gain over the channel at distance
1 m. The channel between Alice, Bob, and Willie is considered a non-line-of-sight (NLOS) channel due to the blockage caused by obstacles. Consider the IRS as a uniform linear array (ULA) antenna, i.e., a system of antennas arranged in a plane according to a linear law, called an antenna array. Then, the gain of the channel from Alice and IRS is
where
denotes the path loss,
is the distance between Alice and IRS,
is the cosine of the AoA of the signal from the UAV to the IRS in the
t-th time slot,
d is the antenna distance, and
is the carrier wavelength.
Similarly, the channels from the IRS to Bob and Willie are considered LOS channels; thus, the fading of the channels between IRS and Bob and Willie can be respectively expressed as
and
where
is the distance between the IRS and Bob,
is the distance between the IRS and Willie, and
and
are the cosines of the angles of departure (AoD) of the signals that Bob and Willie receive from the IRS, respectively.
Assuming that the channel utilization tends to be maximized in each time slot according to (
3)–(
5), the signal received by Bob is
where
is the transmitting power of Alice and
is the signal sent by Alice in the
t-th time slot, which follows a complex Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, i.e.,
. Moreover,
is the AN signal transmitted by the UAV, which satisfies
;
is the AWGN, with mean 0 and variance
at Bob, i.e.,
; and
is the AN transmit power of the UAV, which follows a uniform distribution over the interval
, where
is the maximum AN transmit power of the UAV and takes values in the range
.
Accordingly, the Probability Density Function (PDF) is expressed as
According to (
7), the receiving rate of Bob is
2.2. Detection on CCS by Willie
In this subsection, Willie determines the presence of covert communications by analyzing the received signals. To detect covert communications, Willie employs the hypothesis testing method. Willie first perceives the location of Alice, the UAV, and the IRS; then, according to (
3), (
4), and (
6), the received signal at Willie’s location can be obtained as follows:
where
indicates that there is no covert message transmitted between the UAV and Bob,
indicates the opposite, and
is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with mean 0 and variance
at Willie’s location, i.e.,
. Because the data rate tends to be the same in each time slot, the received power at Willie’s location can be expressed as
Assuming that Willie employs a radiometer detector in each time slot to detect transmissions from Alice to Bob, we can consider
to be Willie’s detection threshold. If
, then the decision state is
, indicating that Willie determines that covert communication exists between the UAV and Bob. Otherwise, the decision state is
, indicating that Willie determines that no covert message is being transmitted. Thus, Willie’s decision rule can be denoted as
5. Numerical Results
In this section, we present the numerical results for the IRS-assisted CCS with UAV. We use Algorithm 1, designed based on SCA and Dinkelbach, to solve the formulated optimization problem. The parameters are listed in
Table 1.
Figure 2 shows the trajectory comparison of the UAV that works as a jammer to assist the CCS. The initial trajectory, denoted as
, represents the UAV moving with uniform speed from the initial point to the endpoint without optimization. For the trajectory optimized using the proposed algorithm, it can be observed that the UAV starts from the initial point, then flies at its maximum speed to Willie following the shortest path. When approaching Willie, the UAV hovers closer to Willie than to Bob. Finally, the UAV travels to the endpoint at the maximum speed using the shortest distance. It can be observed that the transmitting power of Alice and the AN power of the UAV are adjusted simultaneously to guarantee the maximum covert rate. In addition, due to the limit on its AN power, the UAV achieves a higher covert rate by approaching Willie more closely, which can ensure covertness for the CCS. Furthermore, if the UAV is close to the initial point, Alice can reduce her transmitting power and the UAV can enlarge its AN power to guarantee covertness, which leads to a small covert rate. In this case, the UAV flies close to Willie at its maximum speed, and the UAV must expend a large amount of energy in order to jam the communications between Alice and Willie. Thus, to save energy, the UAV is launched only when covert messages are being transmitted.
Figure 3 displays the covert rate versus the flying time with different UAV altitudes and different numbers of IRS units. The IRS is used with 30 and 40 units, the UAV flying times are 30 s, 50 s, 70 s, 90 s, 110 s, and 130 s, and the UAV altitudes are 50 m and 75 m.
From
Figure 3, it can first be observed that the average covert rate increases with the flying time. As the flying time increases, the UAV spends a longer percentage of its time jamming Willie’s received signals. Therefore, increasing the flying time improves transmission efficiency. Second, as the number of IRS units increases, the corresponding average transmission rate increases as well. The reason for this is that the IRS can intelligently adjust the reflection of the signals in the best direction to achieve a higher covert rate. Third, it can be observed that the covert rate of the covert communication system without any IRS [
19] is much lower than that with IRS, demonstrating that IRS can significantly improve the covert rate. Third, the average covert rate decreases with the height of the UAV. The reason for this is that increasing the altitude results in a larger distance between the UAV and Willie, which in turn results in higher path loss for the interfering signal. In this case, Alice must reduce her transmitting power in order to ensure the covertness of the communication, leading to a lower covert rate.
To evaluate the convergence of the proposed algorithm,
Figure 4 plots the average covert rate versus iterations for different outage probabilities and the maximum speed of the UAV. The outage probability
is set as 0.05, 0.1, and 0.3, and the maximum speed of the UAV
is set as 50 m/s and 70 m/s. It can be observed that a high average transmission rate can be obtained with an increase in outage probability. In addition, when the speed of the UAV increases, the average transmission rate increases accordingly. This is because as the speed of the UAV increases, the time required for UAV to arrive at the optimal jamming coordinate is reduced. Thus, the UAV can jam Willie’s communications for a longer time at the optimal jamming coordinate, which results in an improvement in the covert rate. In this way, increasing both the upper limit of the outage probability and the speed of the UAV elevates the covert rate of the proposed CCS.
Figure 5 illustrates the covert rate versus
for different noise variances at Willie’s location and Bob location. The noise variance at Willie’s location is set as −120 dBm, −100 dBm, and −80 dBm, while the noise variance at Bob’s location is set as −120 dBm and −80 dBm. First, it can be observed that as
grows, the average covert rate increases; this is because
is comparatively smaller, which means that the covertness constraint is relatively loose, leading to a higher average covert rate. In the
range of 0 to 0.2 the average covert rate is significantly influenced by
, while when
is larger than 0.2 the change in the average covert rate is negligible. This is because when the value of
is large the covertness constraint is relatively loose, and the average rate can reach its maximum value. Moreover, there is an increase in the covert rate as the noise variance at Willie’s location becomes larger. This is because the increased interference imposed on Willie can help Alice to increase her transmitting power, improving the covert rate. However, when the noise at Bob’s location increases, the signal received by Bob is influenced as well, reducing the outage probability. Therefore, artificial noise generated by Willie or noise signals used to interfere with Willie influence covert communications between Alice and Bob, decreasing the covert rate.
Figure 6 plots the average covert rate versus Alice’s transmitting power with different flying times of 30 s, 70 s, and 110 s. The maximum AN power is set to 1 W and 2 W. It can be observed that the average covert rate increases with the flying time of the UAV; thus, the transmitting power is determined by the flying time of the UAV as well. Therefore, higher transmitting power results in a significant improvement in the covert rate, and higher AN power can ensure better covertness, though resulting in correspondingly higher energy consumption. In addition, the covert rate was maintained almost unchanged as the transmission power increased from 1 W to 2 W when a UAV was not included in the system [
31]. This is due to the fact that, while the increase in AN transmitting power decreases Willie’s detection performance, it also introduces extra interference with Bob’s attempts to receive covert messages.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed an IRS-assisted covert communication system including a friendly UAV deployed in complex environments with communication barriers. The closed form of the DEP of covert communication for Willie is derived by considering Willie’s uncertainty about the transmitting power. To maximize the covert rate, we formulate the joint optimization problem by adjusting the jamming power of the UAV and the transmitting power of the transmitter, where the optimal DEP for Willie, the transmitting power of the transmitter, and the transmitting power of the AN are established as the constraints. An iterative algorithm based on Dinkelbach is designed to solve the established optimization problem. Our simulation results demonstrate that the covertness and covert rate of the system can be improved by increasing the number of IRS, the UAV flying time, and the interference power.
This work serves as a first foray into the design of a covert communication system assisted by IRS and UAVs. Many interesting directions follow from this work and are deserving of further investigation. First, covert wireless communication aided by UAVs can serve multiple users. How to extend the traditional covert wireless communication model to one with more receivers of covert messages and more monitors remains an open issue. Second, because the base station is equipped with multiple antennas, different ways of selecting more than one antenna to transmit covert messages from among all antennas is a matter that requires further investigation. Third, in order to be deployed in complex environments, the proposed covert communication system with IRS and UAVs could be extended to include scenarios in which, in addition to interfering with Willie’s attempts to detect covert communication, the UAV is able to forward covert messages from Alice to Bob as well.