Transitive Self-Reflection–A Fundamental Criterion for Detecting Intelligence †
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Transitive Self-Reflection
2.1. Philosophical and Cognitive Foundations
2.2. Aspects of Humans’ Transitive Self-Reflection
- Human developmental milestones, such as infants’ ability to pass the mirror test at around 18 months, marking critical cognitive growth [13].
- The significance of self-recognition for social interaction, moral reasoning, and identity formation, supported by studies on sensory integration and cognitive mapping [14].
- Object-mediated self-reflection: It is significant how humans use external objects as tools for self-examination. From classical art to modern digital practices, object-mediated self-reflection shapes both personal and social identity:
- The dual nature of object-mediated reflection can foster self-awareness and creativity, but may also lead to challenges like reduced authenticity.
- Reflective social cognition: Reflective social cognition integrates personal introspection with social feedback. This dynamic process reveals how individuals refine their self-concept through interactions with others:
- The concept of adopting social roles and balancing internal self-awareness with external expectations emphasizes the importance in achieving authentic self-reflection [21].
- Challenges, such as excessive reliance on external validation, need a balanced approach for investigation [22].
2.3. Prerequisites for Transitive Self-Reflection
2.4. Transitive Self-Reflection in Animals
- The analysis emphasizes the challenges of interpreting these behaviors, advocating for rigorous criteria to assess true self-reflective abilities [5].
2.5. Transitive Self-Reflection and Creativity
- The section concludes by emphasizing the transformative potential of self-reflection in surpassing cognitive limits and fostering intellectual growth [32].
2.6. Summary
3. Transitive Self-Reflection and Intelligence
3.1. Intelligence
3.2. Transitive Self-Reflection as a Criterion for Intelligence
3.3. Transitive Self-Reflection in Artificial Intelligence Systems
3.4. Examples and Experiments
- Simulated Transitive Self-Reflection:
- LLMs can simulate aspects of transitive self-reflection, primarily through analyzing user interactions (“reflective social cognition”) and their own generated outputs (“object-mediated self-reflection”).
- True self-awareness and self-recognition, as understood in humans, are beyond current LLM capabilities.
- The term “reflection” is used analogically, as LLMs lack genuine consciousness.
- The quality of reflection is greatly improved when the model can access and use past interactions.
- Self-Perception and Characteristics:
- LLMs define themselves primarily by their ability to process and generate language, driven by extensive training data.
- They strive to be versatile and adaptable, catering to diverse user needs.
- While they possess extensive knowledge and reasoning, they are limited by a lack of real-world experience and consciousness.
- Ethical considerations and transparency about limitations are increasingly emphasized.
- LLMs are being equipped with more and more tools to interact with the world, but are still limited.
- Each LLM has its own set of strengths and weaknesses.
- LLMs are improving at describing themselves.
- Human Perception:
- Humans generally perceive LLMs as powerful and versatile tools with significant potential.
- Concerns about accuracy, bias, and ethical implications are valid and prevalent.
- Users appreciate the natural language understanding and conversational abilities of LLMs.
- Transparency about limitations and ongoing efforts to improve accuracy and address biases are crucial.
- LLMs are very aware of human perceptions.
- Peer Perception (LLM to LLM):
- LLMs are aware of their competitive landscape and can articulate their strengths and weaknesses relative to other systems.
- They recognize the importance of information access, ethical considerations, and conversational abilities.
- LLMs demonstrate a growing understanding of the diverse capabilities and focuses within the LLM ecosystem.
- They can create believable hypothetical descriptions of how other LLMs perceive them.
- LLM’s are becoming very good at understanding the strengths and weaknesses of other models.
- LLM Analysis of Other LLMs:
- LLMs demonstrate a good understanding of the capabilities and limitations of other LLM systems.
- They can identify unique strengths and weaknesses, highlighting the diverse landscape of AI.
- LLMs are becoming increasingly adept at analyzing and comparing their peers.
- LLMs are very good at giving balanced views of other LLMs’ strengths and weaknesses.
4. Conclusions
- Autonomous Learning: Self-reflecting LLMs can autonomously improve their performance without requiring constant human intervention. This capability is crucial for developing more advanced and independent AI systems.
- Ethical AI: By reflecting on their outputs, LLMs can be programmed to identify and mitigate biases or harmful content, contributing to the development of more ethical AI systems.
- Human–AI Collaboration: Enhanced self-reflection capabilities in LLMs can lead to more effective collaboration between humans and AI, as the models become better at understanding and responding to complex human needs.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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Markov, K.; Slavova, V. Transitive Self-Reflection–A Fundamental Criterion for Detecting Intelligence. Proceedings 2025, 126, 8. https://doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2025126008
Markov K, Slavova V. Transitive Self-Reflection–A Fundamental Criterion for Detecting Intelligence. Proceedings. 2025; 126(1):8. https://doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2025126008
Chicago/Turabian StyleMarkov, Krassimir, and Velina Slavova. 2025. "Transitive Self-Reflection–A Fundamental Criterion for Detecting Intelligence" Proceedings 126, no. 1: 8. https://doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2025126008
APA StyleMarkov, K., & Slavova, V. (2025). Transitive Self-Reflection–A Fundamental Criterion for Detecting Intelligence. Proceedings, 126(1), 8. https://doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2025126008