Design of Inter-BAN Authentication Protocols for WBAN in a Cloud-Assisted Environment
Abstract
:1. Introduction
1.1. Overview of WBAN
- In the intra-BAN tier, communication takes place between sensor and controller nodes. The patient’s data is monitored and captured by sensors, and it is subsequently transmitted to the controller node through an unsecured channel.
- In the inter-BAN tier, communication takes place between a controller node and a medical server. Software is developed at the controller node/local server for gathering data from sensor nodes and then sending it to the medical server via unsecured channels. In addition, another software is developed at a remote medical server to obtain the data from the controller and store it in the database system for further analysis.
- In the beyond-BAN tier, communication takes place between a medical server and a doctor. The medical server can be in the cloud, and the doctor can view the data stored on the server.
- The Trusted authority initializes the system and registers the system parties.
- The patient wears sensing devices to gather sensitive medical data, which is then transferred via public channels for medical purposes.
- The doctor can request access to the patient’s data and provide appropriate treatment measures.
1.2. Problem Statement and Main Contributions
- How do we achieve secure and efficient inter-BAN authentication protocols for WBAN in a cloud-assisted environment?
- We design two inter-BAN authentication protocols for WBAN: P-I is for emergency authentication, and P-II is for periodic authentication.
- We conduct an informal security analysis to demonstrate that our protocols meet all of the security requirements in this research.
- We evaluate our proposed authentication protocols using BAN logic and the AVISPA simulation tool.
- We conduct a performance analysis in terms of computation and communication costs.
1.3. Research Scope
2. Literature Review
2.1. Preliminary
2.1.1. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
- Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP): Given an elliptic curve Eq(a, b) and two points Q, P on Eq(a, b) such that , it is hard to determine an integer n.
- Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECDHP): Given an elliptic curve Eq(a, b) and three points P, x.P, y.P on Eq(a, b), it is hard to determine .
2.1.2. Adversary Model
- All messages exchanged through public channels are completely under the control of the attacker [27].
- A patient’s controller node/mobile device can be stolen, and the attacker can access the data on it [28].
- A patient’s identity (IDi) or password (PWi) could be guessed by an attacker, but not both at the same time [29].
- An attacker has the ability to launch attacks through public channels [30].
- The private key of the trusted authority cannot be compromised by the attacker [31].
2.2. Requirements of WBAN Authentication Schemes
- Emergency and periodic authentication protocols: Whenever a sensor identifies an emergency in the body of the patient, the patient’s controller device begins an emergency authentication with the medical server to send the emergency report in a secure manner. Likewise, when the patient’s data must be obtained from the controller node and stored on the server at a specific time, the cloud-based medical server begins a periodic authentication with the controller node to ensure secure data transmission.
- Perfect forward/backward secrecy: Future and past keys will not be compromised.
- Anonymity and Untraceability: This refers to an attacker’s inability to determine a patient’s identity via message eavesdropping and tracking a patient through messages transmitted during earlier sessions.
- Secure password change: A legitimate mobile device’s password cannot be changed at will by an attacker since the attacker is unaware of IDi and PWi.
- Controller node revocation: It is essential to include a revocation mechanism if a patient’s mobile device/controller node is lost or stolen.
- Replay attack: When messages are sent through insecure channels, an attacker can obtain them. However, if the message has a timestamp, the attacker cannot launch a replay attack.
- Session key disclosure attack: An attacker cannot extract secret values from messages transmitted over an unsecured channel. This prevents the attacker from computing the session key.
- Off-line guessing attack: A patient’s IDi or PWi could be guessed by an attacker, but not both at the same time.
- Impersonation attack: An attacker is unable to generate an authentication message to pretend to be a real entity.
- Controller node stolen attack: An attacker who gets a valid patient’s controller node cannot retrieve any information on it.
- Known session-specific temporary information attack: The session key cannot be computed even if an attacker has the random values produced securely throughout the session.
- Desynchronization attack: This attack, which corrupts the communication between two parties, should be prevented by updating the data kept on both parties during the authentication.
- Computation cost: This refers to the computational load on the involved parties. The computational cost should be minimized since it is critical for devices with constrained resources.
- Communication cost: This is the cost of exchanging messages in terms of bit sizes and communication overhead between the parties participating in the authentication. Regarding communication overhead, the authentication messages should require at most one round trip.
2.3. The Existing Authentication Schemes in WBAN
2.4. Findings
3. Proposed Scheme
3.1. Initialization Phase
- TA chooses an elliptic curve Eq(a, b) over a finite field Fq, and a base point P on Eq(a, b).
- TA chooses a hash function h:{0,1}* → Zq*.
- TA creates a secret number STA ∈ Zq* as its secret key and computes its public key PKTA = STA * P.
- TA makes the parameters (Eq(a, b), PKTA, P, q, h) public while keeping STA secret.
3.2. Registration Phase
- Pi selects IDi and PWi, then produces a number randomly ai ∈ Zq*, and calculates HIDi = h (IDi || ai). Pi transmits (IDi, HIDi) to TA in a secure manner. Then TA calculates Si = h (IDi || STA) as CN secret key, PKi = Si*P, SIDi = (HIDi * STA)*PKTA, and CIDi = h(HIDi || STA). TA stores HIDi and IDi in secure memory and makes (PKi) public.
- MSh chooses IDh and sends (IDh) to the TA securely. Afterward, the TA produces ui ∈ Zq* and retrieves HIDi from secure memory. TA then calculates Sh = h (IDh || STA) as MSh secret key, PKh = Sh*P, Vi = ui ⊕ h (Sh), Wi = HIDi ⊕ h(ui), and REi = CIDi ⊕ h(Sh). The TA makes (PKh, IDh) public.
- TA sends (Sh, HIDi, Vi, Wi, REi) to MSh securely. MSh defines Sh as its secret key and computes PIDh-i = HIDi ⊕ h(Sh). MSh stores PIDh-i, Vi, Wi, and REi in its memory.
- TA sends (Si, SIDi, CIDi, Vi) to CN securely. CN defines Si as its secret key and creates a number bi ∈ Zq*. CN then computes HPWi = h (IDi || PWi || ai), APi = h (IDi || PWi) ⊕ ai, BPi = HPWi ⊕ bi, CPi = SIDi ⊕ bi * P, DPi = h (ai || bi || HPWi || SIDi), and EPi = CIDi ⊕ SIDi. CN keeps (APi, BPi, CPi, DPi, EPi, Vi) in its memory.
3.3. Authentication P-I
- Pi enters IDi and PWi to CN. Then CN calculates ai = APi ⊕ h(IDi || PWi), HIDi = h(IDi || ai), HPWi = h(IDi || PWi || ai), bi = HPWi ⊕ BPi, and SIDi = CPi ⊕ bi*P. Then, CN verifies if DPi ≟ h(ai || bi || HPWi || SIDi), Pi is logged into CN successfully.
- CN produces a number ri ∈ Zq* and a current timestamp T1. CN calculates XRi = ri* P, Xi = ri * PKh, Ji = Vi ⊕ Xi, and Li1 = h (Xi || HIDi || T1 || IDh || Vi). Afterward, CN transmits the message (XRi, Ji, Li1, T1) to MSh through an unsecured channel.
- When (XRi, Ji, Li1, T1) is received, MSh validates the timestamp, i.e., if |T1 − T1*| < ΔT, where T1* denotes the time of message receipt, then MSh calculates Xi = XRi * Sh, Vi = Ji ⊕ Xi, then retrieves Wi of Vi from its memory and calculates ui = Vi ⊕ h(Sh), and HIDi = Wi ⊕ h(ui). MSh checks whether HIDi ⊕ h(Sh) ≟ PIDh-i is in its memory. If this condition is met, CN of Pi is registered. MSh then checks whether Li1 ≟ h (Xi || HIDi || T1 || IDh || Vi). If so, then CN is authenticated.
- Next, MSh creates random numbers rh ∈ Zq*, ui+ ∈ Zq*, and current timestamp T2. Then, MSh calculates Rh = rh * P, Vh = rh * PKi, Vi+ = ui+ ⊕ h(Sh), Wi+ = HIDi ⊕ h(ui+), and SKi-h = h(HIDi || Vh || Xi || Vi). MSh replaces (Vi, Wi) with (Vi, Wi, Vi+, Wi+), then computes C1 = Vi+ ⊕ Vh, and Li2 = h (Vh || SKi-h || IDh || HIDi || Vi+ || T2). Then MSh transmits the message (Rh, Li2, C1, T2) to CN through an insecure channel.
- When (Rh, Li2, C1, T2) is received from MSh, CN checks the validity of the timestamps. If |T2 − T2*| < ΔT, where T2* denotes the time of message receipt, then CN calculates Vh = Si * Rh, SKi-h = h(HIDi || Vh || Xi || Vi), and Vi+ = C1 ⊕ Vh. CN checks if Li2 ≟ h (Vh || SKi-h || IDh || HIDi || Vi+ || T2), CN replaces (Vi) with (Vi+) in its memory, MSh is authenticated, and SKi-h is created between CN and MSh.
3.4. Authentication P-II
- MSh generates secret numbers fh ∈ Zq*, bh ∈ Zq*, and current timestamp T1. MSh retrieves (CIDi) from the secure memory, where CIDi = REi ⊕ h(Sh), (i.e., retrieve the identity of the requested Pi). MSh then computes XBh = bh * P, Bh = bh * PKi, Fh = h (CIDi) ⊕ fh, SKh-i = h (Bh || CIDi || fh), and Lk2 = h (Bh || CIDi || IDh || SKh-i || T1). Afterward, MSh transmits the message (XBh, Fh, Lk2, T1) to CN through an unsecured channel.
- When (XBh, Fh, Lk2, T1) is received from MSh, Pi enters IDi and PWi to CN. Then CN calculates ai = APi ⊕ h(IDi || PWi), HIDi = h(IDi || ai), HPWi = h(IDi || PWi || ai), bi = HPWi ⊕ BPi, and SIDi = CPi ⊕ bi*P. After that, CN verifies if DPi ≟ h(ai || bi || HPWi || SIDi), Pi is logged into CN successfully.
- CN validates the timestamps. If |T1 − T1*| < ΔT, where T1* denotes the time of message receipt, then CN calculates CIDi = EPi ⊕ SIDi, Bh = XBh * Si, fh = Fh ⊕ h(CIDi), and SKh-i = h (Bh || CIDi || fh). Next, CN checks whether Lk2 ≟ h (Bh || CIDi || IDh || SKh-i || T1). If so, MSh is authenticated, and SKh-i is created between MSh and CN.
3.5. Password Change Protocol
- Pi enters IDi and PWi in CN.
- CN calculates ai = APi ⊕ h(IDi || PWi), HIDi = h(IDi || ai), HPWi = h(IDi || PWi || ai), bi = HPWi ⊕ BPi, and SIDi = CPi ⊕ bi * P. Then, CN verifies if DPi ≟ h(ai || bi || HPWi || SIDi), CN prompts Pi to choose a new password.
- Pi chooses a new password PWi+ and transmits it to CN.
- After getting PWi+, CN calculates HPWi+ = h (IDi || PWi+ || ai), APi+ = h (IDi || PWi+) ⊕ ai, BPi+ = HPWi+ ⊕ bi, CPi = SIDi ⊕ bi * P, and DPi+ = h (ai || bi || HPWi+ || SIDi). Finally, CN replaces (APi, BPi, CPi, DPi, EPi,Vi) with (APi+, BPi+, CPi, DPi+, EPi,Vi).
4. Security Analysis
4.1. Informal Security Analysis
4.1.1. Emergency and Periodic Authentication Protocols
4.1.2. Perfect Forward/Backward Secrecy
4.1.3. Patient Anonymity and Untraceability
4.1.4. Secure Password Change
4.1.5. Controller Node Revocation
4.1.6. Replay Attack
4.1.7. Session Key Disclosure Attack
4.1.8. Off-Line Guessing Attack
4.1.9. Impersonation Attack
4.1.10. Controller Node Stolen Attack
4.1.11. Known Session-Specific Temporary Information Attack
4.1.12. Desynchronization Attack
4.2. BAN Logic Proof
4.2.1. Inference Rules
4.2.2. P-I Goals
4.2.3. P-I Assumptions
4.2.4. P-I Idealized Forms
4.2.5. P-I Formal Analysis
- Step 1: D1 is obtained from Msg1.
- Step 2: confirms that the message sent is from . Applying MMR with D1 and A6 yields D2.
- Step 3: checks whether request is fresh. D3 is obtained by applying FR using A1 and D2.
- Step 4: verifies whether request is legitimate. D4 is obtained by applying NVR using D2 and D3.
- Step 5: now trusts and all its sent parameters. D5 is obtained by applying BR using D4.
- Step 6: D6 is obtained by using SKR with D3 and D5 to achieve G4.
- Step 7: has complete control over the sent parameters. D7 is obtained by using JR with A4 and D6 to achieve G3
- Step 8: D8 is obtained from Msg2
- Step 9: confirms that the message sent is from . Applying MMR with D8 and A5 yields D9.
- Step 10: checks whether request is fresh. Applying FR with D9 and A2 yields D10.
- Step 11: verifies whether request is legitimate. D11 is obtained by applying NVR using D9 and D10.
- Step 12: now trusts and all of the parameters it has sent. D12 is obtained by using BR with D11.
- Step 13: D13 is obtained by using SKR with D10 and D12 to achieve G2.
- Step 14: obtains the parameters of the new session key from the sent parameters. D14 is obtained by using JR with A3 and D13 to achieve G1.
4.2.6. P-II Goals
4.2.7. P-II Assumptions
4.2.8. P-II Idealized Forms
4.2.9. P-II Formal Analysis
- Step 1: D1 is obtained from Msg1.
- Step 2: trusts the transmitted parameter and that is genuine. D2 is obtained from D1, A5, fh = h () ⊕ Fh, Bh = bh * PKi, and the session key SKh-i = h ( || CIDi || fh) to accomplish G4.
- Step 3: D3 is obtained by using JR with A3 and D2 to achieve G3.
- Step 4: D4 is obtained from Msg2
- Step 5: confirms that the message sent is from . D5 is obtained by applying MMR using D4 and A4.
- Step 6: checks whether request is fresh. D6 is obtained by using FR with A1 and D5.
- Step 7: verifies whether request is legitimate. D7 is obtained by applying NVR using D5 and D6.
- Step 8: now trusts and all of the parameters it has sent. D8 is obtained by using BR with D7.
- Step 9: D9 is obtained from D8, A6, fh = h () ⊕ Fh, Bh = XBh * Si, and the session key SKh-i = h ( || CIDi || fh) to accomplish G2.
- Step 10: obtains the parameters of the new session key from the sent parameters. D10 is obtained by using JR with A2 and D9 to achieve G1.
4.3. AVISPA Simulation Tool
5. Performance Analysis
5.1. Computation Costs
5.2. Communication Costs
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
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Symbol | Description |
---|---|
Pi | Patient-i |
CN | Controller node of Pi |
MSh | Cloud-based medical server-h |
TA | Trusted authority |
IDi, PWi | Pi’s identity and password |
HIDi | Pi’s masked identity |
SIDi | Pi’s secret identity |
IDh | MSh’s identity |
Si, PKi | CN’s secret and public keys |
Sh, PKh | MSh’s secret and public keys |
STA, PKTA | TA’s secret and public keys of |
ai, bi, ri | CN-created random numbers |
rh, ui+, fh, bh | MSh-created random numbers |
ui | TA-created a random number |
HPWi, APi, BPi, CPi, DPi | Data used by CN to authenticate Pi |
Vi, Wi, Vi+, Wi+ | Data to verify message synchronization |
Tn | Timestamp n |
ΔT | The maximum transmission delay |
Tn* | The time of message receipt |
XRi | Public data generated by CN and used by MSh to compute Xi |
Xi | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem |
Ji | Data utilized to retrieve Vi in P-I |
PIDh-i | Data stored on MSh to check CN’s registration |
Rh | Public data generated by MSh and used by CN to compute Vh |
Vh | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem |
C1 | Data utilized to retrieve Vi+ in P-I |
Li1 | Data that MSh uses in P-I to authenticate CN |
Li2 | Data that CN uses in P-I to authenticate MSh |
REi | Data that MSh uses in P-II to retrieve CIDi |
CIDi | Data generated by TA and used by MSh to authenticate CN |
XBh | Public data generated by MSh and used by CN to compute Bh |
Bh | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem |
Fh | Data utilized to retrieve fh in P-II |
EPi | Data stored on CN and used to retrieve CIDi in P-II |
Lk2 | Data that CN uses in P-II to authenticate MSh |
SKi-h | Session key between CN and MSh in P-I |
SKh-i | Session key between MSh and CN in P-II |
P | A base point on an elliptic curve |
q | Large prime number |
* | Scalar multiplication operation |
Zq* | The nonzero positive integers modulus q |
⊕ | XOR operation |
h | Hash function |
|| | Concatenation operation |
→ | Public channel |
⇢ | Secure channel |
Scheme | S01 | S02 | S03 | S04 | S05 | S06 | S07 | S08 | S09 | S10 | S11 | S12 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[29] | ✘ | ✓ | ✓ | ~ | ✘ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✘ |
[33] | ✘ | ✓ | ✓ | ✘ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ~ | ✓ | ✘ | ~ | ✘ |
[40] | ✘ | ✓ | ~ | ✘ | ✘ | ✓ | ✓ | ~ | ✓ | ✘ | ~ | ✘ |
[43] | ✘ | ✓ | ✓ | ✘ | ✘ | ✓ | ✓ | ~ | ✓ | ✘ | ~ | ✘ |
[45] | ✘ | ~ | ✘ | ✓ | ✘ | ✓ | ✓ | ✘ | ✘ | ✓ | ✘ | ✘ |
[48] | ✘ | ✘ | ✓ | ✓ | ✘ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✘ | ✘ |
[51] | ✘ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✘ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✘ |
Proposed | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
Notation | Description |
---|---|
P, Q | Two principals |
X1, X2 | Two statements |
SK | The session key |
P|≡ X1 | P believes X1, if X1 is true |
P ⊲ X1 | P sees X1, i.e., P receives X1 contained within a message, but P does not necessarily believe X1 |
P| ∼X1 | P once says X1, i.e., P transmits a message including X1. It is unknown if P sent the message recently or a long time ago, but P believes X1 when P sends it |
P| ⇒ X1 | P controls X1, and P should trust X1 |
#(X1) | X1 is fresh, i.e., X1 has never been sent before |
(X1) K | X1 is combined with K |
Q | P and Q have the same key K |
If P is true, then Q is also true |
Scheme | Computation Cost | ||
---|---|---|---|
CN | MSh | Total (ms) | |
[48] | 1Tbp + 2Thp + 3Tmul + 1Trng + 1Ted + 4Th | 1Tbp + 2Thp + 4Tmul + 1Trng + 1Ted + 2Th | 77.977 |
[33] | 1Thp + 6Tmul + 1Trng + 2Tadd + 4Th | 1Thp + 6Tmul + 1Trng + 2Tadd + 4Th | 52.7596 |
[29] | 8 Tmul + 1Trng + 8Th | 2Tbp + 5 Tmul + 1Trng + 5Th | 41.6679 |
[43] | 1Texp + 5Tmul + 1Trng + 1Ted + 1Tadd + 4Th | 1Tbp + 4Tmul + 1Trng + 1Ted + 2Tadd + 4Th | 30.887 |
[45] | 5Tmul + 1Trng + 1Tadd + 7Th | 1Tbp + 1Texp + 3Tmul + 1Trng + 1Tadd + 6Th | 28.6345 |
[51] | 3Tmul + 1Trng + 11Th | 3Tmul + 1Trng + 7Th | 14.4754 |
[40] | 2Tmul + 2Trng + 3Ted | 1Tmul + 1Trng + 3Ted | 8.3226 |
P-I | 4Tmul + 1Trng + 7Th | 3Tmul + 2Trng + 6Th | 17.2289 |
P-II | 2Tmul + 7Th | 2Tmul + 2Trng + 4Th | 10.0073 |
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Almuhaideb, A.M.; Alghamdi, H.A. Design of Inter-BAN Authentication Protocols for WBAN in a Cloud-Assisted Environment. Big Data Cogn. Comput. 2022, 6, 124. https://doi.org/10.3390/bdcc6040124
Almuhaideb AM, Alghamdi HA. Design of Inter-BAN Authentication Protocols for WBAN in a Cloud-Assisted Environment. Big Data and Cognitive Computing. 2022; 6(4):124. https://doi.org/10.3390/bdcc6040124
Chicago/Turabian StyleAlmuhaideb, Abdullah M., and Huda A. Alghamdi. 2022. "Design of Inter-BAN Authentication Protocols for WBAN in a Cloud-Assisted Environment" Big Data and Cognitive Computing 6, no. 4: 124. https://doi.org/10.3390/bdcc6040124
APA StyleAlmuhaideb, A. M., & Alghamdi, H. A. (2022). Design of Inter-BAN Authentication Protocols for WBAN in a Cloud-Assisted Environment. Big Data and Cognitive Computing, 6(4), 124. https://doi.org/10.3390/bdcc6040124