Electricity Pricing and Its Role in Modern Smart Energy System Design: A Review
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- Introduction of the development of power grid pricing in chronological order, from 1989 to the present, and changes in the framework of the electricity market so that readers can clearly understand the development of the electricity market;
- A comprehensive review of electricity pricing enables researchers to better identify current research gaps. These include pricing (and energy sharing)-enabled control for modern distributed power grids with P2P and M2M energy trading; pricing in RESs, ESSs, and controllable loads applications; and the impact of DSAS provision on power pricing schemes;
- A comprehensive summary of the current pricing framework and limitations of retail and wholesale markets, with suggestions for future electricity markets and research directions in this field.
2. Development of Pricing in the Power Grid
2.1. Brief History
2.2. Electricity Price Structure
- Wholesale electricity price: The wholesale electricity price is simply the cost incurred when preparing to transmit electricity to the user. It includes the cost of generating electricity, distributing it, and the cost of operating and maintaining transmission infrastructure. No matter what kind of energy is used (coal and RESs), it will enter the wholesale market once generated. Wholesale electricity prices are determined by supply and demand in the wholesale electricity market, which is where energy producers and retailers buy and sell electricity. Retailers buy electricity from the wholesale market, where prices are generally set every 30 min but fluctuate based on supply and demand. The factors that influence wholesale electricity prices include fuel prices, weather, electricity demand, transmission capacity, and renewable energy generation.
- Network costs (poles and wires): The network cost is the cost of the transmission and distribution network when transmitting energy required by the user to the user’s place of consumption. It includes the cost of building, operating, maintaining, and upgrading the infrastructure necessary to transmit and distribute electricity or gas. Energy suppliers typically charge network costs to cover using the energy grid in order to transport energy to customers. Network costs are regulated by regulatory bodies in each country to ensure that they are fair and transparent and that energy companies do not overcharge customers. These costs are usually calculated based on the amount of energy used by customers, as well as the distance between the energy source and the user’s location. Some factors that can affect network costs include the age and condition of the infrastructure, the level of demand and consumption, the cost of raw materials and labor, and the level of investment in new technologies and renewable energy sources. Reducing network costs is often a key priority for energy suppliers, as it can help them remain competitive and provide cost-effective energy solutions to their customers.
- National government schemes and state or territory government schemes and levies: Many national and state governments have environmental programs, such as Australia’s Large Scale Renewable Energy Target and Small Renewable Energy Plan. The cost of these government programs can also affect electricity prices for consumers. However, it is important to note that while these programs may increase electricity prices in the short term, they are ultimately expected to lead to greater energy efficiency and a transition toward RESs, which may ultimately reduce prices in the long term. Furthermore, the cost of environmental damage caused by non-renewable sources is often not factored into electricity prices, so these programs may lead to cost savings in the long run by reducing the impact of pollution on public health and other resources. Overall, government environmental programs can have a complex and nuanced impact on electricity prices, but they are ultimately a necessary step toward a more sustainable and equitable energy future.
- Retail services and other charges: Retail service is the bridge between energy retailers (such as ActewAGL) for consumers and the wholesale market. Energy retailers buy electricity for consumers from wholesale markets; arrange their meters, bills, and connections; and ensure that consumers can better manage their energy throughout the process. Retail services also offer customers a wide range of energy plans and options depending on their needs and preferences. They advise on energy efficiency, RESs, and the latest technologies that can help customers reduce their energy usage and bills. The retail services team manages customer accounts, billing, customer service, and support. They provide customers with information on their energy usage, tariffs, and billing and help them understand their consumption patterns and habits. Retail services also offer various payment options and plans to help customers manage their energy bills more effectively. In summary, retail services play a crucial role in ensuring the smooth and efficient operation of energy markets and in providing customers with high-quality services and support. Their expertise and knowledge help customers make informed decisions and take action to reduce their energy usage and bills while also contributing to a sustainable energy future.
2.3. The Evolution of the Electricity Market
3. P2P and M2M Energy Trading and Pricing in the Electricity Market
3.1. Pricing Mechanism of P2P and M2M Electricity Trading
3.2. Recent Development of P2P and M2M Energy Trading and Sharing
4. Pricing in RESs, ESSs, and Controllable Loads Applications
4.1. Pricing Model in Today’s Smart Grid
4.2. Photovoltaic Prosumers
5. Pricing in Smart Grid with Demand-Side Ancillary Services Provision
5.1. Market Structure and Pricing
5.2. Impact on Pricing Schemes
6. Pricing Framework in Retail and Wholesale Markets in the Modern Smart Grid
6.1. Pricing Framework in the Retail and Wholesale Markets
6.2. Limitation in Electricity Retail and Wholesale Markets
- Lack of flexibility: The traditional pricing framework is rigid and lacks the flexibility to accommodate changes in customers’ behavior and preferences. It cannot adapt to the dynamic energy demand and supply patterns in modern smart grids.
- Complexity: Pricing frameworks for smart grids are often complex and difficult to understand for the average consumer. This creates confusion and may discourage them from adopting energy-efficient practices.
- Inequity: Pricing frameworks may lead to inequity in terms of cost-sharing among customers, especially those who cannot afford to invest in energy-efficient appliances or heating systems.
- Data privacy concerns: Smart meters used to measure energy consumption and feed data into the pricing framework may raise privacy concerns among customers.
- Operational challenges: Implementing and maintaining pricing frameworks can be costly and time-consuming, especially for small utility companies.
- Resistance to change: Customers may resist changes in pricing structures due to familiarity and a lack of trust in new pricing mechanisms.
- Potential for market manipulation: Pricing frameworks have the potential to be manipulated by energy companies, leading to unfair pricing practices.
7. Future Research Directions
8. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Electricity Markets Model | Advantages | Disadvantages |
---|---|---|
Monopoly model | 1. Efficient use of resources: The monopoly model enables a single firm to coordinate all production activities, ensuring efficient resource use and lower production costs and prices. 2. Economies of scale: The monopoly model allows the firm to operate at a larger scale, resulting in production efficiency and lower costs. | 1. Lack of competition: The monopoly model has been criticized for its lack of competition, which can lead to higher prices and lower-quality service. 2. Barriers to entry: Monopolies can create barriers to entry that can limit competition, preventing new entrants from entering the market and stifling innovation. 3. Limited consumer choice: Consumers have limited choice, as only one provider is in the market. This can lead to a lack of product diversity and options for consumers. 4. Lack of innovation: Monopolies may not have the motivation to innovate, given that there is no competition. This could stall technological advancements in the industry. |
Single-buyer model | 1. Reduced transaction costs: In a single-buyer model, electricity trading occurs between a single seller and a single buyer. This reduces transaction costs for both parties as the need to negotiate multiple contracts is eliminated. 2. Promotes stability: The single-buyer model can promote stability in the power market by ensuring a large and consistent demand for electricity. This can help ensure that power plants are running at optimal levels, which can reduce prices and increase efficiency. 3. Encourages investment: The single-buyer model can also encourage investment in the power sector by providing investors with a stable and predictable revenue stream. This is particularly attractive to investors who may hesitate to invest in a more volatile market. | 1. Risk of inefficiency: The single-buyer model can also lead to inefficiencies in the power sector. This is because the buyer may have different incentives than multiple buyers to negotiate the best prices, leading to higher prices. 2. Political interference: The single-buyer model can also be vulnerable to political interference, which can lead to prioritizing certain projects over others, even if they are not the most efficient or cost-effective. This can lead to a suboptimal allocation of resources in the power sector. 3. Other limits: Consumers still need to sign long-term contracts and are subjected to regulated prices. |
Pricing Mechanism | Brief Description | Reference |
---|---|---|
Marginal pricing | Considering the transaction preference in the distribution network, a carbon-aware distribution location marginal pricing scheme for the distribution system operator’s operation service pricing scheme is proposed to guide the P2P trading between producers and consumers. | [41] |
A new pricing mechanism (including preference, uncertainty, and local marginal price) for P2P energy trading is proposed. These pricing strategies can overcome current market uncertainty issues and increase the reliability of energy trading. | [42] | |
Dynamic pricing | A dynamic pricing mechanism for P2P energy trading is designed to enable the efficient trading of on-site energy and contribute to decarbonization and grid security goals—design dynamic price policies using multi-agent reinforcement learning with an open-source economic simulation framework built by Salesforce Research. | [43] |
A P2P energy trading mechanism for electric vehicles and solar power businesses is proposed. The mechanism is based on a dynamic pricing mechanism developed for storage energy prices. | [44] | |
A framework for P2P trading prices considering dynamic retail electricity prices is proposed, through which prosumers can automatically generate bids and participate in auctions in P2P markets. | [45] | |
Three-part tariff price | This paper deals with pricing schemes for utilities and electricity consumers. The utility determines the time-varying price of non-renewable energy and the buy-back price of RESs while maximizing its profit. Electricity consumers decide whether to become prosumers according to the pricing policy. | [46] |
Game theory | Based on the cooperative game of bargaining, a pricing mechanism for M2M energy trading is proposed. Additionally, a fast alternation method is introduced to solve the energy management problem of MGs in a decentralized manner. The results show that MGs can actively trade with each other and gain economic benefits. | [47] |
An efficient game theory-based approach is proposed to determine the electricity price mechanism in direct P2P electricity markets. Additionally, the participant’s reserved price for electricity trading is considered to ensure that the participant’s electricity transaction price is the best profit price. | [48] | |
This paper considers two trading scenarios (smart homes and electric vehicles) and proposes a generalized Nash bargaining model to obtain optimal pricing strategies, effectively reducing overall costs. | [49] | |
Hybrid pricing | A power price mechanism framework is designed based on local households, and its optimization goal is to make the power distribution of adjacent families more balanced and stable. The framework utilizes real-time data from smart meters to monitor the power consumption of individual households and adjust the price accordingly. | [50] |
Decentralized energy trading mechanism | A decentralized P2P energy trading mechanism in a distributed manner is proposed to maximize social welfare. The aim is to create a more efficient and dynamic energy market driven by market forces and consumer demand. The decentralized nature of the system also provides greater resilience and stability, as it reduces the risk of power outages and blackouts. | [51] |
Feed-in tariff | By studying the techno-economic performance of renewable energy depreciation in energy-sharing systems, new energy management strategies have been proposed to improve the relative capacity of batteries. | [52] |
Methods | Brief Description | Reference |
---|---|---|
Multi-leader and multi-follower Stackelberg game | A two-stage P2P energy trading market is proposed. In the first stage, a multi-leader and multi-follower Stackelberg game establishes a comprehensive P2P market. In the second stage, network reconstruction is considered. | [53] |
A P2P energy trading market strategy is proposed based on the blockchain, and the Stackelberg game is used to establish leaders and followers. This strategy considers the market’s supply and demand and provides accurate energy transfer signals, facilitating transactions between MG. | [54] | |
Cooperative game theory and blockchain | A P2P energy trading mechanism combining cooperative game theory and blockchain is proposed and verified by conducting comprehensive theoretical analysis and simulation experiments using a standard IEEE 14 bus system and real datasets. | [55] |
Blockchain platform | A credit-based P2P electricity trading model in a blockchain environment is proposed to facilitate the local trading of RESs. The model is based on a blockchain platform where each participant is registered as a node and has a digital wallet. Each RES is equipped with a smart meter measuring production and consumption. In this model, participants can sell their excess electricity to other participating nodes or use it to offset their consumption. | [56] |
Blockchain technology and smart contract | A P2P multi-energy market trading mechanism is proposed, which can simultaneously generate electricity and heat from RESs and enable users to trade their excess energy in a decentralized manner. The proposed mechanism utilizes blockchain technology to ensure secure and transparent transactions and smart contracts to automate the trading process. The trading mechanism is based on a bidding system, where users can place bids to buy or sell energy based on their energy needs or availability. Smart contracts automate the trading process, eliminating the need for manual intervention and ensuring that transactions are executed automatically when predefined conditions are met. | [57] |
Distributed ledger technology | A P2P electricity trading method based on intelligent interconnection multi-regional regulatory distributed ledger technology is proposed, which promotes the reliability of P2P trading. | [58] |
Decentralized market clearing | A new decentralized P2P energy trading platform is proposed. It mainly includes the market layer and the blockchain layer. The market layer is mainly used for transactions and clearing, while the blockchain layer is used for real-time settlement, and platform simulation experiments have been carried out. | [59] |
Nash non-cooperative game | A Nash non-cooperative game P2P energy trading model based on residential and commercial prosumers is proposed to achieve price fairness in multi-energy transactions. This model considers the dynamics of the energy market, the energy consumption patterns of prosumers, and RES generation, which influences the energy supply. Prosumers with excess energy can sell it to other prosumers by using a blockchain-based decentralized platform, and buyers can purchase energy from the corresponding sellers by using the platform. | [60] |
Stochastic decision-making framework and bilateral contracts | Using a stochastic decision-making framework and in the case of a P2P energy trading mechanism based on bilateral contracts, electricity is purchased from wind generators, and stored electricity is sold. Maximizing the profit of the upper wind power generators via a two-level stochastic model also minimizes the cost of the DR aggregator in the lower layer. | [61] |
Double auction | A local electricity trading platform is proposed, which is based on the blockchain-distributed P2P double auction transaction mechanism, and the impact of trading mechanisms on distribution network control, operation, and planning is analyzed. | [62] |
Cooperative game | An algorithm for local power exchange based on cooperative game theory has been proposed, which combines incentive mechanisms to facilitate M2M energy trading among local prosumers. The algorithm aims to maximize the community’s social welfare by efficiently allocating energy trades and balancing energy demand and supply. The proposed algorithm provides a framework for efficient and fair M2M energy trading among local prosumers, leading to cost savings, reduced carbon footprint, and increased grid resilience. | [63] |
Game-theoretic and a motivational psychology framework | A game-theoretic P2P energy trading scheme is developed, and a motivational psychology framework is introduced to analyze the psychological motivations of prosumers before they are persuaded to participate in energy trading. | [64] |
Pricing Strategies (Objectives) | Brief Description | Reference |
---|---|---|
Balance the supply and demand and minimize the cost of energy | A novel demand-side management framework is developed. The aggregator sets energy prices for flexible customers based on the predicted energy demand for the upcoming day. They then use a real-time market monitoring algorithm to adjust prices throughout the day in response to changes in market demand. The aggregator also buys energy from the day-ahead market, aiming to balance the supply and demand and minimize the cost of energy. | [84] |
Increase user participation | User-centered design is an approach in which users’ needs, preferences, and behaviors are considered in the design process. When designing a DSAS, it is important to consider the willingness of users to pay for the service and their time. Considering these factors, they can make the program more appealing and increase user participation, ultimately leading to a more effective DR program. | [85] |
Manage flexible load requirements optimally | Combined with the time-of-use pricing strategy, a consumer perception pricing strategy (residential DR pricing strategy) is proposed. Each customer will receive electricity price signals based on their load requirements to manage flexible load requirements optimally. | [86] |
Obtain optimal power supply and consumption strategies | A distributed real-time pricing strategy is proposed considering supply and demand interests. Real-time pricing is determined via information interaction between users and suppliers to obtain optimal power supply and consumption strategies. | [87] |
Reducing electricity usage during peak periods | A home energy management system introduces dynamic pricing to incentivize consumers to change how they operate on the user side, reducing electricity usage during peak periods. | [88] |
Make electricity price forecasts more accurate | A dynamic pricing mechanism and a demand response program for industrial parks are proposed, and a dynamic price forecasting model uses long short-term memory technology to predict electricity prices with high accuracy. This technology can process large amounts of data and can detect patterns and trends that may otherwise be missed by traditional forecasting methods. | [89] |
Benefit all stakeholders | A multi-objective optimization model for the dynamic price considering DR and multiple stakeholders’ preferences. Optimizing supply and demand parties to jointly formulate dynamic prices and obtain dynamic price control strategies for different stakeholders in different situations. | [90] |
Reducing peak demand | A model of residential DR based on real-time locational marginal price is proposed. This model utilizes real-time price signals to incentivize residential consumers to adjust their energy consumption patterns, reducing peak demand. The model considers location-specific prices, which indicate the cost of supplying energy to a particular location at a given time. | [91] |
Improve market profitability | A probability distribution function of market price based on the demand–price allocation curve is proposed to estimate the optimal pricing method for retailers in the electricity market. Mainly considers the profitability of the retailer and the market-clearing price for bidding. | [92] |
Reduce consumer costs | A reverse optimization pricing method is developed based on DSAS and day-ahead markets. Estimates the cost function of other consumers given historical market clearing prices and the capacity to generate electricity and then bids strategically based on these data. | [93] |
Positive | Limitation |
---|---|
Cost reduction: DR programs encourage customers to reduce their electricity consumption during peak hours in exchange for incentives or lower rates. | The increased cost of electricity: DSAS can increase the cost of electricity by requiring additional resources to maintain power quality and reliability. |
Improved grid stability: The grid’s stability is improved by using DSAS, as they allow grid operators to manage electricity demand and supply better. | Distorted pricing signals: Ancillary services can distort the pricing signals in power markets, leading to market inefficiencies and resulting in sub-optimal allocation of resources. |
Increased reliability: DSAS can increase the grid’s reliability, as they can help prevent blackouts and other power disruptions by reducing demand during peak hours. | Uncertainty in market planning: This can result in increased investment costs in the short term to ensure adequate ancillary service capacity as well as the overbuilding of resources to ensure adequate capacity. |
Encouraging RESs: DSAS can also encourage the use of RESs, and DASA refers to the ability to manage and adjust electricity consumption in real time to match the fluctuating electricity supply from variable RESs. | Reduced market competition: Ancillary services can disincentivize entry into the power market, as potential competitors may view the regulatory requirements surrounding ancillary services as too onerous or costly. |
Enhanced energy efficiency: DSAS also supports energy efficiency by promoting energy conservation and reducing energy waste during peak hours. | Increased regulatory complexity: Ancillary services can also add to the regulatory complexity of power markets, requiring additional oversight and reporting requirements. |
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Liu, J.; Hu, H.; Yu, S.S.; Trinh, H. Electricity Pricing and Its Role in Modern Smart Energy System Design: A Review. Designs 2023, 7, 76. https://doi.org/10.3390/designs7030076
Liu J, Hu H, Yu SS, Trinh H. Electricity Pricing and Its Role in Modern Smart Energy System Design: A Review. Designs. 2023; 7(3):76. https://doi.org/10.3390/designs7030076
Chicago/Turabian StyleLiu, Jiaqi, Hongji Hu, Samson S. Yu, and Hieu Trinh. 2023. "Electricity Pricing and Its Role in Modern Smart Energy System Design: A Review" Designs 7, no. 3: 76. https://doi.org/10.3390/designs7030076
APA StyleLiu, J., Hu, H., Yu, S. S., & Trinh, H. (2023). Electricity Pricing and Its Role in Modern Smart Energy System Design: A Review. Designs, 7(3), 76. https://doi.org/10.3390/designs7030076