Reliability Improvement of 28 nm Intel FPGA Ring Oscillator PUF for Chip Identification
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Background
2.1. Motivation
2.2. Related Works
3. Ring Oscillator PUF Scheme
3.1. Frequency Measurement
3.2. Identity Characterization
3.3. Response Generation
3.4. Resource Utilization
4. Evaluation and Stability Improvement Scenarios
4.1. PUF Metrics
4.2. Proposed Frequency Mapping
Algorithm 1 Proposed step for frequency mapping |
f_temp = [Initial f]; --reads frequencies and their position |
f_sort = sortrows(f_temp,2); --sorts frequencies |
f_dif = range(f)/(n − 1); --calculates average difference |
f_sort(1,2) = min(f); --reads out minimum frequency |
for p = 2: n |
f_sort(p,2) = f_sort(p-1,2) + f_dif; --maps into new values |
end |
f_re_sort = sortrows(f_sort,1); --reposition frequencies to initial |
4.3. Proposed Response Generation
Items | Specification/Condition |
---|---|
Chip | Cyclone V |
Hard Processor | ARM Cortex A-9 |
Lithography | 28 nm |
No. of chips | 11 |
Temperatures | 25 °C, 50 °C |
Recorded frequency | 11,000 |
RO placement | Fixed location |
Routing hotspots | Uniform [16] |
No. of ROs | Ten |
Measurement tools | Pattern Generator, Logic Analyzer |
5. Results
5.1. Metric Evaluation
- Activate ROs during a specific time.
- Read counter values out of the chip.
- Convert the values into frequencies.
- Calculate Q values (Q2, Q3, … Qn−1).
- Set quantization to level (denoted as ql).
- Generate response bits.
- Calculate uniqueness and reliability.
5.2. Bit Flip Contribution of Q
- Q2 and Q8: each 45 values.
- Q3 and Q7: each 120 values.
- Q4 and Q6: each 210 values.
- Q5: 252 values.
- Q9: 10 values.
5.3. Improvement of Q
5.4. Improvement in Response
- Apply Q improvement using the proposed frequency mapping. As Qs are extracted to distinguish among chips, the shift in frequency difference between low and high temperatures causes lower reliability. The frequency mapping is proposed to uniformize frequency differences and improve Qs, as shown in Figure 7.
- Consider Qs that contribute fewer bit flips. Response bits are generated using several Qs, for instance, Q2, Q3, Q8, and Q9 (others are neglected). Exclusion is based on a detailed analysis, as can be seen in Figure 5, where Q4, Q5, and Q6 contribute a significant bit flip. The response is expected to be more immune to temperature change, even though this scenario produces fewer response bits.
- Choose a quantization level that balances reliability and uniqueness. This work suggests generating responses using a quantization level of ql = 16. At this point, the reliability is around 95.8%, which is acceptable, and the uniqueness is approximately 42%. The score is also acceptable since the ideal uniqueness value is estimated using 11 chips, implying that uniqueness is less than 50% [22]. The selected quantization level affects responses when higher Q values are involved because the levels derived from a range of Q values shift.
5.5. Uniformity and Bit Aliasing
5.6. Performance Comparison
Uniqueness (%) | Reliability (%) | Uniformity (%) | Bit Aliasing (%) | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Suh et al. [9], 2007 | 46.15 | 99.52 | - | - |
Maiti et al. [10], 2009 | 35.91–45.90 | - | - | - |
Xin et al. [33], 2011 | 32, 41 | 99.29 | - | - |
Maiti et al. [17], 2011 | 49.99–50.07 | ±92 *, ±70 * | 50.02, 49.4 | 50.02, 49.4 |
Feiten et al. [3], 2013 | 6.68–37.03 | 99.41–82.5 | 50.00, 62.07 | - |
Sahoo et al. [4], 2013 | 47.57 | 90.70 ** | 47 | 14.95 |
Kodytek et al. [24], 2016 | 48.42–48.74 | 98.22, 97.55 | - | - |
Delavar et al. [18], 2016 | 49.81 | 96.07 | - | - |
Chauhan et al. [25], 2019 | 49.9 | 97.85–99.80 | - | - |
Deng et al. [26], 2020 | 49.95 | 91.4–99.13 * | 49.61 | - |
Zulfikar et al. [14], 2021 | 50.18 # | 99.51 # | 47.55 | 62.98 |
Martinez et al. [19], 2022 | 47.52–48.94 | 96.84−98.53 | - | - |
This work | 42% # | 95.8% # | 56.97 # | 56.97 # |
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
RO-PUF | Ring Oscillator Physical Unclonable Function |
CRP | Challenge and Response |
FPGA | Field-Programmable Gate Array |
PC | Personal Computer |
UART | Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter |
HPS | Hard Processor |
HD | Hamming Distance |
HW | Hamming Weight |
AXI | Advanced eXtensible Interface |
Appendix A
No. | Measurement (Pulse) | Frequency (MHz) | Proposed Freq. Mapping Frequency (MHz) | Q2 | Response |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 434,405 | 434.405 | 436.8086667 | 1.086994 | 1 |
2 | 433,389 | 433.389 | 435.6271111 | 2.430592 | 1 |
3 | 440,266 | 440.266 | 442.7164444 | 2.173988 | 1 |
4 | 437,535 | 437.535 | 441.5348889 | 1.086994 | 1 |
5 | 434,414 | 434.414 | 437.9902222 | 1.882729 | 0 |
6 | 433,264 | 433.264 | 433.264 | 2.66258 | 1 |
7 | 443,898 | 443.898 | 443.898 | 1.882729 | 1 |
8 | 436,520 | 436.52 | 440.3533333 | 1.537241 | 1 |
9 | 433,556 | 433.556 | 434.4455556 | 1.537241 | 1 |
10 | 434,452 | 434.452 | 439.1717778 | 2.66258 | 0 |
11 | - | - | - | 2.430592 | 0 |
12 | - | - | - | 1.537241 | 1 |
13 | - | - | - | 1.537241 | 1 |
14 | - | - | - | 2.875915 | 0 |
15 | - | - | - | 2.173988 | 0 |
16 | - | - | - | 1.086994 | 1 |
17 | - | - | - | 1.882729 | 1 |
18 | - | - | - | 1.086994 | 1 |
19 | - | - | - | 2.173988 | 0 |
20 | - | - | - | 3.074483 | 0 |
21 | - | - | - | 1.086994 | 1 |
22 | - | - | - | 1.537241 | 1 |
23 | - | - | - | 2.875915 | 0 |
24 | - | - | - | 1.882729 | 1 |
25 | - | - | - | 1.882729 | 1 |
26 | - | - | - | 2.875915 | 0 |
27 | - | - | - | 1.537241 | 1 |
28 | - | - | - | 1.086994 | 1 |
29 | - | - | - | 2.66258 | 0 |
30 | - | - | - | 1.537241 | 1 |
31 | - | - | - | 2.173988 | 1 |
32 | - | - | - | 2.430592 | 0 |
33 | - | - | - | 1.537241 | 1 |
34 | - | - | - | 1.882729 | 1 |
35 | - | - | - | 1.086994 | 1 |
36 | - | - | - | 3.260981 | 0 |
37 | - | - | - | 2.66258 | 0 |
38 | - | - | - | 1.086994 | 1 |
39 | - | - | - | 2.430592 | 1 |
40 | - | - | - | 1.882729 | 1 |
41 | - | - | - | 3.074483 | 0 |
42 | - | - | - | 2.173988 | 0 |
43 | - | - | - | 2.430592 | 1 |
44 | - | - | - | 1.086994 | 1 |
45 | - | - | - | 2.173988 | 1 |
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Author | No. of CRPs | CRP Enhance/Location |
---|---|---|
Suh et al. [9] | n/8 | no/inside chip |
Maiti et al. [10] | n − 1 | no/inside chip |
Merli et al. [15] | n/2 | no/inside chip |
Maiti et al. [17] | 2n − n − 1 | yes/outside chip |
Yin et al. [11] | log2 n! | no/inside chip |
Delavar et. al. [18] | 2n − 1 | yes/outside chip |
Zulfikar et al. [14] | n!/2(n − 2)! | yes/inside or outside |
This work | nC2 + nC3 | yes/outside chip |
Factor Q | Mathematical Expressions | ||
---|---|---|---|
Subtraction | Power/Square | Summation | |
Q2 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
Q3 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
Q4 | 6 | 6 | 5 |
Q5 | 10 | 10 | 9 |
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Zulfikar, Z.; Walidainy, H.; Rahman, A.; Muchtar, K. Reliability Improvement of 28 nm Intel FPGA Ring Oscillator PUF for Chip Identification. Cryptography 2025, 9, 36. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography9020036
Zulfikar Z, Walidainy H, Rahman A, Muchtar K. Reliability Improvement of 28 nm Intel FPGA Ring Oscillator PUF for Chip Identification. Cryptography. 2025; 9(2):36. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography9020036
Chicago/Turabian StyleZulfikar, Zulfikar, Hubbul Walidainy, Aulia Rahman, and Kahlil Muchtar. 2025. "Reliability Improvement of 28 nm Intel FPGA Ring Oscillator PUF for Chip Identification" Cryptography 9, no. 2: 36. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography9020036
APA StyleZulfikar, Z., Walidainy, H., Rahman, A., & Muchtar, K. (2025). Reliability Improvement of 28 nm Intel FPGA Ring Oscillator PUF for Chip Identification. Cryptography, 9(2), 36. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography9020036