Non-Invasive Detection Method for Recycled Flash Memory Using Timing Characteristics †
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- Detection method has to be quick, non-invasive, and inexpensive.
- The detection approach has to be suitable for mass-volume recycled Flash chips because some detection technique (e.g., ID-based) is complex and does not support detection for mass-volume chips.
- The detection mechanism needs to be robust against temperature and voltage variation.
- Minimal usage or no usage of the database is another criteria for the detection mechanism.
- The detection method needs to be straightforward and should provide a yes-no decision with a high confidence level. The detection technique should also identify the exact usage of the memory.
- Detection techniques should be independent of the vendor, technology node, and capacity. However, the threshold of detection parameter might vary across manufacturers, technology nodes, and capacities.
- We propose a universal and widely applicable framework to identify recycled Flash memories by measuring the Flash array characteristics, such as erase time, program time, fail bit counts, etc.
- Experimental data shows that erase time is the best metric to detect recycled Flash chip. We find that erase time shows minimum variation between different memory blocks and it increases significantly with usage.
- We validate our proposed method with commercial off the shelf Flash chips from several vendors, technology nodes, memory types (SLC vs. MLC), and capacity (i.e., memory size). Measurement results show that we can detect a recycled Flash chip with high accuracy if it has been used as less as 0.05% to 3.0% of its total lifetime.
- Proposed method does not require any hardware modification or any prior database maintenance. Hence it can be implemented on many existing storage solution with system updates.
2. Background
3. Existing Work on Detecting Counterfeit IC
4. Recycled Flash Memory Detection
5. Results and Analysis
5.1. Experimental Set-Up
- At first a block is selected on which we want to perform program-erase operation.
- The selected block is then erased, or in other words, all the bits of that block is set to “1”.
- Then the block is programmed with all “0” data pattern.
- Read operation is then carry out on one page at a time.
- Program time, Erase time and FBC are then recorded.
- Process is then continued for other blocks of the memory.
- Finally different plots are obtained by analyzing the recorded data.
5.2. Measurement Procedure for Flash Timing
5.3. Evaluation of Different Flash Characteristics for Early Detection
5.4. Validation on Different Technology Nodes
5.5. Validation on Flash Chip from Different Manufacturers
5.6. Validation on SLC and MLC Flash Chips
5.7. Usage vs. Confidence Level
- Timing investigation ensures that erase time distribution can be applied for the detection of recycled and fresh Flash memory at acceptable accuracy.
- How early a Flash chip can be detected (i.e., the “usage”) with acceptable confidence depends on manufacturers, technology nodes, memory types (SLC vs. MLC), and capacity.
- Among three Flash memory parameters, erase time is the best to identify a recycled Flash memory as early as possible (i.e., with minimal usage). Program time and FBC also demonstrate changes over time however not sufficient to use to identify a recycled Flash memory from fresh one with minimal usage.
- Impact of Testing on Wear-out: Our technique involves one erase operation per block, which have minimal impact on aging (typical erase count for a chip is ∼100,000).
- Test Time: Testing the entire chip can take a few seconds because a typical erase operation take 1 to 10 milliseconds per block and a chip can contain more than 1000 blocks.
- Temperature Effect: Our methodology works for all different temperatures; however, the exact detection threshold depends on the operating temperature.
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Part Number | Manufacturer and Chip Description | Endurance (P/E Cycle) | Chip Count | Acceptable * Confidence Level @ |
---|---|---|---|---|
MT29F64G08CBABAWP:B TR | Micron 64 Gb MLC (20 nm node) | 5000 | 3 | ≥0.25% usage |
MT 29F32G08CBADAWP:D | Micron 32 Gb MLC (20 nm node) | 5000 | 3 | ≥1.4% usage |
TC58NVG3S0FTA00-ND | Toshiba 8 Gb SLC (32 nm node) | 100,000 | 3 | ≥2% usage |
MT29F8G08ABABAWP:B | Micron 8 GB SLC (34 nm node) | 100,000 | 3 | ≥2.7% usage |
MT29F8G08ABACAWP:C | Micron 8 GB SLC (25 nm node) | 100,000 | 3 | ≥0.05% usage |
MT29F4G08ABADAWP:D TR | Micron 4 GB SLC (34 nm node) | 100,000 | 3 | ≥3% usage |
Usage (%) | Confidence Level | ||
---|---|---|---|
Vendor 1 | Vendor 2 | Vendor 3 | |
1% | Not Acceptable | Not Acceptable | Not Acceptable |
1.4% | * Acceptable | Not Acceptable | Not Acceptable |
2% | Acceptable | Acceptable | Not Acceptable |
2.7% | Acceptable | Acceptable | Acceptable |
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Sakib, S.; Kumari, P.; Talukder, B.M.S.B.; Rahman, M.T.; Ray, B. Non-Invasive Detection Method for Recycled Flash Memory Using Timing Characteristics †. Cryptography 2018, 2, 17. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography2030017
Sakib S, Kumari P, Talukder BMSB, Rahman MT, Ray B. Non-Invasive Detection Method for Recycled Flash Memory Using Timing Characteristics †. Cryptography. 2018; 2(3):17. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography2030017
Chicago/Turabian StyleSakib, Sadman, Preeti Kumari, B. M. S. Bahar Talukder, Md Tauhidur Rahman, and Biswajit Ray. 2018. "Non-Invasive Detection Method for Recycled Flash Memory Using Timing Characteristics †" Cryptography 2, no. 3: 17. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography2030017
APA StyleSakib, S., Kumari, P., Talukder, B. M. S. B., Rahman, M. T., & Ray, B. (2018). Non-Invasive Detection Method for Recycled Flash Memory Using Timing Characteristics †. Cryptography, 2(3), 17. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography2030017