Living Systems Escape Solipsism by Inverse Causality to Manage the Probability Distribution of Events
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
The author of the present article develops a scheme for addressing the millennium-old hard-problem of percept-reality as circumventing the unwelcome failure of being entrapped by a solipsism in one form or another. It has been a commendable effort and has demonstrated a passable breakthrough to a reasonable extent. The reviewer recommends its publication after a minor revision as responding to a few points raised below.
The dichotomy between a cognizer (internalist) and a cognizer system (to the externalist) is fine and well taken. However, there is a definite difference of temporality between the two to which the author would seem to remain mute. How is the internalist temporal sequence denoted as t0, t1, t2, … related to the externalist type as T0, T1, T2, …? Do these two refer simply to an aspect of two faces of a unified model? Alternatively, can the one face be theoretically deduced from or practically constructed from the other one, and then how?
As a matter of fact, the externalist takes a discourse practiced in third-person description in the present tense for granted. That means that the time referred to in the present tense is uniform and permeating into everywhere in the discursive universe as championed by the Kantian transcendental scheme. This practice has been well accepted even if the relativity of being simultaneous is taken into account.
On the other hand, the temporality specific to the internalist is approachable to us (externalist) through referring to the indexical usage of our language. The internalist may be at home with the finished indexical sequence of mere events even of a solipsistic nature, that could be registered in the present perfect tense with recourse to our language. Although the time specific to the present tense does remain symbolic, the time in the present perfect tense is at most indexical as referring to something already done somewhere and then to being updated subsequently. The update may proceed in the present progressive tense. Thus, we can say that the indexical usage of our language may enable us to approach a comprehensible sequence of symbols even as starting from what may look like merely a solipsistic indexical sequence of events, as the author has aptly demonstrated. That is about an endeavor for anchoring the present perfect tense on the present tense. The relevant issue must be how to externally reach comprehensible symbols as starting internally from relational indices alone. This has been the reviewer’s way of appreciating the author’s hidden message.
Author Response
Replies to Reviewer 1
The author appreciates the reviewer’s suggestive comments with a deep insight into the temporality and questions about the model used in this paper. The author has made revisions according to the two reviewers’ comments and some modifications in other places to make the arguments clearer. Finally, English has been edited by a native speaker. Here, the author replies to the comments by reviewer 1:
(1) The dichotomy between a cognizer (internalist) and a cognizer system (to the externalist) is fine and well taken. However, there is a definite difference of temporality between the two to which the author would seem to remain mute. How is the internalist temporal sequence denoted as t0, t1, t2, … related to the externalist type as T0, T1, T2, …? Do these two refer simply to an aspect of two faces of a unified model? Alternatively, can the one face be theoretically deduced from or practically constructed from the other one, and then how?”
In this paper, the concepts of internalist and externalist models are defined as follows: The internalist model describes a single cognizer composed of sub-cognizers (sensor, signal transducer, effector). Here, other cognizers with which the focal cognizer might interact, are hidden. Here, a focal cognizer is a system of sub-cognizers. In other words, it is called a “cognizer” system (no “s” for cognizer); seeing a single cognizer as a system of entities at a lower level. Here the model describes the focal cognizer only (Figure 2, Tables 1, 2, 3). On the other hand, the externalist model describes a system of cognizers, i.e., a “cognizers” system (“s” for cognizer), in which the model describes the entire system of cognizers (Figure 2). L287-295.
Accordingly, in this paper, the temporal scheme for the internalist model includes both time at the cognizer level (Ti) and at its component (sub-cognizer) level (ti).
In the revised version, the author has made clearer the difference in temporality between the internalist and externalist models, new paragraphs were inserted in L389-L404 as follows:
“The process of the subject cognizer (S) is framed on two timescales at the level of measurers (t) and that of the system of measurers (T). … An internalist model focusing on a single cognizer (Cognizer 1 in Figure 2) can describe it as a system organized in a nested hierarchy with a specific timescale (t or T) for each level of the system. Therefore, different timescales for different levels are defined within the internalist model. In contrast, when we take an externalist stance, in which a focal subject cognizer is described in relation to other cognizers in the environment (Cognizers 2–5 in Figure 2), the externalist needs to coordinate the time occurring in different cognizers by introducing a common temporal framework in which they are situated”.
The author understands that the issue that the reviewer points out is how to coordinate two different temporal frameworks in internalist and externalist in a model. As indicated above, the present model includes different timescales relating to different hierarchical levels within the internalist model.
Finally, the author appreciates the reviewer’s suggestions on the temporality in the scientific models in relation to tense in our language.
Reviewer 2 Report
This is a good paper that takes on a neglected problem. Some clarifications are needed, and some additional connection to the broader literature in this area would be helpful.
ln. 152: It's worth pointing out that this is a form of disambiguation.
ln. 355: The t3/t3' notation for time in Table 1 isn't clear. What's the relation between tn and tn' for any n? If the "'" times are just subsequent, please use a different symbol. Whatever the relation is, it needs to be explained in the text. The same applies to Tables 2 and 3.
ln. 369: Give an example of what a "hallucination" would be for a cell. Would the situation in ln. 497-502 be an example? A better example might be an internal process acting on [CheY] directly.
ln. 598: The statement seems too strong. What's being assumed about the availability of memory, and how fine-grained is "same"? E. coli, for example, doesn't appear to have a robust memory for environmental states or actions - why can't an E. coli be in the "same state" 15 minutes later if it is living in, e.g. a Petri plate with a slight, time-invariant nutrient gradient?
While the model proposed here does not yet have the memory components needed to support prior probabilities, some further discussion of how this approach relates to, and potentially underlies, the ideas involved in active inference would be helpful.
Author Response
Replies to Reviewer 2
The author appreciates the reviewer’s suggestive comments, which helps improve the previous version in making the arguments informative and clearer. The author has made revisions according to the two reviewers’ comments, in addition to some modifications in other places to make the ideas clearer. Finally, English has been edited by a native speaker. Here, the author replies to comments by reviewer 2:
(1) ln. 152: It's worth pointing out that this is a form of disambiguation.
The author revised the sentence L152-153: “Then, new symbols e0* and e1* are introduced behind the first and second m1, respectively, to disambiguate the difference”.
(2) ln. 355: The t3/t3' notation for time in Table 1 isn't clear. What's the relation between tn and tn' for any n? If the "'" times are just subsequent, please use a different symbol. Whatever the relation is, it needs to be explained in the text. The same applies to Tables 2 and 3.
The author corrected the indications of time: t0, t1, …, tn, tn+1, .. for the measurer process, and T0, T1, …, Tn, Tn+1, .. for the cognizer process. Accordingly, the following explanations of the meanings of tn and Tn were inserted each for Tables 1, 2, and 3.
For Table 1, L355-362: The measurers change their states on a fine-grained timescale, t0, t1, t3, …, tn, tn+1, tn+2. This modeling is introduced due to the assumption that the measurers return to a baseline state after a cognition(s), taking two time-units. Therefore, a single state of S included one cognition taken by the measurers. Thus, the cognizer changes its states (i.e., cognition at the cognizer S level) on a coarse-grained timescale: x (T0), y (T1), …, x (TN), z (TN+1). “TN” indicates the time when the same state of a cognizer (e.g., x) recurs as that occurs at T0; “tn” indicates the time for the measurer level that corresponds to TN as shown in Table 1.
For Table 2, L418-422: The measurers change their states on a fine-grained timescale, t0, t1, t3, …, tn, tn+1, tn+2. The cognizer changes its states on a coarse-grained timescale: x (T0), y (T1), …, x (TN), z (TN+1). “TN” indicates the time when the same state of a cognizer (e.g., x) recurs as that occurs at T0; “tn” indicates the time for the measurer level that corresponds to TN as shown in Table 2.
For Table 3, L572-576: The measurers change their states on a fine-grained timescale, t0, t1, t3, …, tn, tn+1, tn+2. The cognizer changes its states on a coarse-grained timescale: x (T0), x (T1), y (T3), …, x (TN), x (TN+1), z (XN+2). “TN” indicates the time when the same state-change of a cognizer (e.g., x -> x) recurs as that occurs at T0 – T1; “tn” indicates the time for the measurer level that corresponds to TN as shown in Table 3.
(3) ln. 369: Give an example of what a "hallucination" would be for a cell. Would the situation in ln. 497-502 be an example? A better example might be an internal process acting on [CheY] directly.
The author revised the paragraph (L538-546), in which the description of a process acting on CheY:
“a mutant producing a mutated CheY protein that can be phosphorylated (activated) by metabolites other than CheA-P. They may cause maladaptive flagellar mortar regulation for swimming, which may be considered a kind of hallucination in a living cell, similar to those in animals”.
(4) ln. 598: The statement seems too strong. What's being assumed about the availability of memory, and how fine-grained is "same"? E. coli, for example, doesn't appear to have a robust memory for environmental states or actions - why can't an E. coli be in the "same state" 15 minutes later if it is living in, e.g. a Petri plate with a slight, time-invariant nutrient gradient?
Yes, the author agrees this suggestion. The sentence was corrected as follows (L665-667): “Any living system as an entire system will not return to the same state frequently, …”
(5) While the model proposed here does not yet have the memory components needed to support prior probabilities, some further discussion of how this approach relates to, and potentially underlies, the ideas involved in active inference would be helpful.
The author discusses briefly active inference and an issue concerning the generality of this concept, based on the present approach. The paragraph (L648-658) was inserted in section 4.6:
“The search for sensor data to reduce the uncertainty of events may closely relate to one aspect of active inference proposed by Friston [3-5] in brain science, .. The uncertainty of sensory data about the signs does not appear to be harmful to living systems”.
