Embodied AI beyond Embodied Cognition and Enactivism
AbstractOver the last three decades, the rise of embodied cognition (EC) articulated in various schools (or versions) of embodied, embedded, extended and enacted cognition (Gallagher’s 4E) has offered AI a way out of traditional computationalism—an approach (or an understanding) loosely referred to as embodied AI. This view has split into various branches ranging from a weak form on the brink of functionalism (loosely represented by Clarks’ parity principle) to a strong form (often corresponding to autopoietic-friendly enactivism) suggesting that body–world interactions constitute cognition. From an ontological perspective, however, constitution is a problematic notion with no obvious empirical or technical advantages. This paper discusses the ontological issues of these two approaches in regard to embodied AI and its ontological commitments: circularity, epiphenomenalism, mentalism, and disguised dualism. The paper also outlines an even more radical approach that may offer some ontological advantages. The new approach, called the mind-object identity, is then briefly compared with sensorimotor direct realism and with the embodied identity theory. View Full-Text
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Manzotti, R. Embodied AI beyond Embodied Cognition and Enactivism. Philosophies 2019, 4, 39.
Manzotti R. Embodied AI beyond Embodied Cognition and Enactivism. Philosophies. 2019; 4(3):39.Chicago/Turabian Style
Manzotti, Riccardo. 2019. "Embodied AI beyond Embodied Cognition and Enactivism." Philosophies 4, no. 3: 39.