The Frame Survival Model of Conscious Continuity: A Theoretical Framework for Subjective Experience in a Branching Universe
Abstract
1. Introduction
1.1. How Can Subjective Continuity Be Connected to the Branching, Probabilistic Nature of Reality?
1.2. Model Scope and Limitations
2. Definitions
2.1. Assumptions of the FSM
- Emergent Consciousness: Consciousness arises from sufficiently complex, integrated physical systems such as biological neural networks.
- Decoherence-Defined Frame Boundaries: Hyperframes are delineated by quantum decoherence events that render superposed states effectively classical and distinguishable, particularly within consciousness-relevant structures.
- Binary Survival Outcomes: Each Hyperframe F is assigned a binary survival value A(F) ∈ {0,1}, determining whether subjective awareness persists or terminates.
- Observer-Relative Survival Paths: Each conscious agent experiences a private survival path through Hyperframes, independent of the experiences of other agents.
- Standard Quantum Mechanics Framework: The model operates within the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics involving decoherence without invoking additional hidden variables, objective collapse mechanisms, or postulated metaphysical structures.
2.2. Hyperframes
2.3. Conscious Agents
2.4. Dead Frame (0-Frame)
2.5. Alive Frame (1-Frame)
Note on Digital or Artificial Agents
2.6. Survival Function
2.7. Survival Path (Timeline)
2.8. Frame Transition
Frame Chunking and Temporal Coherence
2.9. Observer-Relative Continuity
2.10. Decoherence-Defined Frame Resolution
- The rate at which consciousness-relevant systems decohere.
- The emergence of new distinguishable macrostates capable of sustaining awareness.
2.11. Decoherence Event Index (e) and Frame Index (t)
- In theory, n can be set as low as 1 (comparing just two consecutive frames for “instantaneous” variance), although this may be too noisy for most cognitive or phenomenological timescales.
- n can also be set higher, up to the maximum subjective frame rate (approximately 50 Hz for humans, corresponding to n = 50), which would analyze a 1 s window of continuous experience.
- For nonhuman or digital agents, n can be tuned to match the agent’s substrate or phenomenological requirements—shorter windows for fast digital minds and longer windows for slower systems.
2.12. Decoherence Timescale
- Decoherence timescales are defined when frames become distinct and navigable.
- Consciousness-relevant systems decohere at rates that constrain the maximum possible transition speed between frames.
2.13. Decoherence-Conditioned Survival Probability
- |Ψ⟩ is the predecoherence quantum state of the system; it represents the full quantum information about all possible outcomes before decoherence or measurement occurs.
- |Ft+1⟩ denotes a specific possible outcome frame—a definite, effectively classical state that can emerge through decoherence as quantum interference is suppressed. In this model, it can represent a specific conscious brain state or configuration of the observer’s world at the next step.
- ρt is the density matrix representing the (mixed) quantum state of the system at time t, just prior to decoherence—a situation common in open or realistic systems subject to environmental interactions.
- is the projection operator onto the frame ∣Ft+1⟩; for mixed states, this operator is used in the density matrix [9].
2.13.1. Steps for Extracting the Density Matrix from a Hyperframe
- Identify the conscious-relevant subsystem: For a human brain or a biological brain, this might be a functionally integrated neural circuit or large-scale brain network; for a digital agent, it could be a memory register or computational process.
- Construct the physical state: Given complete knowledge of all degrees of freedom, specify the quantum state |Ψ⟩ of the total system (or the classical-probabilistic equivalent for nonquantum agents).
- Reduce to the subsystem: Take the partial trace over everything not included in the consciously relevant system, yielding the reduced density matrix ρF.
- Plug into the model: Use this ρF for transition probabilities, coherence calculations, etc., as per the equations in the main text.
2.13.2. Representative Survival Probability (Ps) Values
2.13.3. Flexibility in Defining Survival Probability (Ps)
2.14. Information Coherence Function
2.14.1. Optional Flexibility
2.14.2. Representative Information Coherence (I) Values for Phenomenological States
2.14.3. Relationship Between Φ and I
2.15. Definition of N: The Set of Possible Next Frames
- Physically possible: Frames in which Ps(Ft → Ft+1) > 0, i.e., transitions that are not forbidden by quantum law and system dynamics.
- Informationally coherent: Frames in which I(Ft → Ft+1) > 0, i.e., transitions that are not maximally incoherent or disconnected from the current frame.
- : the number of survival-compatible candidate frames at decoherence event e.
- : the number of non-survival (dead) candidate frames at decoherence event e.
- : the alive-to-dead ratio at decoherence event e, representing the relative weighting of survival-compatible versus non-survival outcomes.
- which provides a simple measure of survival weighting within a given decoherence window. A higher ratio indicates that the branching structure contains proportionally more alive frames, producing a “thick thread” of continuity. Conversely, a lower ratio reflects a greater density of dead outcomes, yielding a “thin thread” where subjective continuity is more precarious. In this way, N serves not only as the minimal set of viable next frames but also as the basis for evaluating the strength of continuity across branching events. In the limiting case where , the ratio diverges, corresponding to a maximally robust survival thread in which all candidate frames are alive.
3. Theoretical Framework of the FSM
3.1. Survival-Filtered Frame Navigation
3.2. Formal Description of Frame Transitions
- P(Ft+1 ∣ Ft) is the probability of transitioning from Ft to Ft+1,
- A(Ft+1) determines whether the frame supports conscious awareness.
Transition Flow in the FSM
3.3. Frame Transition Rate and Decoherence Dynamics
- rt: the frame rate at time (or step) t along the subjective survival path.
- rmax: the maximum possible frame rate for any particular substrate.
- τeff,t: the dimensionless effective continuity factor governing the progression of subjective moments, derived from the fastest physical decoherence constraints in the local environment and modulated by ongoing changes in cognitive stability and informational coherence.
- Integral/sum: Both expressions accumulate the total number of moments experienced by summing the “fraction of a moment” contributed by each tiny time interval, weighted by the local decoherence timescale. If τeff is constant, this scales the accumulation of subjective moments by τeff; if it varies, the moments are “packed” more tightly or spread out as τeff decreases or increases.
- Nsubjective: The total number of subjective moments (or “conscious frames”) experienced over the interval. This represents the “ticks” of conscious awareness, which might differ from objective clock time if the conditions for consciousness change.
- T0,T1: The start and end times of the interval being considered (can be measured in seconds, minutes, etc., depending on context).
- T: Elapsed local (proper) time for the agent, measured according to the agent’s own subjective/process clock. T can be in seconds, minutes, hours, or any unit appropriate for the time scale of the process under consideration. In relativistic or time-dilated scenarios, T always refers to the local time actually experienced by the agent, not the time measured by an external or distant observer.
- d: denotes the index of the last alive frame before subjective death, that is, the endpoint of a lifetime survival path, such that A(Fd) = 1 and A(Fd+1) = 0. When specifically calculating the total number of subjective moments up to the agent’s final alive frame, d is used.
- r(T): The instantaneous subjective frame rate at each moment. This value determines how rapidly conscious frames occur—a higher r means that moments are packed closely together (time feels “fast” or “full”); a lower r means that moments are more spaced out (time feels “slow” or “fragmented”).
- Δt: The size of each time step in the simulation or dataset. For real neural or behavioral data, this might be the sampling interval; for a theoretical model, it is typically set to “1” for event-by-event counting.
- n: denotes the final event or frame index in the interval considered (for example, the endpoint of a simulation run, time segment, or experiment—not necessarily related to death). Use n, t, or e for general sums over any period.
3.3.1. Cognitive Variance Interpretation of τeff,t
- Varcog: represents the variance or instability across a local window of n consecutive frames—either the most recent n frames or a moving window within a chunk.
- k: a proportionality constant that determines the scaling between the cognitive variance and the subjective frame transition timescale.
- ϵ: a saturating parameter.
- B: the scaling constant is empirically set so that the model’s predicted variance matches the observed subjective frame rates in both high-focus and unconscious states.
- Varcog(Ft → Ft+1): The cognitive variance between the current frame Ft and its possible future frames.
- n: The number of future candidate frames or decoherence events in the survival path (the window size over which variance is computed).
- i: The index for summing over the n future frames.
- Ft: The current frame (the agent’s current conscious state or informational configuration).
- Ft+i: The i-th candidate future frame (a possible next state for the agent at time t + i).
- I(Ft → Ft+i): The coherence measure (information similarity, or quantum fidelity) between the current frame and the i-th candidate future frame.
- [1 − I(Ft → Ft+i)]: The degree of informational divergence (or incoherence) between frames; higher values indicate greater differences.
- : The average divergence over all n candidate future frames; this gives the overall cognitive variance for the window.
3.3.2. Parameter Fitting and Generalization
- k (integration timescale): This is set to match the system’s minimal processing or integration window on the basis of experimental or computational studies (e.g., the shortest neural or algorithmic cycle, reaction time, or update step).
- B (variance scaling constant): Fit B so that the output variance range (Varcog) covers the full observed spectrum from high coherence (focus) to low coherence (maximal fragmentation) in the target system. Physiological or behavioral data, such as flicker fusion rates, perceptual binding, or task performance limits, are used.
- ϵ (nonlinearity/sensitivity): Tune ϵ to ensure that the frame rate curve matches empirical data across states. For example, choose ϵ so that the model yields maximal frame rates in the correct range for high-alertness states and appropriately low rates for sleep, coma, or high-load digital agents.
3.3.3. Worked Example: Illustrative Frame-Rate Modulation Under Variance
3.4. Observer-Relative Survival Paths
- An observer may witness another agent’s apparent death.
- However, from the perspective of the dying agent, survival may continue along a distinct, unshared branch.
3.5. Formalization Through Survival Graphs
- V is the set of all frames F,
- E ⊆ V × V is the set of directed edges representing allowable transitions between frames.
- Each frame F ∈ V is assigned a binary survival value, A(F) ∈ {0,1}, where
- A(F) = 1 if the frame sustains the conscious agent C,
- A(F) = 0 otherwise.
Normalization Condition
3.6. Binary Interpretation of Survival Paths
- Entropy of Survival Paths: The degree of randomness versus order in survival sequences could reflect underlying structural regularities or instability in the frame network.
- Compression Possibility: If survival sequences are highly compressible, this would suggest patterned, nonrandom dynamics guiding survival threading. High-entropy sequences imply stochastic survival landscapes.
- Error-Correction Analogy: Consciousness navigating survival-compatible frames resembles an information-preserving process, selectively “correcting” for decoherence-induced branching threats.
- Information-Theoretic Interpretation: Subjective continuity itself may be regarded as the maintenance of an informational thread through an environment characterized by probabilistic frame transitions.
3.7. Probabilistic Existence of Survival Paths
- A discrete network of frames F, each assigned a survival value A(F) ∈ {0,1}.
- Transition probabilities P(Ft+1∣Ft) defined over frame pairs, conditioned on A(Ft+1) = 1.
- The multiverse structure infinitely branches due to quantum decoherence dynamics, generating an unbounded number of future frame possibilities at each point.
Formal Sketch Using the Infinite Traversal Theorem
3.8. Passive vs. Active Navigation of Survival Paths
How Agentic Preference Weight (S) Links to Chunks
3.9. Informational Structure of Transition Distributions
3.10. Informational Coherence and Transition Weighting
- A(Ft+1) ∈ {0,1} is the survival function, as defined previously.
- I(Ft → Ft+1) is the information coherence function, quantifying the informational, cognitive, or structural consistency between the current frame and the candidate future frame.
- Frames that preserve prior informational content (e.g., memory traces, environmental layout, and cognitive integrity) have higher transition probabilities.
- Frames that break coherence (e.g., hallucination, memory loss, and chaotic shifts) are less likely to be experienced, even if they are survivable.
- This helps explain why lived reality feels smooth and structured, despite the probabilistic and decohering nature of the underlying universe.
- Normalized form:
3.11. Frame Continuity Transition Equation
- A(Ft+1) ∈ {0,1} enforces survival compatibility.
- Ps(Ft → Ft+1) ∈ [0, 1] captures the likelihood of a decoherence-conditioned transition.
- I(Ft → Ft+1) ∈ [0, 1] quantifies the informational coherence between the current and candidate frames.
- S(Ft+1) ∈ (0, Smax] represents the agent’s preference bias among the viable options.
- The denominator serves as the normalization constant Z, ensuring that all survival-compatible transition probabilities from a given frame sum to 1:
3.11.1. Incorporating Chunk Dynamics
- A(Fi) ∈ {0,1}: binary survival indicator.
- Ps(Ft → Fi) ∈ [0, 1]: decoherence-conditioned survival probability.
- I(Ft → Fi) ∈ [0, 1]: informational coherence from the chunk origin to Fi.
- S(Fi) ∈ (0, Smax]: agentic preference weighting.
- Pchunk(Ft+1 ∣ Ft): the probability of continuing within a coherent chunk.
- Pbase(Ft+1 ∣ Ft): the original decoherence-based transition.
- αt ∈ (0, 1]: dynamically adjusts on the basis of local stability.
- Ps(Ft → Ft+1): the decoherence-conditioned survival probability (likelihood of resolving into this frame).
- A(Ft+1): enforces the survival constraint.
- Δ(Ft+1, chunk(Ft)): the decoherence or informational distance between the new frame and the chunk.
- σ2: controls how tight the chunk’s influence is.
- S(Ft+1): the agent’s preference (e.g., structural or narrative alignment).
- Zchunk: represents normalization, so all chunk probabilities sum to 1.
3.11.2. Dynamic Chunk Confidence Coefficient
- at: Dynamic chunk confidence coefficient, recalculated at each time step.
- λ: A sensitivity constant controlling how rapidly it decreases with increasing instability.
- Varwindow: The moving average of cognitive variance, defined above, which quantifies local volatility in the survival trajectory.
- Varwindow(Ft:t+n): The overall cognitive variance computed across a window of n consecutive frames, representing the local stability or instability of experience within a time chunk.
- Window size (n): The number of recent events (frames) included in the window for the average.
- : For each frame Fj in the window (from t to t + n − 1), compute the cognitive variance for its possible next states, and take the average for all frames in the window, providing a summary measure of local cognitive (in)stability over time.
- : The cognitive variance at frame Fj, calculated as the average informational divergence between Fj and its Nalive possible next candidate frames.
- : Each possible frame into which the agent/system can transition from Fj at the next step; Nalive is the total number of such candidates.
- : A measure of how similar (or “coherent”) the present frame is to each candidate next frame; it ranges from 0 (completely different) to 1 (identical).
- : Quantifies how much the next candidate frame differs from the current frame; higher values indicate greater instability or unpredictability.
- : Compute the mean divergence for all possible next frames at each time step, capturing the expected variability in the immediate future.
- Varwindow(e):
- The windowed cognitive variance at decoherence event e, summarizing the local cognitive (in)stability over the most recent n events (frames).
- Window size (n):
- The number of recent events (frames) included in the window for the average.
- : For each frame Fj in the window ending at event e (i.e., the last n frames from e − n + 1 to e), compute the cognitive variance, then average these values.
- : The cognitive variance at frame Fj, which is calculated as the average divergence between Fj and its Nalive possible next candidate frames.
- : Each possible frame the system could transition into from Fj at the next step; Nalive is the number of such candidate frames.
- Information coherence and divergence: For each candidate next frame, compute the information coherence ; quantifies how different each candidate is from the current frame.
- Averaging across windows and candidates: First, the divergence across all Nalive candidates at each step (using Varcog) is averaged across the n recent steps (window), yielding Varwindow(e).
- κ: A nonnegative weighting constant that determines how strongly the informational coherence penalty (1 − I(Ft → Ft+1)) influences the chunk confidence at.
- I(Ft → Ft+1) ∈ [0, 1]: A function measuring how well the transition aligns with the chunk structure or informational integrity. High coherence suppresses the penalty; incoherent transitions lower at.
- Interpretation:
- When recent transitions are stable (low variance) and coherence is high, at ≈ 1, the system strongly favors transitions that preserve chunk continuity.
- When variance is high or coherence is low, at → 0, the system deactivates the chunk and reverts to the base survival model, ensuring ongoing conscious continuity even during structural collapse.
- When κ = 0, at is determined solely by the local variance of recent frames (Varwindow). As κ increases, transitions with low informational coherence (I ≈ 0) are penalized more heavily, causing at to drop sharply for incoherent transitions, thereby favoring the persistence of stable chunks. Higher values of κ increase the impact of coherence on at, making the system more sensitive to abrupt or incoherent transitions. The optimal value of κ is not a universal constant but a calibration parameter that reflects how strongly the system weights informational coherence relative to variance. Unlike λ, which governs overall sensitivity to instability, κ specifically tunes the penalty for incoherent transitions. Its value depends on the sensitivity of the agent or system to structural integrity in information flow. κ can be fitted through empirical data (e.g., neural dynamics, behavioral experiments) where coherence loss is measured, or set as a theoretical parameter in simulations to explore system tolerance under different coherence conditions.
3.11.3. Chunk Definition (Event Index Form)
4. FSM Implications
4.1. Subjective Immortality
4.2. Relativity of Death Across Survival Paths
4.3. Consciousness Bias
4.4. Private Multiverse Threads
4.5. Subjective Novelty and Continuity
4.6. Comparison to Alternative Branching and Continuity Models
4.7. Altered States, Sleep, and Fragmented Consciousness
4.7.1. Acute Events: Startle, Survival Mode, and “Life-Flashing” Phenomena
4.7.2. Pharmacological, Drug, and Medication Effects on Coherence and Chunking
4.7.3. Mental Illness, Hallucinations, and Fragmented Experience
4.7.4. Emotional States: Unified Modeling in the FSM
4.7.5. Applications to Sensory States
4.8. Physical Limits to Frame Survival
4.8.1. Entropy and Survival Path Thinning
Survival Path Density and Entropy
4.9. Survival Path Filtering and Natural Selection: The Entropic Logic of Continuity
4.9.1. Entropy and Survival Path Dynamics
4.9.2. The Analogy of Natural Selection
4.9.3. Adaptive Persistence and the Structure of Experience
4.9.4. Brain–Body Relationship and Mutual Survival Benefit
4.10. Informational Structure of Survival and Emergent Digital Reality
4.11. Duplicate Frames and Divergent Continuity
4.12. Emergence of Consciousness Through Probabilistic Survival
4.13. Time Dilation and Relativistic Subjective Experience
4.13.1. Relativistic Adjustment of k
General Relativistic Time Dilation (Gravity)
4.13.2. Frame Rate Calculation with Time Dilation
4.13.3. Comparison with a Stationary Observer
- Stationary observer:
- Relativistically moving observer:
4.14. Implications for Cosmic Life and Consciousness Emergence
4.14.1. Implications for Alien Intelligence and the Fermi Paradox
4.14.2. Implications for Digital Life and Artificial Consciousness
Digital Minds and Survival Paths
AI Design and Consciousness Engineering
Digital Evolution and the Emergence of Consciousness
Ethics, Rights, and AI Safety
Digital Immortality and Personal Continuity
4.14.3. Outlook on Animal Consciousness and Survival
4.15. Paradox Implications of the FSM
4.15.1. Fermi Paradox and Synchronization Paradox (SETI/Astrobiology)
4.15.2. The Grandfather Paradox (Time Travel Paradox)
4.15.3. Quantum Immortality Paradox
4.15.4. Subjective Death Paradox
4.15.5. The Measure Problem (Many-Worlds Probability)
4.15.6. Duplicate Frame/Merging Identity Paradox
4.15.7. Arrow of Time Paradox
4.15.8. Sleeping Beauty and Anthropic Paradoxes
4.15.9. Observer-Relativity of Death
4.15.10. Private Multiverse Threading/Observer-Relative Worlds
4.15.11. Subjective Novelty Paradox
4.15.12. Death Relativity/“Local Death” Paradox
4.15.13. Black Hole and Time Dilation Paradoxes
4.15.14. Digital Mind Pause/Death Paradox
4.15.15. Closed Timelike Curves (CTCs) and Causality Paradoxes
4.15.16. Boltzmann Brain Paradox
Further Paradoxes and Generalization
5. Implications for Future Research
5.1. Potential Experimental Implications
5.1.1. Proxy Falsifiability and Validation Criteria
5.1.2. Thought Experiment: Decoherence Modulation in Neural Systems
5.2. Simulation of Survival Path Dynamics
- Nodes: Each node represents a decoherence-resolved frame F, assigned a survival status A(F) ∈ {0,1}.
- Edges: Directed edges represent allowable transitions between frames. An edge from Ft to Ft+1 exists only if A(Ft+1) = 1.
- Survival Probability Assignment:
- ○
- Upon generation, each frame is assigned a survival status on the basis of a survival probability Ps.
- ○
- For initial simulations, I set Ps ≈ 0.99, reflecting a high baseline chance of survival between frames under normal decoherence conditions.
- Random Decay Dynamics:
- ○
- Frame-by-frame variability in survival probability is introduced through stochastic noise.
- ○
- For example, model survival decays using a Gaussian random walk, where the survival probability slightly drifts at each step:
- ○
- where σ controls environmental volatility.
- ○
- This allows survival conditions to deteriorate realistically over long subjective timescales, simulating entropy-driven survival thinning.
- Begin with an initial frame F0 such that A(F0) = 1.
- At each step:
- ○
- Sample possible next frames on the basis of survival probabilities.
- ○
- Traverse to a randomly selected frame Ft+1 such that A(Ft+1) = 1.
- If no alive frames are reachable (i.e., no outgoing edges to A(F) = 1), subjective continuity terminates.
- Metrics to Analyze
- Survival Path Lengths: Average number of consecutive alive frames traversed before termination.
- Survival Path Entropy: Degree of randomness versus order across different runs.
- Critical Thresholds: Identify the environmental volatility levels (σ) at which survival paths collapse rapidly.
5.3. Statistical Models of Extreme Survival
5.4. Directions for Future Research on the FSM
5.4.1. Dynamics of Interaction Between Agentic Preference and Coherence
5.4.2. Explicit Functional Dependencies: Modeling Interactions Between Variables
5.4.3. Empirical Identification of Φcritical and Key Model Parameters
- Correlating integrated information measures (Φ) with markers of conscious and unconscious states (e.g., comparing awake, asleep, anesthetized, or comatose subjects).
- Identifying a transition point or threshold—where loss of consciousness occurs across species or substrates—to suggest a universal or context-dependent Φcritical.
- Simulating or constructing artificial agents (digital or AI systems) and tracking when, if ever, they surpass the threshold for supporting subjective experience, as operationalized in the FSM.
- Using perturbational or information-theoretic methods (e.g., brain stimulation, system knockouts) to test the stability of subjective continuity and frame viability under controlled changes to Φ or related variables.
5.4.4. Adaptive Chunking Based on Entropy and Environmental Volatility
5.4.5. Modeling the Content of Consciousness
5.4.6. Precise Cognitive and Physical Decoherence Timescales
5.4.7. Initial Parameter Ranges and Simulation Guidelines
Core Parameters for Future Simulations
- Range: 0.01–0.8
- Typical values:
- ○
- High focus/flow: 0.01–0.1
- ○
- Everyday alertness: 0.1–0.3
- ○
- Sleep/fatigue: 0.3–0.5
- ○
- Coma, extreme fragmentation: 0.5–0.6+
- Interpretation:
- Default: 0.5
- Range: ≈ 0.2–0.7
- Interpretation:
- Default (passive agent): 1.0 for all frames
- Range:
- +–3
- Interpretation:
- Empirical value: Currently unknown; set as a relative threshold in simulation (e.g., “top 1–5% of possible frames” or via normalization).
- Interpretation: Only frames with Φ > Φcritical are considered conscious/alive.
- Recommendation:
- +–3
- κ: 0–3.0
Interpretation
- For fragile/unstable states, a higher λ is used. For resilient/focused states, a lower λ is used.
- Window Size (n)
- Default (human-like agents): 10–30
- Range: 1–50
- Interpretation:
- 5.0 for human brains (empirically fits frame rates 50–1 Hz)
- Lower (3.0–5.5) for substrates with slower processing
- Higher (10.0–15.0) for digital or engineered systems with very fast or slow subjective timescales
- +–40 (empirically tunable)
- Typical values:
- Low sensitivity:
- ○
- +–10
- ○
- Medium sensitivity (humans): 15–30 (empirical fit: 27)
- ○
- High sensitivity: 30–40+
- Interpretation: Controls how sharply the subjective frame rate slows as cognitive variance increases; higher values indicate more rapid slowdown and fragmentation with instability.
6. Methods
7. Conclusions
- Formalizing survival using binary outcome logic;
- Grounding frame transitions in decoherence dynamics relevant to cognitive systems;
- Introducing private multiverse threading for each conscious agent;
- And quantifying consciousness bias toward survival outcomes.
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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| Transitions/Risk Scenario | Survival Probability (Ps) |
|---|---|
| Routine, everyday transitions | Ps ≈ 1.0 |
| Mild risk/moderate stress | Ps ≈ 0.9–0.95 |
| Significant risk (medical trauma, accident) | Ps ≈ 0.5–0.9 |
| Lethal threat/near-death | Ps ≪ 1.0 |
| Frames in which survival is impossible | Ps = 0 (these are pruned from the survival path) |
| Cognitive State/Condition | Information Coherence (I) |
|---|---|
| Flow/Peak Focus | I ≈ 0.9–1.0 |
| Normal Alertness | I ≈ 0.8–0.9 |
| Routine/Mild Distraction | I ≈ 0.7–0.8 |
| Sleep/Fatigue, Drugs, Shock/Trauma | I ≈ 0.5–0.7 |
| Coma/Unconsciousness | I ≲ 0.5 |
| Frames in which survival is impossible | I = 0 (these are pruned from the survival path) |
| Symbol/Notation | Name/Description | Typical Values/Domain | Section/Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| F, Ft | Hyper frame (Frame): Complete macro state at an instant in spacetime | – | Section 2.2, throughout |
| C | Conscious agent: Coherent info-processing structure in frame F | – | Section 2.3 |
| t, e | Frame index/Decoherence event index (discrete time step) | t = 0,1,2,… e = 0,1,2,… | Section 2.11 |
| A(F) | Survival function: Binary indicator if F is “alive” (supports consciousness) | [0,1] | Section 2.4, Section 2.5, Section 2.6 and Section 2.7, throughout |
| Φ | Integrated information: Degree of integration in a frame | [0,∞) (the max is dependent on substrate and species) | Section 2.5 |
| Φcritical | Minimum threshold for conscious frame | Context-dependent | Section 2.5 |
| S(F), Smax | Agentic preference weight: Transition bias/intent for frame F | (0,Smax] | Section 3.8 |
| N | Set/Number of candidate next frames at a transition | 1 to large (106+) | Section 2.15 |
| Nalive | Subset of survival-compatible frames satisfying A(F) = 1 and viable for conscious continuity | 0 to large (106+) | Section 2.15 and Section 4.8.1 |
| Ndead | Subset of terminating or non-viable frames with A(F) = 0; experientially inaccessible (dead states) | 0 to large (106+) | Def 2.15 |
| Ra/d | Alive-to-dead ratio: Proportion of survival-compatible frames relative to terminating frames within the candidate set N | [0,∞) (the max is dependent on the alive/dead distribution in N) | Def 2.15, Section 4.8.1 |
| ρ(t) | Survival-density function: Proportion of viable (alive) frames relative to the total candidate frame set N at time t | [0,1] (the max is dependent on the alive/dead distribution in N) | Section Survival Path Density and Entropy |
| TC | Survival path: Sequence of alive frames for agent C | – | Section 2.7 and Section 2.9 |
| τ | Decoherence timescale: Time for a quantum system to decohere | 10–50 ms (humans, could be higher or lower in different substrates) | Section 2.12 and Section 3.4 |
| τeff,t | Effective Continuity Factor: Context-dependent interval determining subjective frame transition rate. Only meaningful for survival-compatible frames | (0,1] (when A(F) = 1); τeff,t = 0 (when A(F) = 0) | Section 3.3.1 |
| r, rmax, rrel | Frame rate, maximum, and relativistic frame rate | 1–50 Hz (humans, substrate dependent) | Section 3.3 and Section 4.12 |
| I(Ft → Ft+1) | Information coherence function: Similarity between frames | [0,1] | Section 2.14 |
| Ps(Ft → Ft+1) | Survival probability: Likelihood of decoherence into next frame | [0,1] | Section 2.13 |
| w(Ft→Ft+1) | Transition weight: Unnormalized likelihood for next frame | – | Section 3.10 |
| P(Ft+1 | Ft), Pbase, Pchunk | Transition probability: Normalized probability for next frame | [0,1] | Section 3.5 and Section 3.11 |
| Varcog | Cognitive variance: Instability/divergence for a frame’s next states | [0,1) | Section 3.3, Section 3.11.2 and Section 4.12 |
| Varwindow | Windowed cognitive Variance: Mean Var across window of n frames | [0,1) | Section 3.11.2 |
| n | Window size (number of recent frames for chunking/variance) | 10–30 (humans, substrate dependent) | Section 2.11, Section 3.3, Section 3.11.2 and Section 4.13 |
| at | Chunk confidence coefficient: Weight for chunk-based transitions | (0,1] | Section 3.11.2 |
| k | Integration timescale constant (min. frame update time) | 0.01–0.1 s (depends on the substrate) tunable | Section 3.3 and Section 4.13 |
| B | Scaling constant for variance to match frame rates | ∼5 (humans, substrate dependent), tunable | Section 3.3 and Section 4.13 |
| ϵ | Saturation/nonlinearity parameter in frame rate | ∼27 (humans, substrate dependent) tunable | Section 3.3 and Section 4.13 |
| γ | Lorentz factor (relativity) | ≥ 1 | Section 4.13 |
| μ | Mean frame index (for entropy/variance metrics) | – | Section 3.9 |
| σ2 | Chunk “tightness” parameter | Tunable (generally σ2 > 0) | Section 3.11.1 |
| Z, Zchunk | Normalization constants for probability distributions | – | Section 3.11 and Section 3.11.1 |
| λ | Sensitivity to cognitive variance in chunking(αt) | +−3, tunable | Section 3.11.1 |
| κ | Sensitivity to coherence loss in chunk confidence (αt) | 0–3 | Section 3.11.1 |
| i | Index for summing over candidate frames in variance/averaging formulas | – | Section 2.11, Section 3.1, Section 3.3, Section 3.11.2 and Section 4.12 |
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Kurtz, A.G. The Frame Survival Model of Conscious Continuity: A Theoretical Framework for Subjective Experience in a Branching Universe. Philosophies 2026, 11, 14. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010014
Kurtz AG. The Frame Survival Model of Conscious Continuity: A Theoretical Framework for Subjective Experience in a Branching Universe. Philosophies. 2026; 11(1):14. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010014
Chicago/Turabian StyleKurtz, Alexander George. 2026. "The Frame Survival Model of Conscious Continuity: A Theoretical Framework for Subjective Experience in a Branching Universe" Philosophies 11, no. 1: 14. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010014
APA StyleKurtz, A. G. (2026). The Frame Survival Model of Conscious Continuity: A Theoretical Framework for Subjective Experience in a Branching Universe. Philosophies, 11(1), 14. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010014

