Is Raz’s Critique Correct?—Dworkin’s Interpretive Theory and the Justification of Legal Authority

Abstract

If evaluated solely by Raz’s criteria, Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law indeed faces a crisis of authority justification. This controversy stems from their divergent understandings of the nature of authority. By drawing on Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics to interrogate the rational foundation of prejudice, the rational essence of authority is re-exposed. Authority is a rational and free activity, tied to recognition, and manifests as the possibility of being justified through reasoning. Dworkin’s methodological approach provides a robust justification for legal authority, which manifests in three key dimensions. First, the very act of interpretation demonstrates recognition that authority constitutes a rational activity, thereby affirming that the establishment of legal authority represents a voluntary, autonomous, and reason-governed enterprise. Second, the interpretive theory of law correlates with the be-earned character of authority across three constitutive aspects: its susceptibility to justifiability, its normative demand for justification, and its substantive realization through justificatory practices. Third, the substantive content of interpretive theory corresponds to the epistemic features of authoritative justification—including its informational properties, scope of application, communal dimensions, and capacity for adaptive rationalization. Consequently, contra Raz’s critique, Dworkin’s theoretical framework successfully provides a coherent account of legal authority’s justificatory foundations.

1. Introduction: The Problem and the Debate

The nature of legal authority constitutes one of the central issues in legal philosophy. A seminal critique advanced by Joseph Raz against Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law strikes at its very core: Raz contends that Dworkin’s methodological approach is fundamentally incapable of accounting for law’s authority (pp. 299–301) [1]. This criticism is not superficial; rather, it stems from their profound divergences regarding the essential character of authority, the structure of practical reasoning, and the very mission of legal theory.

The essence and key points of Raz’s critique can be distilled into the following logically interconnected chain: First, The Conceptualization of Authority’s Nature as “Content-Independent and Exclusionary Reasons”. The cornerstone of Raz’s theory of authority lies in characterizing legal authoritative directives as content-independent and exclusionary reasons. This entails two fundamental dimensions: (a) An authoritative directive derives its binding force not from the substantive merits of its content (i.e., not from the inherent value of the action it prescribes), but solely from its source—for instance, its issuance by a legitimate authority in accordance with established procedures. (b) Authoritative directives do not merely enter into deliberation alongside other first-order reasons (such as personal moral judgments or utilitarian calculations). Rather, they exclude and replace these primary reasons, thereby directly constituting the basis for action.

Second, The Diagnosis of Dworkin’s Methodology. From Raz’s perspective, Dworkin’s theory of constructive interpretation fundamentally conflicts with the nature of authority, thereby undermining its essential character. Raz identifies two defining features in Dworkin’s methodological approach to the question of law’s nature: (a) The question of law’s nature is treated as one among many issues in American jurisprudence. (b) Any interpretation of law’s nature must adhere to the principles of constructive interpretation. Regarding the first feature, Raz argues that Dworkin conflates the conceptual question of law’s nature with particular problems in American law—two fundamentally distinct inquiries. As to the second, Raz maintains that a proper analysis of law’s nature must rely on uncontroversial legal facts and evaluations. Dworkin’s evaluative criteria, being essentially moral standards, improperly introduce direct, content-dependent moral assessments. For Raz, the appropriate evaluative framework must instead be authority-based and satisfy the requirement of content-independence. Dworkin requires judges (and all legal interpreters) to engage in moral reasoning to discover “the best justification of legal practice.1” This implies that the truth-value of a legal proposition ultimately depends on its moral merit2. Such a content-sensitive justificatory approach directly contradicts the content-independence required of authoritative reasons. If substantive moral reasoning is necessary to determine what the law is, then legal directives can no longer function as independent reasons that preempt personal judgment—they instead become the conclusions of one’s moral deliberation.

Consequently, Raz charges that Dworkin’s interpretive theory fails to accommodate the phenomenon of authority. He contends that Dworkin’s reduction of law to a form of moral argumentation renders law incapable of performing its core function as practical authority—namely, to provide agents with decisive reasons for action through directives that do not require recourse to their underlying justifications. In Dworkin’s framework, far from offering exclusionary reasons, law instead demands that citizens and judges engage in precisely the kind of moral reasoning it purports to replace. On this basis, Raz concludes that Dworkin’s theory “cannot account for the authority of law”—it depicts a form of legal practice without authority.

Raz’s critique is incisive and profound, compelling any defense of Dworkin to confront a fundamental question: How can an interpretive theory grounded in moral argumentation be reconciled with the authoritative character of law? This article contends that the key to resolving this seemingly irreconcilable conflict lies in reexamining Raz’s foundational presuppositions regarding the nature of authority. Drawing on Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, the following analysis will first illuminate an alternative conception of authority—one based on recognition and rationality, distinct from Raz’s instrumentalist model. It will then demonstrate that Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law does not negate authority but, on the contrary, offers a superior, dynamic rational reconstruction of legal authority.

2. The Nature of Authority

Raz’s conceptualization of authority posits an inherent tension between authority and rationality. His analytical framework presupposes a binary opposition between these concepts, treating the so-called “paradox of authority’s rationality” as a central theoretical problematic. Yet this very methodological commitment—which frames authority as fundamentally irreconcilable with autonomous reason—leads his theory progressively further into a conceptual cul-de-sac regarding authority’s essential nature.

2.1. Authority–Rationality Paradox

The Authority-Reason Paradox seeks to demonstrate their fundamental incompatibility. By asserting that authoritative commands can never constitute genuine reasons for action, this view implies that rational agents can never legitimately submit to authority. In other words, authority-based obedience can never be rationally justified.

Raz contends that the crux of the matter lies not in the putative capacity of authorities to impose obligations per se, nor in the assumption of their ability to issue content-independent prescriptions, but rather in a fundamental misconception concerning the nature of rationality and authority’s impact on practical reasoning. He maintains that the “problem of authority” would readily dissolve once we properly acknowledge the distinctive rational contribution made by authoritative commands to justified obedience. Raz advances two philosophically distinctive theses: Instrumental Justification Thesis and Preemptive Force Thesis. Significantly, Raz’s solution systematically combines: An instrumental approach to authoritative commands and a hierarchical theory of practical reason. While authoritative directives serve to optimize conformity with right reason (Normal Justification Thesis), their rational force derives from the general recognition of legitimacy rather than case-by-case demonstration of this effect (Preemption Thesis). The subject’s obligation persists even when particular commands appear suboptimal from a first-order reasoning perspective (pp. 16–17) [4].

This theoretical framework a priori excludes rationality from the essential constitution of authority. For Raz, while reasons provide the ultimate foundational justification for all practical concepts, his reason-based account of authority merely demonstrates the functional role of authoritative statements within practical reasoning. Regardless of whether Raz’s proposed solution to the paradox holds water, his conceptualization of authority systematically externalizes reason from authority’s normative content. Consequently, the essential nature of authority remains fundamentally obscure, and crucial ontological dimensions of authority persist in theoretical obscurity (p. 201) [4,5]3.

2.2. The Rational Essence of Authority

Authority and rationality are not antithetical; rather, rationality constitutes the very essence of authority. Building upon his critique of the Enlightenment’s prejudgment theory, Gadamer rearticulates the intrinsic relationship between authority and reason. The Enlightenment erroneously equated the concept of authority with blind obedience, entirely disregarding its potential as a source of truth. Its wholesale denunciation of all authority itself constitutes a prejudice—a conceptual distortion that deviates from the core contextual reality of authority, thereby directly engendering its misinterpretation and epistemic obscuration. Through a systematic examination of diverse Enlightenment theories of prejudgment, Gadamer interrogates the rational foundations of preunderstanding, exposing their theoretical lacunae and fallacies. He ultimately demonstrates that authority, in its fundamental nature, is rational.

To explore the essence of authority, we must first clarify a fundamental question: Is it authority itself that displaces our judgment, or is it the prestige of authority that does so? Gadamer argues that if authority simply replaces our autonomous judgment, then it indeed constitutes a form of prejudice. Since the Enlightenment, authority and reason have been artificially bifurcated. The Enlightenment disparaged all authority, framing it as inherently opposed to reason and freedom. Authority was reduced to a caricature of blind obedience, stripped of its rational and intersubjective dimensions.

“The Enlightenment’s distinction between faith in authority and using one’s own reason is, in itself, legitimate. If the prestige of authority displaces one’s own judgment, then authority is in fact a source of prejudices. But this does not preclude its being a source of truth, and that is what the Enlightenment failed to see when it denigrated all authority”.

(p. 280) [6]

Returning to the nature of authority itself, from the perspective of its acquisition, authority rooted in recognition and acknowledgment constitutes a rational activity. Gadamer argues that authority originates from acknowledgment—individuals rationally recognize others’ judgments as superior to their own, thereby granting them priority (p. 281) [6]. This process is inherently rational. Thus, from the standpoint of the authority-recipient, acknowledging authority is not a surrender of reason but an exercise of rational judgment4. Authority does not replace rationality, nor does it entail blind obedience; rather, it enhances practical reasoning by integrating superior insight into one’s deliberative framework.

The recognition of authority stems from the fact that “what the authority says is not irrational and arbitrary but can, in principle, be discovered to be true” (p. 281) [6]. In other words, authoritative claims conform to reason and are capable of being rationally justified. The act of recognition is itself rational, and the rationality of the authority’s pronouncements is precisely the precondition for this recognition. Thus, the rational essence of authority manifests in its justificatory potential—its capacity to be discursively validated. Since the content of this justification consists of shared perspectives, values, and beliefs between the authority-giver and the recipient, the justifiability of authority involves three dimensions: (1) Authority as an Informational Attribute (Not a Personal One). Authority is a property of information, not of individuals. References to personal authority signify the agent’s normative competence to generate authoritatively binding communications. “But within the limits set by such a metarational framework of ideas, values, and beliefs, human reason can elaborate any utterance made, and it is the potentiality for such reasoned elaboration that lends authority to the utterance (p. 203) [5].” Strictly speaking, only information can be authoritative; individuals are merely its conduits. (2) The Scope of Justification. Content Scope: The shared perspectives, values, and beliefs that form the basis of authority’s justification. Applicability Scope: Authority exists only within the “shared framework” between the authority-giver and the recipient—what might be called its communal dimension. Authority is relational; it depends on mutual recognition within a normative or epistemic community. (3) Adaptive Justification. Authority’s justification must accommodate fluidity and change. Shared beliefs and values evolve with new social conditions, and past justifications may lose their validity. Consequently, authority dissolves when its rational basis erodes—it cannot persist through mere inertia or coercion.

The authority of law inherently possesses these defining characteristics. Like all forms of authority, legal authority is fundamentally: reason-dependent—grounded in justificatory rationality; recognition-based—contingent upon intersubjective acknowledgment; discursively defensible—manifesting as justificatory capacity. Within this framework of rational authority, we must reassess Raz’s critique of Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law. This raises two pivotal questions: (1) Can Dworkin’s theory adequately account for legal authority? (2) Does it inherently conflict with the concept of authority?

2.3. Gadamer’s Potential Response to Raz

By revealing the rational essence of authority through Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, we are able to examine—and potentially respond to—Raz’s critique of Dworkin from a fundamentally different perspective. Raz’s theory of authority is built upon a formal and instrumental presupposition: that the function of authority lies in issuing “content-independent and exclusionary reasons” to replace agents’ first-order rational deliberation, thereby resolving coordination problems and enhancing behavioral efficiency. This presupposition stems directly from his framing of authority and reason as oppositional—what he terms the “paradox of authority.”

From a Gadamerian perspective, however, Raz’s theory remains captive to a conceptual fallacy shaped by the Enlightenment: the unreflective equation of “authority” with “blind obedience” and the “abdication of reason.” Gadamer’s philosophical project aims precisely at deconstructing this very opposition. If, as he argues, the essence of authority lies in its free rational recognition—grounded in the acknowledgment of the superior rational force of another’s judgment and insight—then authority is not antithetical to reason, but rather a mode of reason’s actualization within historical and social practice.

Consequently, Gadamer’s theoretical framework enables the following fundamental potential responses to Raz’s critique:

First, Raz’s requirement for the “content-independence” of authority misses its rational core. Raz maintains that the validity of an authoritative directive derives from its source rather than its content, and that identifying law does not require moral deliberation about its content. From Gadamer’s perspective, however, the very precondition for authority to be “recognized” lies in the fact that “what authority declares is neither irrational nor arbitrary, but is in principle open to being recognized and accepted.” In other words, the justifiability and acceptability of content constitute internal conditions for the establishment of authority, rather than external factors to be excluded. By mechanistically separating “source” from “content,” Raz overlooks that authority’s practical validity precisely depends on its content being perpetually open to rational scrutiny and recognition.

Second, Raz’s characterization of authority as an “exclusionary reason” constitutes an oversimplified model of practical reasoning. He contends that the function of authoritative directives is to “foreclose” an individual’s deliberation on dependent reasons. However, if the essence of authority is a rational activity, then obedience to authority does not terminate reflection but rather involves the acceptance and integration of superior judgment. As Gadamer aptly notes, authority serves to “enhance practical volition,” providing weightier reasons for action without negating the participation of individual rationality. In Dworkin’s constructive interpretation, the judicial process of identifying law exemplifies this form of rational engagement: it does not disregard legal sources (such as precedents or legislation) but employs moral argumentation to uncover and realize the rational demands inherent within those sources. This approach does not negate authority; on the contrary, it represents the highest form of respect for authority’s rational essence.

Third, Raz’s accusation that Dworkin “confuses the question of the nature of law with problems in American law” stems from his neglect of the structure of “prejudice”. Gadamer emphasizes that all understanding necessarily proceeds from “prejudices”—horizons formed within historical traditions that interpreters cannot escape. Dworkin’s treatment of legal practice as “argumentative” and his adoption of the internal perspective of a participant within a specific legal tradition (such as American adjudication) is not a methodological flaw but an honest engagement with the hermeneutic situation. Raz’s pursuit of a nearly “prejudice-free,” purely analytical inquiry into law’s nature is, from a Gadamerian standpoint, impossible. Justifications of legal authority always unfold within a community sharing specific “prejudices” (e.g., constitutional traditions, judicial principles). Thus, Dworkin’s approach is far from being a parochial fallacy; it is, rather, a precise grasp of the historical and communal character of legal authority.

In summary, through Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, we can discern that Raz’s critique of Dworkin largely originates from a deficient conception of authority—a formalistic model that opposes authority to reason. Gadamer helps us recognize that the essence of authority is rationality, its mode is recognition, and its mode of being is justification. Once this more substantive conception of authority is adopted, the theoretical premises of Raz’s critique are unsettled, while Dworkin’s interpretive jurisprudence reveals its potential to provide a superior account of legal authority.

3. Interpretive Theory of Law Under the Conception of Rational Authority and Legal Authoritativeness

Having clarified the rational essence of authority, we may now return to Raz’s core critique—that the interpretive theory of law fails to account for legal authority. Raz’s criticism is predicated upon his specific conception of authority. However, through the conception of rational authority illuminated by Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics, it becomes evident that the theoretical premises underlying Raz’s critique are themselves open to question. To address this, we must first systematically reconstruct the implicit conception of authority within Dworkin’s theory, then respond to Raz’s criticisms, and ultimately demonstrate that Dworkin’s framework not only accommodates authority but also offers a profound explanation of legal authority.

3.1. The Implicit Theory of Authority in Dworkin: A Reconstruction

Although Dworkin never systematically analyzed the concept of “authority” in the thematic manner of Raz, his entire philosophy of law as integrity is permeated by a distinctive conception of authority that resonates with the spirit of Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics. By examining his interpretive theory, we can reconstruct three core features of this conception.

First, authority is rational, contestable, and actualized through justification. In Dworkin’s framework, legal authority is never an automatically effective or given fact. It cannot be reduced merely to an institutional enactment (as in Raz’s “sources thesis”). On the contrary, authority must be earned through ongoing rational justification within each concrete context of legal practice. When judges advance legal propositions in adjudication or when citizens express allegiance to law, the precondition is that the law can be situated within a coherent system of principles and demonstrate its character as the “best moral justification.” This process of “earning” authority is precisely the rational activity of recognition and acknowledgment described by Gadamer. Thus, the force of legal authority in Dworkin’s work stems not from the imperatival force of commands, but from the persuasive power of justification.

Second, authority as immanently constituted, not externally imposed. Dworkin’s model of constructive interpretation reveals that legal authority is not imposed upon participants from outside legal practice (such as by a sovereign’s will). On the contrary, authority is immanently constituted within legal practice—through the argumentative activities of participants who strive to understand, apply, and develop legal standards. When judges debate “what our legal tradition truly requires,” they are actively engaged in shaping and reinforcing the authority of that very tradition. Authority resides in the structure of this dialogic practice itself; it is an internal product of interpretive engagement, not an external precondition. This situates legal authority as intrinsically linked to a community’s shared history, principles, and commitments-rather than treating it as an alien, purely instrumental device.

Third, legal authority rests on “best moral justification,” not mere sources. The most fundamental divergence between Dworkin’s conception of authority and Raz’s position lies here: for Dworkin, determining “what the law is” and exploring “what the law ought to be” are not separate inquiries but are synthesized within constructive interpretation. The truth-value of a legal proposition ultimately depends on whether it can be supported by the best justification drawn from political morality. Consequently, the ultimate foundation of legal authority resides in the moral acceptability of its content, not the pedigree of its sources.

This is not to say that sources are irrelevant—institutional history such as statutes and precedents forms a “fit” constraint that interpretation must satisfy. Rather, the legal meaning of these historical facts must be uncovered through moral argumentation. Legal authority is thus content-sensitive; its force derives from its capacity to demonstrate to rational citizens that its directives represent the optimal realization of the community’s inherent principles and demands of justice.

Thus, Dworkin implicitly espouses a theory of authority that is rational, discursive, immanent to interpretive practice, and oriented toward moral justification. This reconstruction reveals that Raz’s critique—based on his “sources thesis” and “content-independence”—is fundamentally misaligned with Dworkin’s theoretical premises. Raz asks, “How can a directive function as an exclusionary reason?” while Dworkin answers, “How can a practice, through sustained rational justification, make itself worthy of being regarded as authoritative?” Having established Dworkin’s own conception of authority, we can cogently demonstrate that each dimension of his interpretive theory perfectly embodies and enacts this rational conception of authority.

3.2. A Response to Raz’s Critique

The force of Raz’s critique depends entirely on his presupposition that authority stands in opposition to rationality. Once we adopt the alternative framework—defended by Gadamer—that the essence of authority is rationality, the foundation of Raz’s critical edifice is undermined. Their disagreement is not a minor dispute within a shared conceptual scheme but stems from fundamentally different philosophical stances on the meta-question: “What is authority?” This foundational divergence manifests concretely at three levels.

First, is the basis of authority source or recognition? Raz locates the basis of authority in its source. A directive possesses authority because it is issued by a recognized authority following specified procedures. Thus, identifying law requires tracing it to the correct source, without evaluating the soundness of its content. This is the core of his “sources thesis” and “content-independence” argument. In contrast, the Dworkinian/Gadamerian view holds that the basis of authority lies in rational recognition. Authority is not automatically conferred by its source but must be earned through the justifiability of its content. As Gadamer notes, authority depends on “the recognition and acknowledgment that another’s judgment and insight surpass one’s own”—a free and rational act. Dworkin’s constructive interpretation is precisely the ongoing, public exercise of rationality by judges, as representatives of the community, demonstrating through argumentative practice why the law merits such recognition.

Second, is the function of authority to replace personal judgment or to augment practical volition? Raz argues that the function of authority is to replace the agent’s own rational deliberation. Authoritative directives, as “exclusionary reasons,” require agents to set aside—rather than integrate—their own assessment of dependent reasons, thereby efficiently solving coordination problems. In this model, authority and individual rationality exist in an inverse relationship. The Dworkinian/Gadamerian position is that authority functions to augment the agent’s practical volition. It does not replace reason but supplements and strengthens practical reasoning by providing weightier, well-considered reasons. Etymologically, auctoritas is linked to augere (“to increase”), revealing authority’s nature as a “reason-enhancing” force. In Dworkin’s theory, the judge’s search for the “best justification” aims precisely to endow legal decisions with greater rational force, thereby enhancing their capacity to guide and persuade members of the community.

Third, is the practice of authority “formal identification” or “interpretive engagement”? Raz conceives the practice of authority as a form of formal identification. Legal participants–especially citizens–in identifying authoritative directives, are expected to apply a content-independent test. The existence and content of law are, on this view, matters of social fact that can be ascertained prior to moral evaluation. In contrast, the Dworkinian/Gadamerian position maintains that the practice of authority is necessarily one of interpretive engagement. Understanding an authoritative directive—particularly one embedded in a meaning-laden practice like law–requires entering its universe of meaning and considering its purposes and values. Gadamer’s theory of “prejudice” (Vorurteil) demonstrates that all understanding already entails a preliminary recognition of traditional authority. Dworkin systematizes this insight methodologically: determining what the law is constitutes a task of constructive interpretation, which inherently demands recourse to substantive moral reasoning to reveal the conception that best realizes the practice’s immanent values (such as integrity). This is not a dismissal of authority, but rather the most serious rational treatment of it.

Based on the preceding comparative analysis, it becomes evident that Raz’s criticism—that Dworkin’s theory “fails to account for legal authority”—carries the unstated premise: “it does not conform to my (Raz’s) model of authority.” However, if Raz’s authority model, predicated on a strict authority-reason dichotomy, is itself partial and neglects the rational and recognitive dimensions essential to authority’s very existence, then his critique loses its normative force as a definitive standard. Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law, in contrast, precisely describes and embodies a rational conception of authority. It does not settle for treating authority as a brute social fact but strives to elucidate why authority merits the allegiance of rational agents. Consequently, Dworkin does not fail to explain authority; rather, he provides a richer and more explanatorily powerful account of authority than Raz’s model affords. In the following section, we will demonstrate concretely how Dworkin’s interpretive theory, in both its methodological structure and substantive content, fully instantiates this rational conception of authority.

3.3. The Correspondence Between Interpretive Theory and the Demands of Rational Authority

Dworkin’s development and application of law’s argumentative character, along with his consequent choice of interpretive methodology, inherently presuppose recognition of legal authority. He maintains that legal practice is fundamentally argumentative, and establishing a genuine theory of legal grounds requires a novel approach—constructive interpretation. From the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, prejudice as the pre-structure of interpretation is an inevitable component of all understanding. Authority is intimately connected with prejudice, as the rational basis of prejudice lies in authority’s potential for truth. This insight emerges from analyzing prejudice: other forms of prejudice—whether due to negligence, rashness, or other epistemic vices—lack this justificatory potential. For legal interpretation, and specifically for Dworkin’s interpretive theory, this prejudice constitutes the pre-existing meaning of legal texts prior to interpretation—that is, the meaning embodied in their enactment and historical application. Legal texts, as the content of prejudice, already incorporate an element of authority before being interpreted. The very act of “interpretation” demonstrates that authority is a rational activity, acknowledging that legal authority is obtained through volitional, free, and reason-governed engagement. This interpretive methodology further unfolds to reveal how authority’s essence manifests in the possibility of discursive justification, which comprises two key aspects: (1) The correspondence between law’s argumentative nature and authority’s contestable character; (2) The alignment between interpretive theory’s content and the justificatory features of authority (e.g., informational traits, communal dimensions, adaptive capacity).

The contestable nature of authority unfolds across three dimensions: susceptibility to justification, demand for justification, and actual justification—with law’s argumentative character exhibiting corresponding relations at each level. At the level of susceptibility to justification, law’s argumentative nature inherently demonstrates its justifiability. The realization of law essentially constitutes the unfolding of this argumentative character in legal practice, through which legal authority is concomitantly established. Within this justificatory structure, law’s epistemic superiority in judgment and insight becomes manifest. Law’s recognition and acceptance by citizens—precisely because of its argumentative merits—enhances and reinforces practical volition. Thus, the process of legal justification simultaneously operates as a mechanism for cultivating normative commitment.

At the level of demand for justification, “it tries to grasp the argumentative character of our legal practice by joining that practice and struggling with the issues of soundness and truth participants face (p. 14) [8].” The methodological requirement for unfolding law’s justificatory capacity is interpretive. This interpretive approach explicates law’s complexity, function, and efficacy within its argumentative structure—Legal propositions are determined by other propositions, which acquire their meaning only through being employed and justified within legal practice—a practice fundamentally constituted by the application and argumentation of these very propositions (p. 13) [8]. Legal practice’s argumentative dimension can be examined through dual perspectives: (1) external perspective (adopted by historians or sociologists): explains why particular modes of legal argumentation emerge in specific historical or social contexts. (2) internal perspective (Dworkin’s primary focus): treats judicial reasoning as paradigmatic for understanding law’s core practice. This participant’s viewpoint—embraced by judges, claimants, or legal theorists—interrogates which legal propositions are justified and why, demanding a theory that clarifies how such norms function in justifying legal obligations or entitlements. Whether through judicial reasoning, citizen deliberation, or scholarly analysis, legal authority is iteratively validated via these argumentative practices. Thus, law’s argumentative nature and the justificatory essence of legal authority are ontologically inseparable.

At the level of actual justification, Dworkin’s interpretive theory demands the best possible argument for law, thereby ensuring that the justification of legal authority constitutes the most rational argument possible. The acquisition of legal authority fundamentally requires substantive justification—authority must be actively claimed and demonstrated through the rational superiority of its normative propositions. Justifying authority is inherently a process of competing rational claims vying for legitimacy. For personal authority, this is achieved by demonstrating the rational advantage of the directives issued. For impersonal authority (such as law), such rational superiority manifests through competing legal theories. Dworkin’s methodology further interrogates which theory provides the best interpretation, thereby offering the most coherent justification for legal authority. This inquiry is guaranteed by two theoretical features. (1) Theoretical design of best justification. Constructive interpretation requires that the proposed theory be the optimal application—“Constructive interpretation is a matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong (p. 52) [8].” Only through this method can legal authority be most persuasively justified. (2) Intentionality as formal interpretive structure. While Dworkin criticizes intentionalism as a fallacy in interpretation, he recognizes that intention serves as a formal structural constraint. He argues that the concept of intention provides a framework for all interpretive claims, allowing the interpreter to discern the object of interpretation:

“This structure is required of an interpretation even when the material to be interpretated is a social practice, even when there is no historical author whose historical mind can be plumbed”.

(p. 59) [8]

This formal structure ensures that competing legal theories remain comparable despite substantive differences. Different legal theories posit different intentional frameworks, yet the shared structural constraint allows them to be evaluated within a common tradition. The theory that proves superior is the one that best justifies legal authority.

The content of interpretive legal theory corresponds to the defining characteristics of authority’s justificatory content. The substantive elements subject to discursive justification of authority consist of shared perspectives, values, and beliefs between authority-grantors and recipients. This framework comprises four primary components: informational attributes of authority; scope of substantive content; communal dimension; adaptive justification. Through his typological distinction of interpretation and critique of intentionalism, Dworkin analytically separates legal discourse from its creators. Authority fundamentally inheres in informational qualities rather than attributes of the information’s originator or promulgator. All genuine authority is ultimately grounded in the rationality of discourse—this alone constitutes its authoritative claim (p. 307) [7]. Such discursive justification manifests in practice as a possibility condition: when authority-holders issue directives (whether as normative propositions or commands), these authoritative pronouncements gain recognition precisely through their potential for rational validation. Our conceptualization of authority reveals a distinctive relationship between authority-holders and rational discourse—the former serve as latent subjects capable of articulating or justifying authoritative propositions. Although such propositions are often transmitted without explicit justification, they remain susceptible to rational reconstruction.

On the one hand, Dworkin explicitly asserts the independence of law from its creators. Legal authority, as a form of institutional (non-personal) authority, is often thought to be intrinsically tied to its legislative origins. However, Dworkin classifies legal practice as belonging to what he terms “creative interpretation”—a mode of interpretation where agents construct entities conceptually distinct from themselves. The authority of law inheres in law itself, not its creators. Legal authority is an attribute of legal propositions, not their promulgators or drafters. Law, as institutional authority, differs fundamentally from personal authority: while its genesis may be traced to human actors, its normative force cannot be reduced to them. Conflating law’s authority with its creators inevitably distorts the inquiry into authority’s essential nature. Thus, legal authority derives neither from: the will of legislators (authorial intent); enactment ceremonies (formal validity); raw political power (de facto control). Rather, it emerges from: the rationality of discourse (redeemable through reason); justificatory potential (capacity for normative defense). On the other hand, Dworkin rejects applying authorial intentionalism to interpreting social practices. He maintains that intentionalist accounts merely answer what particular individuals believed the practice required, failing to explain the practice itself (p. 63) [8]. Thus, constructive interpretation methodologically severs the explanation of legal practice from the search for creators’ intentions. The connection between legal authority and its origins remains purely formal or extrinsic—law’s substantive authority depends not on its makers, but on its function as reason-giving information that guides conduct.

Dworkin’s interpretive theory demands the best possible justification for law. His conception of interpretive attitude posits that law possesses an inherent point—a purposive dimension that shapes its development and determines what counts as properly understood legal requirements. Here, value and content are fundamentally intertwined. Consequently, the interpretive content of law—and by extension, its justificatory framework—necessarily incorporates evaluative judgments, including moral beliefs and other normative commitments. This demonstrates a clear substantive correspondence between interpretive legal theory and the justification of authority.

The communal dimension of authority justification manifests itself within the dynamic process of constructive interpretation. The justification of authority inherently possesses a collective character—authority only operates as such within a delimited sphere defined by the shared perspectives, values, and beliefs of both authority-grantors and recipients. Legal authority similarly exists within communities bound by common conceptual frameworks and normative commitments. In his dynamic account of interpretive theory, Dworkin delineates three hermeneutic stages: pre-interpretive, interpretive, and post-interpretive, each requiring varying degrees of communal consensus. He explicitly situates interpretation within specific communities, noting that the interpretive attitude thrives within a community, though the requisite level of consensus differs across each stage (p. 65) [8]. Consequently, Dworkin frames the inquiry into law’s nature within the broader context of its communal attributes. Only within a sufficient consensus framework does law attain its essential character, and only then can discussions about legal authority achieve substantive validity.

The dynamic character of authority justification is embedded in constructive interpretation’s conceptualization of its object. The justification of authority is inherently mutable—to accommodate environmental shifts and creative innovations, the underlying perspectives, values, and beliefs must continuously evolve. When authoritative propositions fail to adapt and justify themselves under changed circumstances, they cease to function as genuine authority. Any legal theory construction must address two fundamental demands: (1) The need for stability in legal order; (2) The need for growth and adaptation in law. As a methodological framework for legal theory, Dworkin’s interpretive approach systematically reconciles these demands through his interpretive attitude, which incorporates two axiomatic postulates: (1) Purpose Postulate. The practice has an immanent point—it serves particular interests, purposes or principles that constitute its value. (2) Adaptation Postulate. The practice’s required behaviors or endorsed judgments are not static; they evolve in response to its developing purpose. Legal practice both sustains this interpretive attitude and satisfies its dual postulates. These principles demonstrate that constructive interpretation: recognizes law’s purposive dimension (embodied in shared conceptions of value),and acknowledges interpretation’s constitutive function (the point determines what counts as properly understood present legal requirements). Through this conceptual apparatus, Dworkin synthesizes stability and change—thereby satisfying the dynamic justificatory requirements of legal authority itself.

3.4. Chapter Summary

In summary, Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law does not, as Raz alleges, dissolve authority. On the contrary, it provides a dynamic account of how legal authority is generated, sustained, and renewed. When viewed from the overarching perspective of his philosophy of law as integrity, it becomes evident that Dworkin’s “constructive interpretation” is far more than a mere methodology; it is, in essence, the practical unfolding of his theory of rational authority.

First, the objective of “constructive interpretation” is to provide the “best justification” for legal practice, which in itself constitutes the most thorough commitment to rational authority. This methodology requires the interpreter to present legal practice as “the best possible instance of the genre to which it belongs,” necessitating a commitment to uncovering and demonstrating the rational force and moral value inherent in the legal system. This process is the jurisprudential embodiment of what Gadamer identified as “recognizing authority as a rational activity”—judges and citizens are not engaged in blind obedience, but are collectively participating in affirming the law as a rational enterprise worthy of allegiance.

Second, the value core of the political virtue “Integrity” is precisely the commitment to rational authority. Integrity demands that the government speak with a single voice and treat all citizens according to a coherent set of principles. This constitutes a rigorous requirement for the rational consistency of legal authority. It prevents authority from degenerating into mere power through arbitrariness or partiality, thereby ensuring that legal directives are, in principle, capable of being recognized and accepted. The authority of a legal system that adheres to Integrity derives precisely from this pervasive, coherent character—a character that remains continually accountable to the scrutiny of public reason.

Finally, the interpretive attitude and its tripartite dynamic process—“pre-interpretive, interpretive, post-interpretive”—precisely model the complete life cycle through which rational authority is justified, affirmed, and subsequently evolves in practice. The pre-interpretive stage, involving the preliminary identification of “what the legal practice is,” corresponds to the initial acknowledgment of authoritative tradition (what Gadamer terms “prejudice”). This constitutes the historical starting point for all rational justification. The interpretive stage, which asks “what justification presents it in its best light,” represents the core moment where authority earns its rational recognition. This stage centrally embodies authority’s contestable nature and its justificatory potential. The post-interpretive stage, wherein interpretive conclusions “reflectively” reshape our understanding of and demands upon the law, demonstrates the adaptive justification characteristic of rational authority. The content of authority must continually revalidate its rationality through dialogue with evolving social practices and moral consciousness—or risk losing the very basis of its recognition.

Consequently, Dworkin’s entire theoretical project can be understood as a grand argument: it seeks to demonstrate that the authority of law resides not in a static, top-down “command-obedience” relationship, but is immanent within an ongoing, public practice of constructive interpretation. Within this practice, authority and reason are no longer adversaries; instead, they jointly ensure that the legal enterprise can both possess the guiding force necessary to sustain social cooperation and persistently maintain its openness to the pursuit of justice and morality.

4. Conclusions

Since human legal systems emerged from divine origins, demonstrating how law can simultaneously maintain stable authority while requiring continual adjustment has remained a central challenge for legal philosophers. Authority is essential to any legal order. Raz employs reasons as his analytical framework for authority, conceptualizing legal authority as practical authority—a content-independent exclusionary reason. From a positivist stance, he adopts an analytical approach to authority, seeking to resolve the perceived paradox between authority and rationality. Yet no fundamental paradox exists between authority and reason. Both substantive discussions of authoritative content and formal expositions of authority must be grounded in authority’s rational essence. The nature of authority is ultimately a question of justifiability. Raz overlooks this rational core, reducing authority to a formal practical concept, and from this limited perspective criticizes Dworkin’s interpretive approach as failing to address the issue. In contrast, Dworkin insists on constructive interpretation of law—a method inherently aligned with authority’s rational foundation. Thus, contrary to Raz’s critique, Dworkin’s theory can satisfactorily account for legal authority. The proposition that “law is authority-based” does not conflict with Dworkin’s fundamental assumptions; rather, it is implicitly embedded within his framework as a necessary consequence. This very divergence on authority reflects the distinct illuminative power that positivist and Dworkinian methods, respectively, bring to interpreting legal practice and history. The crucial questions are: Must we choose one approach over the other based on their explanatory merits? Or can we envision a theoretical framework that synthesizes them dialectically? To some extent, Dworkin’s theory may represent such an unfinished attempt. Through interpretation, it reveals and accommodates the tension and evolution between form and content in law, creating conceptual space for their dynamic reconciliation. This inclusive methodology bridges the “gap” between legal form and substance, not by eliminating their distinction but by enabling their historical and concrete unity. In doing so, it provides law with the necessary hermeneutic flexibility—an appropriate “redundancy space” for its development and application.