Revisiting Kant’s Conception of Political Freedom and Its Relation to the Practical Concept of Freedom from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

Abstract

In this paper, we revisit Kant’s conception of political freedom and draw a connection to the concept of freedom presented in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals—a practical concept of freedom that is immediately grounded in the transcendental concept of freedom. Also, we defend the traditional viewpoint on the relationship between Kant’s theory of morals and the theory of Right, which is equivalent to the claim that political freedom is based on the definition of freedom in the Groundwork.

1. Introduction

In many of his writings, Kant advances his theory of freedom. There are many concepts of freedom within Kant’s philosophy; prima facie, they are interconnected by implication.1 However, the claim that different concepts of freedom are connected by implication has raised some suspicion in the secondary literature. Some authors, such as Allen Wood and Marcus Willaschek, interpret the relationship between Kant’s moral and political philosophy in a way that implies Kant’s conception of political freedom is not implied by Kant’s conception of practical freedom defined in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, which we shall denote moral freedom. The traditional interpretation, in contrast to that of Wood and Willaschek, implies that moral freedom grounds political freedom.

Our aim in this paper is to revisit Kant’s conception of freedom in politics while presenting a defense of the thesis that political freedom is based on moral freedom. Accordingly, there are two intended audiences for this paper. On the one hand, a wider philosophical audience would benefit from a recapitulation and additional analysis of Kant’s conception of political freedom. On the other hand, political philosophers may be interested in the main argument of this paper, which shows that Kant’s conception of political freedom is grounded in his conception of moral freedom. From this, as we will see, it easily follows that Kant’s theory of morals implies political theory.

This paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we briefly characterize Kant’s practical philosophy in general and its connection to freedom, which is its supreme principle. In the second section, we discuss moral freedom. In the third section, we characterize political freedom. In the fourth section, we try to reconcile moral and political freedom and present and argue against positions that treat them as irreconcilable.

2. Preliminaries

2.1 As Rauscher explains, Kant’s political philosophy is a branch of his practical philosophy [1]. Kant’s entire system is divided into theoretical and practical philosophy, that is, “the one part must be the philosophy of nature, the other that of morals” [2] (p. 3). Kant’s political philosophy is elaborated in the first part of The Metaphysics of Morals (Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right) and in several shorter writings (for example, Toward Perpetual Peace, On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Hold in Practice, etc.) [1]. It should be noted that, as Vuković explains, Kant’s political philosophy “has two sides—the normative and the descriptive” [3] (p. 203).2 In this paper, our focus is on the normative side, which is based on freedom as its supreme principle.

2.2 Rauscher emphasizes the strong dependence of Kant’s political philosophy on the core of his practical philosophy 3 [1]. We illustrate the dependency in question with the following quote and its interpretation:

If there is no freedom and no moral law based upon it, and everything that happens or could happen is a mere mechanism of nature, then politics (understood as the art of using this mechanism in order to govern humans) makes up the entirety of practical wisdom, and the concept of Right is an empty thought.

[4] (p. 96)

In the latter stages of this paper, the last quote will become clearer to the reader. However, for now, the following can be said. Essentially, the freedom in question here is transcendental, that is, a form of causality that, in an absolute sense, initiates some event, so that there is no event that precedes that particular initiation and that conditions it (KdrV A448/B476) [5]. On this concept of freedom, the “practical concept of freedom is grounded” (KdrV A533/B561) [5]. Furthermore, the moral law is based on this practical concept of freedom [6] (p. 48), which, in turn, is the basis of Right (Recht)4 and ethics. Assume that there is no freedom in a transcendental sense. Then, there is no morality [7] (pp. 52–53). Not only is this the case, but everything in nature is a pure mechanism; every event—including our actions—is determined by external causes, since only they exist. Right, which is based on this concept of freedom, has no content, nor does the core of the metaphysics of morals. There is only “practical wisdom”, which is the art of utilizing the mechanism of nature to govern people. In that sense, Kant’s political philosophy is extremely dependent on the core of his practical philosophy.

We should emphasize one specific point that this quote suggests: the theory of morals and the theory of Right are interconnected in such a way that the former conditions the latter. The common principle of these theories, as the quote suggests, is freedom in a transcendental sense. Given the fact that the theory of morals conditions Right, it is sufficient that the supreme principle of morals conditions the supreme principle of Right.5 Utilizing the aforementioned statements, we may say that transcendental freedom conditions moral freedom, whereas moral freedom conditions political freedom. An interpretation of this form can be justified only if it is possible to show that moral freedom justifies political freedom.

3. Moral Freedom

3.1 “The concept of freedom is a pure rational concept”, or idea [6] (p. 48). If we want to prove the reality of some empirical concept, intuitions are required, and they are called examples; in the case that someone requires proof of the reality of some pure rational concept, that is, of an idea, “then one desires something impossible, since no intuition adequate to them can be given at all” [2] (p. 225). Therefore, no example can be given of the concept of freedom, in any possible experience, and, hence, it cannot be the subject of theoretical knowledge [6] (p. 48).

Although the reality of the concept of freedom cannot be the subject of cognition, there is another way in which its reality can be proven. When Kant speaks of freedom as an idea, he speaks of freedom in a transcendental sense. In order to explain this, a note about causality is necessary.

Transcendental freedom is a type of causality. Let us first consider causality on the basis of the law of nature. This kind of causality implies that “everything that happens (begins to be) presupposes something, which it follows in accordance with a rule” (KdrV A189/B232) [5]. Kant also names this causality “causality as natural mechanism” [8] (p. 5). All of the objects of our senses function on the basis of this principle, and they make up one mechanism which we call nature. For our purposes, the following is of great importance: for each one of these events that takes place through that form of causality, it follows that it “presupposes a previous state, upon which it follows without exception according to a rule” (KdrV A444/B472) [5]. Based on the aforementioned notion, there is no event for which this could not be applied. Freedom, in a transcendental sense, is “a faculty of absolutely beginning a state, and hence also a series of its consequences […]; so that nothing precedes it through which this occurring action is determined in accordance with constant laws” (KdrV A445/B473) [5]. Therefore, in contrast with causality based on natural laws, where for every event there is something that precedes it and conditions it in accordance with some rule, when it comes to transcendental freedom, such an event does not exist. The aforementioned explains the absolute beginning of some state.

Therefore, the reality of freedom cannot be the subject of theoretical knowledge because theoretical knowledge may be related only to possible or actual intuitions, which are possible only on the basis of the causality of the law of nature, among other things. Transcendental freedom does not have a place within the sphere of possible experience. In that sense, Kant says that the concept of freedom “is transcendent for theoretical philosophy” [6] (p. 48). The sole thing we will say about Kant’s justification for assigning this type of causality to humans is the following: “objects of experience as such, including even our own subject, hold only as appearances but at the same time on putting things in themselves at their basis” [8] (p. 5). As our own subject is an appearance, in its basis, something in itself corresponds to it. A thing in itself does not exist in time and space, if it exists at all, since these are pure intuitions a priori and the necessary conditions of every possible experience. Causality as a mechanism of nature presupposes time, and hence causality as a mechanism of nature does not apply to a thing in itself. In that way, causality based on freedom can be attributed to a thing in itself without any contradiction (KdrV A538–A542/B566–B570) [5].

However, the following question easily arises: How can we deem ourselves free agents when we ourselves are part of nature, which is governed by deterministic causal laws, at least in Kant’s framework? We partly answered this question and should add that we adopt Allison’s two-aspect interpretation of transcendental idealism. There are “two ’standpoints’ or ’points of view’ from which actions can be considered (one involving causal determination and the other not)” [9] (p. 73). From the first point of view, we ourselves are appearances and therefore subject to immutable deterministic laws of nature. From the other point of view, we are things in themselves (intelligible entities) to which laws of nature do not apply. As such, as we have already said, causality based on freedom can be ascribed to us without contradiction.

On the practical “concept of freedom […] are based unconditional practical laws, which are called moral” [6] (p. 48). However, that concept is based on freedom in a transcendental sense. If one would even want to talk about morals, politics, or any other sphere of human action, it is necessary to presuppose moral freedom, which is possible only if transcendental freedom is possible. The implementation of these practical principles proves the reality of the concept of freedom, specifically freedom in a transcendental sense, where our action, as we usually conceive it, would not be possible without the presupposition of the reality of freedom.

3.2 It is necessary to present some concepts related to Kant’s understanding of the capacities of the human mind. “The capacity for desire is the capacity to be by means of one’s representations the cause of the object of these representations” [6] (p. 40). If the determination of conduct is in the capacity for desire, then that capacity is called the capacity for doing or refraining from doing as one pleases [6] (pp. 41–42). If the capacity for doing or refraining from doing as one pleases is “joined with one’s consciousness of the capacity to bring about this object by one’s action, it is called the capacity for choice” [6] (p. 42). Will is the capacity for desire, whose determination lies in the reason of the subject; as a form of the capacity for desire, will primarily corresponds to the determination of choice for some action and not to the action in itself [6] (p. 42); if will determines choice, then it is practical reason.

Freedom is one of the characteristics of choice; it is the capacity of choice to be determined independently of sensible impulses [6] (p. 42). In other words, it “is the independence of the power of choice from necessitation by impulses of sensibility” (KdrV A534/B562) [5]. This is the negative concept of freedom of choice, whereas the positive one goes as follows: “capacity of pure reason to be of itself practical” [6] (p. 42). In order to better grasp the positive concept of freedom, we provide a clarification. Since we are interested in the practical faculty of reason, it is sufficient to limit ourselves to the following definition of reason: reason is the capacity of practical principles, that is, the lawgiving capacity [6] (p. 42), of every rational being. The positive definition of freedom is, in reality, implied by the negative definition [7] (p. 52). According to Kant, every causality presupposes some law, and thus the freedom of choice also presupposes some law [7] (p. 52). This law is not the law of nature since the focus here is on another form of causality. As it has been said before, sheer will is none other than practical reason. Therefore, the causality in question is the causality of pure reason [6] (p. 48). The freedom of choice will be none other than the choice that is determined by will, that is, the choice that acts in accordance with the laws given by reason itself. Accordingly, the “capacity of pure reason to be of itself practical” is the capacity of reason to prescribe laws to itself.6

With the aforementioned, the definition of free and animal choice can be understood without much effort. Free choice is the choice determined by pure reason, while animal choice is the one determined only by sensible impulses [6] (p. 42).

The self-lawgiving faculty of reason consists of prescribing moral law [6] (p. 48). As we have observed within the preceding parts of this paper, choice can be determined by either sensible impulses or will. It does, in some way, “not of itself conform to the pure will”, and it often contradicts it, and for this reason, this law takes the form of the imperative [6] (p. 48). Imperatives make some contingent action practically necessary, whereas practical necessity itself is reflected in the relationship between action and moral law.

3.3 We are able to understand the difference between the theory of Right and the theory of virtue by first recognizing the differences between external and internal lawgiving. External and internal lawgiving can be differentiated on the basis of the incentives that we have when we take some action in accordance with the law. “Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law” [7] (p. 13). Lawgiving prescribes some duties with which we should act in accordance. Lawgiving, which “makes an action a duty and also makes this duty the incentive, is ethical” [6] (p. 46). In contrast, lawgiving, which does not constitute an action as an incentive but allows the incentive to be something completely different from duty itself, is juridical [6] (p. 42).

In general, duties belong to ethics; however, their lawgiving is not always a part of ethics. Let us look at the following example, which presents Kant’s reasoning: Someone signed a contract to return a loan. Since a contract entails a promise to return the money, our duty is, in accordance with the contract, to return the money. We can look at this duty from two different perspectives. If the fulfillment of a promise is itself the incentive for fulfilling the promise, then that can be deemed an internal duty, and therefore that duty is prescribed by moral law. If the incentive for the fulfillment of the promise is not only the fulfillment of the promise given, but, for example, also the fear of some penalty prescribed by a positive law or something similar to this, then the duty is external, and thus can be an element of external lawgiving.

It should be taken into account that internal lawgiving makes all duties indirectly ethical [6] (p. 47). Let us make this clearer with an example. The issuance of a receipt does not have to be an element of ethical lawgiving in itself. However, if we do not issue receipts, it implies fraud, since we are bound, for example, by the very act of opening a shoe store, to issue those receipts under appropriate conditions and in accordance with the positive law that regulates trading activity. The mere fact that the action constitutes fraud, an unfulfilled promise, makes that action unacceptable in an ethical sense, and the issuing of a receipt a duty. In this way, the issuance of a receipt is an indirect ethical duty. Conversely, external lawgiving does not account for the virtue of individuals but forms instruments for the determination of choice, which are independent of my will in itself.

We discuss external (or political) freedom in some detail in the following section. For now, it is sufficient to say that it is the independence of the choice of the other that coerces it. Freedom to which juridical laws refer “can be only freedom in the external use of choice”, whereas the freedom to which ethical laws apply can be freedom in both internal and external use [6] (p. 42), that is, moral freedom. What can be said about freedom in external use? The action taken from duty is moral action, or, in other words, action in accordance with the laws of freedom. If my conduct is not determined by my will but by some external reasons, then we cannot talk about moral freedom at all. If the incentive is to return a debt because I will be punished, then there can be no discussion about moral freedom as we described it earlier in this paper, because choice is determined pathologically (by sensible impulses). Based on this, it seems that moral freedom and external (or political) freedom—which we have not yet determined precisely—are completely different things.

4. Political Freedom

4.1 What external or political freedom implies can be seen in the following quote from Kant:

Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original Right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity.

[6] (p. 63)

We have the following definition of political freedom: freedom of choice is the independence from the choice of another that coerces it. In other words, one’s choice is free—in an external sense—if it can be determined independently of the choice of others.

4.2 Right is based on the form of freedom of choice [1], that is, the fundamental principle of Right is freedom. “Right is therefore the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom” [6] (p. 56). Vuković explains how Right, according to Kant, has formal equality as its subject: “freedom which we give to others so that they themselves can take care of their own survival and happiness” [3] (p. 207).

The definition of Right has been stated, and the universal law of Right states the following: “So act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” [6] (p. 56). The first thing that can be noticed is that Right is restricted to external lawgiving. Based on this, the duties the law prescribes do not have to have duty itself as their incentive; rather, the incentive can be pathological, as explained in the previous section. Kant himself says that if we want to talk about Right and not virtue, “one may not and should not represent that law of Right as itself the incentive to action” [6] (p. 57). Additionally, the freedom that figures in this law is political.

There is an analytical relationship between the concept of Right and coercion. A wrong deed is an act that is contrary to duty [6] (p. 50). Based on the universal law of Right, it can be said that in the case of a wrong deed, the free use of another individual’s choice is restricted by my own free use of choice. In other words, one’s free use of choice is an obstacle to someone else’s free use of choice [6] (p. 57). If coercion exists that goes against one’s free use of choice and is not in accordance with universal law, then that coercion is an obstacle to the free use of choice of people under universal law, so it “is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws” [6] (p. 57).

5. Moral and Political Freedom

5.1 In this section, we clarify the relationship between moral and political freedom. The reason for this lies in one paradox, which we have already tackled before, and which we want to show is only apparent. The first thing is that moral freedom is, as Vuković says, “freedom from the animality within” [3] (p. 205). What really is the relationship between “freedom from the animality within” and freedom as independence from another’s choice that coerces? Freedom, as depicted in the second section of this paper, may not exist; we can even know that our choice is free only when we act in accordance with moral law [8] (p. 4). Therefore, there are cases where our choice is pathologically determined, yet it can still be characterized as free in an external sense. In the sphere of politics, people are free agents by assumption, and only a pathologically determined choice can endanger the freedom of choice of some other individual. Thus, if those are to some extent coextensive concepts, paradoxically, it looks as if my free choice can be an obstacle to someone else’s free choice. Furthermore, how is it possible that coercion does not limit my moral freedom? We spoke about the analytical relationship between coercion and Right. If coercion is not compatible with moral freedom, then political freedom cannot be compatible with moral freedom.

Our justification of political freedom by moral freedom lies in the following. The dignity of a rational being consists of the fact that it “obeys no law other than that which he himself at the same time gives” [7] (p. 42). One cannot have another’s consciousness as an object of one’s own consciousness—and even if one could, it would be prohibited. Therefore, for every action of another person, one cannot know if their choice is determined pathologically or by will. Furthermore, it is possible that by limiting the action of another person, one limits the realization of some act of their choice that is determined by will. By doing this, one would destroy another person’s dignity. That is unacceptable. Hence, one must act in such a way that for every act of another person for which it might be possible that it is determined by will, one assumes that it is determined by their will.

Let us repeat the previous statement in another way: one must act so that, for every act of a person that could be the result of their free choice, it is assumed to be a free act in terms of moral freedom. This is what justifies political freedom and its role in Right on the basis of moral freedom. Hence, the impossibility of the susceptibility of moral freedom—and consequently of humanity—is secured by a norm that does not take people’s motives into account but only the form of their external actions. Therefore, Kant’s theory of Right can be seen as constructed independently of his earlier works on morals, yet still in a way that makes it perfectly compatible with them.

When it comes to coercion, it exists when an individual’s action is not determined by will, and only then can it be justified. An individual who acts constantly in accordance with the law of reason cannot infringe upon the freedom of another. Conversely, one does not infringe upon another’s dignity or humanity when they act as a human rather than as an animal—that is, when their choice is pathologically determined.

This is our attempt to explain how political freedom is grounded in moral freedom, which, as a consequence, grounds Right in morality only insofar as Right is in accordance with morality.

5.2 There are interpretations that do not align with the one proposed in this paper, albeit indirectly. If moral freedom can justify political freedom, then, because they are the supreme principles, respectively, of morals and Right, morals can justify Right. Therefore, it is in accordance with Right. By the traditional interpretation of Kant’s theory of morals in The Metaphysics of Morals, the theory of morals implies a theory of Right [10] (p. 49). Therefore, the consequence of our attempt to base political freedom on moral freedom is that we advocate for the traditional interpretation of Kant’s The Metaphysics of Morals.

There are interpretations that are opposed to traditional interpretations. Willaschek states that several authors contest the traditional interpretation of the relationship between morals and Right in many ways. Some authors explain how Kant’s political philosophy can be developed without invoking morals; that is, it can be reconstructed only on the basis of the concept of external freedom as the supreme principle [10] (p. 52).7 As mentioned previously, we do not doubt this. However, this does not mean that Kant’s political philosophy is not based, or that it cannot be based, on his theory of morals.

The second type of critique of the traditional interpretation advocated by Wood goes as follows: Right is not based on morals, since the universal law of Right, in Kant’s words, is an analytical principle [11] (p. 7). This claim is in itself dubious. Because the concept of Right is based on analytical principles, that theory cannot be truly informative. However, the universal law of Right—so act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law—effectively becomes a tautology, but only when it is presupposed that political freedom is to some extent coextensive with moral freedom. Namely, the free use of one’s choice must coexist with the freedom of anyone’s choice. If one’s choice were to constrain that of others, it would undermine their dignity and therefore could not be free. Kant’s concept of analytical propositions is not as simple as our modern concept of tautology, but if we say that the concept of moral freedom extends to the concept of political freedom, then the universal law of Right is analytical. In that sense, it seems to us that this critique does not achieve its end.

The substantive critique, which is also upheld by Willaschek, consists of the following: How is it possible to justify coercion from the standpoint of morals [10] (p. 52)? We cannot provide a better justification for the application of coercion than the one already offered.

If it is not possible to justify coercion, then morals and Right are mutually exclusive. The impossibility of justifying coercion may arise in two distinct ways: either coercion is morally indifferent, or it is forbidden. In the first case, the theory of morals can coexist with the theory of Right, but Right cannot follow from morals for the following reason: the universal law would first have to be justified by the theory of morals; since it is a fundamental principle of Right, and since there is an analytical relationship between Right and coercion, if coercion is morally indifferent, then Right must also be morally indifferent. Therefore, if the first disjunct holds, Willaschek’s critique of the traditional interpretation is successful. If coercion is forbidden, then every attempt to combine Right and morals must result in a contradiction. Not only does the theory of morals not prove the theory of Right, but it proves its negation. This can have extremely detrimental consequences for Kant’s practical philosophy, and partly for his philosophy as a whole. This consequence could be reflected in the fact that Kant’s system would be inconsistent; therefore, if we want to assert everything except for his theory of Right, we must reject that theory. Thus, if the second disjunct holds, Willaschek is right.

Taking these critiques of the traditional interpretation into account, we considered the relationship between moral freedom and political freedom as well. They, in the worst-case scenario, suggest that Kant’s system might be inconsistent. However, on the basis of our justification of political freedom by moral freedom, there should be no concern that a contradiction will appear.

6. Conclusions

In this paper, we revisited Kant’s conception of political freedom while defending the thesis that political freedom is based on moral freedom. In the fourth section, we saw that the question of the compatibility of these two aspects of freedom is not simple and that it can be contested by challenging the relationship of certain parts of Kant’s practical philosophy. It is important to note that the result of our interpretation of political freedom is a metaphysical grounding of political freedom, a grounding in freedom in the transcendental sense. As it is metaphysical, the laws of freedom—which are none other than moral laws—can be discovered a priori; therefore, they have a universal and necessary validity for all rational beings, unlike some other political theories that derive their principles from experience, referring, for instance, to the notion of happiness. Because of its empirical origin, the concept of happiness is vague and contingent, and thus cannot serve as a basis for universal lawgiving. Kant’s attempt to ground a system of law so that its universal and necessary validity can be asserted is, in our opinion, successful, as far as it can be presented in this paper.