Conditionality (idappaccayatā) in the Pāli Discourses of the Buddha
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsThis is a well argued paper on a topic that is under-researched. I think the conclusions drawn are plausible and compelling. Another question worth considering is how causality connects to the interpretation of conditionality you offer, especially of one takes into consideration the problems of a counterfactual analysis of causality.
Author Response
Comment 1: This is a well argued paper on a topic that is under-researched. I think the conclusions drawn are plausible and compelling.
Reply: I'm thankful to the reviewer for their comments on my paper. While I made several improvement to the revised version, I do not think that in this same paper I can also address the further issue of counterfactuals without making the paper too long.
Reviewer 2 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsReview of “Conditionality (idappaccayatā) in the Pāli Discourses of the Buddha”
This article offers an interesting and in many ways illuminating discussion of dependent-origination (DO) in early Buddhism (so long as the Pali texts represent this tradition). It suggests that the logic of dependent-origination is not a causal, linear and diachronic one, but more a synthetic and synchronic process of affordance between a network of conditions that become available and thereby afford the possibility of a generation of an effect, which is never fully detached from its conditioning factors. The approach touches on real aspects of this seminal Buddhist theory and helps develop an understanding of them, which resonate with different approaches within the tradition, including in Abhidhamma (ideally, the latter would be discussed, but it is probably beyond the scope of the article). I am thus sympathetic to this study and see it as a promising contribution. However, as it stands, the article suffers from a number of shortcomings, and there is much work to be done that help it improve. Thus, the article should be revised in line with the following suggestions, and resubmitted again for consideration, in order to be strengthened and developed, but also in order to eliminate a number of weaknesses.
Parts of the article are more convincing than others, and generally, there is not enough textual discussion to leave me in a place where I can fully accept its interpretation. When texts are discussed, they are over-interpreted to say far more than they actually do. This is especially true in relation to the Upanisā-sutta, which is discussed in the first section that suggests that DO works according to a systemic, rather than a linear, logic so that conditions form a web or a network. This text thus provides the basis for later analyses, and is part of a section that the author assumes is less controversial. Quite simply, this text very clearly posits a linear sequence, based on other such linear sequences – as in the description of liberation that the first part is based on, or the later inclusion of the 12 links. The author’s systematic interpretation of DO is compelling, but here is simply unconvincing so long as it is based on the text. Rather, if the author was clear that s/he is offering an interpretation, as s/he is in relation to the first 6 links of this text discussed on page 6 (beginning with line 222), the reading becomes much more cogent. The author should be clear about offering an interpretation of the Upanisā-sutta (the idea of Upaniṣad is intriguing here; see Smith’s classic work on Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual and Religion), rather than claiming that his/her ideas are simply what the text says. That is, it is true that “It is hard to impose on them a strict diachronic ordering” (line 234). Yet, this is the way the text expresses itself, at least in a literal way.
Here the inclusion of the 12 links, in fact 11, as link 12 is replaced by dukkha in order to fit the sequence, is better explained as textual creativity, along the lines of Shulman’s play of formulas (esp. his 2021 monograph), or, if the author prefers, according to Anālayo’s theory of errors in Buddhist orality (esp. his 2022 monograph, although scholars seem suspicious of this position, as in Allon’s 2021 monograph, ch. 5, or Gethin’s recent review of all 3 works – playing with formulas, recently published in Indo-Iranian Journal). Thus, there is no need to explain how ignorance conditions (or causes) liberation, etc., a digression that is unnecessary and quite confusing, and which should simply be omitted. Rather, it would be more fruitful to see this inclusion of the 12 links as an expression of the basic principle of conditionality that the authors of the text are referring to, which works in many ways that for whoever edited or composed this text seem to fit well together. Perhaps, this idea of textual creativity can also connect to the more general point that the author is trying to make, as it seems to support the notion that there are many forms of conditionality that are active, and they do not really reduce to strict sequences. The author’s interesting case for “a certain progression in which several realizations build momentum in a symphonic way” (275) should be brought out more gently, without forcing the texts to say what they do not.
Regarding this section, AN 10.61,62 seems to me better suited to bringing out the understanding of the web of conditions than the upanisā-sutta. Also, the water simile seems rather linear as well - at least when one reads it for what it says. However, the interpretation of it makes great sense as a network that works in many directions, which supports what the author is suggesting. More careful analysis of this idea would be highly compelling, and would suggest that systematic and multidirectional flow of conditionality that the author is interested in provides a better interpretation for this simile.
To be completely clear, the author should be clear that this article is offering an interpretation that better suits the insight of DO. This helps us move into the next section, which is more philosophical, but which again does not fully live up to its promise. If the article were construed as an interpretation that would make better sense of the materials, one that is philosophically aware of questions regarding causality that are active also in Western philosophy, and showing how the Buddhist texts articulate a position in this domain, we would be driven to accept the author’s position. Since the article aims to make a more systematic point regarding the nature of causality, and the author seems to be knowledgeable of such discussions, we should be introduced in a more informative manner to problems in understanding causality as these are conceived in Western philosophy. A comprehensive survey would surely be tiresome, but a more solid introduction would be helpful, perhaps using a small number of sources to show us what the problem is.
In relation to earlier scholarship, another place in which the article is less strong, is in basing its discussion mainly on works by Buddhist practitioners. A greater survey of academic scholarship on Buddhism would be helpful, even if only acknowledging and referencing the (linear, causal, analytic) views that the author sets out to balance or correct. Here, a good footnote would be enough.
In this section on causality, I am also not fully convinced by the author’s interpretation. Specifically, causality seems to me to be a big part of the logic of dependent-origination. The basic idea that when conditions are present – and even more so, when only one condition listed in the classic sequence of the 12 links is activated – the effect necessarily arises. And indeed, it arises or originates, as the Buddha emphasizes so strongly in his moment of understanding – samudayo samudyo (Nidāna-saṃyutta #65), described as an important realization on his path to awakening (this need not be taken as history, but is significant a narrative voice nonetheless). This means that the effect is a new phenomenon, that is generated through the impulse of the previous link in the sequence, and the two do seem to be distinct. The necessity of the event requires us to think also of an idea of causation. As the author argues (417) – “Causality, instead, aims at uncovering an order in the succession of events, possibly for the sake of foreseeing or even manipulating them.” This possibility for manipulation seems to me integral to the idea of DO.
A more balanced position seems to me that rather than denying the causal logic completely, it would be better to remain with the point that is articulated early on that causality is one form of conditionality, which does not capture the full meaning of DO and has been over-emphasized in scholarship. The author allows for determination (note 3), but not for causation, which seems odd.
In this context, the statement in the paragraph that begins on line 420, seems to me plainly wrong (!) when s/he suggests that a causal or linear sequence “…is ultimately misleading, since ‘thirst’ is not something that can occur (or not occur) in its own right. ‘Thirst’ is a conditioned condition itself and thus always co-occurs together with its conditioning condition (feeling, and so forth).“ This statement flies in the face of the vast majority of texts on conditionality. There is surely a distinction between the events described by DA, and they do not reduce to a mere co-occurence. There is also a temporal sequence between them. This means that the author is assuming far too much, when he posits his position as a self-evident truth. Rather, the whole point is to argue for it.
The case must be built more carefully. The interrelation between viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa, adduced in certain texts and classically in the Dīgha Nikāya’s Mahā-nidāna-sutta, makes an interesting argument in the direction that the author wishes to move in. However, again, the case that this is a general principle must be made, and probably here too offered as an interpretation that makes philosophical, psychological and practical sense. The point is made in a more convincing manner later, when the authors says that “However, if the bearer of the inherent property is necessarily a conditioned content (per hypothesis, and as discussed further below), it is unclear how a conditioned reality can possess inherent properties at all” (556-558). This can surely be offered as a legitimate and compelling interpretation of DA, and especially when it is situated within broader questions on causality that have opened up over the last few pages. Yet the argumentation must be advanced and the position built in a manner that one can accept on each step of the way.
Part of the missing argumentation can be found in the third section, which although the author is concerned it may be more difficult to accept, is actually a place where s/he both grounds the analysis in a central textual passage - the general formulation of DA, and at the same times offers compelling argumentation that supports his/her position. However, here, the author clothes his argument it technical garb, which is helpful to an extent, but overly obscures the more simple point of the co-occurrence of conditions. In fact, this point could be thought to be expressed, or at the very least hinted at, by the formation imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti (when this is, that is) itself. At the same time, I do not agree that this passage precludes the diachronic interpretation in the way the author seems to believe. Rather, as with causality and conditionality, the diachronic aspect should be seen as a mode of a broader pattern of conditionality that includes both synchronic and diachronic modes.
In this section, the author should notice that the interpretation offered for samudaya-vaya-dhamma (beginning 777) is at best a remote possibility, but more likely an unconvincing construction of the compound, which in fact is samudaya-vaya-dhamma-anupassī. The author should take this as an example for how not to argue. After samudaya-dhamma-anupassī, observing the quality/fact/phenomena of arising (in the body etc.), and vaya-dhamma-anupassī – observing the fact of fading away, their combination is not, at least not straightforwardly, “the reality of fading away in the originating.” If, by this stage, the author was clearer in offering an interpretation, or perhaps a philosophical re-construction (and I mean philosophical not only as argumentation, but also as serious engagement with the material that could make practical sense), it could have been suggested that the meaning offered can be taken as one level of meaning embedded within the compound. In fact, as an identification of a certain level of meaning that may be active in this passage, the reading offered is quite interesting, and perhaps even a full reading of the refrain of the sati-paṭṭhāna could make sense here, to see that it becomes more interesting and vibrant when such ideas are taken into account. Yet evidently, this would not be offered as the one correct translation, but as a layer of meaning found in the text. That is to say, that I like where this analysis leads to, as in lines 817-872 – “Instead, for someone who sees cessation within whatever arises, appropriation and grasping become impossible, and ignorance disappears.” Yet the analysis does not take me there in a reliable enough manner.
I should also add that for my tastes there is too much of a romantic scent of an idealized liberation that the texts clearly express and that the Buddha and his disciples realized. It is not that I doubt the serious practice and profound experiences that the Buddhist teachings can lead to. Yet the texts negotiate this space, strive to articulate it, and have trouble doing so, perhaps precisely since the image of one final liberation as a final end game is misleading. It is misleading especially if the rich and sensitive understanding of conditionality that the author is trying to bring out is true. Is this utter peace, or a deep mode of peace with different intensities and qualities? I would think the latter, and it seems to me that the author’s discussion of this issue before the conclusion fits such an approach better.
That is to say that I like where this article is going and what it is trying to do. There is not only logic to this but also beauty and a deep expression of Buddhist vision. However, the article must improve in its argumentation and in the way it makes its point in order to be published. I very much hope that a reconstruction, trimming, and in certain places elaboration, will take place, to bring this rich analysis to the level it deserves.
Notice the typo “leads requires” on line 849
And weariness as a translation of nibbidā is perplexing.
Author Response
Comment 1: Parts of the article are more convincing than others, and generally, there is not enough textual discussion to leave me in a place where I can fully accept its interpretation. When texts are discussed, they are over-interpreted to say far more than they actually do. This is especially true in relation to the Upanisā-sutta, which is discussed in the first section that suggests that DO works according to a systemic, rather than a linear, logic so that conditions form a web or a network. This text thus provides the basis for later analyses, and is part of a section that the author assumes is less controversial. Quite simply, this text very clearly posits a linear sequence, based on other such linear sequences – as in the description of liberation that the first part is based on, or the later inclusion of the 12 links. The author’s systematic interpretation of DO is compelling, but here is simply unconvincing so long as it is based on the text. Rather, if the author was clear that s/he is offering an interpretation, as s/he is in relation to the first 6 links of this text discussed on page 6 (beginning with line 222), the reading becomes much more cogent. The author should be clear about offering an interpretation of the Upanisā-sutta (the idea of Upaniṣad is intriguing here; see Smith’s classic work on Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual and Religion), rather than claiming that his/her ideas are simply what the text says. That is, it is true that “It is hard to impose on them a strict diachronic ordering” (line 234). Yet, this is the way the text expresses itself, at least in a literal way.
Reply 1: In revising the whole of section 2 I made more explicit in my phrasing that the non-linear reading is my own interpretation.
Comment 2: Here the inclusion of the 12 links, in fact 11, as link 12 is replaced by dukkha in order to fit the sequence, is better explained as textual creativity, along the lines of Shulman’s play of formulas (esp. his 2021 monograph), or, if the author prefers, according to Anālayo’s theory of errors in Buddhist orality (esp. his 2022 monograph, although scholars seem suspicious of this position, as in Allon’s 2021 monograph, ch. 5, or Gethin’s recent review of all 3 works – playing with formulas, recently published in Indo-Iranian Journal). Thus, there is no need to explain how ignorance conditions (or causes) liberation, etc., a digression that is unnecessary and quite confusing, and which should simply be omitted.
Reply 2: In the revised version, I have omitted this passage as suggested.
Comment 3: Rather, it would be more fruitful to see this inclusion of the 12 links as an expression of the basic principle of conditionality that the authors of the text are referring to, which works in many ways that for whoever edited or composed this text seem to fit well together. Perhaps, this idea of textual creativity can also connect to the more general point that the author is trying to make, as it seems to support the notion that there are many forms of conditionality that are active, and they do not really reduce to strict sequences. The author’s interesting case for “a certain progression in which several realizations build momentum in a symphonic way” (275) should be brought out more gently, without forcing the texts to say what they do not.
Reply 3: In the revised version, I rephrased this point as suggested by the reviewer.
Comment 4: Regarding this section, AN 10.61,62 seems to me better suited to bringing out the understanding of the web of conditions than the upanisā-sutta. Also, the water simile seems rather linear as well - at least when one reads it for what it says. However, the interpretation of it makes great sense as a network that works in many directions, which supports what the author is suggesting. More careful analysis of this idea would be highly compelling, and would suggest that systematic and multidirectional flow of conditionality that the author is interested in provides a better interpretation for this simile.
Reply 4: In the revised version of section 2 I changed the order of the presentation and anticipated this discussion, as suggested by the reviewer.
Comment 5: To be completely clear, the author should be clear that this article is offering an interpretation that better suits the insight of DO.
Reply 5: This has been made clearer throughout the paper.
Comment 6: This helps us move into the next section, which is more philosophical, but which again does not fully live up to its promise. If the article were construed as an interpretation that would make better sense of the materials, one that is philosophically aware of questions regarding causality that are active also in Western philosophy, and showing how the Buddhist texts articulate a position in this domain, we would be driven to accept the author’s position. Since the article aims to make a more systematic point regarding the nature of causality, and the author seems to be knowledgeable of such discussions, we should be introduced in a more informative manner to problems in understanding causality as these are conceived in Western philosophy. A comprehensive survey would surely be tiresome, but a more solid introduction would be helpful, perhaps using a small number of sources to show us what the problem is.
Reply 6: I rewrote the introduction of this section, trying to explain better what the problem is, while taking into account the limited scope of this paper.
Comment 7: In relation to earlier scholarship, another place in which the article is less strong, is in basing its discussion mainly on works by Buddhist practitioners. A greater survey of academic scholarship on Buddhism would be helpful, even if only acknowledging and referencing the (linear, causal, analytic) views that the author sets out to balance or correct. Here, a good footnote would be enough.
Reply 7: In the introduction of section 3, I added further references as required.
Comment 8: In this section on causality, I am also not fully convinced by the author’s interpretation. Specifically, causality seems to me to be a big part of the logic of dependent-origination. The basic idea that when conditions are present – and even more so, when only one condition listed in the classic sequence of the 12 links is activated – the effect necessarily arises. And indeed, it arises or originates, as the Buddha emphasizes so strongly in his moment of understanding – samudayo samudyo (Nidāna-saṃyutta #65), described as an important realization on his path to awakening (this need not be taken as history, but is significant a narrative voice nonetheless). This means that the effect is a new phenomenon, that is generated through the impulse of the previous link in the sequence, and the two do seem to be distinct. The necessity of the event requires us to think also of an idea of causation. As the author argues (417) – “Causality, instead, aims at uncovering an order in the succession of events, possibly for the sake of foreseeing or even manipulating them.” This possibility for manipulation seems to me integral to the idea of DO.
Reply 8: I have significantly reworked section 3, I’ve removed the expressions that created issues for the reviewer and simplified my argument focusing on the differences between causation and conditionality.
Comment 9: A more balanced position seems to me that rather than denying the causal logic completely, it would be better to remain with the point that is articulated early on that causality is one form of conditionality, which does not capture the full meaning of DO and has been over-emphasized in scholarship. The author allows for determination (note 3), but not for causation, which seems odd.
Reply 9: In the revision of section 3 I’ve fully taken this comment into account.
Comment 10: In this context, the statement in the paragraph that begins on line 420, seems to me plainly wrong (!) when s/he suggests that a causal or linear sequence “…is ultimately misleading, since ‘thirst’ is not something that can occur (or not occur) in its own right. ‘Thirst’ is a conditioned condition itself and thus always co-occurs together with its conditioning condition (feeling, and so forth).“ This statement flies in the face of the vast majority of texts on conditionality. There is surely a distinction between the events described by DA, and they do not reduce to a mere co-occurence. There is also a temporal sequence between them. This means that the author is assuming far too much, when he posits his position as a self-evident truth. Rather, the whole point is to argue for it.
Reply 10: In the revised version, I have removed this paragraph.
Comment 11: The case must be built more carefully. The interrelation between viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa, adduced in certain texts and classically in the Dīgha Nikāya’s Mahā-nidāna-sutta, makes an interesting argument in the direction that the author wishes to move in. However, again, the case that this is a general principle must be made, and probably here too offered as an interpretation that makes philosophical, psychological and practical sense. The point is made in a more convincing manner later, when the authors says that “However, if the bearer of the inherent property is necessarily a conditioned content (per hypothesis, and as discussed further below), it is unclear how a conditioned reality can possess inherent properties at all” (556-558). This can surely be offered as a legitimate and compelling interpretation of DA, and especially when it is situated within broader questions on causality that have opened up over the last few pages. Yet the argumentation must be advanced and the position built in a manner that one can accept on each step of the way.
Reply 11: In the revised version I reworked my discussion in order to incorporate this suggestion.
Comment 12: Part of the missing argumentation can be found in the third section, which although the author is concerned it may be more difficult to accept, is actually a place where s/he both grounds the analysis in a central textual passage - the general formulation of DA, and at the same times offers compelling argumentation that supports his/her position. However, here, the author clothes his argument it technical garb, which is helpful to an extent, but overly obscures the more simple point of the co-occurrence of conditions. In fact, this point could be thought to be expressed, or at the very least hinted at, by the formation imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti (when this is, that is) itself. At the same time, I do not agree that this passage precludes the diachronic interpretation in the way the author seems to believe. Rather, as with causality and conditionality, the diachronic aspect should be seen as a mode of a broader pattern of conditionality that includes both synchronic and diachronic modes.
Reply 12: In the revised version, I changed the phrasing, allowing for diachronicity, while emphasizing that the synchronic reading is also entirely possible.
Comment 13: In this section, the author should notice that the interpretation offered for samudaya-vaya-dhamma (beginning 777) is at best a remote possibility, but more likely an unconvincing construction of the compound, which in fact is samudaya-vaya-dhamma-anupassī. The author should take this as an example for how not to argue. After samudaya-dhamma-anupassī, observing the quality/fact/phenomena of arising (in the body etc.), and vaya-dhamma-anupassī – observing the fact of fading away, their combination is not, at least not straightforwardly, “the reality of fading away in the originating.” If, by this stage, the author was clearer in offering an interpretation, or perhaps a philosophical re-construction (and I mean philosophical not only as argumentation, but also as serious engagement with the material that could make practical sense), it could have been suggested that the meaning offered can be taken as one level of meaning embedded within the compound. In fact, as an identification of a certain level of meaning that may be active in this passage, the reading offered is quite interesting, and perhaps even a full reading of the refrain of the sati-paṭṭhāna could make sense here, to see that it becomes more interesting and vibrant when such ideas are taken into account. Yet evidently, this would not be offered as the one correct translation, but as a layer of meaning found in the text. That is to say, that I like where this analysis leads to, as in lines 817-872 – “Instead, for someone who sees cessation within whatever arises, appropriation and grasping become impossible, and ignorance disappears.” Yet the analysis does not take me there in a reliable enough manner.
Reply 13: In the revised version I carefully flagged the suggested translation as a possibility, more than as a literal rendering of the text
Comment 14: I should also add that for my tastes there is too much of a romantic scent of an idealized liberation that the texts clearly express and that the Buddha and his disciples realized. It is not that I doubt the serious practice and profound experiences that the Buddhist teachings can lead to. Yet the texts negotiate this space, strive to articulate it, and have trouble doing so, perhaps precisely since the image of one final liberation as a final end game is misleading. It is misleading especially if the rich and sensitive understanding of conditionality that the author is trying to bring out is true. Is this utter peace, or a deep mode of peace with different intensities and qualities? I would think the latter, and it seems to me that the author’s discussion of this issue before the conclusion fits such an approach better.
Reply 14: For as much as possible, in revising the paper I tried to make the style of the paper more sober.
Comment 15: Notice the typo “leads requires” on line 849
Reply 15: I corrected the typo.
Reviewer 3 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsThis is a good paper that discusses the understanding of conditionality (idappaccayatā) in Pāli in connection with meditation.
I will only point out a few typographical errors.
Digha Nikāya>Dīgha Nikāya
fulfillment>fulfilment
upanisa is both a necessary condition (like a laccata)>upanisā is both a necessary condition (like a paccaya)
[O1]: When this is, that is (Iti imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti); >
If "Iti" is included, it would need to be translated as "thus" or something similar. However, ordinarily, "iti" would not be considered part of this sentence.
Author Response
Comment 1: I will only point out a few typographical errors.
Reply: In the revised version, I have corrected all the typographical errors.
