Conditionality (idappaccayatā) in the Pāli Discourses of the Buddha

Abstract

In the Pāli discourses of the Buddha, ‘conditioned co-origination’ (paṭicca-samuppāda) is the key insight that underpins the Buddha’s own awakening and his teaching. This paper aims to shed light on three connected aspects of conditioned co-origination: the synchronic and non-linear nature of the conditional relations it establishes, the non-causal nature of this relation, and how the whole teaching can be seen as a deepening and expansion of the Buddha’s core insight about the impermanence and uncertainty (anicca) of all conditioned phenomena, which is also central in several forms of Buddhist meditation. These three points are connected. (1) By realizing how any given experience arises out of the systematic conditional relationship among several factors, (2) the practitioner’s attention is directed to contemplate the constitutively conditional nature of phenomenal experience as a whole (instead of focusing on specific causal relations), (3) by thus becoming able to directly see that ‘whatever has the nature of arising, all of that has the nature of ceasing’ (SN 56.11), which is the key insight that unlocks the path towards nibbāna.

1. Deep and Complex

Ānanda, this conditioned co-origination is deep, and looks deep. Ānanda, not awakening to this reality, not understanding it, this generation has become confused, entangled, matted, and it does not go beyond unhappiness, misery, destruction, and rebirth.

(SN 12.60)

In the Pāli discourses of the Buddha, the teaching of paṭicca-samuppāda (‘conditioned co-origination’, often translated in English as ‘dependent arising’ or ‘dependent origination’) is the key insight that underpins the Buddha’s own awakening (e.g., SN 12.10; Ud 1.1-3).1 Conditioned co-origination provides a core pedagogic scheme on which many discourses rely, including what is considered to be the first public sermon of the Buddha, on the ‘four noble truths’ (SN 56.11, cf. AN 3.61). Despite its centrality, the teaching is never presented in a monolithic way, but it arises out of several components. Four aspects of conditioned co-origination can be discerned: (i) a relatively fixed series of individual links or items that are connected by the principle of conditioned co-origination; (ii) a general formula explicitly stating the scheme that underpins the insight of conditioned co-origination; (iii) alternative variants of the series of links considered; and (iv) similes used to illustrate how conditioned co-origination works.

The actual number of items or links involved in (i) is variable, although the most standard presentation (e.g., SN 12.1) counts twelve of them running from ignorance to death and ‘the whole mass of suffering’. Those presentations that do not identify twelve links most often include a subset of these. The general formula that presents the underpinning scheme of conditioned co-origination (ii) always appears as an introduction to the twelvefold structure as a way of making the nature of that structure more apparent. Sometimes, though, the discourses include chains of factors (iii) different from the twelve just mentioned (e.g., SN 12.23). These factors are connected by a relationship of conditionality and thus can be interpreted as instantiating variants of the same principle. In some cases, some of the twelve standard factors of conditioned co-origination receive extra discussion (like ignorance, AN 10.61, or thirst, AN 10.62) and an explanation of what sustains and supports them. These presentations also make use of two sorts of similes: the simile of ‘food’ or ‘nourishment’ used to explain how a certain factor is supported by another set of conditions, and the simile of the water cycle (from rain on top of a mountain to the overflow of rivers into the ocean), to illustrate how the whole process hangs together.

Given its importance, paṭicca-samuppāda has been subject to various interpretations. In the Theravāda commentarial tradition, this teaching has been explored as a way of accounting for the process of rebirth. In this reading, the twelve links are distributed over three lifetimes [1,2,3]. More recently, this interpretation has been challenged by Ñāṇavīra Thera [4] (p. 13–32) and Ajhan Buddhadasa [5], with the intention of vindicating the possibility of a direct contemplation and experience of conditioned co-origination in the present (see an assessment of this debate in [6]). In fact, the teaching—as it appears in the Pāli corpus—has been interpreted as a psychological model for how individual experience is shaped and constructed by various factors [7] and can also serve as a blueprint for today’s meditation practice [8]. Later, Mahāyāna traditions tended to regard conditioned co-origination as a way of expressing the universal inter-connectedness of all phenomena. However, more recent scholarship [9] takes it that the actual meaning of the teaching—at least in terms of how it was interpreted in early Mahāyāna—is to show the conceptually constructed nature of reality.2

Although it is still relatively standard to speak of conditioned co-origination as a causal principle (interpreting each link as playing the role of a cause for the subsequent factors in the series), it has been observed that what is actually at stake in paṭicca-samuppāda is not really causation (at least in its more common meaning as a factor responsible for bringing about a certain effect) but rather conditionality.

One of the first to advance this point was (once again) Ñāṇavīra Thera, who contended that ‘paṭicca-samuppāda has nothing to do with temporal succession (cause-and-effect). Precedence in paṭicca-samuppāda is structural, not temporal: paṭicca-samuppāda is not the description of a process’ [4] (p. 80). Ñāṇavīra’s view did not receive the attention it deserves, perhaps due to the relatively brief and somewhat scattered nature of his discussion of this topic.3

The non-causal reading of conditioned co-origination has received some attention. Dhivan Thomas Jones [12] (especially pp. 40–42) proposes a distinction between causes (that which is responsible for the occurrence of an effect) and conditions (any supporting factor). Causation should thus be regarded as a particular case of conditionality. In turn, the argument goes, conditioned co-origination deals mostly with conditionality rather than with causation. Along similar lines, Peter Harvey notes that ‘conditioned co-arising is about the fact that, when there has been or is “A” (among other conditions), B occurs. It is about the concomitance of phenomena and possible patterns in the arising of phenomena, whether over periods of lifetimes or as they flash in and out of existence, moment to moment’ [3] (p. 61).

This paper aims to contribute to this latter line of research by advancing three connected points. The first is that conditioned co-origination entails a systemic (rather than strictly linear) structure of conditionality. Despite the linearity suggested by the way the discourses list the factors involved, these factors are best interpreted as often forming a complex network or system in which they mutually influence each other. The second is that conditioned co-origination primarily outlines a conditional relationship rather than a causal one. While certain texts and expressions of conditioned co-origination can also be read in a causal way, I suggest that reading conditioned co-origination in conditional terms provides a better basis for understanding its role and scope within the discourses. The distinctive contribution of this paper is to provide a sustained conceptual and philosophical argument for this conditional interpretation, which so far has been lacking. The third point concerns the possibility of a synchronic, rather than diachronic, nature of the contemplation of the arising and ceasing of conditioned factors. This aspect, alluded to by Ñāṇavīra in the quote above, has been the most neglected so far. Nonetheless, synchronicity is crucial since it reveals how the contemplation of conditioned co-origination deepens and expands on the meditative contemplation of impermanence or uncertainty (anicca), aimed at unlocking the understanding of non-self (anattā), thus leading to ultimate liberation (e.g., SN 22.59).

These three points are connected. (1) By appreciating that any given experience arises out of the systematic conditional relations between several factors, (2) the practitioner’s attention is directed to contemplate the constitutively conditional nature of phenomenal experience as a whole (instead of focusing on specific causal relations), (3) by thus becoming able to directly see that ‘whatever has the nature of arising, all of that has the nature of ceasing’ (SN 56.11), which is the key insight that unlocks the path towards nibbāna. For clarity’s sake, the following discussion addresses these points in turn by first reflecting on the systemic (rather than linear) nature of conditionality, then addressing the conditional (rather than causal) nature of the relationship that binds the various links, and finally reflecting on the synchronic (rather than diachronic) way of contemplating these relations.

2. Systemicity

The way in which the discourses introduce the various links connected by the principle of conditioned co-origination often suggests a linear relationship between them simply because the various links are presented as a list of factors (e.g., SN 12.1). While a certain linearity cannot be completely avoided, the relationships among the various links can also be interpreted from a more systemic perspective.4

Let me start with an interesting case offered by two twin discourses on ignorance and thirst (AN 10.61 and 10.62) in which the twelvefold formula is expanded. For brevity’s sake, only the first will be considered here. The beginning of this discourse illustrates how the Buddha distinguishes between a potentially causal story about the ‘origin’ of something (a story that might go backward indefinitely) and a story about what ‘sustains’ something and what its supporting conditions are. This latter account is very much relevant for practical purposes. Regardless of what the origin of ignorance is, if ignorance needs a certain set of conditions to sustain itself, then removing or interfering with those conditions will allow one to undermine ignorance itself. The practical purpose and focus of this discourse are further illustrated by the actual links that the Buddha mentions. They are presented in a linear way, but in this case, as a food chain, in which each component is the nourishment for the next. Ignorance is nourished by the five hindrances, which are nourished by the three kinds of misconduct, which is nourished by non-restraint, which is nourished by lack of recollectedness (sati), which is nourished by unwise attention, which is nourished by lack of faith, which is nourished by not hearing the good teaching, which is nourished by not associating with good persons.

Arguably, these conditions do not form a purely linear sequential chain. Instead, they can be interpreted as mutually conditioning factors that together steer one’s life and understanding in a certain way (towards ignorance). Previous factors remain operative and resonate with subsequent factors, even if they are not directly or proximately connected in the sequential list provided in the discourse. The simile of nourishment, in fact, suggests a certain temporal overlapping, as the act of taking food provides sustenance not only for a moment but for a certain (prolonged) time period during which further actions can take place. Notice also that most of these factors are directly connected with meditative practice (like the five hindrances, recollectedness, and attention). Hence, the discourse also provides an account of how a certain (wrong) practice works to nourish and sustain ignorance (regardless of what the first cause of ignorance might be). Again, these practices are not usually performed sequentially, and even when they are activated in a certain order, the practitioner aims to combine them. For instance, abandoning the hindrances surely reinforces recollectedness, but once recollectedness is established, this does not mean that one gives up on preventing hindrances from arising again in the future, which is, in fact, part of the right recollection of the hindrances (MN 10). In its positive sequence, the lacking factors are replaced by their fulfillment (lack of faith becomes fullness of faith), while the inherently wrong factors are replaced by their positive counterpart (the hindrances are replaced by the awakening factors). In this way, the discourse accounts for how right practice can starve ignorance, deprive it of its nourishment, and thus bring it to an end. But once again, this entails that the whole process is aimed at building momentum, which requires a number of factors to progressively coordinate and even coalesce together (for instance, it would be odd to imagine that the awakening factors are dismissed altogether once freedom is achieved).

To illustrate how this process works, the discourse introduces the simile of the water cycle (mentioned also at the end of the Upanisā-sutta, SN 12.23, and repeated in the twin discourse AN 10.62):

Mendicants, suppose that it rains heavily on the top of a mountain. The water flows down along the slope and makes full (paripūreti) the clefts, the gullies and creeks of the mountain. When these are full, they make full the springs; when these are full, they make full the streams; when these are full, they make full the rivers; when these are full, they make full the great expanses of water and the great ocean; in this way, the great expanses of water and the great ocean are nourished (āhāro) and are made full.

(AN 10.61)

This passage combines the simile of food and the simile of the water cycle. The simile of food by itself is often used in the discourses to indicate the supporting conditions of something. For instance, unwise attention is the food of the hindrances, while wise attention is the food of the awakening factors (SN 46.2). The simile of the water cycle expands the scope of the simile of food by giving it a broader perspective. In fact, it shifts the perspective from a dyadic relationship between just two elements (the food and what is nourished by it) and encompasses a whole system that is underpinned by that relationship. The water cycle can also be used to further deepen the understanding of conditionality, which can thus be further spelled out in terms of a ‘coordination’ between different but mutually co-conditioning elements.

Following this intuition, the links involved in conditioned co-origination are best understood as the items that constitute a conditional system. Each item is relatively independent from the others in terms of causes that lead to its own arising in the system. Nonetheless, each factor has a precise function in the sustaining of the whole system. Taking this simile a step further, one might even compare this system to an ecosystem. Birds are not caused by trees; lakes are not caused by rocks. Nonetheless, each item in the ecosystem is coordinated with the others in such a way that changes in one item have consequences for the others. This coordination entails feedback loops: with the change of a dependent condition, the whole ecosystem is changed, which in turn affects how its constituent items change.

The simile of the water cycle brings attention to two ways in which this conditional system works: by focusing on the presence (their being there) of certain elements and their amplification (their increase or decrease of intensity, being more or less ‘full’). This twofold division is very common in the discourses, which often investigate whether something is present or absent and how it can grow or decrease (again, see examples in the fourth domain of the Satipatṭhāna-sutta, MN 10, or in the standard account of ‘right effort’, e.g., SN 45.8). Presence does not entail growth, and growth does not ensure continued presence in the future. However, the same link can be responsible for both the presence and growth of a link that depends on it, in a way similar to that in which taking food is both what sustains one’s life and what contributes to its development. In turn, development encompasses considerations about the intensity of certain phenomena or the degree or extent to which a certain link is sustaining and amplifying others. Taking little food will sustain one little; taking more food will sustain one more. Beneath a certain threshold, food is not enough to sustain a certain phenomenon, which will then fade away. In any case, by stressing the progressive and gradual way different factors affect each other and the way that momentum eventually builds or decreases, these teachings reinforce the idea that the sort of conditionality envisaged in the discourses has a non-linear and systemic structure.

This systemic interpretation suggests that while certain links can be more directly or proximately connected with certain others, eventually, they all form a quasi-organic system of conditional relations. To test this interpretation, it might be helpful to discuss a relatively non-standard and yet important example of how the principle of conditionality is extended beyond the twelvefold scheme, which is provided by the Upanisā-sutta (SN 12.23).

Here, the Buddha begins by stating that the destruction of the intoxicants (āsavānaṃ khayaṃ) is for one who knows and sees (jānato passato). Knowing and seeing are then immediately explained by using the formula about the contemplation of the five aggregates and what originates from them—an important element also included in the fourth domain of the Satipatṭhāna-sutta (MN 10). After this introduction, the Buddha explains:

Mendicants, I say that the knowledge of destruction (khayeñāṇaṃ) with regard to the destruction [of the intoxicants] is with a support (saupanisaṃ), and not without support (anupanisaṃ). Mendicants, what is the support of the knowledge of destruction? ‘Liberation’ (vimutti) should be said.

Mendicants, I say that liberation is with a support, and not without support. Mendicants, what is the support of liberation? ‘Dispassion’ (virāgo) should be said.

Mendicants, I say that dispassion is with a support, and not without support. Mendicants, what is the support of dispassion? ‘Weariness’ (nibbidā) should be said.

Mendicants, I say that weariness is with a support, and not without support. Mendicants, what is the support of weariness? ‘Seeing and knowing things according to nature’ (yathābhūtañāṇadassanan) should be said.

Mendicants, I say that seeing and knowing things according to nature is with a support, and not without support. Mendicants, what is the support of seeing and knowing things according to nature? ‘Composure’ (samādhī) should be said.

(SN 12.23)

At this point, the text continues applying the exact same pattern to a chain of factors that are usually presented as leading to composure: pleasantness (sukha), tranquility (passaddhi), enthusiasm (pīti), gladness (pāmojja), and faith (saddhā). Alongside faith, the discourse then continues by presenting the twelve links of conditioned co-origination in the reverse order from dukkha to avijjā,5 using again the same upanisā formula (instead of the more standard paccaya formula). Arrived at avijjā, the Buddha then articulates the whole sequence from avijjā back to the knowledge of destruction, presenting each link as the ‘support’ (upanisā) of the next.

The structure of conditionality is introduced with a slight terminological variation, phrased here in terms of ‘support’. The term upanisā is sometimes translated as ‘proximate cause’ (Bhikkhu Bodhi), ‘supporting condition’ (Walshe), but also as ‘prerequisite’ (Ajhan Ṭhānissaro). Both the more traditional and more recent commentators tend to regard the sequence of the Upanisā-sutta as an extension of a general principle of conditioned co-origination, which is more commonly illustrated by the standard formula linking twelve factors (see discussion in [14]). However, Jones has recently disagreed by claiming that this interpretation belongs to a later commentarial construction and was not the intended meaning of these teachings envisaged in earlier Buddhist thought.

Jones suggests that the Pāli word upanisā should be related to the Sanskrit upaniṣad meaning ‘connection’ and that the discourses show how early Buddhism appropriated this early Vedic term. He explains the following:

This suggests that the main use of the word upanisā in early Buddhism is in the specifically Buddhist formulation of the path as characterized by progressive fulfillment. In this formulation, the idea of upanisā has developed beyond the idea of a supportive condition for the sake of awakening, into the idea of a chain of conditions, such that each stage of the pat is an upanisā for the next, where an upanisā is both a necessary condition (like a paccaya) and a purpose or aim (an attha).

[15] (p. 51)

Jones thus translates upanisā as ‘precondition’ in order to emphasize both the function of an upanisā as a supporting factor for something else and as a teleological and subjective element connected with the fulfillment of a soteriological path (a feature further explored in [16]). He also claims that, especially because of this teleological and subjective element, upanisā was originally not intended to be conflated with paccaya, which (he implies) works as ‘cause or condition’ (with these terms being taken as synonymous). He writes the following:

Since these nidānas are not usually presented as purposive, nor as intentional inner states of a practitioner, the Upanisā Sutta would appear to be a somewhat experimental or rhetorical extension of the full version of the upanisā series. The extension depends on treating each paccaya (‘condition’) of the nidāna series as an upanisā, exploiting the fact that upanisā implies ‘necessary condition’.

[15] (p. 52)

However, Jones’s conclusions can be reversed. Instead of invoking the teleological and subjective nature of upanisā to distinguish this notion from the causal and conditional paccaya, one might equally realize that paccaya itself is teleological and describes the internal states of a practitioner. Although later Buddhist traditions tended to generalize the principle of conditioned co-origination, taking it as a description of the interconnectedness of all phenomena, Shulman [7] has provided a convincing case that in the early discourses, conditioned co-origination in its twelvefold structure has a primarily psychological dimension and is meant to account for how subjective experience is constructed.

Moreover, each of the links in the twelvefold formula can also be interpreted teleologically. In some cases, this is relatively straightforward. The sensory basis is a condition but also a (teleological) prerequisite for contact; there is a sensory basis for the sake of having experience, sensory stimulation. Contact is a (teleological) prerequisite of feeling; there is a sensory experience for the sake of discerning how that experience feels to those who experience it. Thirst aims at appropriation (otherwise, why does thirsting occur in the first place?), and appropriation aims at existence (otherwise, what could one appropriate?), which aims at birth (and the birth of ‘myself’ is the fulfillment and end-goal of the process of appropriating existence).

The fact that birth can be a (teleological) prerequisite for suffering and death might seem counterintuitive from an ordinary perspective, but this fits quite well the content of the first noble truth, which reveals that birth, in fact, is suffering (SN 56.11). And what would be the point of feeling pleasure or pain if they were not (teleological) prerequisites that direct thirst towards different sorts of objects? Moving beyond the twelvefold structure, one can also see that ignorance itself is a (teleological) prerequisite for fabrication and action, insofar as an ordinary person, ignoring the structure of conditioned co-origination, tries to act, control, and appropriate their experiences (which leads to the unfolding of the whole sequence). In short, if (following Jones’ remarks) one takes seriously a teleological reading of the teaching on conditionality, there is no conceptual reason not to also acknowledge a teleological element embedded in the items connected by the twelvefold formula.

This discussion leads to a significant observation. Pace Jones, the commentarial tradition seems right in regarding upanisā and paccaya as synonyms. But pace this tradition, Jones’s suggestion that upanisā is best understood as a ‘precondition’, which includes a teleological and subjective dimension, can be retained and, in fact, can be helpful in interpreting the twelve nidānas of the standard formula. By doing so, one can appreciate how the structure of conditionality sketched in these teachings reveals a system of conditions rather than a linear sequence.

Consider the first six extra links: they cover a progression that is often mentioned in the discourses (SN 22.59, for instance), which follows a thorough contemplation. As a result of this contemplation, one becomes weary of certain contents (for instance, the aggregates) and then dispassionate towards them. Consequently, one is freed, and one knows that freedom is reached, which also brings about the destruction of the intoxicants (an expression for final awakening). Contemplation leading to this result is often cultivated in the context of composure, which is praised by the Buddha because it leads one to see things according to nature (SN 22.5). Now, this progression might have some linearity, but it is also based on overlaps and mutual implications. In actual practice, it is arguably not the case that one first sees things according to nature and then, abandoning that vision, one becomes simply dispassionate, and at a later moment, abandoning dispassion, one is freed. Instead, these different factors more likely build momentum and remain co-present like overtones of experience that lead to final awakening. It is hard to impose on them a strict linear and diachronic ordering. The same applies to the cultivation of composure itself (covered by the other extra links). Enthusiasm and pleasantness are factors that shape in different ways three of the four contemplations (jhāna) that provide the standard account of right composure. Composure does not follow them (in a temporal sense); it is constituted by them (which have arguably been cultivated before the meditator actually enters the first jhāna), and its establishment, in turn, modifies their nature (for instance, in the first contemplation enthusiasm arises out of relief and then constitute composure, but in the second contemplation enthusiasm arises out of composure and constitutes the second contemplation itself). In this sense, I suggest that the links of conditioned co-origination are best interpreted not only from a linear perspective but also in a systemic sense, as creating a complex network of conditions in which multiple realizations build momentum in a symphonic way.

3. Conditionality

The teaching of conditioned co-origination is often presented as a teaching about “causation”, although it is also often noted that this causal interpretation can be problematic if it is not sufficiently nuanced.6 For instance, Bhikkhu Bodhi [14] acknowledges the difficulties entailed by a strict causal reading. Speaking about the ‘transcendental’ set of links in SN 12.23, he writes the following:

The type of causal development displayed by this progression is quite different from the pattern of blind efficient causality which involves the incidental emergence of an effect out of its causal matrix […]. What we have here is not an instance of simple, one-directional causality proceeding forward unmodified in a straight line; we have, rather, a species of teleological causality involving purpose, intelligence, and planned striving simultaneously projected towards and refracted from the aimed at effect in a process of reciprocal determination.

In this quote, Bhikkhu Bodhi adopts the terminology familiar in Western discussions of causality, which is traceable back to Aristotle’s fourfold distinction between material, formal, efficient, and final causes. He cites the insufficiency of a model based on efficient causality alone and the need to rely on final causality as well.

Discussing the principle of conditioned co-origination, Ajhan Ṭhānissaro insists on the need to interpret it as a combination of different causal chains that together form a complex network:

There are many possible ways of interpreting this formula [of conditioned co-origination], but only one does justice both to the way the formula is worded and to the complex, fluid manner in which specific examples of causal relationships are described in the [Pāli] Canon. That way is to view the formula as the interplay of two causal principles, one linear and the other synchronic, that combine to form a non-linear pattern. The linear principle—taking [1.b] and [2.b] as a pair—connects events, rather than objects, over time; the synchronic principle—[1.a] and [2.a]—connects objects and events in the present moment. The two principles intersect, so that any given event is influenced by two sets of conditions: input acting from the past and input acting from the present. Although each principle seems simple, the fact that they interact makes their consequences very complex.

[19] (p. 24)

It is clear from this quote that Ajhan Ṭhānissaro regards conditioned co-origination as a “causal” principle and that one part of it directly entails a form of linear, diachronic causality.

More critical of this causal reading is Ñāṇamoli [20] (pp. 30–31), who argues that “Paṭiccasamuppāda is a principle of timeless dependence, i.e., existential superimposition. With the presence of one thing, the other thing is simultaneously present, too.” Ñāṇamoli’s observation draws from a more complex discussion ([4], pp. 106–127) about the structure of immediate and reflexive experience.

If we are open to understanding conditioned co-origination in a systemic way, then interpreting it in causal terms becomes more difficult. The notion of causality has an immensely rich philosophical history, both in the West and in the East, which I cannot go into here (but see, for instance, [9,21]). However, when we talk about A causing B, we make two basic assumptions about (i) some sort of priority (explanatory, ontological, or temporal) of A over B (in other words, we assume causation is an asymmetrical relationship); and (ii) some ground in virtue of which A causes B (in other words, we assume causation is a grounded relationship). In what follows, I will argue that these two assumptions sit uneasily with the way in which the discourses present conditioned co-origination. The alternative I propose is to distinguish “causality” (understood as an asymmetrical and grounded relation) from “conditionality” (understood as a symmetrical and ungrounded relation).7 I will then suggest to call “conditionality” the kind of relationship that is at stake in the teaching of conditioned co-origination.

To begin with, it is worth noting that conditionality and causality are ways of expressing something more than a mere accidental co-occurrence between different factors (things, events, or anything else). The co-occurrence between A and B is the sheer fact that A and B can be observed in the same moment, but it does not entail anything further about them or their possible relation. Conditionality and causality are ways of spelling out this relation, which, in turn, has consequences for how we understand the nature of those relata. Both conditionality and causality express something stronger than mere co-occurrence. That is, both establish a sort of counterfactual dependence: if this had not occurred, then that would not have been obtained.8 Within this shared domain, though, causality and conditionality work differently.

(i) Causality is an asymmetrical relationship that implies a kind of priority of the cause over the effect. This priority can be spelled out either in temporal terms (the cause is prior in time with respect to the effect) or in more logical or metaphysical terms (the cause is the ground of the effect or the condition in virtue of which the effect obtains). Neither of these options works for conditionality. Consider temporal priority. This entails that there is a certain ordered succession of moments of time within which the cause occupies a certain position (say that the cause occurs at moment t₁) while the effect occupies another position downstream (say that the effect occurs at moment t₂). If this is so, then when the cause is present, the effect is not yet present, and when the cause is no longer present, the effect is still present. However, as discussed in greater detail in the next section, the formulation of conditioned co-origination in the discourses does not seem to suggest or entail this form of diachronicity. Rather, it implies that ‘when this is, that is’, arguably suggesting synchronicity between conditioning and conditioned conditions.

If one assumes that there is a moment in which both cause and effect are simultaneously present, and one wants to interpret them in causal terms, then the causal relationship cannot be understood as a temporal priority of the cause over the effect. The problem with this latter option is that non-temporal priority (however it is further spelled out) necessarily entails some form of asymmetry. If the relationship between two items is perfectly symmetrical, then each one can be prior to the other; hence, neither is actually prior to the other. But if causation entails a non-temporal priority, causation must be asymmetrical.

From a textual point of view, there is evidence in the discourses that the links of conditioned co-origination do not always show this asymmetry since several of them are considered to be both conditioning factors and conditioned factors. The most glaring example is the connection between viññāṇa and nāmarūpa since the Buddha states ‘conditioned by nāmarūpa, there is viññāṇa; conditioned by viññāṇa there is nāmarūpa’ (DN 12). A similar symmetrical relationship can also be inferred about the connection between the other links, given that (for instance) the sixfold sensory basis conditions contact, but contact in itself conditions how the sixfold sensory basis works.

(ii) Moreover, one might ask whether a conditional or causal structure is ‘well-founded’, namely, whether there is an ultimate ground upon which the whole structure rests. This ground ought not to have temporal but logical priority. However, the discourses suggest that, while the two cases are different, neither causal nor conditional structures have such an ultimate ground. In contemporary Western terminology ([23], pp. 151–245), when the absence of an ultimate ground leads to an infinite proliferation of conditions, one might say that this structure is non-well-founded ‘all the way down’. If the absence of the ground leads the structure to loop on itself, then non-well-foundedness is ‘all the way around’. There is some evidence in the discourses that causal structure can be non-well-founded ‘all the way down’, while conditional structures are non-well-founded ‘all the way around’. In both cases, the sort of logical priority and asymmetry required by the notion of causality is undermined.

In the same discourse quoted in the previous section (AN 10.61), the Buddha draws a distinction between knowing the beginning of something and knowing what sustains that phenomenon. Talking about ignorance (but a similar claim is made about thirst), the Buddha states the following:

Mendicants, a first point (purimā koṭi) of ignorance is not known, such that ‘before this there was no ignorance, but after this it comes to be’. However, Mendicants, this is said, and it is known: ‘ignorance as a that-conditionality (idappaccayā avijjā)’.

(AN 10.61)

Ignorance, the first item of the twelvefold structure of conditionality, does not have a discernible beginning point in time. The issue seems to be epistemic (i.e., about the possibility of knowing such a beginning) rather than ontological (i.e., about whether it exists or not). This might be interpreted as a way of referring to a possible causal investigation into what brings ignorance about. One might search for the cause of ignorance, understood as what is responsible for distinguishing a time before which ignorance was not present and after which it is. But the Buddha discards this sort of investigation as endless (thereby allowing for the possibility of a regress ‘all the way down’ when it comes to this inquiry).

However, he also contrasts this causal account with his own notion of ‘that-conditionality’ (the phrasing is clearly an abridged reference to conditioned co-origination). He thus acknowledges the possibility of a non-well-foundedness all the way down, but he connects it with a causal investigation and then suggests abandoning such an investigation as irrelevant for the soteriological goals of practice. What is relevant for awakening is rather an inquiry into ‘that-conditionality.’ From the discussion in section two, we can already infer that conditional systems are not well-founded since each link is grounded in the whole of the system, and no particular link acts as an ultimate ground. If non-well-foundedness ‘all the way down’ is associated with causal inquiry, and ‘that-conditionality’ also leads to non-well-foundedness but is distinguished from causality, it might be possible to infer that the sort of non-well-foundedness proper of conditionality must go ‘all the way around’, namely, it constitutes circles and feedback loops. In turn, this is consistent with the fact that some links (at least) are explicitly presented as co-conditioning one another. If this is so, then conditionality cannot be taken as an asymmetric relation, even when this asymmetry is not necessarily conceived of as temporal. But if conditionality is not asymmetric, then it cannot account for the sort of priority that a cause must have over its effect, or more generally, it should be regarded as irreducible to a causal relation.

Another way of establishing the difference between causation and conditionality in terms of their grounding is to consider whether a causal relationship can be grounded in an intrinsic or extrinsic property, by virtue of which A is the cause of B. This approach, however, does not fit with the overall orientation of the discourses.

Intrinsic properties are at odds with several places in the discourses in which the fundamental constituents of reality (the five aggregates, for instance) are denied any inherent ‘core’ (sāro, literally the heartwood of a tree) and are described as utterly empty and void (SN 22.95). From a more conceptual point of view, inherent properties are the sort of thing that are directly ruled out by the scheme of conditionality. If something is endowed with an inherent property, then there is that content of experience at least (the inherent property itself), which is not conditioned by something else. However, if the bearer of the inherent property is necessarily a conditioned content (by hypothesis and as discussed further below), it is unclear how a conditioned reality can possess inherent properties at all.

One way of understanding this claim is by distinguishing between a realm of eternal essences and a world where these essences can be actualized or not. Perhaps, in the world, there are no triangles, and if there are triangles, they depend on other conditions. However, if there is any triangle in the world, it will have three sides since it is just an inherent property of triangles to have three sides. But the discourses nowhere posit such a dichotomy between a realm of eternal essences and a world where they get actualized, and this distinction is, in fact, at odds with the account of experience as entirely conditional.

For a property to inherently belong to something, it is necessary that either the intrinsic property itself is some free-floating unconditioned element of reality that somehow sticks to this or that conditioned reality or that it inheres in an unconditioned bearer of that property. In the first case, the inherent property would just be an unconditioned element; hence, it would directly contradict conditionality. In the second case, the inherent property cannot be intrinsic because the property bearer cannot have a property in its own right and without reference to anything else (which is what ‘intrinsic property’ means) if the bearer in itself is conditioned by other conditions. If a triangle is what it is because of the way in which geometrical space is conditioned by certain lines, there is no unconditioned triangle in the first place that can inherently have the property of having three sides since triangles arise out of conditions, and their properties are subject to those same conditions.

Although taking causation as an extrinsic property might then sound more in line with the discourses, this, too, faces significant problems. Extrinsic properties need something that establishes them and imposes them upon their relata. Being extrinsic, they do not arise spontaneously from within their relata; they are imposed upon them. For this reason, extrinsic properties are often construed as the result of human and sometimes divine conventions. The discourses never suggest that causal relations might be the result of the arbitrary decision of (some) God, who freely established them. However, they also never suggest that the scheme of conditionality should be understood as the result of some human convention.

Moreover, there seems to be a conceptual reason to believe that if intrinsic properties are ruled out, extrinsic properties ought to be too. Consider the relationship of ‘property-establisher’ with respect to the establishment of a given property. For instance, take X to be what establishes that A is caused by B. Now, one can ask whether X has this property of being a ‘property-establisher’ in virtue of itself (intrinsically) or in virtue of something else (extrinsically). The first option is ruled out by the fact that there are no intrinsic properties. The second option leads to a vicious regress since the new second-order ‘property-establisher’ will be faced with the same dilemma, and since intrinsic property remains always unavailable, the establishment of properties is constantly and indefinitely deferred, which means that properties are never extrinsically established. If causation cannot be either an intrinsic property or something established by an external factor, then causation cannot be a property that things have.

These observations suggest that in presenting the teaching of conditioned co-origination, the discourses do not assume that the links covered by this teaching are connected by an asymmetrical and grounded relationship (such as causality) but rather that it involves a symmetrical and ungrounded relationship, which is also consistent with the systemic interpretation introduced in the previous section. We can further deepen this interpretation by turning to the general formula that accompanies the doctrine of conditioned co-origination.

4. Synchronicity

In some contexts, the standard list of twelve links of conditioned co-origination is prefaced by the statement of a more general principle, which underscores the basic scheme that connects the links. A close examination of this formula sheds further light on the nature of conditionality at stake in the discourses and, together with the context in which it occurs, reveals its connection with a fundamental element of early Buddhist meditation practice. The purpose of this section, then, is to add an extra layer to the interpretation presented so far by showing that if we take conditioned co-origination to be a systemic and conditional principle, then it is also possible to read the relations it establishes as not only diachronic but also synchronic, which is an important point for uncovering relevant layers of Buddhist meditative practice.

The general formula is articulated into four ordered components:

• [O1]: When this is, that is (Iti imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti);
• [O2]: With the arising of this, that arises (imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati).
• [C1]: When this is not, that is not (Imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti);
• [C2]: With the cessation of this, that ceases (imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati).

These four components are divided into two sets, one concerning origination (O) and the other cessation (C). Each of these sets is further articulated into two statements, both of which express a conditional relationship between two general items (this and that). The first statement is phrased using the verb ‘to be’ (in O1 and C1, sati is the locative present participle of atthi, ‘to be’), while the second (O2 and C2) uses ‘arising’ (uppāda) or ‘ceasing’ (nirodha). Within each of the four statements, the relationship of conditionality makes the second term the ‘conditioned condition’ (that), while the first is the ‘conditioning condition’ (this).

Consider O1. This statement targets some phenomenon that is currently appearing (‘there is that’) and then establishes that this phenomenon relies on a condition (‘only when this is present, then that is’). Hence, the function of O1 is to uncover the conditioned nature of something that appears to be present by drawing attention to the simultaneous presence of a factor that functions as its condition or support. O1 does not state how this conditioned nature is uncovered, nor why a certain conditioning condition is identified instead of another. O1 simply asserts that what is present (‘there is that’) is actually a conditioned phenomenon dependent on something else to be there. There is a sense in which O1 can be interpreted diachronically, as when, after repeated observation, one remembers the sequence between two conditions. However, the formulation of O1 is also directly open to a more synchronic reading based on two co-occurring conditions (this and that). In this sense, O1 points to a relationship of conditional dependency between two simultaneously present phenomena.

O2 takes this remark one step further and stresses the reality of A’s arising, thus moving from a present-moment contemplation of what is there (O1) to the acknowledgment that what is present depends on a form of becoming (O2). O1 entails O2. If something is present but conditioned by something else (O1), this means that its presence is not eternal and everlasting but is subject to arising (O2). Special care should be taken in interpreting what ‘arising’ means. One misleading interpretation would consist of assuming that arising has to do with some form of ontological becoming, in which some entity that was previously not existent is brought about and begins to exist. Although fairly popular, especially in Western thought, this ontological interpretation of becoming is both inherently inconsistent9 and at odds with the context of the discourses, in which ‘existence’ itself is taken to be a faulty notion (SN 12.15; see further discussion in [25]). The fact that O1 is phrased in terms of ‘being’, while O2 shifts to ‘arising’ does not entail that arising is the arising of ‘being’. Rather, ‘being’ is used to point out the presence of something in experience, and this experiential context should also inform the way in which ‘arising’ is understood, namely, as the appearance within the field of experience of something that was previously not present. Arising is not a matter of ontological becoming but rather a change in one’s field of experience, where some content that was not present now appears to be present.

However, O2 has deeper implications than simply spelling out the fact that what is conditioned must have arisen. Since O1 considers something as present, it simply acknowledges that this present content is not absolute but conditioned by some conditioning condition. Conditionality, here, seems to focus on the conditioned condition itself, leaving open the possibility that the conditioning condition might not be conditioned in its own right. O2 dispels this option by revealing that conditionality is transitive. In fact, in order for A (the conditioned condition) to arise due to B (the conditioning condition), it is necessary that B itself is conditioned and not absolute. If B was absolute, then its reality would be posited regardless of anything else, and then B would be eternally present or sempiternal. But if B is the conditioning condition of A, and A is given when B is given, that would make A eternally present and sempiternal, like B. Hence, if O1 establishes that A is really and genuinely conditioned by B, then not only must it be the case that A arises at some point (that is, there must be a point when A is not present in the field of experience, and a point after that in which A is present instead), but B must too. This is because if B did not itself arise, then it would either never be present or always be present, and the same would be true of A.10 This is what O2 spells out: from the arising of B, A arises. Hence, B must be arising (and ceasing) as well.

If one takes O1 in isolation, the sort of conditionality that it suggests might be used to split reality into two sides: conditioned conditions (that, A) and conditioning conditions (this, B). This is because O1 focuses on the experience of present-ness and does not yet include any consideration about changes in appearance. However, if one would stop here, O1 could not be maintained because unless the conditioning condition (B) is also conditioned, there would be no ground to infer that the conditioned condition (A) is conditioned at all since its presence would be absolute (if the presence of its conditioning condition is absolute too). In other words, if one observes an immutable and eternal scenario in which A and B are discerned, it would be impossible to establish that B is the condition of A because there is no possibility for A or B not to be present in that scenario (by hypothesis). Consequently, it would be impossible to establish what conditions what or whether anything conditions anything at all. From a purely speculative point of view, it might be possible to come up with an account of conditionality that is consistent with an eternalist scenario. However, in the context of the discourses, this would be an ill-conceived attempt, given that ‘eternalism’ is ruled out from the start (SN 12.15).

Every conditioned condition must have a conditioning condition, but the latter, in turn, must also be conditioned. This strongly suggests that conditionality is non-well-founded. Such a general formulation leaves it open whether conditionality goes ‘all the way around’ or ‘all the way down’, but this is an issue that can only be decided by looking at the concrete details of the conditional structure (discussed in the previous two sections). For present purposes, it is worth stressing that given the important conceptual work done by O2, it would be a misleading simplification to take O2 as a sheer rephrasing of O1. Rather, O2 performs two key functions: (i) it spells out that conditionality entails the real possibility of arising by linking the contemplation of conditionality with the contemplation of arising; and (ii) it spells out that conditionality concerns not only the conditioned condition but also its conditioning condition.

Building on this interpretation of O1 and O2, one can see how C1 and C2 present a very similar way of analyzing experience, focusing on the aspect of cessation. One way of conceiving of content as unconditioned is by assuming that it will be exempt from cessation, namely, that such content is constitutive of every possible experience, always present, and never ceases. However, C1 establishes the opposite: a certain content is not unconditioned because it is part of the experience and can cease if a certain conditioning condition ceases. A conditioned content cannot make itself a constitutive part of the experience because its being part of the experience in the first place does not depend on the content itself but on its conditioning condition. Hence, cessation is an inherent real possibility for any conditioned content. However, if cessation were, in fact, never actually experienced (that is, if a certain content never actually ceased to be part of the current experience), cessation would not be real after all. It follows that (C2) whatever is conditioned must cease at some point due to the cessation of its conditioning condition. This entails that cessation concerns not only the conditioned condition but the conditioning condition as well (for the same argument presented above), and hence, cessation is an inherent feature of all conditioning and conditioned contents of experience, through and through.

This conceptual analysis of the general formula provides a good stepping stone towards understanding how it fits into the context of early Buddhist meditation practice. On one occasion, the general formula of conditioned co-origination is introduced in the following way:

(0) Mendicants, being endowed with ten powers and four bases of self-confidence, the Realized One claims the place of the bull, roars his lion’s roar in the assemblies and sets rolling the wheel of Brahma;

(1) Such is form, such is origination (samudayo) of form, such is fading away (atthaṅgamo) of form; such is feeling, such is origination of feeling, such is fading away of feeling; such is perception, such is origination of perception, such is fading away of perception; such are coactions (saṅkhārā), such is origination of coactions, such is fading away of coactions; such is discernment (viññāṇaṃ), such is origination of discernment, such is fading away of discernment.

(2) With this being there, that is from the arising of this, that arises. With this not being there, that is not; from the cessation of this, that ceases.

(3) That is, conditioned by ignorance, there are fabrications… (SN 12.21, numbers in brackets added)

After a short introduction (0), this discourse is articulated into three main parts: (1) a contemplation of the origination and fading away in relation to the five aggregates, which is akin to the sort of contemplation included in the fourth domain covered by the Satipatṭhāna-sutta (MN 10); (2) the statement of the general formula of conditioned co-origination (commented above); (3) the standard twelvefold structure of conditioned co-origination.

Elements 1 and 2 are aimed at providing the right context for 3. This means that contemplating conditioned co-origination is deeply linked with the sort of meditative practice cultivated in the Satipatṭhāna-sutta.11 In particular, the emphasis on origination (samudayo) and fading away (atthaṅgamo) in relation to the aggregates informs the two-part structure of the general scheme of conditioned co-origination, which is, in fact, a conditioned co-arising (uppādā, synonym of samudayo) and conditioned co-cessation (nirodhā, synonym of atthaṅgamo). Taking seriously this observation, conditioned co-origination (or cessation) becomes a device or a ‘method’ (ñāya, mentioned in the opening of MN 10, as a definition of what satipatṭhāna is) aimed at observing origination and cessation. Following up on this suggestion, it would be possible to interpret the refrain of the Satipatṭhāna-sutta (in regard to the body, for instance) as saying: ‘dwells observing the reality of origination in the body, or he dwells observing the reality of fading away in the body, or he dwells observing in the body the reality of fading-away-in-the-originating’ (samudayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiṃ viharati, vayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiṃ viharati, samudayavayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiṃ viharati). While the phrase “observing in the body the reality of fading-away-in-the-originating” might not be the most literal translation of the Pāli, it can capture a relevant level of meaning, especially from the point of view of a practitioner concerned with contemplating origination and fading away, as it emphasizes the synchronicity between the two.

A strictly diachronic contemplation (in which arising and ceasing are discerned sequentially) is surely valid (and hence included also in the refrain of MN 10), but it has two main limitations. From a practical point of view, the first limitation is that it does not allow the practitioner to contemplate the arising and vanishing of those very fundamental components of experience (the five aggregates) that are required in order to have any experience at all. While one can contemplate the arising and vanishing of particular bodily acts (like in- and out-breath), one cannot directly contemplate the arising or vanishing of one’s own body as such, given that the body itself is a necessary condition for contemplation. This becomes particularly evident if one takes into account the emphasis in several discourses on contemplating death (e.g., AN 5.57), which is clearly the supreme case of ‘vanishing’, and yet which can be contemplated only while one is still alive and non-dead.

Furthermore, from a conceptual point of view, taking arising and vanishing in a sequential manner misses the connection between the fact of arising and the fact of vanishing. While one is alive, one might well conceive of the possibility of death but also regard it as only an accident, something that could happen but is not inherent in one’s own nature. However, the previous discussion of the general formula makes it clear that because a conditioned condition is subject to arising, it must also be subject to cessation. If a condition is not subject to cessation, then anything that depends on it is also not subject to cessation. In this scenario, both conditioning and conditioned conditions are thus always present, but this means (as mentioned above) they are no longer conditioned phenomena at all. In other words, in order for conditionality to hold, it must entail not only arising but also ceasing.

This is why it might be helpful for the practitioner to discern, within the experience of origination, the fact that whatever is originating will vanish and fade away. In this way, the practitioner can reach the fundamental and liberatory insight that marks the ‘opening of the Dhamma eye’ and brings the first clear glimpse of the nature of liberation, namely, ‘whatever has the nature of arising, (for) that (reason it) has the nature of ceasing’ (yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman SN 56.11).

Returning to the general formula, while cessation must occur at some point (there must be a point where a certain content is no longer within a field of experience), this occurrence is not required for C2 to be discerned. C2 concerns the ‘real possibility’ of cessation, which can be recognized and discerned as a real possibility even when cessation has not yet, as a matter of fact, occurred. One discerns that this is real because one recognizes that it is necessarily the case that this conditioned content will have to cease at some point; and yet, this can be discerned as still a possibility in the sense that, during this very moment in which contemplation unfolds, that cessation has not yet occurred (see further discussion in [25]).

The fact that cessation can be contemplated as a real possibility is key for practice. As mentioned, if one could contemplate cessation only when or after it occurred, then one would never contemplate the cessation of those constitutive elements of experience (like the five aggregates, the sixfold sensory basis, and similar) without which there is no experience at all. However, the discourses also stress that appropriation (upādāna) and self-identification concern precisely these constitutive elements of experience (e.g., SN 22.82 and 22.55), and thus, the contemplation of arising and ceasing should focus on them (as is confirmed by their inclusion in MN 10). One cannot contemplate the actual cessation of one’s own living body since this would require contemplating one’s death after having died. Nowhere do the discourses suggest that this is how one should contemplate, not even how one should contemplate death as such.12 In fact, cessation needs to be discerned before it actually occurs, and as something that is constitutive within any content of experience, as a promise that will inevitably be fulfilled at some point. Doing so, one can realize that even right now, when this content is still present, it is already as if it had already ceased since the real possibility of its cessation is a certainty, entailed by the very structure of the conditioned nature of that content.13

Seeing this, one sees that whatever originates is inherently uncertain (anicca) because it cannot sustain itself by itself nor remain present indefinitely, but it is inherently determined to cease. Whatever is subject to the inherent real possibility of cessation cannot be appropriated as ‘mine’ or ‘myself’ (anattā) because it is impossible to claim any sort of ownership or to have control of something that, by definition, can escape and vanish at any point on its own accord. Fully realizing the impossibility of appropriation is what leads to awakening (SN 22.59).

This interpretation of cessation can help solve a riddle that surrounds the early Buddhist account of embodied liberation. The Buddha (and any fully-awakened disciple) has fully realized conditioned co-origination (e.g., Ud 1.1-3) and reached the complete cessation of thirst and ignorance (SN 56.11), and yet still lives, perceives, and acts in the world (e.g., MN 121, SN 35.232). Several options have been offered to explain how this is possible.

Ñāṇavīra emphasized that the experience of cessation for the arahat is the cessation of ignorance and self-identification [4] (p. 20, and pp. 73–76). The problem with this position is that it explains what happens for the awakened one rather than explaining how that is possible, given the structure of conditionality.

In an attempt to be more specific, Ajhan Buddhadasa proposed a sort of ‘differential’ model of cessation, in which not all links ‘cease’ in the same way. He writes the following:

Nirodha, quenching, or cessation does not mean that something is completely obliterated. Instead, nirodha means that something does not perform its usual function, is unable to perform that function, or has no function. […] From the Dhamma perspective, functioning life is a basis for clinging as ‘my life’, while quenched life has no sense of ego-me.

[5] (p. 104)

The issue with this solution is that it requires one to make ad hoc distinctions between the way cessation is understood for different links. However, the discourses plainly apply the exact same terms and formulas to all the links, thus providing scant direct textual support for this model of cessation. Moreover, allowing for one link to be present without its conditioned condition arising seems to directly contradict O2 (or else, allowing a link to have ceased while its conditioning condition is still present directly contradicts C2).

A workaround to this problem has been suggested by Peter Harvey, who surmised,

The ‘that’ of the abstract formula is not a single determining cause but a major condition, one of several. It is clear that a nidāna is seen as a necessary condition for that which it conditions, but not as a necessary and sufficient condition, otherwise when a buddha or arahat experienced feeling they would inevitably experience craving, which they are beyond. Feeling can be seen as only one among the conditions for craving: a necessary condition, perhaps the predominant one, but not itself sufficient on its own to cause craving.

[3] (p. 65)

As discussed above, a non-linear reading of conditioned co-origination requires that one regard each link, taken in itself or in isolation, as a necessary but insufficient condition since each link is always part of the systematic network of conditions, which ultimately operate in tandem. However, this solution does not seem to line up well with how the structure of condition co-origination ordinarily is supposed to work. Besides the fact that the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions is not made explicit in the text of the discourses, if ignorance is only a necessary but insufficient condition for the rest of the twelvefold structure to arise, why then does that structure originate at all? More generally, positing a conditioning condition as necessary but not sufficient seems to undermine O2 (since the arising of this would no longer be sufficient for the arising of that). By contrast, if each condition can lead to the arising of its proximate conditioned condition only insofar as the whole system is taken into account (as Harvey himself suggests in the quote above), then each condition must be not only necessary but also sufficient.

A common assumption that these two accounts share is that arising and ceasing should be constructed in a sequential way. In the context of conditioned co-origination, this means that ordinary experience is based on the constant arising and renewal of the twelvefold structure, while awakening consists of its cessation. However, the previous discussion of how the conditions for cessation (C1–C2) relate to the conditions for origination (O1–O2) implies that cessation can be observed within the domain of what originates while simultaneously transforming the way that arising is understood. For someone who can discern arising only, cessation is a contingency or an accident that can be countered or resisted. This is the sign of ignorance, which reinforces appropriation and grasping. Instead, for someone who sees cessation within whatever arises, appropriation and grasping become impossible, and ignorance disappears.

Taking this suggestion one step further, it is possible to surmise that for the awakened one, while still alive, all the links of conditioned co-origination are present, but at the same time, they are all seen and understood as having ‘ceased’, namely, as inherently ungraspable and impossible to appropriate. In the case of the basic components of sentient experience (like the sentient body, the sensory basis, or feelings), all these elements arise, but being experienced as something that will cease, they are not appropriated as ‘mine’ (as Ñāṇavīra and Buddhadasa suggested). Those links that instead represent reactions to experience and lead towards clinging, identification, and suffering also emerge in their seminal form (as kilesas) but are seen from the point of view of their cessation and impermanence. That is, they are simultaneously dismissed and obliterated.14 For the Buddha or any awakened one, then, thirst, identification, and suffering have ceased not because they are no longer appearing at all but rather because the experiential context within which they arise makes it impossible for them to be appropriated, taken up, and fostered. Or, to put it in other words, the difference between the fully awakened one and the as-yet unawakened person does not lie in the fact that certain factors no longer arise but rather in the fact that (for the former) whatever arises is simultaneously seen from the point of view of its cessation. The ordinary person sees from the point of view of arising and fails to see the connection between arising and cessation. The awakened one sees everything from the point of view of the co-belonging of arising and cessation and hence cannot be deluded anymore or ignore conditioned co-origination and its implications.

To use a metaphor, both the constituent components of experience and the potential reactions to that experience continue to arise for the awakened one (which can be explained as the inertial ripening of past kamma). However, due to their seeing and understanding of conditioned co-origination, and in particular, the co-belonging of arising and cessation (which makes it impossible to sustain any identification and appropriation of anything that appears), none of these elements is taken up any longer as belonging to anybody, nor it is followed up in order to foster new actions and reactions. In a way, the awakened one is thus capable of seeing not only their past lives (e.g., MN 36) but also foreseeing what could have been their future wandering in saṃsāra. However, they can see this from a distance, namely, from that other shore of safety to which they crossed and from which they see the pointlessness in identifying and immersing themselves again in the flood of conditioned experience. This is clearly a special and hybrid condition, radically different from the ordinary ignorant state and yet also different from a pure, disembodied absence of all conditions. Nonetheless, being ‘awakened in life’ is also a hybrid condition (by definition), and thus, it should not come as a surprise that it brings together elements that seem otherwise irreconcilable and yet can appear simultaneously.

5. Conclusions

Conditioned co-origination is a core teaching attributed to the Buddha in Pāli discourses. However, despite the fact that this teaching is often articulated through the listing of connected elements, the discourses also provide clues for interpreting the relationship between these elements in a non-linear but rather systemic way. From this point of view, conditioned co-origination is not about an unfolding sequence of discrete items that succeed one another but about the constitution of a complex network of conditions, which mutually hinge upon each other.

Moreover, the relationship at stake in conditioned co-origination is best understood as a form of non-well-founded conditionality, which loops on itself and thus remains ungrounded ‘all the way around’. This conditional relationship should be distinguished from ordinary forms of causation, most importantly because it is irreducible to ideas of temporal diachronicity or logical asymmetry between the items that it connects.

In fact, conditioned co-origination relies on the simultaneity of conditioning and conditioned conditions, both in order to understand their dependency and in terms of actual meditative practice. The simultaneity between the links not only allows the practitioner to discern the conditional links in the unfolding of ordinary experience but also to arrive at an insight into the co-belonging of the arising and ceasing. This insight is crucial to undermining appropriation and self-identification, which is the soteriological goal pursued by the discourses. Seeing cessation within arising is thus presented as the first step on the ‘supramundane’ path that leads to full awakening. Full awakening can also be understood as the complete interiorization and consummation of this insight, such that for the awakened one, the arising of the whole world appears within the perception of the emptiness left by its upcoming cessation.