On Divine Rebaptism

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This is a very well-reasoned and well-written discussion that adds to the literature concerned with the semantics of proper names.  I agree that this discussion will be of interest to philosophers who work in this area.

 

My main concerns are with the stated focus on Divine Rebaptism.  First, if this is to be a discussion of interest to scholars who specialize in sacred Judeo-Christian texts, with the intent to learn what we can about the questions of identity and semantics from examples in the texts, then I wonder why the author has limited the discussion to just two examples of such rebaptisms. We also find, for instance, Jacob renamed Israel in Genesis 32:28 and Simon renamed Peter in John 1:42.  How might those texts add to the questions of identity and semantics in divine rebaptism?  

 

Perhaps the author is simply using the two name changes discussed as a vehicle to engage in philosophical issues that happen to arise in the texts in question.  That’s fine.  But then the reader needs to understand that this essay is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of what sacred texts tell us about Divine Rebaptism, in which case it loses some of its value even for Pentateuch specialists (given that the Jacob to Israel name change is in the Pentateuch).

 

This leads to the more general question of the significance of the concept of the divine in the essay.  The two name changes under discussion are examples of a deity renaming a person.  Moreover, the author does discuss in detail the significance of gradation semantics for how best to interpret the meaning of the relevant texts.  However, I was expecting to read more about the religious significance of the conclusions for those who affirm and existence and guiding knowledge of this deity than just the concluding remark that the author intends at another point to discuss the tension between gradation semantics and the necessary existence of Yhwh.

 

I believe clarifying these points would strengthen the essay.

Author Response

Thank you so much for your extremely constructive comments. I tried to account for all of them while hopefully strengthening the essay. More exactly, consider my following replies.

1. “My main concerns are with the stated focus on Divine Rebaptism.  First, if this is to be a discussion of interest to scholars who specialize in sacred Judeo-Christian texts, with the intent to learn what we can about the questions of identity and semantics from examples in the texts, then I wonder why the author has limited the discussion to just two examples of such rebaptisms. We also find, for instance, Jacob renamed Israel in Genesis 32:28 and Simon renamed Peter in John 1:42.  How might those texts add to the questions of identity and semantics in divine rebaptism?”  Thank you for bringing up these passages, which I now mentioned in lines 315-319. I tend to think that these passages raise issues similar to those of Genesis 17:5 and 17:15, that is, they also do not provide sufficient evidence for answering the identity question but indicate the pertinence of gradation semantics. Yet, as I aim to explain in lines 309 to 327, I cannot provide in a short essay, like the present one, a detailed account of Genesis 17:5 and 17:15, while also carefully handling the passages you mentioned. In other words, generality had to be somehow sacrificed.

 

2. “Perhaps the author is simply using the two name changes discussed as a vehicle to engage in philosophical issues that happen to arise in the texts in question.  That’s fine”.  As I now indicate more explicitly in lines 79 to 81, I have two aims: to use Genesis as a vehicle for handling philosophical issues and to do philosophy as a vehicle for backing up a reading of Genesis. In other words, I aim to say something pertinent to philosophers and Pentateuch specialists (or, more broadly, those interested in biblical exegesis).

 

3. “But then the reader needs to understand that this essay is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of what sacred texts tell us about Divine Rebaptism, in which case it loses some of its value even for Pentateuch specialists (given that the Jacob to Israel name change is in the Pentateuch)”. There seems to be a tension between being comprehensive and being specific insofar as an excessive focus on the former may lead to a sacrifice of the latter (and vice-versa). That is so especially when a short essay like the present one is at stake. Given so, my tactic was to focus on Genesis 17: 5 and 17:15 while seeking to be specific without losing sight that the account proposed in my essay might be applicable to several other cases of divine rebaptism, say, those of Genesis 32:28 and John 1:42. I point to this direction in lines 309 to 327.

 

4. “This leads to the more general question of the significance of the concept of the divine in the essay.  The two name changes under discussion are examples of a deity renaming a person.  Moreover, the author does discuss in detail the significance of gradation semantics for how best to interpret the meaning of the relevant texts.  However, I was expecting to read more about the religious significance of the conclusions for those who affirm and existence and guiding knowledge of this deity than just the concluding remark that the author intends at another point to discuss the tension between gradation semantics and the necessary existence of Yhwh”. As I tried to explain in my concluding remarks (lines 681 to 686), I think that the main religious significance of my essay is that it addresses a property Genesis seemly attributes to Yhwh and which has not received much attention. This is the property of being able to rebaptize persons while simultaneously making them change their contingent properties, necessary ones, essences or parts of essences.

 

Thank you again for your review.

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I am glad to have read this paper, which does seem to be the first to analyze the semantics of divine renaming.

Part of the paper concerns whether, say, Abram and Abraham are numerically identical. On the literal view, they are not, as the renaming marks a transformation into a new identity, whereas on the metaphorical reading, the identity is true, and what personal transformation occurs does not change the personal identity.

I find the case for the literal reading, where Abram and Abraham are numerically distinct, to be very lacking.

• De Pury and Hendel are quoted as supporting the literal reading, but on what grounds? And “identity” is often used to mean “a sense of self”; why think they are talking about numerical identity?
• Fertility and barrenness are suggested as necessary properties, such that a change from one to the other would change the being’s identity. But those seem like paradigmatic contingent properties. One who is barren could have been fertile. They are also temporary.
• It was suggested that if Abram and Abraham are identical, then a renaming for something trivial like a new haircut would be justified. This is not true. A change in contingent properties can be extremely important.
• Sarah is said to have given birth at 90. I take it that Abraham and Sarah’s ages did not revert to 0 when they were renamed. Had they been, Sarah’s body would have been even older when she bore a child. That they kept their ages suggests it is the same person.

So, I think the evidence as it stands supports only the metaphorical reading of a new identity.

(Side note: I am not sure why the new name must be orthographically distinct from the old. Why wouldn't a new pronunciation itself not be sufficient? E.g., Helena with emphasis on first syllable vs emphasis on second syllable. Many names, like Jean and Dana, have multiple pronunciations. In a culture with oral storytelling traditions and low literacy rates, you'd need the pronunciation difference more than the spelling one.

Part of the paper concerns the case for gradation semantics, based on the data from the renaming.

It is argued on p7 that since gradation semantics gives a better account of the biblical renaming data, that semantic theory is justified.

This seems dubious. There are countless semantic phenomena; that gradation semantics gives a good account of one of them is a frail grounding for it. The Millian non-descriptivist theory of names has given a good account of myriad semantic phenomena, and I see little reason to think it can’t do so here either.

I don’t see the relevance on p8 of the Austinian idea that some speech acts are performatives.

On p8 the author mentions the idea that the use of names should mirror what is. That is, I guess, each thing has a distinct name, and a new name means a new thing. But is there any support for this as a principle of biblical semantics?

The section on gradation semantics could be better explained, and better applied to the divine renaming. Whose theory is this? I am in philosophy of language and I am not familiar with the theory. Not sure how one name can be more flaccid than another; isn’t it all or nothing?

Author Response

Thank you very much for your very insightful remarks. I tried to account for all of them. More precisely, my replies to your more specific points run as follows.

1. “I find the case for the literal reading, where Abram and Abraham are numerically distinct, to be very lacking”. “I think the evidence as it stands supports only the metaphorical reading of a new identity”. If you were not convinced by the three reasons for the literal reading I provided in 2.3 in the previous version, I am not sure if I am able to make you change your mind. After all, in this new version, the core justification for the literal reading is still constituted by these three reasons which can be found in lines 212-214, 235-237 and 265-266, respectively. What I can do, however, is to provide replies to the reasons you gave for the stated lacking. Consider, in this regard, 2 to 5 in what follows.

 

2. “De Pury and Hendel are quoted as supporting the literal reading, but on what grounds? And “identity” is often used to mean “a sense of self”; why think they are talking about numerical identity?” My reading is that de Pury, Hendel and, more broadly, Pentateuch specialists support neither the literal nor the metaphorical reading, at least not explicitly. I indicate that in lines 54-56 as well as in lines 72-74. Indeed, as these lines also point out, I take that Pentateuch scholars do not address the distinction between these two readings. One of the motivations of the paper is the fact that it does that, while also dialoguing with the literature on philosophy of language.

 

3. “Fertility and barrenness are suggested as necessary properties [if the literal reading is embraced, if I may add], such that a change from one to the other would change the being’s identity. But those seem like paradigmatic contingent properties. One who is barren could have been fertile. They are also temporary.” I acknowledge that yours is a usual way of understanding fertility and barrenness. That is then another reason for the metaphorical reading, as I underline in lines 143-145 in aiming to account for your remark. That is not yet a factor that ultimately decides the dispute in favor of the metaphorical reading. This is because the literal reading still has the three aforementioned reasons on its behalf.

 

4. “It was suggested that if Abram and Abraham are identical, then a renaming for something trivial like a new haircut would be justified. This is not true. A change in contingent properties can be extremely important”. I agree that a change of contingent properties can be very important. I made this explicit in lines 147-149, 219-221 and 246-248. However, that does not seem to affect the thesis that a change of a contingent property is less remarkable or even less “divine” than a change of a necessary property, an essence or part of an essence.

 

5. “Sarah is said to have given birth at 90. I take it that Abraham and Sarah’s ages did not revert to 0 when they were renamed. Had they been, Sarah’s body would have been even older when she bore a child. That they kept their ages suggests it is the same person”. I agree with your point, as I made explicit in lines 195-196. This is indeed another reason for the metaphorical reading closely related to the fact that the bearers of “Abram” and “Abraham” as well as those of “Sarai” and “Sarah” seem to meet traditional conditions for identity. Overall, I think the literal reading is more likely to appeal to faithful persons, whereas the metaphorical reading is more likely to attract faithless persons.

 

6. “Side note: I am not sure why the new name must be orthographically distinct from the old. Why wouldn't a new pronunciation itself not be sufficient? E.g., Helena with emphasis on first syllable vs emphasis on second syllable. Many names, like Jean and Dana, have multiple pronunciations. In a culture with oral storytelling traditions and low literacy rates, you'd need the pronunciation difference more than the spelling one”. I agree with you. I revised the paper accordingly. See lines 9, 35-36 and 670.

 

7. “Part of the paper concerns the case for gradation semantics, based on the data from the renaming. It is argued on p7 that since gradation semantics gives a better account of the biblical renaming data, that semantic theory is justified. This seems dubious. There are countless semantic phenomena; that gradation semantics gives a good account of one of them is a frail grounding for it”. To account for this worry, I added a new paragraph. See lines 366 to 380.

 

8. “The Millian non-descriptivist theory of names has given a good account of myriad semantic phenomena, and I see little reason to think it can’t do so here either”. Insofar as my essay is at stake, the Millian view can give a good account of several semantic issues. Yet, 3.2 and 3.3 offer reasons for thinking that this view is not the most attractive vis-à-vis divine rebaptism or at least that an alternative stance (that is, gradation semantics) deserves attention insofar as it is a plausible way of handling this phenomenon, which, as you acknowledge, has not yet been discussed. For my objections to a non-descriptive account of divine rebaptism, consider, especially, lines 406-428 and 565-570.

 

9. “I don’t see the relevance on p8 of the Austinian idea that some speech acts are performatives”. I think the reference to Austin is justified due to three reasons. First, Hillers has already used Austin to interpret certain passages of the bible. Second, under the influence of Hillers, Hendel takes Genesis 17:5 to be a performative utterance. Third, as I tried to explain in lines 429-439, Hendel seems to have good reasons for doing that.

 

10. On p8 the author mentions the idea that the use of names should mirror what is. That is, I guess, each thing has a distinct name, and a new name means a new thing. But is there any support for this as a principle of biblical semantics? I aimed to back up an affirmative response in lines 408-420.

 

11. “The section on gradation semantics could be better explained, and better applied to the divine renaming. Whose theory is this? I am in philosophy of language and I am not familiar with the theory”. This is my theory or, more broadly, my picture on the semantics of proper names. This is the first time I have defended it, that is, this paper is an attempt to introduce this view in the best way I currently can. Given this situation, it is likely that improvements can be made, say, in future circumstances where I have more space.

 

12. “Not sure how one name can be more flaccid than another; isn’t it all or nothing?” I aim to back up a negative response throughout 3.3, while making a case for T3 and T4. The main idea is that a proper name can be more or less flaccid insofar as it can be more or less meaningful. To account for the worry you raised, I rearticulated the passages on flaccidity. See especially lines: 556-557 and 603-606.

Thank you again for your very insightful remarks.