Johannes Althusius: The First Federalist in Early Modern Times

Abstract

Johannes Althusius (1563–1638) was a pioneer of early modern federalism. Opposing Jean Bodin’s theory of absolute sovereignty, his theory, centered on association and symbiosis, laid the groundwork for later concepts such as associationalism, consociationalism, and the principle of subsidiarity. While his ideas have been rediscovered and reinterpreted by scholars since the 20th century, systematic research on his federalist framework, especially contrasting it with rival theories of that time, remains insufficient. This article addresses this research gap by systematically exploring Althusius’s federalism. It argues that Althusius’s covenant-based, multi-level associational/federal framework provided a counter-theory to the concept of absolute sovereignty. Systematically studying his federalism not only helps to restore his federalist ideas to their rightful place in the history of federalist thought, but also provides insights for contemporary governance paradigms struggling with modern pluralism.

1. Introduction

Johannes Althusius was a Calvinist political philosopher in the 16th and 17th centuries in Germany. He taught law and philosophy at several universities in Siegen, Germany, and began serving as the city syndic of Emden in 1604 (Hüglin 1999, p. 234). At that time, the European continent was ravaged by religious conflicts and the rise of political absolutism. The dual intolerance in religion and politics prompted Althusius to seek a form of self-governing political order. Meanwhile, the Eighty Years’ War was in full swing. The federalism of the Dutch provinces near his city was seen by Althusius as a form of resistance and alternative to the absolutism of Habsburg Spain (Hüglin 1999, pp. 16, 33). Therefore, in the preface to the third edition of his most famous work, Politica: An Abridged Translation of Politics Methodically Set Forth, and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples, Althusius (1995) claimed that this edition was a tribute to the courage and wisdom of the Dutch people.

In this book, Althusius argued that sovereignty should belong to communities and associations. The federation is a community of communities and an association of associations. He traced the origin of the federation to the Latin word “foedus,” meaning “covenant” or “pact” (Hüglin 1999, pp. 101–2), a term deeply rooted in theological and biblical connotations, implying a sacred and morally binding agreement. Through mutually beneficial agreements, associations form a “symbiosis” and thus establish the entire federation (Althusius 1995, p. 14). Unlike Jean Bodin’s concept of absolute sovereignty at the time, Althusius proposed an alternative system of non-centralized sovereignty. Smaller associations transfer some of their powers to larger associations through negotiation and agreement without losing their autonomy (Elazar 1985). This bottom-up, covenant-based, and negotiated federal idea was in stark contrast to the then-dominant political model based on the sovereign state (Aroney 2009; de Benoist 2000). This difference largely caused the European states of the time to “choose between the federalist and centralist models” (Elazar 1982, p. 2).

However, with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the subsequent rise of sovereign states as the primary actors in international politics, the theory of sovereignty seemed to dominate mainstream discussions (Hüglin 1999, p. 5; Osiander 2001). Meanwhile, Althusius’s federalist theories, which emerged during the same period, were largely forgotten (Hüglin 2013, p. 29). The story was not written by chance. Bodin, Hobbes and, later, Rousseau handed those thrones a mirror they liked: a single, shining reflection of one power, one voice, one law. Althusius, meanwhile, sketched a messier picture—power braided through towns, guilds, churches, families, across multiple covenantal associations—each strand tugging gently on the others. His vision, for all its richness, was dismissed as unrealistic—bordering on utopian. It was finally overshadowed by theories that provided a more direct philosophical foundation for the emerging statist order.

Even in later studies of federalism, Althusius’s covenant-based associational federalism was largely overlooked. In the following centuries, the success of the American federal system came to dominate discussions on federalism (Hüglin 2003, p. 276; Requejo 2011). The framers of the American federal system seemed to regard the form of associational federalism, derived from the concept of foedus, as outdated. As Riley (1976, p. 39) noted, “Alexander Hamilton thought traditional ‘foederalism’ imbecilic.” Similarly, in Madison’s view, this old understanding of federalism was a “blemish” on federalism, hindering the “national countenance of the new American Constitution” (Riley 1976, p. 39).

It was not until the late 19th century that the German jurist Otto von Gierke brought Althusius’s federalist theories back into focus (Fontaiña 2022; Skillen 1974). His pioneering work, The German Law of Associations (Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht) (Gierke 2013)—the four-volume magnum opus—was later selectively excerpted and translated into different English versions by various authors, such as Community in Historical Perspective (Gierke 2002), Political Theories of the Middle Age (Gierke 1913), and Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800 (Gierke 1934). Gierke also published a book titled Johannes Althusius and the Development of Natural Law Theory (Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorie), which was later translated into the English version as The Development of Political Theory (Gierke 2018). In these books, Gierke combined traditional Germanic contractual and corporative practices with Althusius’s federalist principles, and advocated a federal political order based on negotiation as a counterargument to the centralizing tendencies during the unification of Germany in the 19th century (Nitschke 2021). Gierke argued that Althusius’s theory could be regarded as a modern reconstruction of medieval corporatism (Gierke 1913, 2018; see also Nitschke 2021). In Gierke’s view, there was a continuous conflict between the central state and various associations (Zapała 2021, pp. 7, 11). The central state law was “Romanistic,” while the law of communities and associations was “Germanistic” (Zapała 2021, p. 9; see also Gierke 2002, p. 198). In the future, the latter would become the foundation for a new order of free federation. This distinction was seen by Hüglin (2013, p. 22) as a division between universalism and particularism, or between the universal Roman legal principles and medieval corporate legal thinking. Moreover, Gierke regarded Althusius as the true founder of social contract theory and the most staunch supporter of popular sovereignty in German political theory (Hüglin 2013, p. 31). However, this claim has been criticized by many German scholars, such as Georg Jellinek (2019), Jochen Winters (1963), Carl Joachim Friedrich (1975), and Peter Nitschke (1995a, 2021). We will address this point in more detail in a following subsection.

In 1932, several decades later, German professor Carl Joachim Friedrich revised and published a Latin edition of Althusius’s Politica, with an introduction. Despite his criticism of Gierke’s interpretation of Althusius, he still regarded Althusius as a pioneer of modern federalism and emphasized its concept of association and its Calvinist tradition (Hüglin 2013, p. 31). Friedrich and Althusius had both attended the same high school Gymnasium Philippinum in Marburg (Friedeburg 1998; Sabine 1932). Friedrich expressed concern about the prospects of democracy predicated on sovereignty, warning that it could devolve into tyranny. After the Nazis came to power in 1933, Friedrich emigrated to the United States.

In 1964, an abridged English translation of Politica by American professor Frederick Smith Carney was published. This translation (Althusius 1995) increased Althusius’s visibility in the English-speaking academic world. Through Carney’s translation, Althusius’s federalist ideas gradually attracted renewed attention from federalism scholars. His status as a pioneer of federalism has increasingly been mentioned by scholars (Baker 1993; Friesen 2005; Skillen 2000). The esteemed federalism scholar Daniel J. Elazar bestowed upon Althusius the title of “the godfather of modern federalism” (Elazar 1979, p. 1).

Another scholar who has made an outstanding contribution to the study of Althusius is the German political theorist Thomas O. Hüglin. In 1990, he published Societal Federalism: The Political Theory of Johannes Althusius (Sozietaler Föderalismus: Die Politische Theorie Des Johannes Althusius) (Hüglin 2013). He published Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World: Althusius on Community and Federalism (Hüglin 1999) in English, where he provides a detailed English language biography of Althusius and introduces his theories of federalism and association. In addition to these works, he also published numerous research articles, dedicated to integrating Althusius’s associational federal theory into broader contemporary political discussions on pluralistic coexistence and other related topics.

At present, the sovereignty state system is increasingly unable to cope with the growing complexity of social, cultural, and ethnic diversity (Kymlicka 2005). This challenge led to renewed interest in exploring alternative paradigms that can better accommodate pluralism, including but not limited to the autonomy of associations, lower level governance, and even non-state institutions. Althusius’s multi-level federalism framework based on association and covenant may offer such a federalist paradigm (Malan 2017). In the view of contemporary German political theorist Peter Nitschke, Althusius’s theory forms an organic understanding of “unity in diversity (einheit in der unterschiedlichkeit)” (Nitschke 1995a, p. 160; see also Nitschke 2002). In the words of Hüglin, it is a “united diversity (geeinter vielfalt)” (Hüglin 2013, p. 95). These resonate with Nitschke’s description of the federalists’ vision as a combination of a regulatory social order and a pluralistic, open-ended perspective (Nitschke 2007, p. 160). This perspective highlights Althusius’s relevance for enhancing modern political pluralism. Althusius’s federalism emphasizes systemic checks, non-centralization, extensive subsidiarity by distributing power across multi-layered autonomous associations, such as families, collegias, cities, and provinces. By empowering these entities, Althusius offers a robust defense against centralism, promoting a more plural political order capable of safeguarding liberty (Hüglin 1979, 1999, 2013).

Althusius’s emphasis on multi-layered covenantal association also resonates with later theorists—especially those on legal pluralism and societal constitutionalism. Angelo Golia, Jr. and Teubner’s (2021) theory of societal constitutionalism, for example, analyzes constitutional phenomena that emerge outside the state legal order, which directly links to Althusius’s social federalism and his constitutional vision of restraining power. As for legal pluralism, Althusius’s framework likewise finds resonance. Robert Cover (1983) argues that in pluralistic societies there exist various normative entities beyond the state, each generating its own normativity. Sally Engle Merry (1988) and Sally Falk Moore (1973) documented how different forms of law operate within various communities. John Griffiths (1986) proposed the distinction between “weak” and “strong” legal pluralism. It is implicitly present in Althusius’s layered associational model. In addition, contemporary discussions on global legal pluralism by scholars such as Paul Schiff Berman (2009, 2012) and Nico Krisch (2011) explore how a single act is increasingly regulated by multiple national, sub-national, transnational, and non-state regimes, as well as the benefits of multi-level governance—precisely the scenario originally envisioned by Althusius. Carol Weisbrod (2009), similarly, examines how normative conflicts between overlapping legal systems. Von Benda-Beckmannn and Von Benda-Beckmannn (2006) have also made important contributions to plural legal orders from an anthropological perspective. Although these thinkers work in different contexts, they, like Althusius, emphasize the importance of associational bonds and plurality in defending free societies. This view is likewise reflected in Henry Maine’s (1986) observation of the shift from status to contract in legal and social evolution. Or it is reflected in de Tocqueville’s (2012) insights into the role of association in American democracy, which he famously contrasted with the more centralized, less associational political culture of his motherland France.

On the other hand, Nitschke subtly points out that, contrary to the federal theory he advocates, Althusius actually, as a politician, promoted the centralization of his own rule in Emden (Nitschke 1995a, p. 170). I will partially elaborate on the reasons in Section 7. This complexity makes it difficult to clarify Althusius’s positioning, so much so that Hüglin (2013, pp. 37, 39, 44) argues that traditional political terms such as “liberal” or “despotic” are no longer suitable for accurately describing Althusius’s theory. Instead, it is necessary to focus on its associational nature and define it as “societal federalism (sozietaler föderalismus)”. The historical development of associations and societies, their relationship with natural law theory, and how they evolved into different paths of centralization and pluralism is another grand topic explored by German theorists such as Hüglin and Gierke.

Overall, exploring Althusius’s theory is not only a valuable historical study, but also of great significance in the fields of federalism research, political institutions, and political normativity. Despite the rediscovery and reinterpretations of Althusius’s work by scholars since the 20th century, a comprehensive analysis that compares his federalist principles with rival theories of his time and their contemporary relevance is still lacking. This study aims to fill this research gap. Specifically, it argues that Althusius’s covenant-based, multi-level associational federalism served as a foundational counter-theory to the then-emerging model of absolute state sovereignty. By revisiting this historical contrast, on the one hand, this study underscores the historical significance of Althusius’s thought; on the other hand, it demonstrates that, just as Hüglin’s view, Althusius’s theory represents a “constitutional connection between particular and universal political structures (konstitutionellen Verbindung von partikularer und universaler politischer)” (Hüglin 2013, p. 161), which is particularly suitable as a reflection on how contemporary governance paradigms can build inclusive communities.

2. Althusius’s Biographical Background

Johannes Althusius was born in the town of Diedenshausen, located in the historical region of Sayn-Wittgenstein (Hüglin 1999, p. 32), which is now part of North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany. In 1563, at the time of his birth, this region was an autonomous entity. Althusius began his study journey in law and philosophy at the renowned Gymnasium Philippinum in Marburg, known for its Protestant educational ethos. This same institution was later attended by Carl Joachim Friedrich, who would contribute to the revival of Althusiusian theory (Friedeburg 1998; Sabine 1932). After completing his high school education, Althusius briefly studied the works of Aristotle at the University of Cologne in 1581. Subsequently, from 1581 to 1586, he studied at the University of Basel, where he obtained his doctorate in canon and civil law (Carvajal 2020).

At Basel, Althusius not only embraced the piety of Calvinism but was also influenced by humanism (Hüglin 2013, p. 70). The renowned humanist Bonifacius Amerbach served as the rector of the University of Basel on multiple tenures. Althusius may have also met the monarchist critic and humanist Franciscus Hotomanus during his time in Basel (Scupin 1965). Additionally, Althusius was exposed to Petrus Ramus’s Dialecticae Partitiones at Basel. This work represented a new systematic ordering of traditional Aristotelian-Scholastic logic (Hüglin 2013, p. 81; Nitschke 1995a, p. 156). These influences profoundly shaped the orientation and writing style of Althusius’s later works (Scupin 1965). According to the Ramist method, Althusius, in his book, divides arguments into different sectors through the continuous subdivision of concepts. This division can be seen in the juxtaposition of secular and religious governance, as well as in the juxtaposition of responsibilities and rights within legal relationships (Gierke 2018, pp. 54–56). On the other hand, Nitschke notes that in the private and public spheres, this division appears to be merely interpretative rather than substantial (Nitschke 1995a, p. 158). One example is that, unlike Aristotle, Althusius does not emphasize the essential difference between the private household and public rule, but rather regards the household as a basic component of associational order (Nitschke 1995a, p. 158). Moreover, Nitschke argues that the Ramism employed by Althusius appears somewhat deliberately formalistic, leaving substantial interpretation to posterity in a rather arbitrary manner (Nitschke 2021, pp. 190–91). This also lays the groundwork for Nitschke’s critique of Gierke’s misunderstanding of Althusius. Other scholars have also raised questions about the ambiguity of Althusius’s Ramism approach (Hüglin 2013). However, this study argues that Althusius’s strategic use of Ramism allowed him to construct a nuanced framework, bridging seemingly distinct realms and providing foundations for his associational theory.

After obtaining his doctorate, Althusius began his academic career at the Calvinist Herborn Academy in Nassau (Hüglin 1999, p. 32; Voigt 1977, p. 152). In 1586, he was appointed as a lecturer of law, and became a full professor at the academy from 1588 onwards. The academy was founded in 1584 by Johann VI, Count of Nassau-Dillenburg, to train Reformed missionaries and gradually expanded into a center of Calvinism with the help of the Nassau family’s connections (Voigt 1977, p. 152). Its first rector was Caspar Olevian, who co-authored the Heidelberg Catechism with Zacharias Ursinus (Chmielewska 2012, p. 13). In addition to his role at Herborn, Althusius also served as a lecturer at the Calvinist Academy of Burgsteinfurt in Westphalia (Gierke 2018, p. 19).

Beyond academia, Althusius entered politics in 1597 when he was elected as a member of the Nassau County Parliament (de Benoist 2000, p. 27). In 1603, he was appointed as the municipal trustee of the city of Emden (de Benoist 2000, p. 27). In 1604, Althusius was promoted to city syndic and led the administration of Emden until his death in 1638 (Hüglin 1979, pp. 16–17). During this period, he even declined offers to serve as a professor at Leiden University and the University of Franeker (Gierke 2018, p. 20). Emden, a northern German city and a maritime hub located in the historic province of East Frisia near the Netherlands, was embroiled in a struggle against the absolutist tendencies of its regional monarch during that period. As Hüglin (1994a, p. 44) clarified, this struggle was driven by “two principal factors, religion and the economy.” Initially, it was primarily religious in nature. However, as the conflict progressed, religious concerns gradually gave way to political concerns (Hüglin 2013, p. 74). Althusius’s direct involvement in Emden’s fight for autonomy profoundly shaped his theoretical opposition to absolutism, and grounded his federalist principles in practical political resistance.

From a religious perspective, since Emden was a stronghold of Calvinism and the first city in Germany to embrace Calvinism in 1526 (Chmielewska 2012), while the ruling family was inclined towards Lutheranism, there was a dispute over the East Frisian Count’s jurisdiction over theological controversies within the province (Hüglin 1979, 1994a). Previously, Johannes à Lasco, an important Calvinist figure in the Reformation, had obtained the position of pastor of the Emden church from Anna of Oldenburg, the Regent of East Frisia. Under his active influence, the city became known as the “Geneva of the North” due to its strong Calvinist spirit (Chmielewska 2012, p. 13). From an economic standpoint, the Count’s attempts to increase taxes and transform the region into a centralized polity were resisted. The citizens of Emden were firmly committed to preserving their fiscal autonomy (Hüglin 1979, pp. 16–17).

During his leadership of Emden’s administration, Althusius played “a leading role in helping Emden wrest greater independence from the local territorial count and nobles” (Witte 2018, p. 167). He led the city in multiple confrontations with the authorities, including the “storming of the provincial chancellery” and “imprisonment of the count in his own residence” (Hüglin 1994a, p. 44). Ultimately, he redefined the relationship between the city and its superior lord, transforming the oath of allegiance “from a unilateral promise of obedience to a mutual contract” (Hüglin 1994a, p. 44; see also Hüglin 2013, p. 28). It was also during this period that he integrated his political practice into his academic thinking (Carvajal 2020). In 1603, he published his famous treatise Politica: An Abridged Translation of Politics Methodically Set Forth, and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples, which he subsequently revised and expanded in the second edition in 1610 and the third edition in 1614. In this seminal work, he articulated a federal vision of maximum autonomy at every level of political order, which became a powerful argument against centralism (Hüglin 2003; Reho 2019).

Althusius’s federal vision was also influenced by the political resistance in the neighboring Netherlands. At that time, the Protestant Republic of the Seven United Netherlands was actively rebelling against the rule of Habsburg Spain. The former’s protection of religious freedom and autonomy became, in Althusius’s eyes, a model of federal practice (Althusius 1995). Moreover, Count Johan the Elder, Althusius’s patron during his tenure at the Herborn Academy, was also “actively engaged in the Dutch Revolt” (Hüglin 1979, p. 16; see also Hüglin 2013, p. 71). This likely deepened Althusius’s firm support for the revolutionary efforts of the Netherlanders. From this perspective, in the preface to the 1614 edition of Politica, Althusius unambiguously supported the Netherlanders, praising them for their “courageous spirit” and “wisdom, fidelity, and constancy” in their uprising (Althusius 1995, pp. 10–11). He claimed to have found inspiration in the Netherlanders’ resistance, where “he could see his theory in action” (Baker 1993, p. 34). According to Althusius (1995, pp. 10–11), the Netherlanders “took away the use and exercise of them from those who abused them,” “recovered what was [their] own,” and “declared that these rights belong to the associated multitude.” Actually, the Dutch Revolt served not merely as an influence, but as a critical real-world validation of Althusius’s federal principles concerning popular rights and resistance to tyranny.

Althusius’s federal vision was also enriched by his legal studies. In 1586, Althusius published his first work, Roman Law Book Two (Iuris Romanis Libri Duo). In 1617, he expanded his legal ideas through the publication of Dicaelogica Book Three (Dicaelogicae Libri Tres). Portions of the book were translated and published as Selections from the Dicaeologicae (Althusius 2006) by Jeffrey J. Veenstra. In this book, Althusius distinguished between two categories of legal norms: positive law and natural law. Althusius developed a concept of law based on natural law (Carvajal 2014). On the other hand, this attempt is regarded as an effort to integrate public law into private law (Gierke 2018, p. 58; see also Hüglin 2013, p. 33). Gierke particularly liked to emphasize this point. Grabill (2006, p. 408) also noted that “Althusius’s concern with symbiosis” was an exploration of “the demands of natural law.” For Althusius, positive law was an extension of natural law, and an organically evolved symbiotic federal political system from the state of nature (de Benoist 2000, p. 33; Friesen 2005, p. 8). The family, based on natural blood rights (jura sanguinis), constituted the smallest unit of the symbiotic association in Althusius’s federal theory.

3. Politics, Association, and Federation

Althusius derived the etymology of the federation from the Latin word “foedus,” which means “covenant” or “agreement” (Baker 1993, p. 35; Hüglin 1999, pp. 101–2). In this context, a federation is represented as a covenantal union formed for a specific purpose. For Althusius, the process of establishing a federation, a union, which he avoided calling a state as the highest authority, is politics itself (Althusius 1995). “Politics” as the “fundamental concept” of his entire theoretical framework (de Benoist 2000, p. 30), existed based on the law of association and symbiosis (lex consociationis et symbiosis) or the right of symbiosis (jus symbioticum) (Woldring 1998). Politics and “association” are synonyms, and the result of association is federation. At the beginning of his work, Althusius declared:

“Politics is the art of associating (consociandi) men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them. Whence it is called ‘symbiotics.’ The subject matter of politics is therefore association (consociatio), in which the symbiotes pledge themselves each to the other, by explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is useful and necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life”.

(Althusius 1995, p. 12)

According to Althusius, the existence of politics presupposes the existence of society, which is regarded as a natural construct—a symbiotic relationship of common life (Elazar 1991; Hüglin 1979). For Althusius, the symbiotic nature of covenantal associations is not only the means of achieving politics but also the “only source” of power (Hüglin 1979, p. 24). The source of the ruler’s power lies with the ruled, with the purpose of pursuing the common good of all and of each individual (Friedeburg 2005; Riley 1976). Moreover, borrowing from Aristotle, Althusius argues that the goal of politics is ultimately a happy life. Specifically, it should serve the two commandments of the Decalogue: to glorify God (piety) and to practice the principle of justice towards one’s neighbor (the first and second commandments). In a certain sense, Althusius at least partially based his theoretical construction on Aristotle, regarding the theory of the purpose of the political community, the theory of mutual benefit for all in a society of division of labor, and the depiction of social life as a form of active human life (vita activa) (Hüglin 2013, p. 55). On the other hand, according to Nitschke, Althusius represents a competitive model to Aristotelianism in politics (Nitschke 1995b, p. 36). While the ruling community in the latter’s understanding exists only among privileged equals, in the former’s federal model, the ultimate decision-making power always remains with the units at the lowest level (Nitschke 1995b, p. 37). In answering what and who establishes the correct order of human communal life, Althusius proposed the theory of association as a social interaction agreement (Nitschke 2002, p. 97).

For Althusius, humans are the benevolent creations of God. Contrary to the Hobbesian notion that humans are innately competitive and hostile, Althusius envisions a “benevolent” natural inclination (Hüglin 1979, p. 21). Althusius (2006, p. 441) asserts that natural law is consistent with divine guidance, “urg[ing] people toward good and call[ing] them back from evil,” thus forming the “foundation of law” and politics. Moreover, human solitude is detrimental to their happiness. Therefore, humans are endowed with the propensity to live together and form associations. In this way, people can provide mutual support, free from the troubles of lacking necessary or useful things, participate in the art of association and form a “loving thy neighbor” paradigm (Guillard 2020, p. 363). As Althusius states:

“The final cause of politics is the enjoyment of a comfortable, useful, and happy life, and of the common welfare… The material of politics is the aggregate of precepts for communicating those things, services, and right that we bring together, each fairly and properly according to his ability, for symbiosis and the common advantage of the social life”.

(Althusius 1995, p. 19)

The subject of politics is the association formed for the sake of social life. Therefore, politics should serve to maintain social order among people and promote their harmonious development in both secular and religious affairs (Reibstein 1965). The associational result that forms this harmonious order is the federation. The philosophy that embodies this associational order is federalism.

According to Chmielewska (2012), the formation of Althusius’s associations is a combination of determinism and voluntarism. On the one hand, from the perspective of voluntarism, the associational process is based on an explicit or implicit covenant (Reibstein 1965). Members of associations come together due to common interests or goals (Scupin 1965), forming a range of societies for social, religious, educational, and commercial purposes—guilds, corporations—based on what were then called guild books (Zunftbücher). They agree on governance methods to serve the interests of the whole and of each individual. The leaders who oversee the work of the association are elected by the common consent of the members. Consent is the source of their authority. On the other hand, from the perspective of determinism, the formation of associations and federations is more an evolution of the natural state and natural law. Families based on natural blood bonds form the foundation of Althusius’s federal system. A detailed discussion of the latter is provided in the following section.

4. The Natural Foundations of Federation: The Family Unit

Althusius divides associations into two categories: public and private (Hüglin 2013, p. 150). Private associations are formed by individual members through contractual agreements (pactum), based on the provision of “necessary and useful” goods and services (Althusius 1995, p. 22). Multiple private associations come together to form a political order (politeuma), constituting a public association. The latter can be called a political association, union, or community (universitas) (Althusius 1995, p. 34). These associations then gather again, cooperating within a broader framework and uniting into a federation, that is, a community of communities (comunitas communitytatum) (Hüglin 1999, p. 61; Malan 2017, p. 8). Without private associations, other forms of association cannot be generated or sustained (Althusius 1995; Hüglin 1999).

Private associations can be further divided into natural private associations and civil private associations (Althusius 1995). Natural private associations are formed through marriage, kinship, and instinctive bonds. These associations are considered the foundational layer of all symbiotic relationships. Within the realm of natural private associations, two subtypes can be further identified: those based on kinship (propinqua) and those based on conjugal or marital relationships (conjugalis). Althusius (1995, p. 26) points out, “conjugal and kinship private association… are the seedbed of all private and public associational life.” The family unit, originating from the marital relationship, is regarded as the most fundamental component of all social relationships (Skillen 1974). In contrast, kinship is seen as a derivative of the marital relationship. The bond that unites conjugal or marital relationships is called the rights of blood (jura sanguinis). In the natural state, the formation of family structures is a natural propensity, based on natural rights of blood (Rothchild 2017). Thus, for Althusius, the most basic associational unit of federation, the family, is a generation of the natural state (Hüglin 2013, pp. 102–3), rather than a deviation from it.

For Althusius, the family is the simple and private correspondence to more complex and public forms of community (Nitschke 1995a, p. 157). The family nurtures the most fundamental political functions, including the development of wisdom, participation in communication, and the pious practice of religion. The phrase “pious practice of religion” deserves particular attention because it reveals the deep theological foundation of Althusius’s legal thought. Althusius was a Calvinist jurist who viewed natural law as God’s will set for humanity, whose true meaning must be grasped through careful study of the Bible and tradition, revelation and reason (Witte 2018). This understanding of natural law inevitably gives his legal thought a strong theological character. The political nature of these activities within the family association also endows all other associations built upon it with political characteristics (Koch 2009). In terms of state-building, the question of “foundational title” is not easily answered, as Huber (2020, p. 774) questions: “what… gives a particular set of people a special claim to… establish a state?” For Althusius, this question is not difficult to answer. It is the marital relationship based on natural right of blood, which aligns with the natural law for the legitimate establishment of a commonwealth. It should be noted that Althusius actually blends classical, biblical, Catholic, and Protestant ideas to show that many basic legal norms and practices are rooted in nature (Witte 2018). In particular, the view that marriage and the family are the foundation of society is strongly shaped by Christian doctrines and canon law on the sacredness of marriage. In discussing the Western legal tradition, canon law played a central role in shaping medieval legal thought and practice, especially in regulating marriage, family, and social bonds; even after the Reformation, its jurisprudential influence could not be fully erased (Berman 1995; Witte and Alexander 2008). Thus, Althusius’s emphasis on the family as the seedbed of all private and public communal life also reflects this insight, deeply rooted in theological and canon-law traditions.

Hüglin (1999, p. 77) accurately describes Althusius’s construction of federation as a “social process of community building,” extending from the basic “organization of the family” to the “constitution of the large commonwealth” in a layered manner. This perspective also highlights the divergence between Althusius’s theory and the theory of state sovereignty. In the theory of sovereignty, there is a clear distinction between the state and the private sphere: the state is the public domain where politics can be exercised. The private is depoliticized, “inhabited by private individuals” (McCullock 2009, p. 340). Althusius’s argument also challenges the traditional Roman law distinction between the public and private spheres (Nitschke 2000b, p. 152). In Roman law, contractual relationships are confined to the private sphere, while administrative and political affairs belong to the public sphere. However, “in [Althusius’s] Politica,” as Hüglin (1999, p. 77) points out, both the public and private spheres “are part of the political.”

On the one hand, this blurring of the line between public and private spheres, along with the extension of contractual relations into politics, has clear roots in canon law. Canon law stressed consent, contract, and corporate organization in shaping medieval legal thought and practice. Its attention to pacta and to the role of consent in forming corporate bodies (universitates or corpora) directly shaped early modern jurists’ views of social and political association and provided a legal model for voluntary political union (Tierney 1982, pp. 58–60). This influence was so widespread that even outside canon law’s jurisdiction, it molded early modern legal thinking and affected jurists such as Althusius (Seipp 1993, pp. 393–95).

On the other hand, Althusius continues the classical concept of citizenship: in ancient Athens, individuals, as singular persons, also had no direct way to participate in public political life but rather participated as private members of families, clans, or tribes (Chmielewska 2012). Private and public associations together constitute the political symbiotic whole of the multi-level federation in both direct and indirect ways (de Benoist 2000). Public associations have jurisdiction over a specific territory, while private associations do not. Despite their different functions, both are based on a common natural foundation. On this point, Althusius at least partially shares a similar view with Aquinas. Aquinas argued that the right of nations (jus gentium) originates from natural law (lex naturalis), while the civil right (jus civile) within a state is determined through a deliberative process from the same source of natural law (Pattaro 2005, p. 256). Althusius further contended that this common root is the family based on the marital relationship (Gierke 2018, p. 265).

5. Associationalism and Consociationalism

In the seventeenth century when Althusius was active, the medieval principles of governance, including governmental pluralism and overlapping centers of power, were seen by thinkers such as Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes as the main causes of the political crises in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe (Deschouwer and Poirier 2015). These thinkers proposed the establishment of centralized and absolute governance systems rather than seeking political principles that could maintain the existing pluralism (Béland and Lecours 2013). In contrast, for Althusius, the “variety of human association” was the “expression of human symbiosis” (Skillen 1974, p. 182). Althusius not only acknowledged pluralism but also regarded it as the requirement of the political community. This required the formation of a multi-level governance structure among cities, provinces, and communities such as tribes, guilds, or corporations, with the lower and smaller units retaining their autonomy (Chmielewska 2012).

In Althusius’s covenantal/associational federation, Hüglin (1994a, p. 47) observed that “smaller consociations always retained residual powers” because they only “relinquished to the larger consociation what they considered necessary.” This means that higher/bigger level associations or institutions do not completely overshadow local governance, but rather intervene only when administrative needs exceed the specific self-regulatory framework (Hüglin 2013, p. 146). With such a mechanism, “the state could never become the central focus of politics” (Hüglin 1994a, p. 47). This perspective has enduring significance because it reflects the essence of federalism, which values and maintains the autonomy and diversity of its components.

For Althusius, associations are fundamentally very different from one another. Therefore, their affairs cannot be regulated by top-down legal norms. Guilds and occupational groups primarily participate in the governance of localities, while the legislative bodies of the republic are composed of representatives from larger associations. Voluntary consent and the commitment to mutual solidarity are the driving forces behind the formation of associations (Chmielewska 2012). Treaties that promote mutually beneficial cooperation and reciprocity are the prerequisites (Hüglin 1979; Ossewaarde 2007). Within this framework, the federation, as the highest political entity—a community of communities, association of associations—derives its rights and powers from the associational units (Althusius 1995; Kincaid 1990; Skillen 1974). For Althusius, political authority does not unilaterally stem from a predestined central sovereign entity. Instead, it arises from “primarily a horizontal process of communication” (Hüglin 2003, p. 279). Specifically, power emanates from the grassroots level, from “a plurality of groups or communities which all possess their own rights and obligations” (Hüglin 2003, p. 279).

In a sense, Althusius’s theory laid the foundation for what later came to be known as associationalism. This latter was articulated by Elazar (1985, 1993a, 1997) as a narrative in opposition to the state-centered organizational model. It assumes that human freedom and well-being can be achieved through the autonomous association of individuals. In fact, Elazar did not explicitly state that the concept of associationalism originated from Althusius. His main argument was that Althusius’s federalism is based on covenantal elements. These covenants not only play an important role in modern federalism (Elazar 1980, 1993b) but also form the basis for the development of associationalism and consociationalism (Elazar 1985, 1993a, 1997). Putnam et al. (1993) in their seminal work Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, compared the civic societies and associations in northern and southern Italy and concluded that regions with a stronger associational culture are less susceptible to authoritarian rule. In Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Putnam (2000) also attributed the decline of civil society to the decline of voluntary associations.

Moreover, some scholars have noted the close connection between Lijphart’s consociationalism and Althusius’s association (Chmielewska 2012, p. 19; Hüglin 2019, p. 20; Kennedy 2019, pp. 305–6). The latter is a framework designed to prevent a majority community from achieving dominance within a polity (McCulloch 2022). Althusius described politics as a process of joint decision-making, shared distribution of wealth, services, and rights, thereby meeting the diverse needs of both individuals and the community as a whole, and maintaining a humanistic society. This mechanism is based on a consensus of shared piety and justice, as well as mutual compromise (Althusius 1995). Althusius argued that without these values, neither individuals nor society can survive. Similarly, consociationalism also represents a consensus-driven, compromise-based political structure suitable for diverse contexts (McGarry and O’Leary 2006).

Lijphart (1979) identified four core elements of consociationalism: grand coalitions, segmental autonomy, the principle of proportionality, and mutual veto power. The Netherlands, which “Althusius had praised as an example of consensus-based decision-making,” is now referred to by scholars as “a point of departure for Lijphart’s… consensus-based or consociational democracy” (Hüglin 2019, p. 20). Moreover, the concept of associating articulated by Althusius has been used by later theorists to address issues of coexistence among multiple ethnic groups (Hüglin 2019, pp. 16–17). In consociationalism, segmental autonomy is seen as skillfully reconciling federal arrangements with the internal cohesion and collective identity of minority groups (McCulloch 2022).

6. Rejection of the Theory of Sovereignty

The fundamental principle of Althusius’s federalism is the covenant, a conditional contract ratified by oath. This involves the commitment and joint efforts of the parties to maintain the interests of the federation. This may remind us of the contract theories of sovereignty espoused by theorists such as Hobbes and Rousseau. However, Althusius differs significantly from them. While the former constructs a direct connection between individuals and a sovereign through a contract, the latter seeks to achieve “pluralization of political order” and “diversity of associational life” (Bretherton 2020, p. 328). Through “close ties and its concern for… interests shared by citizens,” a pattern of “loving thy neighbor” is formed (Guillard 2020, p. 363). The political entity created by the former through a default one-time contract is called the state, while the latter, based on the dynamism, unity, and symbiosis of the polity, aptly names it a federation. This fundamental divergence from conventional contractarian thought underscores Althusius’s unique contribution to political philosophy.

Hobbes created the state through a contract between isolated individuals and a sovereign, without any mediating steps (Chmielewska 2012). The state borrows the power of individuals and, in turn, grants legal personality to associations. Hobbes (1998, p. 89) defined the nature of this contract as “the mutual transferring of right.” However, given the natural plurality of human beings, it cannot be taken for granted that everyone will abide by the contract. Hobbes argued that there must be “some coercive power” to “compel men equally to the performance of their covenants” (Hobbes 1998, pp. 95–96). This coercive power is the state, which acts as the ultimate arbiter and is likened to the Leviathan (Chirila and Varga 2019). In other words, in Hobbes’s view, the establishment of absolute sovereignty is presented as a solution to the tension between the diversity of humanity and individual freedom (Crowe 2007). Hobbes’s emphasis on sovereign authority is heavily influenced by the Roman law traditions of power (imperium) and rule (dominium) (Harris 2011; Lang and Slomp 2016; Springborg 2016). In this tradition, the monarch must impose sufficiently severe punishments to deter any inclination to violate the law (Springborg 2016).

However, Hobbes seems not to have considered that the concentration of power in a sovereign state might inadvertently undermine the diversity and pluralism that the social contract was initially intended to accommodate. This line of thinking, in its later development, may have led to an excessive preoccupation with sovereignty (Fiorenza 2005), to the extent that the later political theorist Carl Schmitt regarded the “autonomy” and “pluralism characteristic” of modern politics as a challenge, because they were “devoid of sovereignty” (Bates 2006, p. 422). This has led some to label Hobbes as a reactionary figure within the liberal tradition (Christov 2007), even “one step away from totalitarian regimes” (Chirila and Varga 2019, p. 38).

Althusius proposed his federal and covenantal ideas half a century before Hobbes’s contractual theory emerged (Chmielewska 2012), offering a distinctly different foundation for political order. This study contends that Althusius’s project represents a profound departure, not a variation, from sovereignty-based theories like Hobbes’s. Unlike the sovereignty-based theory, in which individuals directly establish supreme authority through a contract, Althusius’s theory attempts to build a step-by-step, mediated covenantal process (Hüglin 1994b, p. 48; 1999, p. 150). His project is not a fictional construct to explain the origin of the state. Rather, it envisions social unity “from a process of association which proceeds, as it were, from the bottom upwards” (Gierke 1934, p. 71). The starting point of this construction process, as we mentioned earlier, is the family, which evolves from the natural state based on natural blood right. Moreover, for Althusius, power essentially originates from the constituents, and higher-level entities are merely agents acting on behalf of the federal entity (Heidemann and Stoppenbrink 2016). More importantly, in Althusius’s theory, the individual as a political subject—a characteristic of modernity—does not appear as an actor; instead, the community occupies this position (Nitschke 2021, p. 193).

While Gierke described Althusius as regarding “the contract of society [i.e., the principle of partnership] as the creator of the whole system of public law and order” (Gierke 1934, p. 71), this argument has been criticized by scholars like Nitschke (2021, p. 193), as “a more than strange argument (eine mehr als merkwürdige Argumentation).” We will shortly see their split reading of Althusius again.

If Althusius had lived in the eighteenth century, he might also have opposed Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s popular sovereignty. This study argues that Althusius’s conception of political authority fundamentally diverges from Rousseau’s general will, particularly in its understanding of collective decision-making. Rousseau’s popular sovereignty is essentially founded on the general will based on coercive force (Nitschke 2000a, p. 12). Individuals are forced into freedom and regarded in an unstructured collective manner (Nitschke 1995a, p. 93). In contrast, Althusius’s theory suggests that there is no such thing as a general will or unstructured popular opinion. Even in small communities such as cities, the consensus of the people can only be formed through appropriate structuring and reflected through multi-level governance organized collectively. This still echoes our earlier discussion. Althusius envisioned a step-by-step, mediated covenantal process (Hüglin 1994b, p. 48; 1999, p. 150).

However, Gierke (2016, 2018), to some extent, found Althusius’s ideas in popular sovereignty comparable to Rousseau’s. He argued that Althusius first applied “the precise concept of sovereignty” to popular rights using “majestas” (Gierke 2018, p. 155). This view has been opposed by other scholars. According to Nitschke, linking Althusius with Rousseau has created a tendency towards heroization, in fact, shaping a kind of “hermeneutical naivety (hermeneutischen Naivität)” (Nitschke 2021, pp. 187–88; see also Hüglin 2013). Nitschke (2021, p. 195) argues that the medieval theory of popular sovereignty (Volkssouveränität) abstracted by Gierke from Althusius’s theory lacks a modern representative understanding of individual existence. Gierke’s misreading may stem from his preference for the interpretation of private law. Another important scholar who has brought Althusius’s theory back into focus, as we mentioned, Friedrich, also disagrees with Gierke’s argument. Although Althusius did not attribute sovereignty to a sovereign as an anonymous collective, nor to the ruler, but to the people (Gierke 2018, p. 34), more specifically, it is attributed to the many smaller constituent associations that make up the symbiotic body (Demelemestre 2019; Woldring 1998). In Friedrich’s view, this associational symbiosis makes Althusius’s theory closer to a pluralistic and polycentric power structure (Jouin 2020, p. 3). For Althusius, a more fitting description seems to be that each level of the construction is responsible to those who authorize them, in line with the spirit of popular sovereignty (Jouin 2020, p. 9). Similarly, in Hüglin’s view, the originality of Althusius’s theory does not lie in the theory of the contract or sovereignty, but in its compositeness and multiplicity, in the federal principle derived from the public social sphere (Hüglin 2013, p. 245).

Beyond the specific contrast with theorists of sovereignty, the divergence between Althusius’s theory and sovereignty-based approaches lies in their very understanding of the political entity, or “polity.” Long ago, Plutarch pointed out that the term “polity” has three main meanings. First, it refers to the exchange of rights (jus) within a commonwealth, emphasizing that the polity is about the transfer of rights and the establishment of mutually beneficial communication or partnerships. Second, it refers to the way of managing and regulating. Third, it refers to the form and constitution, which guides the behavior of citizens (Althusius 1995, p. 13). The widely accepted third interpretation usually assumes the “guiding” significance of authority over citizens’ behavior, while the first interpretation is often overlooked. Althusius’s approach aligns with this overlooked first interpretation. For Althusius, the polity is based on symbiosis and cooperation; power is not distributed from a central authority constructed out of the natural state to individuals. Instead, power is generated from equal and commutative symbiotic relationships and associational interactions.

For Althusius, rulers are merely agents acting on behalf of the federal entity (Heidemann and Stoppenbrink 2016), whose role is to protect rather than to replace the sovereignty of the constituent. The ultimate authority belongs to the “organized body of the entire people” (Hüglin 1994a, p. 45). Althusius’s position contrasts sharply with that of Jean Bodin, who is considered to have defined sovereignty as the absolute and perpetual power (puissance absolue et perpétuelle) of the monarch (Carvajal 2020; Elazar 1991; Hüglin 2003; Malan 2017; Ossewaarde 2007). For Althusius, if the constituent bodies do not recognize the legitimacy of the constituted body, they can veto its rule through a voting procedure (Reho 2019). An attempt by higher institutions to usurp the power of their subordinates constitutes a breach of the covenant (Witte 2018). In such cases, individuals have the right to engage in physical resistance when the voting procedure fails (Demelemestre 2019; Henreckson 2018; Reibstein 1965). This stark contrast with Bodin is central to understanding Althusius’s foundational role as a proponent of decentralized and covenanted political order.

7. Politics and Religion

In addition to being a philosopher and political theorist, Althusius was in fact primarily active as a Calvinist theologian. He acknowledged the necessity of considering the impact of theology on politics (Althusius 1995). We have already touched on that when discussing the influence of canon law on him.

During the Middle Ages, the concept of sovereignty as the highest and unlimited power inspired papal absolutism (Gray 1964; Nahme 2013). The priesthood (sacerdotium) and empire power (imperium) gradually merged into one (Chamie 2011). Inspired by Roman history, the Church aimed to unite the entire Christian people into a unified body, a universal Christian society. This society, with Christ in heaven as its spiritual personality, was seen as an imperfect reflection on earth (Augustine 2003). The ideal and sacred model of existence was Christ, who was both the path (via) and the truth (veritas) (Chmielewska 2012). The task of the ruler was to transform this ideal pattern into the form of positive law.

In early modern times, a new understanding of sovereignty took shape (Chmielewska 2012). This allowed monarchs to claim less dependence on the Pope or the Emperor. Jurists, citing Roman law, argued that the sovereign derived directly from God and was the sole master of his kingdom (Dunning 1896; Lee 2013). Law was the will of the ruler. Sovereignty became associated with the state and linked its identity to a specific territory. This was reflected in Jean Bodin’s Six Books of the Commonwealth (Bodin 2009), first published in 1576. This absolute sovereignty not only became the foundation of monarchy but also found an echo in later Jacobin nationalism (Von Eggers 2021). With the rise of Jacobinism, sovereignty detached from natural law, left the king or duke, and found its place in the concept of the nation (Chmielewska 2012). Title III, Of Public Powers, in the 1791 French Constitution stated that the nation had been the natural sovereign from the beginning of its existence. Most modern nation-states still retain traces of this discourse in practice.

However, as this study attempts to reveal, Althusius’s federal theory, based on association, has the potential to provide a non-sovereign paradigm that is more adaptive to the complexities of pluralism (Malan 2017). This paradigm can also find its theological connection.

In the seventeenth century, biblical language, stories, and metaphors were ubiquitous in Calvinist socio-political discussions (Chmielewska 2012). Althusius also drew from this the connection between politics and theology, arguing that both originated from a common source—the Bible (especially the Ten Commandments) (Chmielewska 2012). The Ten Commandments set the standards that politics must follow and can be used to measure political performance (Nitschke 2000b, p. 154). As a strict Calvinist, Althusius had a particular preference for the Old Testament and incorporated the ancient Jewish institutions into his research (Gierke 2018, p. 22). Later, Elazar, a renowned expert on the Jewish political tradition, identified a connection between Althusius’s theory and the covenantal federalism of the Israelites in the Bible (Elazar 1979, 1991). The latter’s covenantal federalism is reflected in the covenants (Latin: foedus) established between God and Noah, and between God and the twelve Hebrew tribes at the foot of Mount Sinai (Elazar 1991). This sacred covenant foedus, witnessed by God, became the etymological root of later federalism (Baker 1993, p. 25). This vision, in which human politics and divine will were closely intertwined, gradually formed an intellectual atmosphere known as “Politica Christiana” (Chmielewska 2012, p. 27). Althusius is one of the most radical representatives of them.

However, theorists have different understandings of how to construct political order from the divine. Bodin (2009) and Hobbes (1998) base their approach on sovereignty. This approach implicitly assumes a singular, absolute source of power and its distribution. In contrast, grounded in Calvinist thought, Althusius sought a political system capable of addressing internal religious diversity (Little 2009; Tuininga 2018). Althusius’s theory laid the foundation for the concept of multi-level federalism, while Bodin’s ideas paved the way for the emergence of the unitary sovereign state. Multi-level federations typically maintain state diversity, whereas centralized unitary systems are often “work[ing] toward its eradication” (Béland and Lecours 2013, p. 212). Deschouwer and Poirier (2015, p. 3) argue that the difference between Bodin and Althusius as “representing, respectively, Catholic and Calvinist approaches.” On the other hand, Nitschke has put forward a subtle perspective. He points out that precisely because Althusius’s political practice to some extent became an important expression of his faith itself, he refers to Althusius as the “Biblicist of purest water (Biblizist von reinstem Wasser).” Althusius’s entire concept thus appears to have a distinct utopian impetus (Nitschke 1995a, p. 167). The authority granted to humans to exercise political power is ultimately a “granted authority (verliehene Autorität)” from God (Nitschke 1995a, p. 167). Individuals are not provided with legal support to objectify their needs. Therefore, Nitschke (2021, p. 192) criticizes Gierke’s argument that Althusius had freed himself from the theocratic notion of the state. Nitschke (1995a, p. 169) describes Althusius’s theory as “a disguised theodicy (eine verkappte Theodizee).” This partially explains that, contrary to the federal theory he advocated, Althusius actually promoted centralization of rule as a power politician. However, this should not be interpreted as Nitschke’s denial of Althusius’s federalism. In another article, Nitschke (2006, p. 55) offers a more nuanced argument. Although he once characterized Althusius’s theological and federal efforts as utopian, he seems to suggest that Europe needs this kind of utopian thinking as a support for federal strategy. Such integration of diversity within a federal structure is a “heritage of the Christian culture” (Nitschke 2006, p. 60).

In Althusius’s multi-level federal system, starting from families, guilds, professional associations, and so on, each level of the federation exercises its rights and responsibilities based on the principle of subsidiarity (Chmielewska 2012). The principle of subsidiarity emphasizes that the power to address issues belongs to the lowest level of association capable of effectively solving the problem (Friesen 2005). Matters of more general concern and common interest are escalated to higher levels (Chmielewska 2012, p. 20; Hüglin 1999, pp. 64–65). Based on the principle of subsidiarity, Althusius’s federal vision is a non-centralized or polycentric structure of power, avoiding top-down power flows and instead generating power from the lower to the higher levels. This is distinct from decentralization, which assumes the existence of a central power and seeks to devolve authority to peripheral or lower levels (Elazar 1997).

Interestingly, Althusius’s discussion of the principle of subsidiarity originally emerged from his discourse on the management of religious affairs. Althusius is considered one of the earliest theorists and theologians to propose the principle of subsidiarity (Hüglin 2000, p. 151). For Althusius, the management of religious institutions and the administration of secular federal associations should follow the same rules (Malan 2017; Rothchild 2017; Witte 2010). As a Calvinist, Althusius was firmly committed to combating political and religious intolerance. He rejected ecclesiastical institutions with unchecked power (Føllesdal 1998; Skillen 1974), advocating instead for the supervision of church affairs by local churches and believers. Although this tradition was not mainstream at the time and was even rejected by the Roman Curia, it eventually gained acceptance within Christianity as the Reformation progressed, uniting a broader community of believers through the principle of subsidiarity (Rothchild 2017, p. 156). However, some theorists argue that the principle of subsidiarity was not adopted by Christianity later on. Instead, it is an “inherent” principle of Christianity itself, representing the “true being and nature of human society” (Mueller 1943, p. 144).

Regardless, the principle of subsidiarity did indeed gain increasing recognition within the Christian world. In the encyclical Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII (1891, pp. 666–67) articulated the role of the state in civil society, emphasizing that the state should oversee citizen communities united according to their rights but avoid interfering in their specific affairs and organizational structures. Forty years later, Pope Piux XI (1931, p. 203) further integrated this principle into Catholic doctrine and its application in social organization. In Quadragesimo Anno, he elaborated on the fundamental concept of subsidiarity:

“Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do… The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to let subordinate groups handle matters and concerns of lesser importance, which would otherwise dissipate its efforts greatly… Therefore, those in power should be sure that the more perfectly a graduated order is kept among the various associations, in observance of the principle of ‘subsidiary function,’ the stronger social authority and effectiveness will be the happier and more prosperous the condition of the State”.

(Piux XI 1931, p. 203)

8. Conclusions

Johannes Althusius was a political theorist and theologian of the early modern period. His association-based federal theory emerged almost simultaneously with theories of sovereignty, presenting a distinct model of state-building. Althusius argued that politics is an art of association. Through the symbiotic relationships of grassroots associations, a federation—literally, an association of associations—is ultimately established. In this model, power and rights belong to the constituent bodies of the federation, not to the constituted body. This theory not only refutes Bodin’s doctrine of absolute sovereignty but also lays the foundation for later consociationalism, associationalism, and the principle of subsidiarity. Beyond theory, Althusius himself led the city of Emden in its struggle against centralism and supported the federalized Dutch resistance against the Habsburgs.

This study systematically examines Althusius’s federal theory. First, we provide a detailed biography of Althusius. Then, we outline the definitions and interrelationships of key terms in his theory, such as politics, association, and federation. For Althusius, the family, arising from natural rights, is the foundation of his federal structure. We then discuss how Althusius’s federal theory has inspired consociationalism, associationalism, and the principle of subsidiarity. His ideas rejected the sovereignty theories that emerged around the same time, despite both drawing on contemporary religious traditions for innovative political interpretations. Althusius’s ideas offer more than historical insights; they present a robust and often-overlooked alternative for modern governance.

Although his theory was marginalized for a time following the establishment of the Westphalian system, it was gradually revived from the 20th century. In the field of federal studies, an increasing number of scholars now regard Althusius as the origin of contemporary federalism. In today’s world, where nation-states face crises of legitimacy and local autonomy coexists with supranational governance, revisiting Althusius’s theory is not only a supplement to early modern federal thought but also a reflection on contemporary governance paradigms. For politicians, policymakers, and community leaders grappling with the complexities of modern pluralism, Althusius’s emphasis on voluntary association, mutual consent, and shared governance offers valuable guidance for inclusiveness and cohesiveness.