Risk-Acceptance Criteria in Occupational Health and Safety Risk-Assessment—The State-of-the-Art through a Systematic Literature Review
Abstract
:1. Introduction
1.1. Basics of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS)
1.2. Objectives and Structure of the Article
2. Materials and Methods—Theory’s Background
2.1. Risk Acceptance Criteria (RAC)
2.2. Individual and Societal Risk
- individual or societal (collective/group) risks;
- localized or non-localized risks;
- natural, man-made, technical, natural-technical, artificial, health, and social risks;
- periodic or non-periodic risks;
- voluntary or unintentional risks;
- risks per time-distance (or per life cycle) and risks per event (conditional risks);
- objective or subjective risks;
- risks based on semi-quantitative or quantitative risk estimates;
- risks based on statistical and historical data or risk based on models;
- risks on demand against continuous (or constant) risks.
2.3. Metrics of Individual Risk (IR)
- Individual Risk Contours (IRC): Indicate the geographical spreading out (or distribution) of IR. Risk contours are calculated from the expected frequency of an event that can cause the specified level of impact at a specified position, irrespective of whether there is (or there is not) any person there to suffer this damage. Thus, contingency maps are created by computing the I-R at each geographical position, assuming anyone is present and unprotected along with subjected to risk at 100% of the time (i.e., the annual exposure is of 8760 h per year). The I-R at any point is expressed by the subsequent relations:
- IR profile (or risk transect): A diagram presenting the I-R as a function of the distance from the risk’s source in a specific direction.
- Maximum I-R (MIR): Indicates the maximum value of I-R at any geographical position. It expresses the risk for a person subjected to the greatest risk in an exposed group of people. For example, this person might be the operator working in the production unit under consideration (unit of measurement: annual incidence of fatalities).
- Average I-R (AIR): Expresses the average value of the entire I-R estimations over a specific population. This risk assessment measure is useful only if the risk is relatively uniformly distributed, and it is given by the equation:
- Fatal Accident Rate (FAR): Is regularly utilized as a measure of employee’s risk in an exposed group of people, and it is calculated from the average individual risk (IRAV). In other words, it is the estimated number of deaths that occur during an activity per 108 hrs of exposure to this activity; it is approximately equivalent with the cumulative number of working hrs per 1000 employees. For the calculation of FAR, we multiply the average individual risk by the coefficient of 108/(24 × 365) = 1.14 × 104. Hence, FAR is calculated from the following equation, by using the IRAV risk for the employee population:
- Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA): Is expressed by the frequency or probability that a person will be killed through a year of exposure. I-R can be calculated either for employees or members of the general public (unit of measurement: annual incidence of fatalities).
2.4. Metrics of Societal Risk (SR)
- F-N Curves: An ordinary measure of S-R is the F-N chart (i.e., “frequency number” chart), wherein the first action in creating an F-N Curve, with reference to a specific problem, is the calculation of the fatalities’ numeral (resulted from a particular accident case), given by the next relation:
- The average “Rate of Death” (ROD): Is the appreciated average amount of casualties in the residents from the entire potential incidents, and it is expressed by the following relation:
- Risk Integral (RI): It has been proposed by the UK HSE as a means of calculating social risk. The risk integral can be calculated from the data used to construct an F-N diagram. However, the advantage reported by HSE is that the RI can be estimated by an assumed F-N curve scheme and information on a proposed worst-case scenario for the installation under consideration (i.e., scenario with higher number of fatalities). It is expressed by the following equation:
- Aggregate Risk Index (ARI): It gives the average rate of fatalities as evaluated for the individuals in a factory building. It coincides with ROD, but it differs in that it focuses our interest on a specific group of the population. ARI is calculated from the following equation:
- The Equivalent Social-Cost Index (ESC): It measures the S-R by identifying the aversion of society to accidents with a large number of deaths. The assessment’s way is equivalent with the one of the ROD, except that the number of casualties is increased by a power-factor of k in order to express the contribution of important incidents to ESC. Besides, it is given by the subsequent relation:
- The Potential Loss of Life(PLL): It expresses the anticipated number of deaths (per yr) referring to a given population, and it is given by the next relation:
2.5. RAC Types
- Societal-Risk form RACs (S-R RAC): It defines the acceptable risk level regarding the fatalities to all exposed people, by using frequency–fatality curves (e.g., F-N curves), such the ones illustrated in Figure 3. An ordinary form of S-R RACs is achieved, as already referred to above, by the illustration of specific curves put on F-N charts, which define the “tolerable” and “intolerable” area. Mathematically, the relation for applying an F-N RAC might be presented [5,31,34,35,36] as follows:
- Cost-benefit RACs (C-B RAC): Define the allowable cost of risk-decrease actions in a cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Although, C-B RACs do not estimate the impact of risks straightforwardly, and consequently they do not constitute strict RACs at all. On the other side, they assess the necessity for risk decrease and are strongly associated with RACs [27]. In other words, C-B RACs define a point wherein the profits of a risk-decrease action compensate their costs, implementing the PRAC of protection’s optimization. One of the most significant topics in a cost-benefit analysis of safety measures is the cost designated to decrease fatality risks, where the vital factor is the VPF one, i.e., the value of preventing a fatality [33]. Numerous types of C-B RACs are in use, such as the following:
- (i)
- The Cost of Averting a Fatality (CAF), which is the cost of an action divided by the expected amount of deaths averted. A specific action (or measure) is regularly recommended when its CAF is less than VPF, and so the VPF can be considered as a type of C-B RAC [33]. Thus, CAF could be expressed by the relation:
- (ii)
- The Net-Present Value (NPV), which is the difference between the reduced profits and the reduced costs of an action, and a measure is regularly recommended when its NPV is positive.
- (iii)
- The “cost per quality-adjusted life-year” (Cost per QALY), which is the cost of an action divided by the saved life-years, standardized to corresponding years of healthy-life. This C-B RAC is comparable to VPF but makes reference to health risks.
- (iv)
- The “benefit-cost-ratio” (BCR), which expresses the reduced benefits of an action divided by the reduced costs, and wherein a measure is generally recommended in case its BCR is greater than 1.0.
- (v)
- The “life quality index” (LQI) “L” is a compound societal indicator and is determined by a function of the GDP indicator “g” (i.e., the gross domestic product per person and per year), and the one of life expectancy at birth, “e”, according to the equation of , where w is the proportion of life spent in economic activity [40]. LQI is a cost/efficiency based RAC, and it is very appropriate for assessment of OHS related risks. It also may be used when risks are neither judged to be negligible nor intolerable, but on the other hand, they are going to be reduced to the ALARP level. The use of the LQI indicator, for establishing thresholds for acceptable life safety risks on the background of socio-economic influences (e.g., as a constraint to economic-optimization principles), has been increasingly important in the last years [41,42,43,44,45].
- Qualitative RACs (QRAC): Define the circumstances according to which a risk is acceptable in a qualitative way. These could involve safety management controls, following standards and/or codes, conditions along with which risk decrease measures are necessary, etc. The type of QRACs is quite wide and theoretically may involve the entire safety requirements. So, the term “qualitative risk criteria” is utilized in this article to recognize that qualitative rationale is an applicable form of decision-making on safety aspects.
- Environmental RACs (ENV-RAC): Additionally, to satisfying requirements concerning I-R and S-R to a population, a variety of activities that introduce further risks to the environment, must take into consideration RACs for environmental risk. So, any harm to the environment could be expressed at various levels such as habitat level, population level, organism level, or entire-ecosystem level, with the result being that numerous environmental components could be harmed. Environmental RAA is associated with assessments of damage concerning the plant’s, the animal’s, and the ecosystem’s integrity in the frame of previously agreed RACs. Nonetheless, due to common sense, environmental RAA for the whole ecosystem is usually not executed, and the risk is rather evaluated for susceptible single components within the environment [46].
- Risk-Matrix form of RACs (RM RAC): It evaluates and illustrates the previous referred risk-regions by a matrix of accidents’ occurrence frequency (or likelihood) versus severity (or consequence). Thus, Figure 4 depicts a case of such an RM table.
2.6. Principles for RACs (PRAC)
- Justification of activity: This PRAC takes into consideration that the activity’s risks ought to be acceptable completely by its profits for the society.
- Optimization of protection: This PRAC keeps in mind that the risks must be minimized by proper safety measures, considering their benefits and costs, and the established good practice as well.
- Justness: This PRAC bears in mind that the risks must not be unjustifiably intended on specific individuals and/or communities.
- Catastrophes’ aversion: This PRAC considers that the risks of significant accidents (relating to manifold-fatalities, extensive and/or high-cost impacts) ought to be a little magnitude of the aggregate.
- Proportionality: This PRAC takes into consideration that the details in the RAA must be in proportion to the level of risk, and, on the other side, negligible risks ought to be expected from thorough assessment.
- Continuous improvement: This PRAC keeps in mind that the total risks must not be increased, but on the other side, as a general rule, they must be reduced.
- Absolute probabilistic RACs: This PRAC does not take into consideration the cost of accomplishing the resultant risk level. Consequently, the risk level is absolutely elaborated, and the RACs are implemented as a highest risk-level that must not be surpassed, without taking into account the cost and profit related to it. For instance, such a RAC associated with this PRAC might be “the fatalities’ frequency will not overdraw the value of 10−6 per person-yr”.
- The principle of equivalency: A common PRAC used for developing RACs of a system (or an activity) is composed by the (i) comparison with identified risk levels for analogous systems (or activities) that are extensively tolerable and (ii) requirement that a comparable risk level is acquired. A diversity of notable risk levels could be utilized as a base for the comparison. Otherwise, someone could use the comparison historical (or statistical) risk data, and if the risk level has been assumed to be tolerable, someone could necessitate that future risk-levels will be comparable with those of the past.
- Comparison with acknowledged hazards: This PRAC is similar with the PRAC of the previous paragraph and dictates the comparison with acknowledged risk levels embedded in regular human activities. Two characteristic examples that are worth mentioning are the following. (i) A human life is expected to be equal with ~102 yrs, and consequently, this statistically denotes an intrinsic background risk to human life equal to ~10−2/yr for the entire people. Taking into consideration that this is the total risk to life, someone can use this estimation as a starting point in order to develop RACs for determined areas. (ii) The yearly rate of death (i.e., fatality rate) due to any reason in the period of life, when this is at its lowest age (4–15 years old) was estimated to be of ~10−3 in OECD countries a few years ago. This estimation is utilized by several regulators as an intolerable limit (IL) for OHS risk, showing that OHS risk does not add great quantities of risk to people. In relation to the principles for establishing RACs based on “acknowledged hazards”, we could refer to the articles by Tanner and Hingorani (2015) [39], Hingorani et al. (2019) [47], Hingorani and Tanner (2020) [48], who inferred acceptance criteria for the design and assessment of structures based on implicitly acceptable risks to persons associated with structures that comply with current best practices.
- The ALARP PRAC: According to this PRAC, the risk management is executed in such a way to achieve the “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP) aim. Thus, the risk levels and the cost regarding the risk moderation are considered, and subsequently, every risk-mitigation measure ought to be implemented given that the implementation cost is within the ALARP area, consistent with cost effectiveness considerations.
- Principle of voluntary risk reduction measures: This PRAC is supported by the theory that resources are mainly powerfully spent on safety aspects when they are spread to the society (to people and/or organizations), rather than when spent on the implementation of compulsory safety interventions. This guesswork is based on the recognition that the safety level is greater in economically developed countries, wherein resources are available to the community for willing expenses on safety, than in developing countries.
- The principle of accountability: This PRAC entails demands for a clear process of risk managing, affecting the people and works as the basis of a professional ethic for the risk management of a population. It also denotes clearly designated RACs that could be utilized in decision making. Moreover, these RACs must be (i) expressed in a quantitative form rather than in a qualitative one and (ii) based on objective assessments.
- The holistic principle: This PRAC implies a holistic examination of every part of risks, where decisions concerning OHS on behalf of the public should be involved via the whole spectrum of jeopardy to OHS of the community. Thus, the anticipated risk-mitigation measures can be accurately assessed, and the RACs for tolerable risk can be appropriately implemented only whenever the whole risk to the public is correctly evaluated.
- RACs based on the combination of singular principles: This PRAC dictates a different way of developing RACs utilized in decision-making, and it is based on the combination of various principles outlined above. For instance, in maritime safety arrangements, the combination of a fully probabilistic RAC is utilized jointly with the ALARP-PRAC. An ordinary process is to settle on a precise value (PV#1) for the highest tolerable risk, which must not be surpassed except for the costs of keeping the risk to a value below it. Besides, a second precise value (PV#2) known as negligible, could be determined, which (i) characterizes the risk levels that are lower than PV#2, and (ii) denotes that no compulsory risk-mitigation measures are essential for risks below PV#2. In addition, it is essential that risk levels between PV#1 and PV#2 are kept “as low as reasonable practicable” according to a cost-effectiveness viewpoint and the ALARP-PRAC. An alternative method for deciding if a system is tolerable or not could be achieved by utilizing empirically derived RACs developed by the industrial good practices. This way is achieved by the F-N chart of Figure 5, wherein two absolute criteria (indicated by the dotted lines) are jointly utilized for determining the intolerable and ALARP societal risks. More specifically, this figure illustrates the F-N diagram (C1-curve) combined with the “mathematical” RAC (C2-line) and the “empirical” one (C3-line) regarding the societal risk of the most significant hazard sources in the energy-production industry of PPC SA (Public Power Corporation of Greece), concerning the period of years 1993–2009. The graph has been adapted from (and improved by) the work of Marhavilas and Koulouriotis (2012) [29].
2.7. Established Quantitatave RACs
2.7.1. Individual (IR) RACs
2.7.2. Societal (SR) RACs
2.7.3. Environmental (ENV) RACs
2.7.4. Cost-Benefit RACs
3. Methodology
- Article title (column A);
- Authors (column B);
- Year of publication (column C);
- Acceptance date (column D);
- Descriptive features of RACs (column E);
- Categorization of RACs (quantitative, qualitative, hybrid) (column F);
- Type of methodology of approaching RACs (algorithm, statistical, theoretical, software, graphical) (column G);
- Type of RAC (IR, SR, CB, ENV, Other) (column H);
- RAA-technique name (that incorporates RACs) (column I);
- Type of RAA technique (column J);
- Type of article data/material (column K);
- Field of RACs application (column L);
- Source/journal (column M);
- Publisher (column N);
- Reference list Nr (column O).
- (a)
- Two reviewers (i.e., the corresponding author (author1) and his co-author (author2)), who worked first independently and later on collaboratively:
- participated in the selection process, in order (i) to filter and screen every record and each report retrieved and (ii) to decide whether a study met the inclusion criteria of the review;
- participated in the data collection process in order to obtain and confirm data from study investigators;
- assessed and reported the risk of bias in the included studies by perusing each study typically in a thorough and careful way and applied the analytical tools of Scopus to visualize/compare/export data (and missing results) for evaluating research output and trends.
- (b)
- We specify (by appropriate graphs) for the outcomes (depicted in the table of the Supplementary Material) the effect measures (e.g., percentages, trend, prediction, and distribution) used in the synthesis of results.
- (c)
- We describe, in our SRM approach, the process to decide what studies were eligible (e.g., by tabulating the outcomes).
- (d)
- For all outcomes, we present, for each study a summary of statistics for each group, a summary of features, and an effect estimate and its precision using a structured table and plots.
- (e)
- We describe a stochastic (probabilistic) method for assessing certainty in the body of evidence for the outcomes and the assessment results.
- (f)
- We cite each included study and present its characteristics in the Supplementary Material and in the references’ list.
- (g)
- We discuss the limitations in the study regarding the review process used and the evidence included in the review.
- (h)
- There were not any competing interests of review authors.
- (i)
- The data used for the analysis, and for the graphs, and any material used in the review are available to any one who will ask for them.
4. Results
5. Discussion
- SQ#1: What about the evolution of the scientific interest about the RACs in OHS? Does this interest increase or decrease day after day?
- SQ#2: Could we make some kind of prediction as far as the evolution of the scientific interest of OHSRACs is concerned?
- SQ#3: Which are the dominant publishers and the prevalent journals as far as the OHS RACs are concerned?
- SQ#4: Which country concentrates the highest percentage of RAC papers, and which is a plausible or justifiable reason for this?
- SQ#5: How important are the RACs with reference to the field of OHS in comparison with the other fields?
- SQ#6: Which “subject areas”, according to Scopus’ categorization and in view of OHS, aggregate the higher percentages of RACs papers?
- SQ#7: Which are the more significant fields for the development/application of OHSRACs according to the concentration percentage of OHSRAC articles?
- SQ#8: Which are the main categories of OHSRACs on the one hand, and the OHS-RACs’ primary types, on the other side, that the scientific literature is focused on?
- SQ#9: Which are the prevailing kinds of methodologies of approaching RACs that are used by the scientific literature?
- SQ#10: Which are the main types of the RAA techniques on the one side, and the more frequent RAA techniques on the other side, that incorporate OHSRACs?
- ANS#1: There is a significant increase of scientific interest of the RACs in OHS, day after day (Figure 9).
- ANS#2: The deduction that the number of publications with reference to OHSRACs follows the Poisson distribution is a remarkable finding, and it would help the scientists to make some kind of predictions as far as the increase of the published articles and the evolution of the scientific interest of OHSRACs are concerned (Figure 10).
- ANS#3: Elsevier, Springer, Taylor and Francis, Wiley, and MDPI are the dominant publishers, and “Reliability Engineering and System Safety“ and “Safety Science” are the prevalent journals, as far as the OHS RACs is concerned (Figure 11).
- ANS#4: The RAC distribution in association with territory shows that Norway (with 13.8%), China (with 12.5%), and USA (with 8.4%) concentrate the higher percentages. One explanation for the topmost Norwegian percentage in the RAC paper distribution is that this country presents the greatest ICAF (implied cost of averting a fatality), which is the optimum amount of money to be spent to avoid a fatality (Figure 11).
- ANS#5: The RAC papers with reference to OHS present a noteworthy percentage (15%) in comparison to the other fields totally aggregated, and this outcome proves that the issue of RACs is fundamental in the field of OHS (Figure 11).
- ANS#6: The most significant “subject areas” (according to Scopus’ categorization and in view of OHS) that aggregate the higher percentages of OHS RACs papers are the ones of “engineering” (36%) and “environmental science” (12%) (Figure 11).
- ANS#7: The more significant fields for the OHSRAC development and application are “industry” (with 45%), “engineering” (with 13%), “transportations” (with 12%), and “constructions” (with 11%) (Figure 12).
- ANS#8: The main categories regarding OHS RACs are “quantitative” (74%) and “qualitative” (25%), and the primary types of these are “S-R RAC” (40%), “I-R RAC” (27%), “C-B RAC” (21%), and “ENV RAC“ (5%) (Figure 12).
- ANS#9: The prevailing types of methodologies of approaching RACs that are used by the scientific literature are “theoretical” (with 74%) and “case study” (with 15%) (Figure 12).
- ANS#10: The main types of the RAA techniques that incorporate OHSRACs are “quantitative” (with 68.8%) and “qualitative” (with 29.7%), while the more frequent RAA techniques are “QRA” (20%), “ALARP” (9%), “FSA” (75), and “Bayesian Networks” (5%) (Figure 13).
- (i)
- Determination of the field of RAC application, such as industry, constructions, etc. (as in Table S1, Supplementary Material #A);
- (ii)
- Determination of the specific RAA technique utilized for accomplishing the required occupational risk analysis and assessment in a specific workplace (e.g., quantitative, qualitative, QRA, FSA, FTA, etc.) (as in Table S1, Supplementary Material #A);
- (iii)
- Determination of the precise features of the RAC, such as “class” (quantitative, qualitative, and hybrid) (Section 2.5, Table S1, Supplementary Material #A) and “type” (IR, SR, CB, ENV, and Risk Matrix) (as in Section 2.5);
- (iv)
- Determination of the applied principles of RACs (as in Section 2.6);
- (v)
- Application of the specific RAA technique by the usage of historical and/or statistical accident data;
- (vi)
- Selection of the appropriate risk metrics (as in Section 2.3);
- (vii)
- Decision about the specific RAC utilized by the company (societal/individual) (as in Section 2.7)’
- (viii)
- RACs adjustment and adaptation on the specific company, in view of the established RACs internationally (Section 2.7.1, Section 2.7.2, Section 2.7.3 and Section 2.7.4) and the company’s safety culture;
- (ix)
- RACs revalidation.
6. Conclusions
- -
- It has been deduced that, day by day, there is a growing trend in the scientific community to evolve and apply RACs in the field of OSH.
- -
- The quantity of published articles regarding OHSRACs seems to follow the Poisson distribution.
- -
- The foremost kinds of RACs are the “S-R RAC”, “I-R RAC”, “C-B RAC”, and the “ENV RAC”.
- -
- The most noteworthy field for the OHSRAC application is “industry”.
- -
- As a general conclusion, from our literature survey concerning OHSRACs used in a range of enterprises and workplaces, every application varies in view of the types of the utilized RACs, the PRACs for their implementation, and the explicit levels adopted.
- -
- The novelty of this article is fulfilled through the fact that a systematic review (survey) of the scientific literature about RACs associated with OHSRAA methodologies, is achieved for the first time.
Supplementary Materials
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Nomenclature
“Aggregate Risk Index” | ARI |
“As-Low-As-Reasonable-Practicable” | ALARP |
“As-Low-as-Reasonably-Achievable” | ALARA |
“Average individual risk” | AIR |
“Average rate of death” | ROD |
“Center for Chemical Process Safety” | CCPS |
“Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis” | CPQRA |
“Cost-Benefit Analysis” | CBA |
“Cost-benefit RACs” | C-B RACs |
“Decision-Matrix Risk-Assessment” | DMRA |
“Deep excavation safety risk” | DESR |
“Environmental RACs” | ENV-RAC |
“Equivalent Social Cost Index” | ESC |
“Event Tree Analysis” | ETA |
“Fatal Accident Rate” | FAR |
“Fault Tree Analysis” | FTA |
“Frequency-Number Curve” | F-N Curve |
“Formal Safety Assessment” | FSA |
“Hazard and Operability” | HAZOP |
“Individual risk contours” | IRC |
“Individual Risk Per Annum” | IRPA |
“Individual-Risk form RACs” | I-R RACs |
“Intolerable Line” | IL |
“Maximum individual risk” | MIR |
“Negligible Line” | NL |
“Occupational Health and Safety Management System” | OHSMS |
“Occupational Health and Safety Risk Assessment” | OHSRA |
“Potential Loss of Life” | PLL |
“Principles for Risk Acceptance Criteria” | PRAC |
“Probabilistic Risk Assessment” | PRA |
“Qualitative RACs” | Q-RACs |
“Quantitative Risk Assessment” | QRA |
“Risk Acceptance Criteria” | RAC |
“Risk Analysis and Assessment” | RAA |
“Risk Control Option” | RCO |
“Risk Integral” | RI |
“Risk-Matrix form of RACs” | R-M RACs |
“Risk Management” | RM |
“Safety Level Approach” | SLA |
“Societal-Risk form RACs” | S-R RAC |
“Specific Research-Methodology” | SRM |
“Supplementary Material” | SM |
“Health and Safety Executive” | HSE |
“Occupational Health-Safety” | OHS |
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Characterization of the RiskLevel |
---|
Intolerable risklevel (unacceptable riskregion) |
Maximum tolerable riskthreshold ALARP/ALARA riskregion |
Broadlyacceptable riskthreshold |
Negligible-risk level (broadly-acceptable risk-region) |
Environmental Damage Category | Typical Recovery (in years) | Acceptable Frequency Limit | Acceptable Annual Probability Limit |
---|---|---|---|
Minor | 0.5 | <1 event per 10 yrs | 0.1 |
Moderate | 2.0 | <1 event per 40 yrs | 2.5 × 10−2 |
Significant | 5.0 | <1 event per 100 yrs | 1.0 × 10−2 |
Serious | 20.0 | <1 event per 400 yrs | 2.5 × 10−3 |
Industry | C-B RACs Used | VPF ($m in yr 2012) |
---|---|---|
Airports (UK) | Qualitative | - |
Road transport (EU) | NPV, BCR | 0.1 to 4.3 |
Road transport (UK) | NPV, BCR | 2.8 |
Road transport (USA) | NPV | 9.1 |
Road transport (Norway) | NPV | 4.5 |
Road tunnels (Austria and others) | Qualitative | - |
Rail transport (UK) | NPV | 2.8 |
London Underground | Qualitative | - |
Nuclear (UK) | NPV | 2.8 |
Onshore process (UK) | Qualitative | - |
Onshore process (Netherlands) | Qualitative | - |
Onshore process (France) | Qualitative | - |
Offshore oil & gas | CAF | Various |
Healthcare (USA) | NPV | 7.4 |
Healthcare (WHO/UK/Spain) | Cost per QALY | - |
SearchProcess | Results | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
SRM-Phases | Search-Query String (a) | Features of the Search Process (Eligibility Criteria) (b) | Quantity of Documents (c) | Features of the Resulted Documents (Eligibility Criteria) (d) |
First | IDENTIFICATION Initial searching: ALL(“Risk Acceptance Criteria”) AND PUBYEAR>1999ANDPUBYEAR<2020 |
| 739 |
|
Second | SCREENING Limit to: ALL(“Risk Acceptance Criteria”)ANDPUBYEAR>1999ANDPUBYEAR<2020AND(LIMIT-TO(DOCTYPE,“ar”))AND(LIMIT-TO(SUBJAREA,“ENGI”)ORLIMIT-TO(SUBJAREA, “ENVI”)ORLIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA, “ENER”)ORLIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA, “CENG”)ORLIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA, “MEDI”)ORLIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA, “AGRI”)ORLIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA, “CHEM”))AND(LIMIT-TO (EXACTKEYWORD, “Risk Assessment”)ORLIMIT-TO(EXACTKEYWORD, “Risk Management”)ORLIMIT-TO (EXACTKEYWORD, “Risk Acceptance Criteria”)ORLIMIT-TO(EXACTKEYWORD, “Risk Analysis”)ORLIMIT-TO(EXACTKEYWORD, “Safety Engineering”)ORLIMIT-TO (EXACTKEYWORD, “Accident Prevention”))AND(LIMIT-TO(LANGUAGE, “English”))AND(LIMIT-TO(SRCTYPE, “j”)) |
| 237 |
|
Third | INCLUSION
|
| 110 |
|
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Marhavilas, P.K.; Koulouriotis, D.E. Risk-Acceptance Criteria in Occupational Health and Safety Risk-Assessment—The State-of-the-Art through a Systematic Literature Review. Safety 2021, 7, 77. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety7040077
Marhavilas PK, Koulouriotis DE. Risk-Acceptance Criteria in Occupational Health and Safety Risk-Assessment—The State-of-the-Art through a Systematic Literature Review. Safety. 2021; 7(4):77. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety7040077
Chicago/Turabian StyleMarhavilas, Panagiotis K., and Dimitrios E. Koulouriotis. 2021. "Risk-Acceptance Criteria in Occupational Health and Safety Risk-Assessment—The State-of-the-Art through a Systematic Literature Review" Safety 7, no. 4: 77. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety7040077