Safety Culture Oversight: An Intangible Concept for Tangible Issues within Nuclear Installations
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Capturing Safety Culture
2.1. A Model Based on Safety Culture Observations
“During an inspection within the main control room, an alarm occurs. The Main Control Room operator directly clears the alarm without checking the alarm card. The operator explains to the inspector that the alarm was related to maintenance works on a system. Nevertheless, the operator is unable to describe the technical links between the maintenance intervention and the alarm. After a short investigation the inspector found that the link between the maintenance intervention and the alarm was not relevant”.
“Requested checklists related to the use of hot cells are not systematically completed. That remark has already been made several times to operators by the nuclear authority”.
2.2. Methodological Aspects of Safety Culture Observations
2.2.1. Seeking Visible and Invisible Elements
- Individual level: elements such as questioning attitude, individual awareness, accountability, reporting, rigorous and prudent approach…
- Group level: elements such as communication, teamwork, decision making, supervision, peer check…
- Organisational level: elements such as definition of responsibilities, definition and control of practices, qualification and training, review functions, management commitment, procedures, safety policies, resources…
2.2.2. Observations are Rather Descriptive than Normative
“A manager of the Operation department goes on the field after work hours in order to check all work in progress. Some gaps are observed and reported by the manager to the team”.
2.2.3. Toward a Deep Understanding of the Workplace
(§1) “During a routine inspection in the main control room of the unit X, it has been observed a discrepancy between the level of the tank ICS C07 (Intermediate Cooling System) indicating 86% and the X-DOC-15 procedure referencing a Technical Specifications criterion of 56% < N < 80% (TS 16.XXX).
(§2) The observation has been made at the beginning of the morning shift in the control room. The unit operated at full power. Questioned about the tank level, the operator in charge stated that he was not aware of this indication: “I rarely take this level into account. It’s not in my procedure. We do not check it systematically”. Rapidly, the chief operator opened the Technical Specifications and stated that the tank maximum level was not reported in the TS. Only the minimum level was reported”.
3. Assessing Safety Culture Observations
3.1. Safety Culture Assessment through a Quantitative Approach
3.2. Safety Culture Assessment through a Qualitative Approach
3.3. Safety Culture Oversight from a Regulatory Perspective
- Management system: within this dimension we can find safety culture elements such as safety policies, work process, procedures, interfaces… The main issue here is to assess the level of integration of safety within the management system and related documentation;
- Leadership: within this dimension we can find safety culture elements such as commitment, decision making, supervision... The main issue here is to assess the level of managers’ involvement regarding operations management;
- Human performance: within this dimension we can find safety culture elements such as a questioning attitude, compliance, team skills, situation awareness… The main issue here is to assess the consistency between field practices and human performance principles as well as the adaptation capabilities of field operators;
- Learning: within this dimension we can find safety culture elements such as reporting or assessment practices, knowledge transfer, continuous improvement… The main issue here is to assess the learning capabilities of the organisation.
4. Applying the Model: An NPP Case Study
- Management system: Loss of meaning regarding rules;
- Leadership: Lack of effective field presence and leadership by exception;
- Human performance: Lack of ownership and routinisation of practices;
- Learning: Insufficient capacity for in depth changes.
- “Designed organization”: firstly, the global rules are followed;
- “Engineered organization”: these rules can be considered as not necessary because their usefulness is no longer perceived;
- “Applied organization”: it appears that local rules take precedence in daily practices;
- “Failure”: ultimately it is the whole system that becomes vulnerable.
5. Conclusions: Tangible Effects of Safety Culture Oversight
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
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Bernard, B. Safety Culture Oversight: An Intangible Concept for Tangible Issues within Nuclear Installations. Safety 2018, 4, 45. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety4040045
Bernard B. Safety Culture Oversight: An Intangible Concept for Tangible Issues within Nuclear Installations. Safety. 2018; 4(4):45. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety4040045
Chicago/Turabian StyleBernard, Benoît. 2018. "Safety Culture Oversight: An Intangible Concept for Tangible Issues within Nuclear Installations" Safety 4, no. 4: 45. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety4040045
APA StyleBernard, B. (2018). Safety Culture Oversight: An Intangible Concept for Tangible Issues within Nuclear Installations. Safety, 4(4), 45. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety4040045