Several Issues and Suggestions Regarding the Future Intrinsically Safe Chemical Industrial Park: Insights from Severe Hazardous Chemical Accident Analysis and Industrial Park Field Investigations

Abstract

A four-step systemic methodology (which is designated as SAID) is proposed to investigate the future intrinsically safe chemical industrial park (FISCP). First, we collected 150 severe chemical incidents that occurred in China from 2010 to 2020 and analyzed their causes, provincial distribution of accidents and fatalities, accident scenario characteristics, and types of hazardous chemicals involved so as to identify potential safety hazards inherent in China’s chemical industry. Second, we scrutinize the interplay between the elements of chemical process safety and exemplary severe accidents. Then, taking the Taixing Economic and Technological Development Zone and 150 severe chemical incidents as a case study, we systematically investigated the existing problems in current chemical industrial parks. According to analyses related to severe chemical accidents and industrial park field investigations, the concept of the FISCP is proposed. This concept was subjected to in-depth analysis, including the identification of core characteristics and the addressing of critical issues related to the proposed FISCP. Finally, a multi-dimensional analysis is conducted in consideration of practical conditions, culminating in the formulation of specific recommendations. Furthermore, this research provides a foundational dataset and information repository, which may serve as a reference for subsequent studies on chemical industry safety and sustainability, as well as for the prevention of major chemical incidents in other regions.

1. Introduction

The chemical industry is integral to meeting diverse human needs across all aspects of existence. The development and utilization of chemical compounds have significantly enriched human life and been pivotal to advancing sophisticated societal infrastructures. For example, the innovation of synthetic ammonia technology has doubled global food production, substantially alleviating global food scarcity. Within any nation, the chemical industry is recognized as an economic cornerstone, critical to enhancing living standards [1,2,3,4].

Within the field of chemistry, a comprehensive registry has cataloged over 2800 distinct hazardous chemicals. These compounds exhibit a Janus-faced characteristic: they act as indispensable enablers for industrial production progression, environmental condition amelioration, and living standard elevation. However, when their management deviates from scientific protocols, the intrinsic hazards of these chemicals pose significant threats to human life and property [5,6,7,8,9,10]. In recent years, the global safety situation of hazardous chemical production has remained critical and complex, with sporadic accidents involving hazardous chemicals continuing to occur. A multitude of scientists are exploring the etiological factors contributing to chemical accidents and formulating mitigative strategies [11,12,13,14,15]. Nevertheless, it appears that the potential of science and technology to enhance safety has not yet been fully realized [16,17,18]. Certain pivotal technologies critical to the safety of hazardous chemicals remain unmastered, and advanced management practices and technical approaches have not been comprehensively integrated into industrial operations [19,20,21,22,23,24,25]. Throughout the chemical life cycle, encompassing production, utilization, storage, distribution, transportation, and waste disposal, there persists an elevated risk of incidents including combustion, explosion, poisoning, and thermal burns. These risks are often attributable to inadequate handling and disposal practices [26,27,28,29,30,31]. And some accidents even trigger a domino effect, which increases the severity of the accident [32,33,34,35,36].

Consequently, the safety management of hazardous chemicals has emerged as a prominent international concern among global nations [26,37,38,39,40,41]. Extensive research has been conducted to identify the etiology of these accidents and devise corrective strategies, thereby advocating for the development of safety technologies and methodologies for hazardous chemicals. Additionally, various nations have established databases documenting such incidents to mitigate the frequency and severity of these occurrences [42,43,44,45,46,47,48]. Wang et al. conducted extensive and rigorous research on the occurrence of hazardous chemical incidents in China [2,15]. They analyzed the characteristics of hazardous chemical accidents during hot seasons in China from 1989 to 2019 and found that during the hot season, combustible materials and explosives caused the most accidents and could create a domino effect that could lead to other types of accidents. Duan et al. conducted an analysis of the causal factors and repercussions of chemical accidents precipitated by a spectrum of hazardous chemicals in China within the time frame from 2000 to 2006 [26]. It is noteworthy that a significant proportion, approximately 80%, of hazardous chemical accidents were recorded in small to medium-sized enterprises located along the economically advanced Southeast coastal regions. Zhang et al. introduced a comprehensive methodology designed to facilitate a holistic and thorough assessment of the standardization development status, future tasks, challenges, and sustainable development trajectories of China’s smart chemical industry parks (SCIPs) in their examination of SCIPs in China [31]. Kang et al. investigate chemical accidents that occurred between January 2008 and June 2018 in South Korea. They find that 76.1% of chemical accidents were caused by human error, highlighting the need to confirm safety work permits and safety protocols, since major accidents occurred during normal operations and maintenance processes. Small-scale enterprises experienced the most chemical accidents during normal operations, while large-scale enterprises experienced the largest number of industrial accidents during maintenance work [14].

Process safety management (PSM) encompasses the strategic prevention and control mechanisms designed to mitigate the risks and consequences of chemical incidents, such as conflagrations, detonations, and the escape of noxious substances, as well as other process-related mishaps [27,34,36,42].

Although numerous researchers have conducted extensive studies on chemical industrial park accidents, severe accidents exert a profound impact on individuals, enterprises, and local administrations, as the injuries and damages incurred being more severe, therefore, we need to invest more effort in paying attention to severe chemical incidents [16,49,50,51]. Nevertheless, there exists a relative dearth of case studies focusing on severe hazardous chemical incidents. The objective of this study is to dissect the severe chemical accidents in China, which were triggered by fires, explosions, and spillages, over the decade from 2010 to 2020. An analysis of the correlation between severe accidents and the elements of the PSM system is conducted. The study introduces the concept of the Future Intrinsically Safe Chemical Park (FISCP) and provides an in-depth examination and suggestions of several issues pertaining to the FISCP.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Data Collection

In this study, data pertaining to 150 severe accidents (Table S1) involving hazardous chemicals were derived from three primary sources: publicly released accident investigation reports by government authorities, the official website of the Ministry of Emergency Management of the People’s Republic of China (MEM), and the China Emergency Management (Work Safety) Yearbook compiled by the MEM. Relevant information about the Taixing Economic Development Zone (TEDZ) was collected by the authors through a multi-method approach, including field interviews and site visits, questionnaire surveys, and systematic document review. The TEDZ was selected as the research object in this study for the following three primary reasons. First, the TEDZ boasts an early construction history and a large industrial scale. Founded in 1991, the TEDZ is one of the first 13 provincial-level development zones in Jiangsu Province, with an initial planned area of 59.8 km². In 2002, it was accredited as the “China Fine Chemical (Taixing) Development Park” by the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation. In 2023, the TEDZ passed the re-verification for chemical industrial park qualification in Jiangsu Province, with a verified planned area of 21.91 km². Economically, the TEDZ achieved an industrial invoice sales volume of CNY 115 billion in 2023, representing a year-on-year growth of 1%; the output value of large-scale industrial enterprises reached CNY 124 billion, with a year-on-year increase of 1.2%. Its comprehensive competitiveness has been consistently strengthened, ranking among the top 10 chemical industrial parks in China for 11 consecutive years. Second, the TEDZ features a distinctive industrial chain. In recent years, the TEDZ has focused on the chloralkali and olefin industrial chains, continuously supplementing, strengthening, and extending these chains. This has led to the formation of a “1 + 2 + X” characteristic industrial system, where “1” refers to fine chemicals as the foundation, “2” denotes new materials and health and beauty (pharmaceuticals, daily chemicals) as the leading sectors, and “X” represents modern service industries as the support. The zone has established industrial chain clusters in chloralkali, olefins, pharmaceuticals, and daily chemicals, forming a development pattern characterized by “agglomeration of large-scale enterprises, concentration of competitive products, and clustering of leading industries.” It is a chemical industrial park in China that covers a relatively complete range of product categories, with fine chemicals as the dominant sector. Third, the TEDZ exhibits prominent inherent risks and high representativeness. Currently, the zone houses 182 major hazard sources, including 57 level I major hazard sources, involving substances such as liquid chlorine and propylene oxide. Among the 18 types of hazardous chemical processes specified by the former State Administration of Work Safety, 15 are present in the TEDZ. Meanwhile, the zone involves a variety of key supervised hazardous chemicals, basically covering all categories of hazardous chemicals listed in the Catalogue of Hazardous Goods (GB 6944-2025) [52]. Whether in terms of overall scale, industrial chain development, or inherent safety risks, the TEDZ demonstrates strong representativeness among chemical industrial parks in China.

Data related to other chemical industrial parks were obtained from peer-reviewed academic papers published by relevant researchers in the existing literature.

2.2. Methodology

A comprehensive and systematic approach was formulated to analyze severe chemical incidents, encompassing the analysis of causative factors, the assessment of chemical process safety, and the exploration of key issues and recommendations for the future development of inherently safe chemical industrial parks. This four-stage methodology, delineated in Figure 1, is designated as SAID.

2.2.1. Step 1: Comprehensive Survey of Severe Chemical Incidents

The inaugural phase of the study involves an examination of the prevailing incidence and characteristics of chemical-related accidents within the territory of China. The survey includes chemical accident trend analysis and accident levels.

2.2.2. Step 2: Analysis of Severe Chemical Accidents

The second step of the methodology aims to analyze the cause of severe chemical accidents. The contents of statistical analysis include the distribution of accidents and fatalities by province, accident scenario analysis, hazardous chemical analysis, and so on.

2.2.3. Step 3: Investigation of Chemical Process Safety Elements and Accidents

Chemical PSM constitutes a pivotal instrument in the safety management arsenal of scientific and industrial establishments. The methodology’s third phase is dedicated to scrutinizing the interplay between the elements of chemical process safety and exemplary severe accidents.

2.2.4. Step 4: Discourse on Pertinent Challenges and Prescriptive Measures for the Prospective Inherently Safe Chemical Industry Park

We have proposed the concept of the FISCP and discourse on pertinent challenges and prescriptive measures for the prospective FISCP.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1. Comprehensive Survey of Severe Chemical Incidents

3.1.1. Severe Chemical Accidents Trend Analysis

To delineate the actual circumstances of severe chemical incidents in China over the preceding 11-year period, Figure 2 illustrates the temporal progression of the accidents and fatalities associated with severe chemical accidents from the year 2010 to 2020. It is evident from Figure 2 that two distinct periods can be identified. (1) From 2010 to 2018, the annual number of severe chemical accidents remained approximately 15; (2) subsequently, this number has decreased to 10 since 2019, which is attributable to the three-year special rectification of hazardous chemicals. In 2020, there was a 20.0% reduction in the number of accidents and a 40.3% decrease in fatalities compared to the figures for 2010. The highest recorded numbers of accidents and fatalities in 2015 were 10 and 198 fewer, respectively, than those in 2020. The data suggests an improvement in safety within China’s chemical industry. However, the ratio of fatalities to accidents has been escalating, as indicated by the blue curve. For instance, a ratio of 3.35 was observed in 2016, which escalated to 11.7 in 2019, largely due to a catastrophic explosion at Tianjiayi, Yancheng, resulting from the mishandling of nitration waste. This incident underscores the dire consequences of a single chemical accident in China and the necessity for increased investment in the prevention of such serious incidents. This trend is further corroborated by the analysis of severe chemical accidents in other years. The 11-year temporal data clearly reflects the effectiveness of China’s regulatory interventions in the chemical industry; specifically, the three-year special rectification of hazardous chemicals implemented around 2019 has achieved a measurable reduction in the annual number of severe accidents and a cumulative decrease in total fatalities. This indicates that macro-level safety governance measures have laid a foundation for mitigating accident occurrence frequency.

3.1.2. Severe Accident Level Analysis

Severe accidents can be classified into three categories in accordance with the Chinese regulation Accident Report, Investigation, and Handling Regulations. The tremendous accident losses over 30 fatalities/over 100 serious injuries/over CNY 100 million direct economic damages are level I. A large accident that causes 10–30 fatalities, 50–100 serious injuries, or CNY 50–100 million direct economic losses is level II. Severe accident losses with 3–10 fatalities/10–50 serious injuries/CNY10–50 million direct economic damage are level III. According to Chinese regulations, the fatalities caused by different kinds of accidents from 2010 to 2020 are illustrated in Figure 3. In the years 2013, 2015, and 2019, the number of deaths was much higher than in other years, especially in 2015 and 2019, due to the tremendous accident that happened in Ruihai, Tianjin, in 2015, resulting in 165 fatalities. From 2010 to 2020, the fatalities caused by severe accidents decreased by 25 units (61.4%). However, larger accidents (II and I) increased in some years. At the same time, we also found that 2014, 2016, and 2020 were the years with the lowest number of fatalities, which was due to the fact that there were no larger accidents (II and I). This demonstrates that preventing level II and level I accidents is urgently needed to control more serious consequences. The data reveals a contrasting trajectory between severe accidents (level III) and larger accidents (levels I and II) over the 11-year period. The 61.4% reduction in level III fatalities suggests effective control measures targeting lower-severity incidents, likely driven by improved basic safety management in routine operations. In contrast, the sporadic increases in level I and II accidents highlight persistent vulnerabilities in managing high-risk scenarios with catastrophic potential.

3.1.3. Accident Analysis by Province

The safety level of China’s chemical industry varies across provinces, reflecting regional disparities. Figure 4 illustrates the provincial distribution of both incidents and fatalities associated with chemical accidents. As depicted in Figure 4, the provinces of Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Inner Mongolia, and Hebei collectively account for 43.5% of the nationwide total of chemical accidents, with fatalities in these provinces constituting 45.7% of the overall death toll. Shandong and Hebei provinces exhibit the highest incidence of severe chemical accidents in terms of absolute numbers, with Shandong also being home to the largest concentration of chemical enterprises in China. The accident rates in Jiangxi and Liaoning provinces are 4.1% and 7.5% of the national total, respectively, despite the chemical industry in these regions not being particularly prominent. In addition to Jiangsu and Shandong, Hebei also reports a high number of fatalities, largely attributed to a significant (level II) accident in Zhangjiakou in 2018, which resulted in 24 deaths. A similar pattern is observed in Tianjin, where a small number of incidents led to a disproportionately high number of fatalities. Guangdong’s chemical industry output is among the top three nationally, yet it has not experienced any severe chemical accidents to date. Shanghai, with a chemical accident incidence of 0.68% (ranking 25th), has a significantly lower accident rate compared to its national ranking in chemical industry output. The data further indicates that the chemical safety level in less developed regions, such as Liaoning and Mongolia, is comparatively lower than in more developed areas, like Guangdong and Shanghai. Therefore, more attention should be paid to provinces that have established large chemical industries in less developed areas. The lower safety levels in less developed regions (e.g., Liaoning, Inner Mongolia) compared to more developed areas (e.g., Guangdong, Shanghai) imply that economic development status may correlate with safety capacity, including investment in safety infrastructure, technical innovation, and professional talent. This finding underscores the necessity of targeted safety interventions in less developed regions with large chemical industries, such as strengthening regulatory oversight, promoting technology upgrading, and enhancing cross-regional safety collaboration to narrow the regional safety gap.

3.1.4. Analysis of Accident Scenarios

Figure 5 presents the distribution of scenarios for severe chemical accidents. Explosion is the most common scenario (54.8%), followed by toxic release (28.8%) and fire (6.8%). Many severe chemical accidents cause explosions, fire, poisoning, and other serious consequences. For example, the most tremendous accident occurred on 21 March 2019 in Yancheng, resulting in 78 deaths, 76 injuries, and huge property losses. Although asphyxiation accounts for only 4.8% of these serious chemical accidents, there are always multiple deaths (one after the other) during blind rescues, so asphyxiation should not be ignored. For instance, on 9 April 2018, a suffocation incident occurred in Shanxi. After one individual succumbed to suffocation and lost consciousness, two others attempted a rescue without proper caution, leading to the tragic outcome of three fatalities. Generally, many accidents are related to multiple scenarios. “Explosion to fire” incidents are frequent. These incidents happened in both large and small industries; regardless of the size of the enterprise, intense attention and perfect supervision are necessary.

3.1.5. Analysis of Accident Origin

The origin of accidents can be categorized into the following eight classes: inspection and maintenance, operation, test run, start–stop, project (technical) construction, warehouse, transfer, and others. Figure 6 delineates the distribution of accident origins. The majority of incidents occur during inspection and maintenance phases, followed by operational activities, testing, and driving and parking events. Consequently, inspection and maintenance are identified as the most hazardous tasks, while routine operations are frequently overlooked by operators, potentially leading to fatalities. Furthermore, 8.7% of accidents transpire during start-up phases, implying the necessity for heightened vigilance and the implementation of decisive measures to mitigate the risks associated with these processes.

3.1.6. Hazardous Chemical Analysis

Over forty hazardous chemicals have been implicated in severe chemical accidents. Hydrogen sulfide emerges as the primary agent in the majority of these incidents, representing 13.8% of the total. Furthermore, coal gas, hydrogen, and vinyl chloride are significant contributors, followed by carbon monoxide and nitrogen, as depicted in Figure 7. Although nitrogen is commonly employed as a protective atmosphere, it can also cause suffocation if used carelessly and in high concentrations in confined spaces. Notably, vinyl chloride, a toxic and flammable gas, was the cause of a major firecracker accident on 28 November 2018 in Hebei. The accident, stemming from a vinyl chloride leak, resulted in 24 fatalities, 21 injuries, and substantial property damage. This clustering suggests that targeted risk management strategies for these priority substances could significantly mitigate the overall incidence of severe chemical accidents, as their inherent hazards (e.g., toxicity, flammability, asphyxiant properties) make them disproportionately responsible for catastrophic outcomes.

3.1.7. Direct Cause of the Severe Chemical Accidents

As illustrated in Figure 8, unsafe human behavior is identified as the predominant cause of severe chemical accidents, constituting 72%. This category encompasses special operations, improper operations, and illegal commands. The absence of adequate safety awareness education and the enhancement of safety skills among employees are contributing factors. Confined space operations and hot work account for up to 91% of special operational accidents, with 56% and 35% attributed to each, respectively. This underscores the necessity for heightened vigilance regarding confined spaces and hot work within the context of special operations. It is imperative that work not commence unless the technology is disclosed, the working environment is deemed safe, security control measures are in place, and a supervisor is on duty. During the production operation phase, improper operation accidents constitute 53% of the accidents, while process defects contribute to 22% of the accidents. Consequently, the safety of process operations is at the crux of our concerns. Enterprises are advised to initiate HAZOP analysis and establish standard creation and operation protocols as the foundation, thereby continuously strengthening the fundamental management of process safety. The proportion of process design defects is as high as 12%, highlighting the imperative for safe design practices. It is essential to select a reputable design institute that rigorously scrutinizes the process origins within the enterprise. This highlights that human-centric interventions, such as targeted training programs for high-risk operations, strict enforcement of operational protocols, and accountability mechanisms for illegal command, should be prioritized in safety management systems, as addressing human vulnerabilities can yield the most significant reduction in accident incidence.

3.1.8. Time Distribution of Accidents

As depicted in Figure 9, the months of January, April, July, and November are characterized by a heightened frequency of accidents. Notably, April exhibits the most concentrated distribution of incidents. This trend is attributed to the period when enterprises are actively resuming operations and prioritizing output and economic gains over safety. Consequently, there is a tendency to relegate production safety to a secondary concern, which results in the neglect of stringent adherence to operational protocols and regulatory compliance. Additionally, July experiences a peak in accidents due to the elevated temperatures that are not mitigated by adequate cooling and preventive measures, which can cause flammable and explosive gases to ignite. During this month, many enterprises opt to cease production for inspection and maintenance, leading to an increase in high-risk operations, such as hot work and confined space activities, thereby acutely escalating the potential for accidents. This time-based clustering indicates that accident risks are not uniformly distributed across the year but are closely linked to specific operational phases and environmental conditions, providing a critical evidence base for developing time-targeted safety intervention strategies.

In order to comprehensively analyze severe chemical accidents in-depth, a fishbone diagram was used, as shown in Figure 10. The fishbone diagram provides a visual, numerical analysis of chemical accidents in China. We have annotated some key indicators and their score analysis in the fishbone diagram. Collectively, the diagram reveals that severe chemical accidents result from intertwined human, technical, and temporal factors, providing a scientific basis for targeted interventions such as strengthening inspection protocols, enhancing operator training, and implementing seasonal risk controls.

3.2. Relationship Between Severe Accidents and Elements of Chemical Process Safety

As indicated in Figure 11 and Table S2, while minor variations exist in PSM elements across countries, each system exhibits unique characteristics. A common feature of these PSM frameworks is the inclusion of process hazard analysis, training, mechanical integrity, change management, incident management (investigation), and compliance review—underscoring the core role of these six elements in chemical process safety management. Additionally, elements identified as accident-related in previous analyses (e.g., hot work, contractor management, operating procedures, and pre-commissioning safety inspections) are incorporated into the PSM systems of China, the United States, and South Korea. This study focuses on the correlation between accidents and PSM from the following six dimensions.

• Process Hazard Analysis. Chemical facilities handling hazardous materials or implementing high-risk processes inherently involve hazardous factors such as high temperature, high pressure, toxicity, and leakage. Process hazard analysis refers to the identification and assessment of potential hazards in production processes using scientific and effective analytical methods; a comprehensive risk assessment is essential for mitigating these hazards. Common analytical methods include the checklist method, what-if analysis, hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies, and failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). Analysis of 150 severe accidents reveals that 57.3% of indirect causes were attributed to inadequate risk identification. For example, during the crude oil tank explosion at the Liaoyang Petrochemical Branch of China National Petroleum Corporation, workers used iron tools and standard lighting equipment during tank cleaning operations, failing to recognize the ignition risk of combustible gases. Therefore, mastering process hazard analysis techniques and identifying effective protective measures are critical for reducing the frequency and severity of accidents.
• Training. Training is a core element of process safety management, with specific requirements established by numerous countries and regulatory authorities. For instance, the Occupational Safety and Health Law mandates that enterprises and production units provide safety education and training to employees. The former State Administration of Work Safety issued regulations on enterprise safety training, requiring the establishment of safety training systems in compliance with relevant laws and administrative regulations. Many accident investigation reports cite insufficient personnel training or poor training quality as indirect causes of accidents. Among the 150 severe accidents analyzed in this study, 85.5% involved training-related issues. A typical case is the “1.6” gas poisoning accident at Xinjiang Dahuangshan Hongji Coke Co., Ltd. The investigation report identified the inexperience of frontline managers and employees (mostly new recruits from colleges and vocational schools) and their lack of on-site operational practice as indirect causes. Thus, improving the effectiveness and quality of chemical safety training is an urgent priority for chemical enterprises.
• Mechanical Integrity. Mechanical integrity covers the entire lifecycle of equipment, including installation, operation, maintenance, repair, inspection, and disposal. When selecting equipment, enterprises must choose products with high reliability, excellent performance, and low maintenance needs that comply with legal and regulatory requirements. Meanwhile, routine maintenance of equipment should be strengthened. A major explosion occurred in the air separation unit of Yima Co., Ltd. (Sanmenxia, China) on 19 July 2019, resulting in 15 fatalities (caused by glass fragments and heavy objects impacted by the explosion shockwave). The root cause was the failure to promptly address a leak, which allowed oxygen-enriched gas to infiltrate perlite, leading to low-temperature embrittlement of the cold box support frame and panels. Under overpressure conditions, a violent “sandstorm-like” sand ejection event occurred, ultimately causing the cold box to collapse.
• Change Management. Improper modifications may introduce new hazards and even trigger accidents. A typical example is the 2013 hydrogen sulfide poisoning incident in Gansu, which resulted from unapproved modifications to key processes, equipment, and facilities. The newly added drying equipment lacked comprehensive verification; without a formal design and due to unauthorized technical modifications, inherent risks and hazardous factors of the process could not be fully identified, and no contingency plan was developed for potential failures of the induced draft fan shutdown. When modifying process technologies, equipment, procedures, or organizational structures, strict adherence to a management system is essential. The core objective of change management is to ensure that all modifications undergo thorough evaluation before implementation—with associated risks identified, analyzed, and controlled—to maintain process integrity during the transition. Enterprises must establish a scientific and streamlined change management system, with particular focus on risk analysis of modifications. During the implementation phase, pre-modification safety inspections, training for affected personnel, and updates to diagrams and documents are also indispensable.
• Accident and Incident Management. Every incident or accident arises from one or more root causes. Identifying these causes and promptly improving corporate management not only prevents recurrence of similar accidents but also mitigates the risk of other potential incidents. Thus, incident management is essentially a proactive accident prevention strategy. The Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Production Safety Accidents require accident investigations to adhere to the principles of scientific rigor, legal compliance, fact-based analysis, and practical effectiveness. Throughout the investigation process, detailed inspection and comprehensive analysis of the production process and accident site are necessary—these efforts also contribute to the optimization of operating procedures and safety management. Therefore, enterprises should conduct in-depth investigation and analysis of minor incidents with the same rigor as severe accidents.
• Compliance Review. Compliance review plays a critical role in identifying deficiencies in an enterprise’s process safety management system through continuous monitoring and evaluation during risk management. Distinct from routine safety inspections, this element is an integral part of the overall safety management framework. The primary goal of compliance review is to ensure the effective implementation and continuous improvement of other system elements, thereby achieving the overarching objective of preventing major accidents. By conducting rigorous compliance reviews, organizations can verify the effectiveness of safety measures and implement data-driven improvements to their process safety management systems.

Figure 12 delineates the systematic interconnections between core PSM elements and direct causes of severe chemical accidents, the colorful lines indicate a causal relationship between the two parties. Six pivotal management dimensions, Process Hazard Analysis, Training, Mechanical Integrity, Change Management, Accident Management, and Compliance Review, are linked to five key accident causes: Improper Operation, Confined Space Incidents, Hot Work Hazards, Process Design Defects, and Illegal Command. Notably, Process Hazard Analysis exhibits multi-faceted relevance, intersecting with nearly all accident causes, underscoring its foundational role in proactively identifying and mitigating risks. Training emerges as critical for addressing Confined Space and Improper Operation risks, emphasizing the necessity of competency-building for personnel. Mechanical Integrity and Change Management converge on Hot Work and Process Design Defects, highlighting the importance of equipment reliability and rigorous change control in preventing technical failures. Accident Management and Compliance Review span multiple causes, reflecting their roles in post-incident learning and regulatory adherence. Collectively, this mapping illustrates that chemical process safety hinges on integrated management across these domains, with each element addressing specific risk vectors. It provides a structured framework for developing holistic safety strategies, guiding organizations to allocate resources toward the most impactful interventions for reducing accident likelihood and severity.

3.3. Several Issues Regarding the Future Inherently Safe Chemical Industry Park

3.3.1. Systemic Risk Management Continues to Face Significant Challenges

• The overall risk assessment of the park lacks precision and scientific rigor. Although regular comprehensive risk assessments are conducted as mandated for accreditation of chemical industrial parks, there is an objective tendency to merely aggregate the risks of all enterprises without adequately accounting for the interplay among product categories, production processes, mutual material safeguards, emergency response capabilities, and other factors. The analysis of domino effects, project admission and exit criteria, supporting functional facilities, and integrated management of safety production and emergency response lacks detail and a systematic approach, failing to provide precise decision support for the park’s overall planning and project attraction strategies.
• The quality and effectiveness of major hazard source control need enhancement. Taking the Taixing Economic and Technological Development Zone as an example, there are 47 enterprises constituting 193 major hazard sources, including 86 first- and second-level major hazard sources, accounting for 44.6%. Over the past three years, the total number of major hazard sources in the park has increased by 39, with 38 added in 2023 alone. Based on this trend, the number of major hazard sources in the park may exceed 250 by the end of 2030. The rapid growth of major hazard sources exacerbates the difficulty of risk management.
• Industrial linkage is insufficiently tight. A few chemical industrial park enterprises have weak internal circulation, which increases road transportation, loading and unloading, and storage links for hazardous chemicals, raising the absolute value of risk points and thereby increasing the overall safety risk of the park to some extent. There is a lack of unified coordination and consultation mechanisms between enterprises and industries, and the theoretical design values of product correlation have not been implemented in actual production, making it difficult to control overall industrial risks.

3.3.2. Weaknesses in Basic Infrastructure Construction

• The quality and efficiency of closed management within the industrial park need further improvement. In recent years, closed management has become a rigid benchmark for park management. However, research indicates that the scope of closed management areas is extensive, with insufficient ground patrol forces and limited coverage of electronic parking violation capture points. Some enterprises within the park have a weak awareness of risk prevention and proactivity, leading to disorderly vehicle parking in their proprietary areas. The operation and maintenance team for closed management, as well as their training, need to be enhanced, as there is a lack of uniformity in policy enforcement and inconsistent service quality. There is also a delay in feedback regarding equipment malfunctions and errors, which hinders the smooth operation of checkpoints, affecting work efficiency and quality. A mature management system for temporary vehicle entry has not yet been established, leaving room for management gaps.
• The management of hazardous chemicals in dedicated parking lots within the park needs further improvement. Dedicated parking lots are an essential requirement for the high-quality development of chemical industrial parks. Taking the park in the author’s region as an example, there are approximately 700 hazardous chemical vehicles entering and exiting daily, with peaks reaching over 1000 vehicles. Thirty-two percent of these vehicles require parking, yet the park currently has only two dedicated parking lots with 102 parking spaces, including only 17 spaces for heavy vehicles, which is insufficient. The overall management of the parking lots also has weaknesses, with an inadequate liaison and scheduling mechanism with related enterprises. Due to insufficient internal scheduling by enterprises, heavy vehicles may accumulate in the dedicated parking lots, creating short-term congregation risks. Moreover, the hazardous chemicals loaded on heavy vehicles vary, and the superposition of various risk factors could lead to extremely serious consequences and great rescue difficulties in the event of an accident.
• The layout of utility corridors and pipelines needs to be optimized. The internal utility corridors of a chemical park are the lifelines of the park. In the park in the author’s region, for example, there are approximately 58 km of utility corridors (with about 42 km of public utility corridors) and 256 pipelines, mainly transporting 29 types of hazardous chemicals such as liquid chlorine, hydrogen, propane, ethylene, propylene, epoxy ethylene, ethanol, butanol, and nitrogen. Some pipelines built by enterprises are arranged in a crisscross pattern, with power lines, signal lines, and other weak wires mounted indiscriminately, slow renewal of old pipelines, and utility corridors operating at full capacity, increasing the risk factor.
• Non-production functions within the park are redundant and complex. The majority of chemical enterprises have established non-production facilities, such as office buildings and canteens. In the author’s park, for instance, there are 24 chemical companies with 162 employee dormitories, 105 with office buildings, 65 with staff canteens (44 of which utilize open gas flames), and 70 with storage areas. The park can accommodate a peak of 13,000 vehicles, with traffic on the three main access roads reaching 6000 vehicles during peak times. The concentration of people, goods, and vehicles increases the regional risk factor and hinders the safe development of the park.

3.3.3. Insufficient Robustness in Information Technology Support

• The operational quality and efficiency of the smart park platform need further improvement. As the development of smart parks progresses, most have implemented intelligent management platforms. However, it has been observed that these platforms require further functional optimization. The video AI analysis systems are not yet refined, leading to numerous false alarms and ineffective early warning systems.
• The application of enterprise “double prevention” platforms needs to be further strengthened. Some enterprises have not organized all employees to conduct a comprehensive and full-process analysis and identification of risks and dangerous factors in all aspects of production processes and safety management. The identification of risks is incomplete. Upon comprehensive analysis of the risks self-checked by enterprises, it is common to find perfunctory self-checks. Enterprises have not conducted comprehensive inspections from the aspects of systems, management, national standards, and inspection guidelines.
• The operational quality and efficiency of automated control and safety instrumentation systems are suboptimal. Firstly, there is a disparity in the level of automation control. Some enterprises have not achieved a high degree of full-process automation control, and there are still gaps between the control measures for key regulated hazardous chemicals and national policy documents, especially with the latest regulations. Some enterprises are slow to respond and are unable to immediately undertake equipment and facility updates and modifications. Secondly, the management of automated alarm systems is not comprehensive. Although some enterprises have established a “five-in-one” platform, there are issues with untimely alarm handling and incomplete resolution of false alarms.

3.3.4. The Emergency Response System Requires Further Optimization and Improvement

• The emergency command system is not fully developed. The emergency response to incidents in the hazardous chemicals field is sometimes limited by professional capabilities and other factors, affecting its scientific nature. In some places, there is no unified platform for information sharing and integrated communication during on-site emergency response, leading to unsmooth emergency command and dispatch, and a lack of agility in response, thus affecting the efficiency of handling.

3.3.5. Refining Management Capabilities to Meet Higher Standards

• The risk base of hot work operations is high, with significant safety risks. Inspection and maintenance are often accompanied by hot work. In the author’s park, for instance, at the peak of inspection and maintenance, there are about 50 hot operations a day. Accidents and incidents occasionally occur due to hot work operations.
• There are deficiencies in the management of inspection and maintenance operations. According to many accident investigation reports, contractors’ inspection and maintenance plans are not standardized, technical briefings are not comprehensive, and violations occur from time to time.

3.3.6. Improvement in Many Other Detailed Aspects

• The regulatory capacity for hazardous chemical enterprises at ports is weak. Many parks have port terminals that support the park. Taking the author’s park as an example, there are three hazardous chemical storage enterprises at the port, with a total of 109 storage tanks and a capacity of 364,350 cubic meters, involving nine level-one major hazard sources and one level-four major hazard source. Only two regulatory personnel are responsible for safety supervision in the port area, and neither has a background in chemical engineering, which is insufficient to meet safety supervision needs.
• Chemical training bases have not fully played their expected role. As a supporting facility for the park, a few chemical training bases are limited by economic and other factors; the construction of chemical training bases is relatively slow, and in some regions, the teaching faculty is relatively weak.

3.4. Future Intrinsically Safe Chemical Park Model

In 2022, the Safety Production Committee of China promulgated the “14th Five-Year Plan for National Safety Production,” which outlines key focuses for safety production in sectors such as hazardous chemicals during the “14th Five-Year Plan” period. The plan proposes the construction of a number of inherently safe chemical parks and large-scale oil and gas storage bases and advocates for the digital and intelligent transformation of hazardous chemical safety. What constitutes an inherently safe chemical park? Based on the aforementioned multi-dimensional and multi-perspective analysis of severe chemical accidents, coupled with the research data from the Taixing Economic and Technological Development Zone and other chemical industrial parks documented in the existing literature, this study proposes the FSCIP model. And we posit that a future inherently safe park should encompass six aspects: controllable systemic risks, robust infrastructure, intelligence and information, scientific emergency response, refined management, and coordinated efforts from various departments. Figure 13 shows the features and elements of the FISCP. Based on an analysis of 150 severe accidents and a survey of some chemical parks conducted by the author, a detailed analysis of several issues currently facing chemical parks has been conducted from these six aspects, along with recommendations for improvement.

The differences between this model and the existing smart park and PSM frameworks primarily lie in the following three aspects. First, it places greater emphasis on risk prevention and control. The first core element of the FSCIP model is “systematic risk”, which is proposed based on a comprehensive consideration of prominent issues in current industrial parks, such as weak inter-enterprise correlation and inaccurate risk assessment. This element not only encompasses the process risks addressed in PSM but also integrates park-level holistic risks, cross-enterprise adjacent risks, and other systemic hazards. Second, it attaches enhanced importance to the basic infrastructure construction of industrial parks. With the continuous expansion of the number of enterprises in chemical industrial parks, the role of basic infrastructure has become increasingly critical. Closed-loop park management ensures the normal, safe, and orderly operation of the park, while rationalized pipeline corridors facilitate efficient and secure material transportation among intra-park enterprises. Third, it highlights port safety management—a dimension not adequately covered by existing smart park frameworks or PSM. Port terminals serve as essential supporting facilities for chemical industrial parks. Given that terminals store large quantities of hazardous chemicals, their safety is indispensable to the overall safety of the entire park, and their significance is self-evident. The incorporation of the above three aspects enriches the connotation of chemical industrial park safety management and provides a scientific and refined guidance framework for the effective safety governance of chemical industrial parks.

3.5. Countermeasures and Suggestions

3.5.1. Systemic Risk Management

Based on existing safety risk assessment guidelines for chemical industrial parks, we should adopt a more scientific evaluation method to conduct a comprehensive and systematic safety risk assessment of the park. We must determine the acceptable level of overall safety risk for the chemical industrial park and further optimize the park’s development layout in alignment with its distinctive industrial system construction goals. We must reserve sufficient space to meet safety risk control requirements and prevent risk accumulation. Additionally, we must employ digital and informational technologies for dynamic monitoring to continually enhance and upgrade the park. We must develop tailored reduction plans for each enterprise based on the status of major hazard sources in the park. By reducing or optimizing storage, consolidating storage locations, adjusting storage areas, etc., we can decrease the number and lower the level of major hazard sources. We must enhance connectivity and internal circulation to optimize operational and supply chain processes, thereby reducing significant hazard sources in storage units. We must balance development and safety in project attraction, avoiding the blind pursuit of “large projects” while neglecting the analysis and judgment of inherent risks, such as major hazard sources, during the early stages of project attraction.

3.5.2. Basic Infrastructure Construction

We must integrate the efforts of various functional departments within the chemical park to establish a unified closed management patrol team, and utilize park-wide AR technology, closed management systems, and surveillance videos for online video patrols to significantly enhance the efficiency of closed management, improving the entry and exit management system. Initially, we must implement appointment-based management for temporary visitor vehicles during specific times and gradually move towards full appointment-based entry for temporary visitors. We must develop a comprehensive management system for ordinary cargo vehicles and other vehicles based on the park’s actual conditions to achieve comprehensive vehicle control. We must strengthen vehicle parking management by comprehensively understanding the media loaded on vehicles, parking duration, specific destinations, etc. We must strictly maintain parking distances for vehicles with materials that may interact with each other to ensure the safe parking of hazardous chemical vehicles. We must organize professional institutions to strengthen risk assessment of pipelines mounted on utility corridors, optimize planning and layout, and raise the entry threshold for pipelines mounted on utility corridors. Efforts should be directed towards guiding enterprises to gradually reduce administrative (living), storage, and parking functions in a steady and orderly fashion to decrease population density. We must integrate with the broader urban public transportation network and develop a robust internal public transportation system within the park to enhance the internal mobility of personnel. This will further reduce the number of private vehicles and significantly enhance the inherent safety standards of the chemical park.

3.5.3. Intelligence

We must develop video AI intelligent analysis models and entrust professional teams to develop special operation intelligent analysis models. We must warn against behaviors such as smoking and starting a fire. We must achieve timely closed-loop disposal of early warnings through system pop-ups, audio, and light alarms. We must strengthen the application of the enterprise double prevention system. We must conduct double prevention mechanism training for enterprises, enhance risk identification, and continuously consolidate the construction of the double prevention mechanism. We must expand the scope of the double prevention mechanism construction. On the basis of all major hazard source enterprises having completed the construction of double prevention platforms, we must urge non-major hazard source enterprises involving high-risk processes within the park to build digital double prevention mechanism systems and effectively apply them. We must improve the alarm response and early warning mechanisms, reduce the number of false alarms, eliminate the proliferation of alarms, and systematically enhance the level of alarm management in enterprises, effectively preventing and resolving major safety risks.

3.5.4. Emergency Response

Firstly, we must strengthen the construction and management of fire brigades to build a team with solid theoretical and practical knowledge and strong adaptability. We must cultivate interdisciplinary talents to ensure everyone is familiar with typical chemical process knowledge. Secondly, we must further improve the supporting fire infrastructure in the chemical park by adding nitrogen-making vehicles, high-power long-distance water supply vehicles, specialized emergency rescue vehicles for hazardous chemical accidents, efficient foam water tank vehicles, and large communication command vehicles. We must enhance the ability to extinguish and control initial fires and achieve full coverage of regional fire rescue forces.

3.5.5. Refining Management

We must control the increase in hot work operations strictly. We must encourage enterprises to refrain from hot work on weekends and prohibit it during holidays. We must encourage enterprises to adopt measures such as prefabrication, followed by installation and physical hard isolation, to reduce the frequency and risk of hot work. We must strengthen contractor management and guide inspection and maintenance operations. We must supervise enterprises to carefully formulate and strictly implement inspection and maintenance plan requirements, conduct safety condition confirmation and technical briefings before operations, strengthen risk identification, and improve emergency procedures.

3.5.6. Other Detailed Aspects

We must strengthen the safety supervision capacity in the port area through public recruitment and internal transfers to ensure that personnel and expertise meet requirements. We must carry out special service guidance to urge hazardous chemicals enterprises at ports. Chemical training bases should center on the requirements of the comprehensive assessment letter from the Emergency Department and improve the internal operation and management system. We must expand the teaching staff, build a course evaluation system to evaluate teaching plans, courseware, and implementation processes, and propose analytical suggestions for improvement to better meet enterprise needs.

4. Conclusions

The number of accidents and fatalities in China has decreased; however, the consequences of individual chemical accidents in China have become more severe. The level of chemical safety is lower in less developed areas than in developed areas. Explosion is the most common scenario (54.8%), followed by toxic release (28.8%) and fire (6.8%) among severe accidents. Most of the accidents originated from a lack of inspection and maintenance. More than forty hazardous chemicals are linked to severe chemical accidents. Hydrogen sulfide is the culprit in most accidents. Unsafe human behavior is the main cause of severe chemical accidents, accounting for 72%. January, April, July, and November are the periods of high accident incidence.

Common features of these PSM frameworks are the inclusion of process hazard analysis, training, mechanical integrity, change management, incident management (investigation), and compliance review, underscoring the core role of these six elements in chemical process safety management. Chemical process safety hinges on integrated management across domains, with each element addressing specific risk vectors. It provides a structured framework for developing holistic safety strategies, guiding organizations to allocate resources toward the most impactful interventions for reducing accident likelihood and severity.

Future inherently safe chemical industrial parks encompass six aspects: controllable systemic risks, sound infrastructure, intelligent and informationalized systems, scientific emergency response, refined management, and coordinated efforts from multiple departments. This study provides insights for risk management of chemical parks, guiding future research and policy decisions.