# Monopolistic Insurance and the Value of Information

## Abstract

**:**

## 1. Introduction

## 2. Insurance Contracting under Monopoly

^{t}, c

^{t}] taken exclusively by those in risk class t earns the insurer a per-customer profit equal to the contract’s expected value,

## 3. Symmetric Information

**Lemma 1:**

**Proposition 1:**

**Proposition 2:**

## 4. Asymmetric Information

**Proposition 3:**

**Proposition 4:**

**Corollary 1:**

## 5. The Social Value of Information

#### 5.1 The Social Value of Symmetric Information

**Proposition 5:**

#### 5.2 The Social Value of Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Information

**Lemma 2:**

**Proposition 6:**

^{a}in Equations (18), (22), and (23), so the difference in social welfare between symmetric and asymmetric information is

## 6. Conclusions

## Acknowledgments

## Conflicts of Interest

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**MDPI and ACS Style**

Snow, A.
Monopolistic Insurance and the Value of Information. *Risks* **2015**, *3*, 277-289.
https://doi.org/10.3390/risks3030277

**AMA Style**

Snow A.
Monopolistic Insurance and the Value of Information. *Risks*. 2015; 3(3):277-289.
https://doi.org/10.3390/risks3030277

**Chicago/Turabian Style**

Snow, Arthur.
2015. "Monopolistic Insurance and the Value of Information" *Risks* 3, no. 3: 277-289.
https://doi.org/10.3390/risks3030277