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Article

Dynamics of Oil Markets Amid Financial Distress Among Small Firms in the Energy Industry

by
Salem Al Mustanyir
Department of Accounting and Finance, Cork University Business School, University College Cork, T12 K8AF Cork, Ireland
Risks 2026, 14(4), 80; https://doi.org/10.3390/risks14040080
Submission received: 20 February 2026 / Revised: 20 March 2026 / Accepted: 24 March 2026 / Published: 1 April 2026
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Corporate Governance and Risk Management at Financial Institutions)

Abstract

This research examines market reactions to financial distress announcements by small privately held Canadian oil firms operating in the upstream sector between 2015 and 2021, employing an event study methodology, with daily spot prices for Brent and WTI crude oil serving as market benchmarks. The sample includes 11 firms that filed for insolvency, giving 99 observations for analysis. Data were collected from the publicly available Haynes Boone repository, ensuring transparency and verifiability. Abnormal returns were computed using market-adjusted returns to control for general market movements, isolating event-specific effects. The findings reveal statistically significant yet modest abnormal returns around the announcement day, indicating a measured market reaction. These results indicate that investors may partially anticipate such events and interpret them as potential restructuring opportunities rather than indicators of sector-wide collapse. The study underscores the importance of transparent disclosure and structured legal frameworks in moderating market volatility during financial distress. While the analysis is confined to short-term effects and small firms, it provides valuable insights into how financial distress in small upstream oil firms influences commodity markets, contributing new evidence to the literature on event studies and financial distress in energy markets, and offers implications for policymakers aiming to enhance market stability.
JEL Classification:
Q41; Q43; G33; G14

1. Introduction

In today’s interconnected global economy, experiencing accelerating technological disruption, shifting policy landscapes, and intensifying systemic interdependencies (Srebro et al. 2021), firms across a wide range of sectors are increasingly exposed to financial pressures that may culminate in insolvency. In this context, insolvency represents more than a legal or procedural resolution; it is a structural rupture that underscores a firm’s inability to sustain operations or fulfill its financial commitments (Casey et al. 1984; Ullah et al. 2021; Voda et al. 2021). Although legal frameworks codify the dissolution of financially distressed firms, the broader economic repercussions of insolvency often unfold well beyond the courtroom. These events can distort credit allocation, trigger shifts in investor confidence, disrupt supply networks, and generate sector-wide volatility—particularly when they occur in industries of systemic importance (Kitowski et al. 2022; Muslim and Dasril 2021; Sari et al. 2022).
The oil sector is uniquely exposed to financial and operational risks associated with oil price volatility, geopolitical tensions, and demand fluctuations. Oil, a cornerstone of the global energy mix and accounting for approximately 30% of primary energy consumption in 2024 (IEA 2024), plays a central role in shaping macroeconomic conditions, trade balances, and financial markets. Its susceptibility to geopolitical tensions, price shocks, and demand volatility makes it a focal point for both policymakers and markets (Baumeister and Hamilton 2019; Liu et al. 2019; Mensi et al. 2020; Tang et al. 2021; Wei et al. 2019; Yin and Ma 2018). While much of the analytical and regulatory focus has centered on large, publicly listed oil majors, a significant share of oil production—particularly in Canada, the world’s fourth-largest oil producer and third-largest exporter (Elder 2021)—originates from small, unlisted firms.
Data from industry analyses by the Canadian Energy Centre indicate that a large majority of Canada’s oil and gas companies are classified as small businesses, with approximately 96% of firms employing fewer than 100 employees and less than 1% constituting large enterprises, reflecting the preponderance of smaller producers in the oil and gas sector (Venkatachalam et al. 2020). When considering operated production, data for small private oil producers in Canada, an aggregation of output from roughly 10 small private companies, represent about 10% of total national crude production, indicating that small firms play a material role within the Canadian oil supply base (Young 2020). This significant share highlights that financial distress among such firms is not limited to marginal participants but involves entities whose production can influence supply expectations, market sentiment, and, consequently, pricing dynamics in global oil markets.
Despite the fact that these entities operate beyond the scope of securities regulation and formal market disclosure requirements, they remain deeply intertwined with the financial system through private lending, lease-based financing, and derivative exposures (Bryce and Ritchie 2024). Their vulnerabilities are therefore not only financial but also systemic, with the potential to propagate shocks into oil supply chains and pricing dynamics.
Between 2015 and 2021, insolvencies among Canadian small unlisted oil firms contributed to an estimated $1 billion in debt exposure (Boone 2022), placing strain on creditors and financial intermediaries while also raising questions about their role in oil market stability. These firms are often embedded in complex contractual frameworks that amplify the transmission of financial distress. Despite their size or visibility, the collapse of such firms can curtail regional production, trigger logistical bottlenecks, and influence short-term price dynamics, particularly in supply-constrained environments. However, these mechanisms have received limited empirical scrutiny.
Although a growing body of literature addresses insolvency forecasting and firm-level financial diagnostics (Kitowski et al. 2022; Máté et al. 2023; Muslim and Dasril 2021; Muzani and Yuliana 2021; Ullah et al. 2021), far less attention has been paid to the consequences of insolvency within energy-intensive industries such as oil. Research has tended to focus on topics such as tax-motivated restructuring (Ricca et al. 2021), earnings management across corporate life cycles (Durana et al. 2021), and sector-specific risks in agriculture or manufacturing (Vavrek et al. 2021). Complementary work has explored legal frameworks and insolvency-related vulnerabilities in emerging financial ecosystems, including digital assets (Fauzia et al. 2022; Ji et al. 2022; Kozlovskyi et al. 2022; Prusak et al. 2022; Suryati et al. 2022).
In light of research on market perspectives and cross-sectoral effects, empirical research shows that firm-level financial distress can propagate measurable effects across markets, influencing asset prices, correlations, and broader systemic stability (Bhattacharyya and Kasa 2018; Issa et al. 2024; Liu et al. 2019; Prusak and Potrykus 2021). While commodity market shocks, particularly in oil and gas, can affect firm stability by increasing default probabilities and raising financing costs (Degl’Innocenti et al. 2025; Maghyereh and Al-Zoubi 2025), the primary focus of this study is the transmission from small firms’ financial distress to oil market behavior. This focus emphasizes that distress in small energy firms can shift supply expectations, market positioning, and investor sentiment in observable, discrete ways, with effects amplified through financial intermediaries and derivative markets. Regulatory and investor attention is particularly sensitive to such corporate distress, making firm-driven events a clear signal for market reactions (Tao et al. 2025).
To further understand insolvency transmission mechanisms, examining insolvency announcements in other sectors is important, as they reveal potential channels through which financial distress propagates to markets. For example, behavioral responses have been identified as a key pathway, with sentiment shifts, herding, and overreactions shaping investor decisions in response to both early distress signals and formal disclosures (Khan et al. 2024; Tao and Shao 2025). An informational channel transmits insolvency signals through analyst reports, financial statements, media, and corporate disclosures, prompting investors to reassess supply, demand, and firm-specific risks, thereby affecting pricing and trading activity (De Blasis et al. 2024; Kallenos et al. 2025). Liquidity channels further amplify these effects, as sector-wide strains influence portfolio adjustments and price reactions that can propagate across broader markets (Michalkova and Ponisciakova 2025; Vukčević et al. 2024). In the oil sector, insolvencies of individual firms can alter supply perceptions, investor risk assessments, and market positioning, affecting perceived market tightness even before operational changes occur. These mechanisms motivate the empirical examination of the relationship between firm distress and oil market outcomes.
In the context of the oil sector, insolvency announcements by small Canadian oil firms can act as signals that influence market expectations, risk perceptions, and short-term pricing dynamics. These events reflect how firm-level financial distress can propagate measurable effects across markets, affecting asset prices, correlations, and broader systemic stability (Bhattacharyya and Kasa 2018; Issa et al. 2024; Liu et al. 2019; Prusak and Potrykus 2021). Even though these firms are privately held, distress can shift supply expectations, market positioning, and investor sentiment in observable, discrete ways (Tao et al. 2025). Collectively, these insights provide a theoretical basis showing that such corporate distress elicits market reactions.
Drawing from the limited empirical attention to insolvency in small energy firms, this paper investigates how insolvency among Canadian small unlisted oil firms influence oil market behavior. By examining a segment of the oil industry that operates outside formal capital markets yet holds economic significance, the study provides a clearer understanding of how localized financial pressures propagate through oil markets, with implications for market stability, investment decisions, and energy policy formulation in commodity-dependent economies.

2. Methodology

This paper examines the oil market’s reaction to insolvency announcements by small privately held Canadian firms, assessing whether attention-grabbing effects influence abnormal returns. The study focuses on privately held Canadian oil firms because they represent the majority of small producers in the sector and play a meaningful role in regional production, financial linkages, and potential market impact, despite operating outside public capital markets. These companies operate primarily in the upstream sector of the Canadian oil industry, focusing on exploration and production activities. Firm-level data were sourced from Haynes Boone (Boone 2022), ensuring transparency and verifiability. Jurisdiction was verified using court identification codes, and listing status was confirmed via Yahoo Finance (yahoofinance 2025). Based on jurisdiction verification and listing status, 12 companies met the initial selection criteria for the 2015–2021 period. To ensure financial relevance, only firms with debt exceeding $10 million at filing were included, resulting in a final sample of 11 companies, capturing those with potential market impact through investor, creditor, and supplier interactions (IMF 2021; OECD 2024).
While the study period spans 2015–2021, the 11 companies selected for analysis and presented in Table 1 filed for insolvency during 2015–2016. Insolvencies of private Canadian oil companies in the subsequent years (2017–2021) were not included, as they did not meet the selection criteria. Moreover, sufficiently reliable data on such insolvencies have not been available since 2022 at the time of developing the study. Thus, within the 2015–2021 period, the study effectively covers all relevant small privately held Canadian oil companies that filed for insolvency and meet the selection criteria.
The overall debt profiles are presented in Table 1, with company names excluded to preserve confidentiality. The companies’ debts were classified as small if less than $50 million, medium from $50 million to less than $200 million, and large if $200 million and above, providing a structured view of their financial positions. Presenting the debt profile in this structure highlights the diversity among the firms and clarifies the composition of the sample, which is essential for understanding the context of the study.
An event study was conducted to assess abnormal returns in the oil market following insolvency announcements of small unlisted Canadian oil firms. Brent crude and WTI daily spot prices were used as market proxies, capturing sectoral dynamics and investor sentiment, with data obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA 2025). Abnormal returns (AR) were computed as the difference between the observed daily price of the market proxy on the event day and the average daily price during the same quarter of the previous year. This calculation captures deviations from typical price levels while accounting for seasonal patterns. The abnormal returns are calculated using the following formula:
AR i t   =   P i , t o b s   P i , q p r e v
where
  • ARi,t = abnormal return of market proxy i on event day t.
  • P i . t o b s = observed daily price of proxy i on event day t.
  • P i , q p r e v = average daily price of proxy i during the same quarter q of the previous year.
The analysis spanned multiple event windows: the announcement day (0), short-term (−1, +1; −2, +2), and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over five-day (−5, −1; +1, +5) and ten-day (−10, −1; +1, +10) periods to capture both immediate reactions and extended market effects. These event windows generate a total of 99 observations across the analyzed windows, expanding the empirical observations beyond the 11 insolvency cases included in the sample, as each event window contributes multiple AR and CAR observations. Such a structure allows for a detailed assessment of market responses to insolvency filings (Miller 2023; Sasikumar and Sundaram 2024). The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each event window are calculated using the following formula:
CAR i   ( t 1 , t 2 )   =   t = t 1 t 2 AR i t
where
  • CARi(t1,t2)= cumulative abnormal return of market proxy i over the event window from day t1 to day t2.
  • ARi,t= abnormal return of market proxy i on day t, calculated as the difference between the observed daily price of the proxy on the event day and the average daily price during the same quarter of the previous year.
  • t1 = beginning of the event window.
  • t2 = end of the event window.
The study applied descriptive analysis to assess the impact of company closures on oil markets. A one-sample t-test was used to evaluate the impact of company closures on oil market. The selected test is suitable for the analysis, as the study sample exhibits a normal distribution (AR: −2, −1, 0, 1, 2; CAR: −10, −5, 5, 10), which was validated using the Shapiro–Wilk test. Additionally, the test aligns with the study’s objective of comparing a single sample mean to a hypothesized value (Skaik 2015). A two-tailed t-test at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels was conducted. The p-value for the mean AR or CAR is reported to evaluate the probability of observing a difference from zero under the null hypothesis, which states that the mean is equal to zero. The statistical analysis was performed using STATA 14.0.
The present study also performed a further analysis on the study sample to identify any patterns in oil market reaction to companies’ closure due to the relatively small size of the study sample. Therefore, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was applied as a nonparametric approach appropriate for the dataset (Fagerland 2012; Manap et al. 2023). This test examines whether the median AR or CAR significantly deviates from zero, providing insight into market reactions (Bagkavos and Patil 2021). A two-sided test at significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% was conducted. The p-value of the median AR or CAR from zero is reported to indicate the probability of a difference if the null hypothesis is true, which is the hypothesis that the median is zero. The mean was also calculated to identify any pattern of market reactions.
Although oil markets are characterized by frequent price fluctuations, this study does not attempt to model volatility dynamics. Instead, the analysis concentrates on identifying abnormal returns around corporate failure announcements within the Canadian oil sector. By employing the market-adjusted returns framework, which controls for overall market movements, the approach isolates price deviations that coincide with these specific corporate events. Short-term movements in oil prices may still occur during the event window; however, such fluctuations are considered part of the broader market environment rather than the source of the measured abnormal returns. This method acts as the primary control, ensuring that the abnormal returns specifically reflect reactions to insolvency announcements rather than broader market fluctuations. In this context, the analysis acknowledges common econometric considerations associated with event-study designs, particularly when interpreting the magnitude and statistical significance of abnormal return estimates. This methodological positioning allows the study to capture observable market responses to firm closures while accounting for the inherently dynamic nature of oil markets.

3. Results

Eleven privately held Canadian oil companies filed for insolvency during the period from 2015 to 2021, with debts ranging from $17.2 million to $475.4 million, and an average debt of $97.7 million. A significant concentration of insolvencies occurred in the second quarter of 2016, with seven companies filing during this time, averaging $125.6 million in debt. Across the study sample, six firms were classified as having small debt levels (less than $50 million), three as medium ($50 million to less than $200 million), and two as large ($200 million and above), which allows the analysis to capture market reactions across a range of financial positions and clarifies the heterogeneity of the sample.
Overall, the quantitative findings indicate a statistically significant positive market reaction to insolvency announcements. Both Brent and WTI indices show positive abnormal returns on the first day following the announcement, with the cumulative abnormal returns remaining positive over the subsequent short-term event window.
The one-sample t-test results for Brent and WTI AR on the first day following the filing announcement showed a significant deviation from zero (p = 0.04, t = 2.34, M = 0.50, and p = 0.10, t = 1.66, M = 0.68), indicating that the AR was higher than zero (see Table 2). Similarly, the CAR for both indices over the 5-day period after the announcement were significantly different from zero, with Brent reporting (p = 0.08, t = 1.90, M = 1.54) and WTI (p = 0.05, t = 2.21, M = 1.49) (see Table 2). These results indicate a consistent positive market reaction on the first day post-announcement, highlighting the immediate effect of firm closures on oil prices. The CAR over the 1–5-day period also captures the extended short-term market effects, reflecting a concentrated reaction around the announcement (see Table 2).
Further supporting these results, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test also showed statistically significant differences from zero for both Brent and WTI AR on the first day post-announcement (p = 0.04, median = 0.47, and p = 0.09, median = 0.61, respectively). Additionally, the CAR for both indices over the 5-day period after the announcement were significantly different from zero for both Brent (p = 0.10, median = 1.51) and WTI (p = 0.07, median = 1.89). These findings suggest that both Brent and WTI indices experienced positive performance on the first and fifth days following the announcement. The results show a positive market reaction on the first day post-announcement, with the CAR over the 1–5-day period also capturing short-term market effects, indicating that price movements are concentrated around the event. Both Brent and WTI indices follow this upward trend across the observed windows (see Table 2).

4. Discussion

The concentration of insolvencies in 2016 may reflect a moment of acute financial stress for privately held oil firms in Canada, pointing to their potential sensitivity to cyclical downturns in commodity markets. Although these firms operate outside the purview of public capital markets, they may not have been shielded from the broader consequences of the 2014–2016 oil price collapse, which could have compressed margins and disrupted capital flows across the sector (Baumeister and Kilian 2016; IMF 2015). Taking into account the average debt burden of $97.7 million, many of these firms might have been financially stretched, relying heavily on leveraged positions that left limited room to absorb sustained price volatility (Boone 2022). The clustering of insolvency events during this narrow window could suggest an underlying structural fragility, where constrained financing options and limited revenue diversification may have amplified vulnerability to commodity shocks.
The one-sample t-test and WSR results suggest that oil markets may have registered a mild but statistically significant reaction following insolvency announcements by small unlisted Canadian oil firms, particularly in the AR (day 1) and 5-day CAR windows. The significance was limited to select event windows, reflecting a nuanced and restrained market response. Even when results were significant, mean and median values generally hovered around or below 1.5, indicating modest price movements (see Table 2). These patterns could suggest that insolvency announcements were partially priced in before their formal disclosure, especially given that many of the affected firms were already under financial strain. Additionally, markets may have interpreted these events not purely as destructive signals but as possible turning points—paving the way for restructuring, asset reallocation, or the eventual entry of more efficient players into the sector. Taken together, the data point toward a measured market reaction, shaped less by surprise and more by expectation management and sectoral resilience.
The relatively modest mean and median AR and CAR following insolvency announcements may also suggest the oil market’s sensitivity to potential disruptions originating from Canada’s oil sector—a key pillar in the global energy landscape. As one of the top producers, Canada generates over 5 million barrels per day and exports a substantial share, primarily to the United States (CER 2021a, 2021b). In this context, firm-level insolvencies could nonetheless be perceived as short-term constraints on supply, particularly when multiple filings cluster within a narrow window. Historical supply disruptions reinforce this view: the 2025 Keystone pipeline shutdown restricted flows by over 600 thousand barrels per day, leading to upward price pressures (Dura and Raza 2025), while the 2025 Alberta wildfires temporarily removed 344 thousand barrels per day from the market, again triggering concern (Reuters 2025). To that end, the mild but positive AR and CAR observed may reflect investor expectations of a brief tightening in supply, potentially benefiting oil prices and, by extension, the broader sector—albeit with a restrained response due to the limited scale and transitory nature of the disruptions.
These modest responses could additionally be attributed to the operation of informational and behavioral channels. Investors could have adjusted their expectations ahead of formal announcements, responding to early signals from analyst reports, media coverage, or informal market discussions (De Blasis et al. 2024; Kallenos et al. 2025). Behavioral mechanisms, including sentiment shifts and herding tendencies, might have reinforced these anticipatory actions (Khan et al. 2024; Tao and Shao 2025). Moreover, liquidity considerations related to the firms’ elevated debt levels may have further moderated market reactions, as participants balanced portfolio adjustments against potential supply impacts (Michalkova and Ponisciakova 2025; Vukčević et al. 2024). Collectively, these channels offer plausible explanations for the relatively contained price movements, despite statistically significant abnormal returns.
The observed market reaction may also be explained by the nature of Canada’s Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), which governs many of the insolvency proceedings in this study. Unlike outright liquidation frameworks, the CCAA facilitates court-supervised restructuring, allowing firms to renegotiate debts and maintain operations during financial distress (DOJ 2024). This legal approach may have tempered market pessimism by signaling a pathway toward stabilization rather than collapse. In light of this, some positive AR and CAR results could reflect investor expectations that the CCAA process might help preserve operational continuity, protect asset value, or even lay the groundwork for more efficient re-entry into the market. While the overall market response remained cautious, the legal context may have encouraged a more nuanced interpretation of insolvency—not purely as a signal of firm failure, but as a potential mechanism for recovery and realignment within the sector.
Prior studies offer evidence consistent with the concentrated and directional market reaction identified in this study. One large-scale empirical analysis confirms that insolvency events generate significant abnormal returns concentrated around the announcement window, signaling rapid repricing rather than prolonged market dislocation (Delshadi et al. 2024). Another study shows that when legal mechanisms enable financial restructuring—rather than liquidation—investors recalibrate expectations without defaulting to pessimism, a dynamic clearly aligned with the oil price gains tracked after CCAA announcements (Adams et al. 2023). Strategic insolvency events are also shown to trigger favorable price responses when interpreted as signals of efficiency realignment or operational repositioning, which reflects the brief price acceleration observed following announcements in this study (Coelho and Taffler 2009).
Additional empirical work finds that the clarity and framing of financial distress play a pivotal role in shaping investor reactions, particularly in sectors where firms operate under tight regulatory and supply chain constraints (Delshadi et al. 2024; Seok et al. 2024). Market data also reveal that distressed firms tend to elicit smaller reactions to earnings shocks, suggesting that investors often calibrate their expectations in advance—a pattern consistent with the moderate, short-horizon reactions captured in this analysis (Howe and Houston 2016). Price signals in commodity-linked sectors respond selectively to firm-level stress when investors perceive supply effects to be limited and temporary, as confirmed by oil market behavior in recent distress episodes (Seok et al. 2024).
This study suggests that adopting structured legal frameworks—such as CCAA—may help mitigate market volatility during corporate insolvencies in critical sectors. Taking into account the restrained yet directionally positive market reactions observed, these court-supervised restructuring regimes could play a stabilizing role by supporting orderly resolution rather than prompting abrupt liquidation. For policymakers, this highlights the importance of continuously refining insolvency procedures to sustain investor confidence and uphold operational continuity during financial distress. Enhancing transparency through timely, standardized disclosures may also strengthen market efficiency by enabling investors to differentiate between collapse and restructuring intent. As such, combining robust legal infrastructure with clear communication protocols could improve price discovery and reduce the likelihood of overreaction in strategically significant industries.
Despite offering meaningful insights, this study has some limitations. The analysis concentrated on short-term abnormal returns, without capturing potential long-run market adjustments, post-restructuring performance, or broader macroeconomic spillovers. Additionally, the relatively small sample size—constrained by the niche scope and the limited frequency of such filings—may limit the generalizability of the findings. The study also focused exclusively on insolvency filings by small privately held Canadian oil companies, which, while relevant, may restrict applicability across broader energy markets or public firms with different capital structures. These constraints highlight the need for caution in interpreting the results and open avenues for future research to expand the scope both sectorally and temporally.

5. Conclusions

This study provides important insights into the market dynamics following the announcement of financial distress for Canadian oil firms, highlighting statistically significant but measured abnormal returns concentrated around the event window. The cautious market reaction likely reflects investor anticipation and a nuanced understanding of firm-level distress within a sector critical to global energy supply. These findings emphasize the importance of transparent disclosure and the stabilizing role that structured legal frameworks can play in moderating market volatility during financial stress. Although the study’s scope is limited to small privately held firms and short-term market responses, it offers valuable insights for policymakers and investors, particularly in monitoring financial distress among small oil firms and understanding its immediate impact on oil market dynamics. Further research should explore broader samples, including publicly listed firms and other energy sub-sectors, as well as long-term market effects to enhance comprehension of insolvency’s wider economic impacts.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

Insolvency-related data used in this research were obtained from the openly accessible Haynes Boone repository. All key data supporting the study’s conclusions are included in the article. Additional details may be provided upon request.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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Table 1. Debt Profile and Insolvency Dates of Small Canadian Oil Companies—Sample Firms.
Table 1. Debt Profile and Insolvency Dates of Small Canadian Oil Companies—Sample Firms.
Firm IDFiling DateDebt (USD)Debt CategoryDebt Share of Total
Firm 130 March 2015133.3Medium12.4%
Firm 213 April 201517.3Small1.6%
Firm 328 August 201525.4Small2.4%
Firm 417 November 201519.6Small1.8%
Firm 525 April 2016103.1Medium9.6%
Firm 65 May 201637.9Small3.5%
Firm 710 May 201621.4Small2.0%
Firm 816 May 2016200Large18.6%
Firm 930 May 2016475.4Large44.2%
Firm 1031 May 201617.2Small1.6%
Firm 117 June 201624.8Small2.3%
Note: All insolvency events included in this table occurred during 2015–2016. Other insolvency in 2017–2021 are excluded based on the sample selection criteria, and sufficiently reliable data post-2021 were not available at the time of developing the study.
Table 2. AR and CAR Results from One-Sample t-Test and Wilcoxon Test—Brent vs. WTI.
Table 2. AR and CAR Results from One-Sample t-Test and Wilcoxon Test—Brent vs. WTI.
Event WindowsUnlisted Companies Effect on Brent PricesUnlisted Companies Effect on WTI Prices
t-Test
p-Value
t-Statisticµ CARWSRMediant-Test
p-Value
t-Statisticµ CARWSRMedian
−1, −100.870.160.070.93−0.650.161.510.630.210.49
−1, −50.840.200.120.590.110.360.940.490.280.76
−20.73−0.35−0.161.000.160.720.360.110.790.06
−10.840.200.080.930.330.740.340.180.85−0.07
00.261.180.581.330.710.271.140.390.320.25
10.04 **2.340.500.04 **0.470.10 *1.660.680.09 *0.61
20.680.420.150.720.120.760.300.170.85−0.12
1, 50.08 *1.901.540.10 *1.510.05 **2.211.490.07 *1.89
1, 100.221.301.320.330.460.420.840.680.471.11
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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