Next Article in Journal
Identifying Risk Regimes in a Sectoral Stock Index Through a Multivariate Hidden Markov Framework
Previous Article in Journal
Predicting High-Cost Healthcare Utilization Using Machine Learning: A Multi-Service Risk Stratification Analysis in EU-Based Private Group Health Insurance
Previous Article in Special Issue
Breaking Barriers: Gender Diversity, ESG, and Corporate Misconduct in the GCC Region
 
 
Font Type:
Arial Georgia Verdana
Font Size:
Aa Aa Aa
Line Spacing:
Column Width:
Background:
Article

Unmasking Greenwashing in Finance: A PROMETHEE II-Based Evaluation of ESG Disclosure and Green Accounting Alignment

by
George Sklavos
1,
Georgia Zournatzidou
2,
Konstantina Ragazou
3,* and
Nikolaos Sariannidis
4
1
Department of Business Administration, University of Thessaly, 41500 Larissa, Greece
2
Department of Business Administration, University of Western Macedonia, 51100 Grevena, Greece
3
Department of Management Science and Technology, University of Western Macedonia, 50100 Kozani, Greece
4
Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Western Macedonia, 50100 Kozani, Greece
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Risks 2025, 13(7), 134; https://doi.org/10.3390/risks13070134
Submission received: 7 May 2025 / Revised: 13 June 2025 / Accepted: 7 July 2025 / Published: 9 July 2025
(This article belongs to the Special Issue ESG and Greenwashing in Financial Institutions: Meet Risk with Action)

Abstract

This study examines the degree of alignment between the actual environmental performance and the ESG disclosures of 365 listed financial institutions in Europe for the fiscal year 2024. Although ESG reporting has become a standard practice in the financial sector, there are still concerns that the quality of the disclosure may not accurately reflect substantive environmental action, which increases the risk of greenwashing. This study addresses this issue by incorporating both ESG disclosure indicators and green accounting metrics into a multi-criteria decision-making framework. This framework is supported by entropy-based weighting to assure objectivity in criterion importance, as outlined in the PROMETHEE II method. The Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI) is a groundbreaking innovation that quantifies the discrepancy between an institution’s classification based on ESG transparency and its performance in green accounting indicators, including environmental penalties, provisions, and resource usage. The results indicate that there is a substantial degree of variation in the performance of ESGs among institutions, with a significant portion of them exhibiting high disclosure scores but insufficient environmental substance. These discrepancies indicate that reputational sustainability may not be operationally sustained. The results have significant implications for regulatory supervision, sustainable finance policy, and ESG rating methodologies. The framework that has been proposed provides a replicable, evidence-based tool for identifying institutions that are at risk of greenwashing and facilitates the implementation of more accountable ESG evaluation practices in the financial sector.

1. Introduction

Greenwashing has become a systemic concern in sustainable finance, eroding trust in ESG-integrated market systems, distorting capital allocation, and undermining transparency. The objective of this study is to assess the risk of greenwashing in European financial institutions by examining the discrepancy between self-reported ESG disclosures and verifiable environmental performance. The geographic scope is expressly restricted to Europe due to the region’s sophisticated ESG regulatory architecture and data availability. The sustainability credibility of 365 publicly listed financial institutions, such as commercial banks, insurance firms, and investment service providers, is assessed using a novel Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI) that was developed through the application of a PROMETHEE II multi-criteria decision-making model and entropy-based weighting approach.
This research is situated within the broader field of sustainable finance, with a particular concentration on the reporting, implementation, and alignment of ESG policies and products by financial institutions, particularly banks and investment firms. In this context, greenwashing is not merely conceived as reputational window-dressing but as a structural misalignment between environmental disclosure narratives and actual performance indicators. This misalignment has the potential to lead to investor misinformation, poor policy guidance, and misallocated capital. It is important to note that the absence of precise regulatory standards in the domain of credit products creates a gray area in which institutions retain discretion over what constitutes as “green” or “sustainable,” further complicating the task of detecting greenwashing in finance.
As defined in the academic and policy literature, greenwashing is the deliberate exaggeration or misrepresentation of environmental initiatives, frequently achieved through selective or inflated disclosure. Recent research has underscored the fact that greenwashing impedes the redirection of capital transfers toward genuinely sustainable activities and distorts market integrity (Delmas and Burbano 2011; Erhemjamts et al. 2024; Todaro and Torelli 2024). It poses an economic and regulatory obstacle that undermines the efficacy of sustainability transitions. Although there are numerous ESG scoring and disclosure frameworks, a significant number of them rely on self-reporting, which may not accurately represent an institution’s actual environmental behavior. Divergence among ESG ratings is frequently the result of discrepancies in methodologies and disclosure emphasis, rather than actual performance, as emphasized by Berg et al. (2022).
Our research suggests a dual-metric assessment model that encompasses both green accounting indicators (e.g., penalties, environmental expenditures, and resource consumption) and ESG disclosure attributes (e.g., climate strategy, external assurance, and policy frameworks) to address these challenges. We identify instances of disclosure–performance misalignment that serve as evidence of potential greenwashing by comparing institutional rankings across these two domains. This discrepancy is the foundation of the Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI), a diagnostic instrument that assesses the credibility of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors in financial services.
Our study is based on the evolving European regulatory landscape, which has recently implemented comprehensive instruments to combat greenwashing. Enhancement of ESG transparency and accountability is mandated by the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD). The proposed Directive on Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition (COM/2022/143) is particularly noteworthy in that it directly addresses greenwashing by mandating that environmental claims be verifiable, explicit, and substantiated. These initiatives are indicative of the EU’s overarching objective to direct capital toward economically sustainable endeavors that are legitimately sustainable by means of credible, enforceable ESG standards.
This study provides a data-driven, replicable framework that makes a conceptual and methodological contribution to the disciplines of ESG integrity, sustainable finance, and greenwashing detection in response to these developments. Its results are pertinent to financial institutions that are striving to align their environmental narratives with operational realities, regulators that are developing supervision tools, and investors who are seeking dependable sustainability signals.

2. Literature Review

2.1. The Risk of Greenwashing in Financial Institutions and ESG Disclosure

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure has emerged as a fundamental component of corporate communication, especially in the financial industry (Asif et al. 2023; da Silva and Vieira 2025; Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 2020; Sun et al. 2024; Sundarasen et al. 2024). Institutions increasingly depend on sustainability narratives to demonstrate accountability to regulators, investors, and customers. The reliability of these tales is disputed because of differences in reporting standards and the lack of enforceable worldwide norms. Notwithstanding the directives from organizations like the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), and the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), ESG reporting continues to be predominantly voluntary and lacking standardization, resulting in considerable variability in both substance and quality (Bais et al. 2024; Krivogorsky 2024).
The financial industry, which includes banks, investment companies, and insurers, plays a crucial role in sustainable financing (Fu et al. 2024; Oliveira and Leal 2024; Rapach et al. 2024). These institutions shape the trajectory and legitimacy of the sustainable transition via capital allocation, credit assessment, and portfolio management. This position has subjected them to heightened scrutiny over the veracity of their ESG disclosures. There is increasing apprehension over the prevalence of greenwashing, defined as the purposeful deception or exaggeration of environmental performance to foster a sustainable image (Ferrara and Ciano 2023; Grijalvo and García-Wang 2023; Lagoarde-Ségot 2024; Sadiq et al. 2024).
Within the field of financial services, greenwashing may manifest in various ways: committing to net-zero objectives without viable transition strategies, issuing sustainability-linked bonds lacking quantifiable effects, or presenting selective ESG metrics that obscure environmentally detrimental activities (Biasin et al. 2024; Dicuonzo et al. 2024; Ragazou et al. 2024a). In contrast to industrial companies, whose environmental performance is readily visible, financial institutions mostly provide narrative and proxy-based measures. This creates a structural discrepancy between stated and actual performance, exacerbated by the absence of obligatory third-party verification.
Prior research has examined rating discrepancies across ESG providers, although they inadequately address purposeful exaggeration or selective reporting—key indicators of greenwashing. Our research expands on specific literature that conceptualizes greenwashing as a discrepancy between disclosure and performance—where self-reported ESG alignment does not correspond with verified environmental outcomes. This disparity is especially concerning in finance, where reputational integrity is fundamental to fiduciary trust and regulatory adherence.
Regulators have begun mitigating this danger. The EU’s Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) and Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) seek to improve the openness and comparability of ESG disclosures. The proposed Green Claims Directive (COM/2022/143) intends to address deceptive sustainability marketing and may substantially influence ESG labeling and assurance methods for financial goods. Nonetheless, regulatory enforcement is still inadequate, particularly in sectors like green loans and credit portfolios, where subjective interpretation continues to prevail (Official Journal of the European Union 2024).
To address this legislative and analytical disparity, our research provides a quantitative approach that evaluates the credibility of ESG disclosures by juxtaposing them with operational green accounting measures. We use a multi-criteria decision-making framework to assess whether institutions with robust ESG narratives exhibit measurable environmental performance. This method facilitates the detection of any greenwashing practices and provides a reproducible framework for evaluating ESG integrity in European financial institutions (Chen et al. 2023; D. Zhang et al. 2023; H. Zhang and Lai 2024).

2.2. The Performance–Disclosure Gap and Green Accounting

Although ESG disclosure frameworks have become indispensable instruments for communicating sustainability objectives, an increasing body of literature contends that such narratives must be founded on verifiable environmental performance to prevent them from becoming superficial or misleading. This has resulted in a heightened focus on green accounting, a field that aims to incorporate environmental factors into corporate decision-making and financial reporting (Schaltegger et al. 2017).
Green accounting is the process of identifying, measuring, and disclosing the costs, liabilities, and investments that are linked to environmental impacts. Among these metrics are quantifiable ones, including provisions for environmental remediation, capital expenditures on green infrastructure, water and energy consumption, and refuse generation, as well as environmental fines and pollution penalties. Green accounting offers tangible, monetized indicators of an organization’s actual environmental imprint, in contrast to ESG scores, which are frequently derived from subjective assessments or policy disclosures.
Green accounting also corresponds with the growing expectation for transparency in financial risk exposure to climate change and environmental liabilities from a regulatory perspective. For instance, the EU Taxonomy Regulation and the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD) mandate the disclosure of environmental hazards in a manner that can impact investment decisions and balance sheets (Pacces 2021; Rapach et al. 2024; Yang et al. 2020). These trends indicate a transition from “soft” ESG reporting to “hard” performance-linked accountability. Furthermore, green accounting is still underutilized in academic research on ESG evaluation, particularly in comparative and cross-sectional analyses, despite its relevance. Most studies frequently depend on ESG scores or self-reported disclosure metrics, which are not always consistent with actual resource use, investments, or liabilities (Searcy and Buslovich 2014). This has resulted in a performance–disclosure divide, in which companies may achieve high ESG ratings because of the implementation of formalized policies or reporting practices, but they may not achieve measurable environmental outcomes.
The financial sector is particularly concerned about this misalignment (López-De-Silanes et al. 2025; Todaro and Torelli 2024). Financial institutions frequently function as intermediaries rather than producers, which facilitates the assertion of ESG alignment without requiring direct operational modifications. While internal environmental performance (e.g., energy use, emissions, or penalties) is either opaque or minimally reported, they may emphasize ESG-linked investment products or sustainable lending strategies. Green accounting provides empirically grounded, auditable indicators that can be compared across institutions and over time, thereby offering a solution.
By integrating green accounting data with ESG disclosure metrics in a unified analytical framework, this study addresses a critical lacuna in the literature. Although previous research has assessed either green performance or ESG disclosure in isolation, there is a scarcity of comparative frameworks that explicitly quantify the divergence between the two. This paper contributes a novel, replicable method to quantify greenwashing in financial institutions by introducing a Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI) that is based on the rank difference between disclosure-based and performance-based evaluations. Additionally, this study is in response to the demand for sector-specific, evidence-based tools that can assist stakeholders in assessing the credibility of ESG claims and identifying instances where reputational signals are not substantiated by environmental substance by applying this framework to a sample of 365 listed financial institutions in Europe (Kiohos and Sariannidis 2010; Mallidis et al. 2024; Sariannidis 2011).

3. Materials and Methods

3.1. Research Design

The dataset exclusively concentrates on financial institutions with headquarters in Europe, as the region boasts a mature sustainability regulatory framework and comprehensive ESG data coverage. This geographic concentration guarantees compliance with disclosure mandates, including the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), which are designed to improve transparency, comparability, and accountability in ESG reporting. The credibility of sustainability disclosures has been the subject of increased scrutiny because of the increasing standardization of ESG practices in this context. The phenomenon of greenwashing, which involves the strategic exaggeration or misrepresentation of environmental actions or performance to project a misleading image of sustainability commitment, is a growing concern in literature and among regulators. The alignment between ESG disclosure and actual environmental performance in financial institutions is assessed in this study using a quantitative multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) framework. The fundamental assumption is that the existence of significant discrepancies between these two dimensions may function as empirical indicators of greenwashing behavior.
This study is organized as a comparative assessment of financial institutions utilizing a series of environmental, governance, and transparency variables derived from the Refinitiv Eikon ESG Screener. Fourteen criteria were chosen, encompassing both green accounting indicators (such as environmental penalties, expenditures, and provisions) and ESG disclosure measures (including ESG ratings, climate initiatives, and external assurance).
The methodological approach consists of two primary analytical phases: (i) Comprehensive ESG Performance Ranking utilizing PROMETHEE II and (ii) Greenwashing Risk Detection via Subgroup Rankings. During the initial phase, the PROMETHEE II approach is utilized to calculate a comprehensive sustainability ranking for each institution. This approach facilitates pairwise comparisons grounded in weighted preferences, yielding a comprehensive and interpretable ranking of alternatives. Entropy weighting is employed to allocate objective significance to each criterion, determined by their informational variability among institutions. The Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI) is established by juxtaposing rankings obtained from two categories of criteria: (i) indicators focused on ESG disclosure and (ii) measures pertaining to green accounting and environmental performance.
A notable disparity between these rankings implies possible greenwashing since it reflects an inconsistency between institutional reports and their real environmental practices. This dual-level assessment facilitates the identification of premier institutions and the detection of discrepancies that might undermine stakeholder confidence and long-term sustainability objectives. This paper introduces an innovative and effective methodology for analyzing greenwashing risk in the financial sector by using objective weights, transparent preference modeling, and accounting-based indicators, ensuring alignment with academic rigor and policy relevance.

3.2. Data Collection and Sample

The dataset for this study was obtained from Refinitiv Eikon, a financial and ESG data platform that is frequently employed in empirical sustainability research. The analysis concentrates on financial institutions with headquarters in Europe because of the region’s advanced sustainability regulatory framework and the availability of comprehensive ESG data. The sustainability transition is significantly impacted by the financial sector, which institutionalizes ESG standards, screens investment decisions, and influences capital allocation. Nevertheless, it is also being scrutinized for potential greenwashing practices, particularly when ESG narratives rely heavily on self-reported and unaudited disclosures rather than demonstrable environmental outcomes.
The final sample consists of 365 publicly listed financial institutions that operate throughout the European Union. This ensures sectoral diversity within the sample, which includes commercial banks, insurance companies, and investment service providers. The sample encompasses both institutions classified as significant and less significant under the European Central Bank’s Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) to guarantee regulatory comprehensiveness. The selection was determined by the availability, completeness, and consistency of green accounting performance data and ESG disclosure attributes for the fiscal year 2024. To preserve the methodological validity of cross-institutional comparisons, entities with missing, conflicting, or internally inconsistent data were excluded from the analysis.
The 14 ESG-related indicators utilized in this study were chosen based on their conceptual relevance to the assessment of greenwashing, data quality and consistency, and regulatory alignment with prominent frameworks such as the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS E1), the Green Loan Principles, and the Sustainability-Linked Loan Principles. These indicators represent two analytically distinct but complementary dimensions of sustainability performance. By capturing tangible environmental and financial engagements, such as environmental expenditures, regulatory penalties, water withdrawal, and refuse generation, green accounting metrics reflect the institution’s operational responsibility. In this context, penalties are financial sanctions that are imposed by national or supranational authorities, such as environmental protection agencies or financial regulators, for violations of environmental legislation, emissions thresholds, or other sustainability-related obligations. The credible proxies for verified environmental underperformance are these externally imposed penalties, which are systematically reported by institutions and collated by ESG data providers such as Refinitiv.
Conversely, institutional transparency, strategic commitment, and governance practices are reflected in ESG disclosure attributes. These encompass the formalization of climate policy frameworks, the presence of external assurance mechanisms, and the extent of greenhouse gas disclosures. To facilitate comparative assessment and standardize the dataset, all indicators were preprocessed. Quantitative data were normalized to a standard [0, 1] range by converting Boolean fields to binary values and applying min–max scaling. To guarantee that higher values indicated inferior environmental performance, cost-type indicators—including penalties, emissions, and waste—were reverse normalized. Using the PROMETHEE II outranking method, this preprocessing facilitated the integration of the selected indicators into a unified decision-making model.
Greenwashing is defined in this study as the quantifiable discrepancy between accounting-based environmental performance and disclosure-based ESG indicators. This study identifies instances in which sustainability narratives substantially exceed actual environmental behavior by constructing distinct institutional evaluations based on each dimension. The resulting Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI) offers a scalable and replicable instrument for evaluating the financial sector’s exposure to greenwashing risk and ESG credibility in Europe.
This study also integrates recent policy developments in addition to referencing established regulations, including the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR). The regulatory urgency surrounding accurate ESG communication is underscored by the inclusion of the 2024 Omnibus Directive (Directive (EU) 2024/825), which explicitly addresses green-washing by requiring sustainability claims be substantiated and verifiable. The policy relevance of developing comprehensive empirical methods capable of identifying discrepancies between environmental disclosure and environmental performance is affirmed by the evolving regulatory context.

3.3. Criteria Selection and Classification

To evaluate the congruence between ESG disclosures and actual environmental performance, this study implements a collection of 14 evaluation criteria that were chosen from the Refinitiv Eikon ESG Screener for the fiscal year 2024. The selection of these criteria was determined by their relevance to sustainability performance, empirical availability across the dataset of 365 European financial institutions, and conceptual alignment with either green accounting or ESG disclosure and governance domains.
Fines, expenditures, and resource utilization are tangible environmental outcomes that are reflected in green accounting criteria. Conversely, ESG disclosure and governance criteria are directed toward strategic alignment with recognized frameworks, such as the Paris Agreement or CDP (Carbon Disclosure Project), as well as transparency and assurance.
Each criterion is categorized as either a cost or a benefit indicator. Benefit criteria are those that indicate superior ESG performance when their values are higher. In contrast, cost criteria indicate that higher values are linked to less favorable environmental outcomes, such as increased fines or water withdrawal. Standardization and type-specific normalization were implemented to ensure that all criteria were prepared for inclusion in the PROMETHEE II model. This classification enables the criteria to be categorized into two thematic subgroups: (i) disclosure-oriented indicators and (ii) green accounting-based indicators, which serve as the foundation of the model’s structure. This dual classification is additionally employed in the following section, where is computed the Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI), which quantifies the ranked discrepancy between operational environmental outcomes and reported ESG practices.
The evaluation criteria are summarized in the table below (Table 1).

3.4. PROMETHEE II Framework: Data Normalization, Entropy Weighting, and Ranking Application

This study applies a multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) approach using the PROMETHEE II method, supported by entropy-based weighting and standardized data preparation, to evaluate the ESG performance of financial institutions. This integrated framework enables a robust ranking system that accommodates the complexity and diversity of sustainability indicators, both in form (e.g., quantitative, binary) and orientation (benefit or cost).

3.4.1. Methodological Rationale

PROMETHEE II (Preference Ranking Organization Method for Enrichment Evaluation II) is a widely used outranking method in the disciplines of environmental management, financial sustainability analysis, operations research, and decision sciences. It is particularly effective for evaluating complex, multi-dimensional decision problems due to its capacity to provide a comprehensive ranking of alternatives through pairwise comparisons across multiple weighted criteria. PRO-METHEE II is particularly suitable for sustainability and ESG assessments because of its non-compensatory nature. This means that a company’s subpar performance in one criterion (e.g., carbon emissions) cannot be entirely compensated for by its superior performance in another (e.g., policy disclosure). This characteristic is consistent with the normative logic of ESG evaluation, which emphasizes the need to scrutinize trade-offs across environmental, social, and governance domains rather than just assuming them. PROMETHEE II facilitates a structured and transparent assessment of these trade-offs without imposing compensatory assumptions.
The entropy weighting procedure is implemented to guarantee objectivity in the attribution of relative importance to criteria. Entropy weighting is a data-driven methodology that determines the weights of each indicator across the dataset by considering its intrinsic variability. Criteria with more dispersion are considered to be more informative and, as a result, have a greater impact on the classification. This prevents biases that are associated with expert-driven or arbitrarily assigned weights and guarantees that the study is consistent with its empirical nature.

3.4.2. Data Normalization and Preparation

All criteria were normalized using min–max scaling to standardize their values on a [0, 1] range prior to the application of PROMETHEE II. This transformation was essential for the purpose of achieving a comparable magnitude between a variety of indicators, including monetary environmental expenditures and binary governance signals. The formula for normalization is as follows:
x = x m i n ( x ) max x m i n ( x )
Normalization was implemented directly for benefit criteria that indicate superior performance (e.g., environmental assurance, ESG scores). To ensure that higher normalized values reflect stronger sustainability performance, an inverse transformation was implemented for cost criteria, including environmental penalties, water withdrawal, and waste generation. Binary indicators, such as the presence of a CDP strategy, were encoded as 1 (positive) and 0 (negative) without any additional modifications.

3.4.3. Entropy Weighting Procedure

Following normalization, entropy weighting was utilized to determine the relative importance of each of the 14 ESG criteria. Entropy measures the degree of disorder or uncertainty inherent in each criterion over all options. A criterion with low entropy has significant discriminating power and is therefore allocated a higher weight. The process includes:
  • Determine the ratio of each value inside a criterion in relation to the total sum of that criterion across all institutions.
  • Compute the entropy value E j for each criterion.
  • Determine the degree of diversification d j = 1 − E j .
  • Determine the conclusive weight for each condition utilizing: w j = d j j = 1 n d j
This weighting method guarantees that the model emphasizes criteria according to their informative value, eliminating the necessity for subjective input.

3.4.4. Application of PROMETHEE II

Once normalized values and entropy-based weights were prepared, the PROMETHEE II method was applied to calculate the overall ESG performance ranking. For each pair of institutions ( a i , a j )   a preference index is computed based on the weighted difference in performance across all criteria. The preference of one institution over another on a given criterion is determined by a linear preference function, commonly used for continuous data.
The aggregated preference index π ( a i , a j )   summarizes how much a i   is preferred to a j , across all weighted criteria. Based on these pairwise comparisons, the following flows are computed:
Positive outranking flow Φ + ( a i ) : how much institution i dominates others.
Negative outranking flow Φ ( a i ) : how much institution iii is dominated by others.
Net outranking flow Φ a i = Φ + ( a i ) Φ ( a i ) : overall performance score.
Institutions are ranked in descending order based on their net flow values Φ with higher scores indicating stronger overall ESG performance. This ranking forms the empirical foundation for assessing both sustainability leadership and inconsistencies in ESG reporting behavior, as further explored in Section 3.5.

3.5. Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI)

The PROMETHEE II method offers a comprehensive evaluation of financial institutions based on their ESG performance; however, it does not, in isolation, distinguish between the substance of environmental action and the transparency of disclosure. The Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI) is a novel metric that the present study introduces to identify discrepancies between the environmental responsibility that institutions report and the actions they take to resolve this limitation. Greenwashing behavior may be suspected when there is a substantial discrepancy between ESG disclosure and actual environmental performance.
GWI is determined by comparing two distinct PROMETHEE II rankings for each institution. The initial ranking is determined by a subset of criteria that reflect the quality of ESG disclosure and governance, such as ESG scores, external assurance of environmental data, participation in recognized frameworks like the CDP, and governance indicators like board meeting attendance. The second ranking is determined by a unique set of criteria that are associated with green accounting practices, such as environmental expenditures, environmental penalties, provisions, and natural resource usage.
The GWI is defined as the discrepancy between the disclosure-based ranking and the green accounting-based ranking of each financial institution. The index is mathematically represented as follows:
G W I i = R a n k D i s c l o s u r e , i R a n k G r e e n   A c c o u n t i n g , i

3.6. Sensitivity Analysis and Visualization Strategy

A sensitivity analysis is conducted in conjunction with targeted data visualizations to guarantee the interpretability and robustness of the ESG performance evaluation and the Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI). These tools are designed to both verify the consistency of the PROMETHEE II results and improve the transparency of model-based inferences for a wider range of stakeholders.
In the event of variations in methodological assumptions, the stability of institutional rankings is evaluated through the sensitivity analysis. This entails the modification of the entropy-based weight distribution to evaluate the extent to which the overall ranking is influenced by changes in criterion importance and to simulate alternative informational scenarios. In addition, the model’s dependence on individual indicators is assessed by examining the impact of removing specific criteria or adjusting normalization parameters. This analysis allows for the identification of rankings that are highly sensitive to specific input conditions, thereby advising caution in their interpretation.
A complementary strategy is implemented to facilitate the interpretation of PROMETHEE II outputs and GWI scores through the use of visualization. Bar charts are employed to illustrate positive, negative, and net preference flows, thereby facilitating a straightforward comparison between institutions. The normalized performance scores across all 14 criteria are displayed using heatmaps, which emphasize the institutional strengths and deficits. In addition, rank comparison graphs are developed to illustrate the magnitude and direction of GWI values by contrasting disclosure-based and green accounting–based rankings. These visual tools not only improve the accessibility of results but also offer intuitive evidence of potential misalignments between environmental action and ESG communication. By utilizing a combination of sensitivity testing and graphical representation, the study enhances the credibility of its findings and provides stakeholders with actionable insights into the financial sector’s environmental integrity, ESG consistency, and greenwashing risk.

4. Results

This chapter presents the outcomes of the ESG performance evaluation and greenwashing risk analysis for 365 European financial institutions for the fiscal year 2024. The results are derived from the application of the PROMETHEE II method using entropy-based weights and the construction of a Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI). The analysis unfolds in three stages. First, the entropy weighting outcomes are discussed to establish the objective importance of each ESG criterion. Second, the PROMETHEE II ranking is presented, providing a comprehensive view of the institutions’ sustainability performance. Third, the Greenwashing Risk Index is calculated and interpreted, revealing potential inconsistencies between ESG disclosure and environmental action.

4.1. Entropy-Based Criterion Weighting

Entropy weighting was employed to ascertain the relative significance of each ESG criterion, which quantifies the variability (or information richness) of each indicator across the entire sample. The degree of uniformity of each criterion is represented by its entropy value E j ; a lesser entropy value suggests a greater degree of differentiation among institutions. The final entropy weights w j used in the PROMETHEE II evaluation were derived by calculating and normalizing the degree of diversification d j = 1 E j from these entropy values.
The findings indicate that the highest weights are assigned to criteria such as the Environmental Pillar Score (C1) and the ESG Combined Score (C10), which indicate a significant amount of informational variation among institutions (Table 2). Conversely, criteria such as Waste Total (C5) and Water Withdrawal (C6) were assigned to extremely low weights, which implies that there is a lack of differentiation in these variables within the sample.
These weights were then applied to the normalized decision matrix to objectively evaluate the ESG performance of each institution.

4.2. PROMETHEE II-Based ESG Performance Ranking

A comprehensive preference-based evaluation of 365 publicly listed financial institutions across Europe was achieved through the implementation of the PROMETHEE II method, which included entropy-weighted and normalized ESG indicators. The net flow score (Φ) of each institution is indicative of its overall sustainability performance in comparison to the rest of the sample. Higher values indicate more balanced and superior ESG practices. The distribution of PROMETHEE II scores that results indicates a significant degree of heterogeneity in the implementation and strategies of ESG. Institutions that incorporate environmental performance into both internal operations and financial decision-making are characterized by the top-performing decile. These institutions exhibit advanced green accounting practices, as evidenced by substantial environmental investments and reduced ecological penalties. Additionally, they maintain comprehensive, externally verified ESG disclosures that are consistent with frameworks such as the TCFD, CSRD, and the Paris Agreement.
In contrast, the bottom segment of the distribution represents institutions that exhibit significant deficiencies in either their green accounting metrics or the credibility of their ESG disclosures. It is intriguing that the middle stratum, which spans the 40th and 60th percentiles, is composed of institutions that demonstrate moderate performance in both environmental outcomes and disclosure. These institutions typically adhere to the minimum regulatory requirements without demonstrating strategic innovation or strong leadership in sustainability. The PROMETHEE II analysis reveals a critical policy implication: while certain financial institutions are genuinely aligning ESG narratives with operational commitments, others are vulnerable to greenwashing concerns due to observable gaps between stated ambitions and actual impact (Pohl and Geldermann 2024; Zobeidi et al. 2024).
The core segment of the ranking (about the 40th to 60th percentile) consists of universities demonstrating average performance. These enterprises often demonstrate strong transparency or environmental initiatives, but seldom both. A business may demonstrate proficiency in disclosure practices—such as ESG transparency, policy execution, and board engagement—while displaying subpar performance in financial metrics pertaining to actual environmental investments or operational sustainability. Institutions at the lowest end of the spectrum, characterized by negative net flows, consistently exhibit underperformance in several dimensions. These underperformers often lack transparency on climate initiatives, have minimal or no external verification of environmental data, and exhibit either insufficient ESG ratings or a general absence of openness. Furthermore, they demonstrate little to absent investment in environmental efforts or policies and frequently display inadequate performance in resource efficiency indicators, such as water use and waste generation.
The range of net flow numbers reveals two unique ESG strategy characteristics. The initial profile includes institutions demonstrating a balanced ESG approach, displaying simultaneous expertise in both green accounting and transparency. These entities are likely really committed to sustainability and may serve as industry benchmarks. The second profile includes organizations that emphasize symbolic disclosure over substantive action; these may attain modest rankings in overall ESG metrics due to proficient policy communication, despite making negligible contributions to environmental investments or operational efficiency. Section 4.3 of the Greenwashing Risk Index further analyzes this discrepancy.
The PROMETHEE II rating functions as a practical tool for decision-makers. Regulators may employ net flow ratings to evaluate which banks excel or underperform in ESG performance. Investors may employ the rankings to inform portfolio screening and engagement strategies, while institutions may assess their performance relative to peers and industry leaders. The PROMETHEE II results offer a comprehensive and detailed analysis of ESG practices in the European banking sector. The rankings highlight both excellent firms with credible environmental commitments and underperformers that may need more scrutiny or intervention.

4.3. Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI) Analysis

Although the PROMETHEE II method integrates both environmental action and disclosure indicators to provide a comprehensive ranking of ESG performance, it does not independently disclose inconsistencies between these two domains. To mitigate this issue, the Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI) was developed as a metric for the rank divergence between the green accounting performance of institutions and their disclosure-based ESG performance (Table A2, Appendix A). Thus, GWI functions as a quantitative proxy for evaluating the substantive support of sustainability disclosures by environmental action.
The results indicate a substantial variation in GWI values throughout the sample, with large negative scores suggesting underreporting of environmental accomplishments and large positive values suggesting potential greenwashing. Institutions with GWI values that are nearly zero are regarded as aligned, indicating that their operational behavior is generally consistent with their sustainability communication.
A subset of institutions demonstrates positive GWI scores that exceed five ranking positions, indicating that their public-facing ESG performance—as measured by ESG scores, external assurance, and climate-related governance—exceeds their actual green accounting commitments (Ragazou et al. 2024b, 2024c; Ragazou and Sklavos 2020). These institutions frequently disclose ambitious ESG policies, engage in high-profile sustainability frameworks, and maintain robust governance visibility. Nevertheless, their environmental investments, liabilities, or resource efficiency performance (e.g., low environmental expenditures, high penalties, or limited provisions) do not align with the ambition of their disclosures. In such instances, the positive GWI functions as a warning sign for symbolic ESG behavior and reputational signaling, which may be indicative of greenwashing tendencies (Lagasio 2024; D. Li et al. 2024; J. Li 2024; Pizzetti et al. 2021; Todaro and Torelli 2024).
In contrast, organizations that exhibit substantial negative GWI values, those whose green accounting rank is substantially higher than their disclosure ranks seem to be under communicating their sustainability initiatives. These organizations prioritize environmental sustainability and sustain robust operational metrics; however, they lack formal ESG reporting structures and transparency. Despite their substantial contributions to sustainability outcomes, this group may be penalized in traditional ESG assessments. These “quiet performers” offer potential opportunities for constructive engagement and support in the enhancement of ESG disclosure practices for investors and regulators.
The final computed results for all institutions are presented in Table A2, which includes the PROMETHEE II net flows and rankings, disclosure-based ranks, green accounting–based ranks, and the resulting Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI). This table provides a practical tool for identifying greenwashing-prone firms within the financial sector and provides a transparent view of institutional alignment or misalignment between reported and actual ESG performance. A bell-shaped curve centered near zero is evident in a visual distribution of GWI scores with a perceptible skewness toward positive values. This implies that greenwashing may be more prevalent than green underreporting in the current sample. The results also indicate that larger institutions with greater media visibility are more likely to produce high GWI scores. This may be attributed to the reputational incentives to appear sustainable, even when the underlying environmental practices are feeble or non-transparent.
Collectively, the GWI facilitates a nuanced, second-layer analysis of ESG performance that surpasses net flows or total scores. It encapsulates the discrepancy between ESG rhetoric and environmental action, enabling institutions to be classified along a credibility spectrum, ranging from high-integrity performers to probable greenwashers. This has direct implications for regulatory monitoring, sustainability risk assessment, and ESG-integrated investment.

5. Discussion

This study investigates the correlation between environmental performance and ESG disclosures to offer a comprehensive and multifaceted evaluation of ESG integrity in the European financial sector. The research unmasks significant discrepancies that challenge the reliability of narrative-based sustainability communication, highlighting the evolving nature of ESG credibility using a hybrid MCDM framework—entropy-weighted PROMETHEE II—and the novel Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI).
The 365 specified financial institutions analyzed were found to exhibit a diverse range of ESG performance in the PROMETHEE II analysis. A combination of robust ESG disclosures and robust green accounting practices was frequently displayed by high-ranking institutions, often accompanied by their involvement in internationally recognized climate frameworks and third-party data assurance. Conversely, institutions with negative net flows demonstrated underperformance in both dimensions, suggesting that there are systemic deficiencies in both disclosure transparency and environmental action. It is intriguing that institutions in the mid-tier of the classification exhibited a significant degree of variability. While some institutions excelled in ESG transparency but underperformed operationally, others performed well in terms of environmental sustainability but lacked comprehensive disclosures. These patterns required a more comprehensive diagnostic, which was provided by the GWI.
The GWI results emphasize a fundamental imbalance in the integrity of ESGs. A substantial number of institutions achieved positive GWI scores, indicating that they performed better in green accounting than in ESG disclosure. Although not all such instances suggest deliberate obfuscation, this misalignment raises concerns about the strength of ESG communication and encourages examination of potential underreporting. In contrast, institutions with negative GWI values, which are indicative of strong performance but inferior disclosure, are at risk of being penalized in investor evaluations that heavily rely on surface-level ESG ratings. The conflation of disclosure quality with actual sustainability performance is a broader structural vulnerability in ESG frameworks, as evidenced by this duality.
This study thereby serves to substantiate a critical insight: ESG performance cannot be accurately predicted solely based on disclosures. The risk of greenwashing may be exacerbated if symbolic conformance is incentivized over substantive environmental engagement in the absence of performance-linked reporting mandates.

5.1. Theoretical, Practical, and Regulatory Implications

This study represents a triple contribution to academic literature. To begin, it operationalizes greenwashing as a quantifiable construction by employing the GWI, a data-driven, replicable instrument that surpasses qualitative and anecdotal typologies. This allows for the quantification of the ESG performance–disclosure disparity across a broad institutional landscape by researchers and practitioners (da Silva and Vieira 2025; Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 2020; Schiemann and Tietmeyer 2022). The second aspect is that it advocates for a disaggregated approach that differentiates between environmental action and narrative strategies, thereby challenging the hegemony of composite ESG scores. In this way, it is consistent with the growing appeal in the literature to reorient ESG evaluation around accountability rather than communication (Asif et al. 2023; Sundarasen et al. 2024). Third, it reaffirms the importance of green accounting metrics—in particular, environmental penalties, expenditures, and provisions—as empirically founded indicators of environmental performance that are frequently disregarded in ESG rating systems.
For institutional stakeholders, the results indicate a paradigm shift. ESG credibility is no longer a reputational asset that is solely derived from disclosures; rather, it is a material risk factor that should be verified. Considering the 2024 Omnibus Directive (Directive (EU) 2024/825), firms with high GWI scores—i.e., significant misalignment between disclosures and actions—are subject to increased reputational, regulatory, and investor scrutiny (Official Journal of the European Union 2024). The necessity of alignment between reported intentions and realized environmental outcomes is emphasized by these frameworks, which also prioritize verifiability and impact.
Investors are provided with a more sophisticated evaluative prism by the proposed framework, which allows them to identify “silent performers” and minimize their exposure to entities that demonstrate narrative compliance but lack operational proficiency. ESG rating providers may implement the GWI as a modification mechanism to mitigate the risk of greenwashing, while regulators may employ it as a screening instrument to identify institutions that require additional audit or policy engagement (Chau et al. 2025; Šević et al. 2024).

5.2. Limitations

This study has certain limitations, despite its methodological rigor and empirical contribution. Initially, the generalizability of the findings to other regions with varying regulatory maturity levels or disclosure cultures may be compromised by the geographical scope, which is restricted to financial institutions based in the EU. Secondly, the methodological consistency of the reliance on Refinitiv Eikon data is inherently influenced by a degree of self-reporting bias. Additionally, certain critical indicators, including Scope 3 emissions and biodiversity metrics, were excluded from the dataset due to their lack of uniform availability.
Third, entropy weighting guarantees objectivity by designating weights based on data variability; however, it may not completely convey the strategic or material relevance of specific indicators across institutional contexts. Increased relevance and balance may be achieved by incorporating stakeholder-informed weighting schemes. In conclusion, PROMETHEE II implies linear preference functions and independence across criteria, which may oversimplify the intricate trade-offs that are present in ESG decision-making. In order to more accurately represent uncertainty and interdependence, future research could investigate fuzzy, stochastic, or hybrid MCDM models.

5.3. Future Research Avenues

The current framework could be improved in numerous significant ways through future research. Longitudinal studies that examine the evolution of GWI scores over time could provide insight into the regulatory impact and trends in disclosure–performance alignment. Differential greenwashing patterns in high-impact industries such as energy, manufacturing, and technology may also be revealed by sector-specific studies. In terms of methodology, the implementation of sophisticated fuzzy models (e.g., fuzzy-VIKOR, hybrid AHP-TOPSIS, and q-ROFS) could enhance the sensitivity of ESG assessments in the presence of uncertainty. Additionally, the use of machine learning techniques, particularly explainable AI models, could be implemented to anticipate greenwashing risk by incorporating financial, governance, and ESG predictors. Importantly, future research should also investigate the repercussions of greenwashing in terms of regulatory penalties, stakeholder trust erosion, or market reactions. The GWI would be validated as a predictive instrument for reputational or systemic risk and would facilitate more actionable ESG supervision because of these analyses.

6. Conclusions

This research examined the correlation between the actual environmental performance and the ESG disclosures of 365 listed financial institutions in Europe during the fiscal year 2024. The research introduces the Greenwashing Risk Index (GWI) as a novel empirical tool to measure disclosure–performance asymmetries by integrating green accounting indicators and ESG transparency metrics into a PROMETHEE II-based multi-criteria decision-making framework supported by entropy weighting.
The results indicate that there are substantial discrepancies in the ESG profiles of financial institutions. While some institutions exhibit high transparency and limited operational engagement, others demonstrate coherent and demonstrable sustainability strategies. This misalignment, which is evident in the elevated GWI scores, implies that reputational sustainability is frequently not supported by environmental action, thereby emphasizing the limitations of relying solely on self-reported ESG data.
This study theoretically contributes to the expanding literature on greenwashing by providing a rank-based, replicable method for its detection. It also serves to emphasize the necessity of disentangling symbolic ESG communication from actual sustainability performance, promoting green accounting metrics as essential indicators of environmental credibility. In practice, the GWI provides a diagnostic instrument for investors, regulators, and institutions that are interested in identifying ESG inconsistencies and enhancing accountability. This study is consistent with recent regulatory developments, such as the CSRD, SFDR, and Directive (EU) 2024/825, from a policy perspective (Official Journal of the European Union 2024). These developments underscore the verifiability and impact of environmental performance, as well as the accuracy of ESG reporting. This regulatory imperative is addressed by the framework proposed in this study, which establishes a strong, data-driven foundation for the improvement of ESG ratings and supervision (Kartal et al. 2024; Peng et al. 2023; Schiemann and Tietmeyer 2022).
Despite its methodological robustness, the study’s geographic scope, dependence on partially self-reported data, and reliance on entropy-based weighting introduce limitations that require consideration. In the future, research should broaden the scope to include regions and sectors, incorporate alternative weighting approaches, and investigate longitudinal trends and predictive outcomes of greenwashing exposure.
In summary, this research illustrates that disclosures alone are insufficient to evaluate the credibility of ESG practices. Tools such as the GWI will be essential in guaranteeing that institutional claims are not only visible but also verifiable, actionable, and consistent with genuine environmental impact as sustainability becomes a fundamental component of financial legitimacy.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, G.S. and K.R.; methodology, K.R.; software, G.Z.; validation, K.R., G.Z. and N.S.; formal analysis, K.R.; investigation, K.R.; resources, G.S.; data curation, G.Z.; writing—original draft preparation, K.R.; writing—review and editing, G.S.; visualization, G.Z.; supervision, G.S.; project administration, G.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

Dataset available on request from the authors.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Appendix A

Table A1. PROMETHEE II net flows and ESG performance ranking.
Table A1. PROMETHEE II net flows and ESG performance ranking.
AlternativeNet_FlowPROMETHEE_Rank
10.061356
2−0.0258254
30.072019
40.068844
50.028185
60.014198
7−0.0279266
8−0.0401318
90.029280
100.070228
11−0.0236251
12−0.0563349
13−0.0298288
14−0.0562348
15−0.0539334
160.070524
170.068349
180.068250
19−0.0189199
20−0.0279268
210.07276
22−0.0124183
230.0094136
240.030472
250.031167
260.070325
270.069933
280.16633
290.0017164
300.069835
310.015292
32−0.0184197
330.069637
34−0.0220233
35−0.0220234
36−0.0380310
370.069339
380.068646
39−0.0550339
40−0.0131185
41−0.0535331
42−0.0210214
43−0.0552341
440.26631
45−0.0138188
46−0.0215223
47−0.0223241
48−0.0211217
490.066952
50−0.0288278
51−0.0219228
52−0.0383311
53−0.0169193
54−0.0127184
55−0.0107180
560.0012166
57−0.0220232
580.0135102
590.068745
600.030970
61−0.0523323
62−0.0356303
630.068942
64−0.0272261
65−0.0209213
66−0.0221239
67−0.0230248
68−0.0391315
69−0.0219230
70−0.0283272
710.0016165
72−0.0222240
73−0.0220231
74−0.0220235
75−0.0361304
760.068941
77−0.0149189
780.013999
790.0047141
80−0.0215222
810.068547
82−0.0192201
830.029774
840.0104132
850.0129108
860.0118117
870.0030154
880.061157
89−0.0002168
90−0.0310298
910.028383
920.031069
930.043659
94−0.0389314
950.015791
96−0.0096179
97−0.0219229
980.029279
990.0109123
100−0.0054176
1010.0086137
1020.031068
103−0.0309297
1040.059958
1050.072018
1060.0040146
1070.043360
1080.072214
109−0.0281270
110−0.0307296
111−0.0214220
112−0.0293283
113−0.0315301
114−0.0209212
115−0.0206210
1160.021389
1170.0105129
1180.0127111
1190.072511
1200.07259
121−0.0214219
122−0.0555344
1230.0031153
124−0.0211218
1250.0105130
1260.014397
1270.031166
1280.069836
1290.0035149
130−0.0247252
1310.0036148
132−0.0226247
1330.0031152
134−0.0296287
135−0.0217226
136−0.0037174
1370.069338
138−0.0231249
1390.0106128
1400.068548
1410.07275
1420.072510
1430.069040
144−0.0280269
145−0.0289279
146−0.0303294
1470.035863
148−0.0583359
149−0.0552340
1500.0105131
1510.0131106
1520.062355
153−0.0118182
1540.072413
155−0.0262256
156−0.0210216
1570.022687
1580.014993
159−0.0220236
160−0.0361305
1610.0128109
162−0.0032172
1630.0005167
1640.019290
165−0.0521322
166−0.0158191
1670.0133104
168−0.0134186
169−0.0526324
1700.071222
1710.070031
172−0.0561346
1730.0109124
174−0.0267259
1750.071321
176−0.0310299
1770.0074138
1780.0043144
179−0.0541335
180−0.0083178
181−0.0233250
182−0.0299289
1830.068151
1840.028184
1850.0138100
1860.0033150
187−0.0514320
188−0.0058177
1890.028981
1900.014595
1910.0127110
192−0.0273262
193−0.0573357
1940.0121116
195−0.0196203
1960.0126114
1970.070029
198−0.0521321
199−0.0220237
2000.014496
2010.042161
2020.070823
2030.022188
2040.0134103
2050.029775
206−0.0191200
2070.0057139
208−0.0554343
209−0.0380309
210−0.0626362
211−0.0401317
212−0.0284274
213−0.0279267
2140.033665
2150.0116120
2160.0018163
217−0.0547336
2180.029676
2190.0101133
2200.0024160
2210.0125115
2220.070326
223−0.0291282
224−0.0155190
225−0.0283273
226−0.0176195
227−0.0562347
228−0.0302291
2290.0101134
230−0.0285276
2310.0021162
2320.07294
233−0.0204209
2340.030073
2350.0132105
236−0.0034173
237−0.0553342
238−0.0111181
239−0.0568351
240−0.0210215
241−0.0201206
242−0.0466319
243−0.0579358
244−0.0385312
245−0.0281271
246−0.0184198
2470.07277
248−0.0216224
2490.0117119
2500.064053
251−0.0221238
252−0.0225246
253−0.0528325
2540.068843
2550.0027157
256−0.0273264
257−0.0265258
258−0.0225245
2590.072412
260−0.0533328
261−0.0136187
262−0.0261255
2630.0051140
264−0.0278265
2650.0039147
2660.25072
2670.070227
2680.030771
269−0.0535330
2700.0032151
2710.0107127
272−0.0264257
273−0.0531327
2740.0117118
275−0.0363306
276−0.0373308
277−0.0569354
278−0.0200204
279−0.0558345
2800.071720
281−0.0028171
2820.0030155
283−0.0225244
284−0.0628364
2850.0114121
286−0.0273263
287−0.0161192
288−0.0571355
2890.072215
2900.07268
291−0.0302292
292−0.0530326
293−0.0534329
2940.0042145
295−0.0608360
296−0.0039175
297−0.0195202
2980.0024159
299−0.0312300
3000.072117
3010.0021161
302−0.0181196
303−0.0216225
304−0.0290280
3050.026286
306−0.0200205
307−0.0303293
308−0.0371307
309−0.0169194
310−0.0201207
3110.0101135
3120.0108126
313−0.0305295
3140.0043143
315−0.0290281
316−0.0539333
317−0.0285275
3180.014894
319−0.0256253
320−0.0286277
321−0.0271260
3220.069932
3230.036262
3240.0126113
325−0.0293284
3260.0029156
3270.0027158
328−0.0225243
329−0.0011169
330−0.0548338
3310.035764
3320.0138101
333−0.0627363
334−0.0536332
335−0.0648365
3360.0111122
337−0.0395316
3380.028882
3390.029677
340−0.0568352
341−0.0568353
342−0.0294285
343−0.0217226
344−0.0300290
345−0.0295286
3460.0045142
347−0.0203208
348−0.0351302
3490.029478
3500.072116
351−0.0207211
352−0.0548337
353−0.0616361
354−0.0214221
355−0.0566350
3560.0127112
357−0.0386313
3580.0130107
3590.069934
3600.062954
3610.0108125
3620.070030
363−0.0224242
364−0.0571356
365−0.0027170
Table A2. Final Greenwashing Risk Index scores with PROMETHEE II, disclosure, and green accounting ranks.
Table A2. Final Greenwashing Risk Index scores with PROMETHEE II, disclosure, and green accounting ranks.
AlternativeNet_FlowPROMETHEE_RankDisclosure_RankGreen_Accounting_RankGWI
10.06135652121−69
2−0.0258254175348−173
30.07201917512
40.06884441354−313
50.02818579318−239
60.01419888682
7−0.0279266184332−148
8−0.0401318308121187
90.02928074121−47
100.07022825315−290
11−0.0236251339121218
12−0.0563349276121155
13−0.029828820112180
14−0.0562348273121152
15−0.0539334240121119
160.07052421297−276
170.06834946342−296
180.06825047350−303
19−0.0189199250121129
20−0.0279268186325−139
210.072762339−337
22−0.0124183362121241
230.0094136128308−180
240.03047266356−290
250.03116761284−223
260.07032522278−256
270.06993330341−311
280.166331553152
290.001716416012139
300.06983532352−320
310.01529281346−265
32−0.0184197243121122
330.06963734121−87
34−0.022023331823187
35−0.0220234319121198
36−0.0380310264121143
370.06933936121−85
380.06864643349−306
39−0.0550339251121130
40−0.013118520912188
41−0.05353312362333
42−0.0210214289121168
43−0.0552341256121135
440.2663182181
45−0.013818821312192
46−0.0215223304121183
47−0.0223241327121206
48−0.0211217293121172
490.06695249121−72
50−0.028827819512174
51−0.0219228312121191
52−0.0383311266121145
53−0.0169193229121108
54−0.012718420712186
55−0.0107180161347−186
560.001216617312152
57−0.0220232317121196
580.013510293263−170
590.06874542243−201
600.03097064320−256
61−0.0523323226253−27
62−0.0356303232121111
630.06894239343−304
64−0.0272261180293−113
65−0.0209213287121166
66−0.0221239324121203
67−0.0230248335121214
68−0.039131522012199
69−0.0219230314121193
70−0.0283272190336−146
710.001616517212151
72−0.0222240326121205
73−0.0220231316121195
74−0.0220235320121199
75−0.0361304238121117
760.06894138345−307
77−0.014918921412193
780.01399989121−32
790.0047141134237−103
80−0.0215222303121182
810.06854744262−218
82−0.01922012542540
830.02977468273−205
840.01041321241213
850.012910899290−191
860.0118117109121−12
870.003015413612115
880.06115755311−256
89−0.0002168166275−109
90−0.0310298206244−38
910.02838377358−281
920.03106963276−213
930.04365954280−226
94−0.0389314278121157
950.015791169340−171
96−0.009617915312132
97−0.0219229313121192
980.02927973329−256
990.0109123115285−170
100−0.0054176338121217
1010.0086137130271−141
1020.03106862351−289
103−0.0309297364121243
1040.05995857291−234
1050.07201815294−279
1060.004014614212121
1070.04336056353−297
1080.07221411327−316
109−0.028127018812167
110−0.0307296363121242
111−0.0214220301121180
112−0.0293283196248−52
113−0.031530121012189
114−0.0209212286121165
115−0.0206210279121158
1160.021389129289−160
1170.0105129121246−125
1180.0127111102121−19
1190.0725117279−272
1200.072596292−286
121−0.0214219300121179
122−0.055534426023525
1230.003115314912128
124−0.0211218296121175
1250.01051301221211
1260.01439787232−145
1270.03116660319−259
1280.06983633295−262
1290.0035149145363−218
130−0.024725234125091
1310.003614814412123
132−0.0226247334121213
1330.003115214812127
134−0.0296287358121237
135−0.0217226309121188
136−0.0037174315121194
1370.06933835121−86
138−0.0231249336121215
1390.0106128120357−237
1400.06854845306−261
1410.07275311−8
1420.07251089−1
1430.06904037121−84
144−0.028026918712166
145−0.0289279354121233
146−0.0303294360121239
1470.03586316512144
148−0.0583359328121207
149−0.0552340255121134
1500.01051311231212
1510.013110697121−24
1520.06235551300−249
153−0.011818216212141
1540.07241310281−271
155−0.026225617612155
156−0.0210216292121171
1570.022687135361−226
1580.01499383121−38
159−0.0220236321121200
160−0.0361305218322−104
1610.0128109100359−259
162−0.0032172170335−165
1630.000516716312142
1640.01929013212111
165−0.0521322224121103
166−0.0158191222255−33
1670.013310495236−141
168−0.013418621112190
169−0.0526324227249−22
1700.07122219270−251
1710.07003128287−259
172−0.0561346271121150
1730.0109124116247−131
174−0.026725917812157
1750.07132118268−250
176−0.0310299365121244
1770.0074138131310−179
1780.0043144139313−174
179−0.0541335241121120
180−0.0083178346121225
181−0.0233250337121216
182−0.0299289359121238
1830.06815148256−208
1840.02818478304−226
1850.013810091288−197
1860.0033150146331−185
187−0.0514320221338−117
188−0.0058177340121219
1890.02898175238−163
1900.01459585277−192
1910.0127110101317−216
192−0.0273262181316−135
193−0.0573357298121177
1940.0121116108121−13
195−0.0196203263121142
1960.0126114105239−134
1970.07002926344−318
198−0.0521321223299−76
199−0.0220237322121201
2000.01449686337−251
2010.04216158121−63
2020.07082320305−285
2030.022188127296−169
2040.013410394121−27
2050.02977569241−172
206−0.0191200253121132
2070.005713916412143
208−0.0554343259121138
209−0.0380309262121141
210−0.0626362347121226
211−0.0401317307121186
212−0.028427419212171
213−0.0279267185328−143
2140.03366580364−284
2150.0116120112121−9
2160.0018163159334−175
217−0.0547336247121126
2180.02967670121−51
2190.01011331251214
2200.0024160157324−167
2210.0125115106274−168
2220.07032623121−98
223−0.0291282357121236
224−0.015519017112150
225−0.028327319112170
226−0.017619521712196
227−0.0562347272121151
228−0.030229120312182
2290.01011341261215
230−0.0285276351121230
2310.002116213712116
2320.072941229−228
233−0.0204209277121156
2340.03007367251−184
2350.013210596242−146
236−0.0034173299365−66
237−0.0553342257264−7
238−0.011118120012179
239−0.0568351282121161
240−0.0210215290121169
241−0.0201206269121148
242−0.0466319352360−8
243−0.0579358311121190
244−0.038531221912198
245−0.028127118912168
246−0.0184198244121123
2470.072774333−329
248−0.0216224305121184
2490.0117119111121−10
2500.06405353259−206
251−0.0221238323121202
252−0.0225246333121212
253−0.0528325228121107
2540.06884340303−263
2550.002715715212131
256−0.0273264350121229
257−0.0265258177330−153
258−0.0225245332121211
2590.0724129265−256
260−0.0533328233121112
261−0.013618721212191
262−0.0261255344234110
2630.0051140133240−107
264−0.027826518312162
2650.0039147143267−124
2660.2507265263
2670.07022724321−297
2680.030771107258−151
269−0.0535330235121114
2700.0032151147230−83
2710.0107127119121−2
272−0.026425734526976
273−0.0531327231312−81
2740.0117118110121−11
275−0.036330624512233
276−0.0373308252121131
277−0.0569354285121164
278−0.0200204267121146
279−0.0558345265121144
2800.07172016121−105
281−0.0028171291121170
2820.0030155150257−107
283−0.0225244331121210
284−0.0628364349121228
2850.0114121113121−8
286−0.0273263182326−144
287−0.0161192225121104
288−0.0571355295121174
2890.07221512102
2900.072685286−281
291−0.0302292204323−119
292−0.0530326230261−31
293−0.0534329234121113
2940.0042145140252−112
295−0.0608360342121221
296−0.0039175325121204
297−0.0195202261121140
2980.002415915612135
299−0.031230020812187
3000.07211714121−107
3010.0021161158355−197
302−0.0181196242121121
303−0.0216225306121185
304−0.0290280355121234
3050.02628690121−31
306−0.0200205268121147
307−0.030329320512184
308−0.0371307246121125
309−0.016919421612195
310−0.0201207270121149
3110.01011351414137
3120.0108126118298−180
313−0.0305295361121240
3140.004314316812147
315−0.0290281356121235
316−0.0539333239121118
317−0.028527519312172
3180.01489484121−37
319−0.0256253174302−128
320−0.02862771947187
321−0.0271260179283−104
3220.06993229121−92
3230.03626259121−62
3240.0126113104121−17
325−0.029328419712176
3260.002915615112130
3270.00271581548146
328−0.0225243330121209
329−0.0011169258121137
330−0.0548338249121128
3310.035764167272−105
3320.013810192121−29
333−0.0627363348121227
334−0.0536332237121116
335−0.064836535330152
3360.0111122114121−7
337−0.0395316294121173
3380.02888276309−233
3390.02967771121−50
340−0.0568352283121162
341−0.0568353284121163
342−0.029428519812177
343−0.0217226309121188
344−0.030029020212181
345−0.029528619912178
3460.0045142138260−122
347−0.0203208275121154
348−0.035130221513202
3490.02947872121−49
3500.07211613282−269
351−0.0207211281121160
352−0.0548337248121127
353−0.061636134331429
354−0.0214221302121181
355−0.056635028024535
3560.0127112103121−18
357−0.0386313274121153
3580.013010798121−23
3590.06993431266−235
3600.06295450307−257
3610.0108125117121−4
3620.07003027121−94
363−0.0224242329121208
364−0.0571356297121176
365−0.0027170288362−74

References

  1. Asif, Muhammad, Cory Searcy, and Pavel Castka. 2023. ESG and Industry 5.0: The role of technologies in enhancing ESG disclosure. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 195: 122806. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  2. Bais, Beatrice, Guido Nassimbeni, and Guido Orzes. 2024. Global Reporting Initiative: Literature review and research directions. Journal of Cleaner Production 471: 143428. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  3. Berg, Florian, Julian F. Kölbel, and Roberto Rigobon. 2022. Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings. Review of Finance 26: 1315–44. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  4. Biasin, Massimo, Andrea Delle Foglie, and Emanuela Giacomini. 2024. Addressing climate challenges through ESG-real estate investment strategies: An asset allocation perspective. Finance Research Letters 63: 105381. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  5. Chau, Le, Le Anh, and Vo Duc. 2025. Valuing ESG: How financial markets respond to corporate sustainability. International Business Review 34: 102418. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  6. Chen, Simin, Yu Song, and Peng Gao. 2023. Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance and financial outcomes: Analyzing the impact of ESG on financial performance. Journal of Environmental Management 345: 118829. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  7. da Silva, Paulo Pereira, and Isabel Vieira. 2025. ESG Disclosure and Labour Investment Efficiency. Research in Economics 79: 101060. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  8. Delmas, Magali A., and Vanessa Cuerel Burbano. 2011. The Drivers of Greenwashing. California Management Review 54: 64–87. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  9. Dicuonzo, Grazia, Matteo Palmaccio, and Matilda Shini. 2024. ESG, governance variables and Fintech: An empirical analysis. Research in International Business and Finance 69: 102205. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  10. Erhemjamts, Otgontsetseg, Kershen Huang, and Hassan Tehranian. 2024. Climate risk, ESG performance, and ESG sentiment in US commercial banks. Global Finance Journal 59: 100924. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  11. Ferrara, Massimiliano, and Tiziana Ciano. 2023. Sustainable finance: New issues and perspectives. In Reference Module in Social Sciences. Cambridge: Academic Press. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  12. Fu, Maozheng, Sujuan Huang, and Sheeraz Ahmed. 2024. Assessing the impact of green finance on sustainable tourism development in China. Heliyon 10: e31099. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
  13. Grijalvo, Mercedes, and Carmen García-Wang. 2023. Sustainable business model for climate finance. Key drivers for the commercial banking sector. Journal of Business Research 155: 113446. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  14. Kartal, Mustafa Tevfik, Dilvin Taşkın, Muhammad Shahbaz, Serpil Kılıç Depren, and Ugur Korkut Pata. 2024. Effects of Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG) Disclosures on ESG Scores: Investigating the Role of Corporate Governance for Publicly Traded Turkish Companies. Journal of Environmental Management 368: 122205. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
  15. Kiohos, Apostolos, and Nikolaos Sariannidis. 2010. Determinants of the Asymmetric Gold Market. Investment Management and Financial Innovations 7: 26–33. Available online: https://scholar.google.gr/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=el&user=xU_kC08AAAAJ&citation_for_view=xU_kC08AAAAJ:M3ejUd6NZC8C (accessed on 23 April 2025).
  16. Krivogorsky, Victoria. 2024. Sustainability reporting with two different voices: The European Union and the International Sustainability Standards Board. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 56: 100635. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  17. Lagasio, Valentina. 2024. ESG-washing detection in corporate sustainability reports. International Review of Financial Analysis 96: 103742. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  18. Lagoarde-Ségot, Thomas. 2024. Greenwashing and sustainable finance: An approach anchored in the philosophy of science. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 66: 101397. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  19. Li, Donghui, Zhanxiang Zhang, and Xin Gao. 2024. Does artificial intelligence deter greenwashing? Finance Research Letters 67: 105954. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  20. Li, Jiao. 2024. Controlling shareholders’ stock pledges and greenwashing–Evidence from China. Finance Research Letters 69: 106227. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  21. Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Joseph A. McCahery, and Paul C. Pudschedl. 2020. ESG Performance and Disclosure: A Cross-Country Analysis. Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 2020: 217–41. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  22. López-De-Silanes, Florencio, Jorge Bento Farinha, and Enzo Scannella. 2025. ESG, Greenwashing and Financial Controversies in Organizations. Journals.Sagepub.Com. Available online: https://journals.sagepub.com/pb-assets/cmscontent/BRQ/BRQ_Special%20Issue_ESG,%20Greenwashing%20and%20Financial%20Controversies%20in%20organizations-1708083341.pdf (accessed on 22 March 2025).
  23. Mallidis, Ioannis, Grigoris Giannarakis, and Nikolaos Sariannidis. 2024. Impact of board gender diversity on environmental, social, and ESG controversies performance: The moderating role of United Nations Global Compact and ISO. Journal of Cleaner Production 444: 141047. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  24. Official Journal of the European Union. 2024. Directive—EU—2024/825—EN—EUR-Lex. Available online: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/825/oj/eng (accessed on 22 March 2025).
  25. Oliveira, Benilde, and Cristiana Cerqueira Leal. 2024. Leading the way toward a sustainable future: The role of sustainable finance and environmental, social, and governance investing. In Circular Economy and Manufacturing. Cambridge: Woodhead Publishing, pp. 53–82. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  26. Pacces, Alessio M. 2021. Will the eu taxonomy regulation foster sustainable corporate governance? Sustainability 13: 12316. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  27. Peng, Yan, Hanzi Chen, and Tinghui Li. 2023. The Impact of Digital Transformation on ESG: A Case Study of Chinese-Listed Companies. Sustainability 15: 15072. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  28. Pizzetti, Marta, Lucia Gatti, and Peter Seele. 2021. Firms Talk, Suppliers Walk: Analyzing the Locus of Greenwashing in the Blame Game and Introducing ‘Vicarious Greenwashing’. Journal of Business Ethics 170: 21–38. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  29. Pohl, Erik, and Jutta Geldermann. 2024. PROMETHEE-Cloud: A web app to support multi-criteria decisions. EURO Journal on Decision Processes 12: 100053. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  30. Ragazou, Konstantina, and George Sklavos. 2020. Circular economy as a footpath for regional development in European Union. Paper presented at International Virtual Conference on Social Sciences, Virtual, May 28. [Google Scholar]
  31. Ragazou, Konstantina, Christos Lemonakis, Ioannis Passas, Constantin Zopounidis, and Alexandros Garefalakis. 2024a. ESG-driven ecopreneur selection in European financial institutions: Entropy and TOPSIS analysis. Management Decision 64: 1316–45. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  32. Ragazou, Konstantina, Georgia Zournatzidou, George Sklavos, and Nikolaos Sariannidis. 2024b. Integration of Circular Economy and Urban Metabolism for a Resilient Waste-Based Sustainable Urban Environment. Urban Science 8: 175. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  33. Ragazou, Konstantina, Nikolaos Sariannidis, Constantin Zopounidis, and David Roubaud. 2024c. Investigating the interconnection between financial performance and eco-efficiency in British universities: A roadmap towards sustainable higher education. Studies in Higher Education, 1–29. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  34. Rapach, Seonaid, Annalisa Riccardi, Bin Liu, and James Bowden. 2024. A taxonomy of earth observation data for sustainable finance. Journal of Climate Finance 6: 100029. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  35. Sadiq, Muhammad, Ch Paramaiah, Robinson Joseph, Ziguang Dong, Muhammad Atif Nawaz, and Nizomjon Khajimuratov Shukurullaevich. 2024. Role of fintech, green finance, and natural resource rents in sustainable climate change in China. Mediating role of environmental regulations and government interventions in the pre-post COVID eras. Resources Policy 88: 104494. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  36. Sariannidis, Nikolaos. 2011. Stock, Energy and Currency Effects on the Asymmetric Wheat Market. International Advances in Economic Research 17: 181–92. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  37. Schaltegger, Stefan, Igor Álvarez Etxeberria, and Eduardo Ortas. 2017. Innovating Corporate Accounting and Reporting for Sustainability—Attributes and Challenges. Sustainable Development 25: 113–22. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  38. Schiemann, Frank, and Raphael Tietmeyer. 2022. ESG Controversies, ESG Disclosure and Analyst Forecast Accuracy. International Review of Financial Analysis 84: 102373. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  39. Searcy, Cory, and Ruvena Buslovich. 2014. Corporate Perspectives on the Development and Use of Sustainability Reports. Journal of Business Ethics 121: 149–69. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  40. Sun, Yanqi, Dan Zhao, and Yuanyuan Cao. 2024. The impact of ESG performance, reporting framework, and reporting assurance on the tone of ESG disclosures: Evidence from Chinese listed firms. Journal of Cleaner Production 466: 142698. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  41. Sundarasen, Sheela, Rajespari Kumar, Krishna Tanaraj, Ahnaf Ali Alsmady, and Usha Rajagopalan. 2024. From board diversity to disclosure: A comprehensive review on board dynamics and ESG reporting. Research in Globalization 9: 100259. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  42. Šević, Aleksandar, Michail Nerantzidis, Ioannis Tampakoudis, and Panayiotis Tzeremes. 2024. Sustainability indices nexus: Green economy, ESG, environment and clean energy. International Review of Financial Analysis 96: 103615. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  43. Todaro, Dina Lucia, and Riccardo Torelli. 2024. From greenwashing to ESG-washing: A focus on the circular economy field. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 31: 4034–46. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  44. Yang, Zhi, Thi Thu Huong Nguyen, Hoang Nam Nguyen, and Thi Thanh Cao. 2020. Greenwashing behaviours: Causes, taxonomy and consequences based on a systematic literature review. Journal of Business Economics and Management 21: 1486–507. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  45. Zhang, Dongyang, Li Meng, and Jintao Zhang. 2023. Environmental subsidy disruption, skill premiums and ESG performance. International Review of Financial Analysis 90: 102862. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  46. Zhang, Hua, and Jie Lai. 2024. Greening through ESG: Do ESG ratings improve corporate environmental performance in China? International Review of Economics and Finance 96: 103726. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  47. Zobeidi, Tahereh, Masoud Yazdanpanah, Nadejda Komendantova, Katharina Löhr, and Stefan Sieber. 2024. Evaluating climate change adaptation options in the agriculture sector: A PROMETHEE-GAIA analysis. Environmental and Sustainability Indicators 22: 100395. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
Table 1. Description of the criteria.
Table 1. Description of the criteria.
Code of CriterionCriterionDescription TypeCategory
C1Environmental Pillar Score (last 4 FY)Refinitiv’s assessment on environmental policy and performanceBenefitESG Disclosure
C2GHG Emissions Scope 1 and 2 Paris Agreement AlignedAssesses the organization’s comprehensive dedication to minimizing its carbon impact in absolute termsBenefitESG Disclosure
C3GHG Emissions Intensity Scope 1 and 2 Paris Agreement AlignedEvaluates the company’s efficacy in dissociating economic growth from carbon emissionsBenefitESG Disclosure
C4Energy Consumption External AssuranceSpecifies if energy data are externally verifiedBenefitESG Disclosure
C5Waste Total (last 4 FY)The institution’s total waste across four fiscal yearsCostGreen Accounting
C6Water Withdrawal TotalThe total volume of water that was withdrawn over a four-year periodCostGreen Accounting
C7Self-Reported Environmental Fines (USD)Fines assessed for environmental violations (in US dollars)CostGreen Accounting
C8Environmental Expenditures (USD)Capital expenditures allocated to environmental initiativesBenefitGreen Accounting
C9Environmental Provisions (USD)Estimated financial obligations associated with environmental obligationsCostGreen Accounting
C10ESG Combined ScoreEnvironmental, social, and governance dimensions are combined to create a composite ESG scoreBenefitESG Disclosure
C11ESG ScoreESG grade that is solely determined by performance metricsBenefitESG Disclosure
C12ESG Controversies ScoreExposure to ESG-related controversies is reflected in the scoreBenefitESG Disclosure
C13CDP Climate Strategy (Presence)The existence of a formal climate strategy that is aligned with the CDP (1 = Yes; 0 = No)BenefitESG Disclosure
C14Board Meeting Attendance (%)The average attendance at board meetings, as a proxy for government engagementBenefitGovernance
Table 2. Entropy values, diversification scores, and final weights here.
Table 2. Entropy values, diversification scores, and final weights here.
CriterionC1C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9C10C11C12C13C14
Entropy_Ej0.00000.81150.87730.79980.99950.99910.99950.19350.99950.98400.98270.99320.00000.9770
Diversification_dj1.00000.18850.12270.20020.00050.00090.00050.80650.00050.01600.01730.00681.00000.0230
Weight_wj0.29560.05570.03630.05920.00010.00030.00010.23840.00010.00470.00510.00200.29560.0068
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Sklavos, G.; Zournatzidou, G.; Ragazou, K.; Sariannidis, N. Unmasking Greenwashing in Finance: A PROMETHEE II-Based Evaluation of ESG Disclosure and Green Accounting Alignment. Risks 2025, 13, 134. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks13070134

AMA Style

Sklavos G, Zournatzidou G, Ragazou K, Sariannidis N. Unmasking Greenwashing in Finance: A PROMETHEE II-Based Evaluation of ESG Disclosure and Green Accounting Alignment. Risks. 2025; 13(7):134. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks13070134

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sklavos, George, Georgia Zournatzidou, Konstantina Ragazou, and Nikolaos Sariannidis. 2025. "Unmasking Greenwashing in Finance: A PROMETHEE II-Based Evaluation of ESG Disclosure and Green Accounting Alignment" Risks 13, no. 7: 134. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks13070134

APA Style

Sklavos, G., Zournatzidou, G., Ragazou, K., & Sariannidis, N. (2025). Unmasking Greenwashing in Finance: A PROMETHEE II-Based Evaluation of ESG Disclosure and Green Accounting Alignment. Risks, 13(7), 134. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks13070134

Note that from the first issue of 2016, this journal uses article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Metrics

Back to TopTop