Designing Stress Tests for UK Fast-Growing Firms and Fintech
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Prudential Regulation Authority Review
2.1. Findings
2.2. Regulatory Developments
3. Prudential Supervision of UK Fintech
3.1. Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process
3.2. Stress Testing
3.3. Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process
3.4. Prudential Risk Management of Fintech
3.5. Fintech Activity-Based Regulation
4. UK Fintech Regulation: Fit for Purpose?
5. Conclusions
Funding
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
1 | PRA’s consultation papers (CP) are published with request for input. After incorporating feedback received, an update is produced that is usually translated into the updated policy statements (PS) and supervisory statements (SS). |
2 | Bank of England’s guidance regarding stress testing with the regulatory prescribed scenarios is captured in further detail in Dent et al. (2016). |
3 | For more information regarding the PRA buffer calculation and guidance please see PRA’s Statement of Policy, section II: Pillar 2B (PRA 2020e, p. 25). |
4 | The stress impact that comprises the first of the three assessments of the PRA buffer refers “an assessment of the amount of capital firms should maintain to withstand a severe stress scenario” as in paragraph 9.3 of PRA’s Statement of Policy (PRA 2022). |
5 | The term ‘pragmatic’ SREP was first used by the European Central Bank and the European Banking Authority (EBA 2020; ECB 2020a, 2020b), with adjustments made based on COVID-19 developments in early 2020. In this context the ‘pragmatic’ SREP refers to understanding the risk management capabilities of the fintech, building on the key components of the SREP but managing expectations, in comparison with systemic and/or more mature institutions. |
6 | Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 321, 26.6.2013) - CRR, Regulation (EU) 2019/876 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit risk, market risk, exposures to central counterparties, exposures to collective investment undertakings (CIU), large exposures, reporting and disclosure requirements, and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 – CRR II. |
7 | Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013)—CRD, Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures—CRD V. |
8 | The recommendations denoted in bold and underlined refer to amendments of the actual PRA’s ICAAP guidance SS31/15 (PRA 2021c). |
9 | For further guidance on the SWD (not fintech/FGF specific) please see the Single Resolution Board guidance (SRB 2021) and BoE’s CP9/17 (PRA 2017). CP9/17 captures the regulatory expectations in relation to SWD with respect to recovery options and the firms’ recovery plans (PRA 2017), with more information captured in the SS19/13 (PRA 2018). |
10 | For more information about regulatory sandboxes with country examples please see IMF’s report (2019, p. 21). |
11 | |
12 | |
13 | Based on the PRA’s guidance (PRA 2020a), new banks refer to ‘firms that are in the ‘mobilisation stage’ (authorisation with restrictions) and those that have received authorisation without restrictions within the past 12 months, whereas growing banks refer to banks that are typically between 1 and 5 years post-authorisation without restrictions’. |
14 | Referring to data privacy, security, discontinuity of banking services, inappropriate marketing practices based on the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS 2018, graph 6). |
15 | These are strategic and profitability risks, cyber-risk, high operational risk-systemic/idiosyncratic dimensions, third-party/verndom management risk linked to outsourcing, increased interconnectedness between financial parties, compliance risk inclusive of failure to protect consumers and data protection regulation, money laundering, liquidity risk and volatility of bank funding sources based on the (BCBS 2018, graph 6). |
16 | The definition of this risk denoted as ICT refers to the ‘risks of losses or potential loess related to the use of network information systems or communication technology, including breach of confidentiality, failure of systems, unavailability or lack of integrity of data and systems, and cyber risk’ (EC 2021a, 47 Article 1 20k 52). |
17 | |
18 | For further detial please see the published Pillar 3 disclosures and reports from ClearBank, Atom Bank, Monzo Bank and Starling Bank. |
19 | |
20 | For further information please see the study of Borio et al. (2022) that presents a comparison between AB regulation versus entity-based (EB) regulation under the aim of maintaining financial stability. |
21 | For the evolution of financial services with technological innovations and fintech solutions please see Figure 1 of IMF’s report (2019). |
22 | For a list of the key fintech products and services please see BCBS (2018, graph 1). |
23 | Note that conduct and fairness, competition and market development (Arner et al. 2015) are not examined in this paper. |
24 | Referring to recommendations 7 (‘safeguarding the financial system from evolving risks’), 8 (‘enhancing protection against cyber-risks’) and 9 (‘embracing digital regulation’) as in Van Steenis’ report (2019). |
25 | This refers to implementing recommendation 1.3 (p. 33) and 2.4 (p. 37) in particular, with recommendations 1 (p. 21) and 2 mainly (p. 35) (Kalifa 2021). |
26 | An example about policy cooperation regarding cyber security and cyber risks is the cyber resilience coordination centre (CRCC) (Doerr et al. 2022). |
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Capital 1 | Year 0 | Year 3 | Year 5 |
---|---|---|---|
|
|
| |
Chapter | Paragraph | Amended Guidance |
---|---|---|
2 | 2.1 | Dynamic ICAAP, with more frequent updates in line with business model developments and changes in risk profile and risk appetite |
2.5 | Framework for stress testing, scenario analysis and capital management, agile and flexible to reflect the risk profile and nature of FGF/fintech | |
2.19 | Extension of regular stress testing of the business continuity plan in an appropriate and proportionate manner to the business, focusing on cyber and operational risks | |
3 | 3.4 | Explore sensitivities in the short- and medium-term business plans and how capital needs might change |
3.6 | Broad range of stress tests…at a firm-wide level for key financial and non-financial risks | |
3.7, 3.11 | Use the results of its stress testing and scenario analysis to support business strategy and setting risk appetite, evidencing senior management/board engagement and challenge | |
3.8, 3.13 | Stress tests and scenario analysis should be carried out more frequently than annually, ideally every time the business plans are updated, with scenario recalibration | |
3.9 | Short- and medium-term projection of capital resources and capital requirements for a 0–1 year, 1–3 year and 3–5 year horizon | |
3.16–3.20 | Simplified approach and quantification of Common Stress Scenarios and exploratory exercises from BoE: Annual Cyclical Scenario, Concurrent Solvency Stress Test |
Element | Atom Bank | ClearBank | Monzo Bank | Revolut | Starling Bank | Zopa |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Annual Report | Yes (2015) | Yes (2016) | Yes (2017) | Yes (2016) | Yes (2016) | Yes (2020) |
Pillar 3 Report | Yes (2016) | Yes (2016) | Yes (2018) | No | Yes (2016) | Yes (2020) |
ICAAP | Yes (2015) | Yes (2016) | Yes (2018) | No | Yes (2016) | Yes (2020) |
ILAAP | Yes (2016) | Yes (2016) | Yes (2019) | No | Yes (2016) | Yes (2020) |
RRP | Yes (2016) | Yes (2016) | Yes (2018) | No | Yes (2018) | Yes (2020) |
S and ST | Yes (2015) | Yes (2016) | Yes (2018) | Yes (2020) | Yes (2016) | Yes (2020) |
PRA Buffer (Pillar 2B) | Yes (2016) | Yes (2017) | Yes (2018) | No | Yes (2019) | Yes (2020) |
Fintech | S and ST Highlights |
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Atom Bank | -Stress tests for retail credit risk, liquidity and funding risk, market risk and capital risk, as part of risk mitigation for principal risks (Atom Bank 2022a) -IFRS 9 scenarios presented in detail with their results and assumptions (Atom Bank 2022a) -Detailed liquidity stresses assumptions (Atom Bank 2022a) -Stress testing and scenario analysis included in risk management objectives and policies, and linked to recovery and resolution planning (Atom Bank 2022b) |
Clear Bank | -Stress testing for how key risks are mitigated, focusing on financial risks (ClearBank 2022b) -Horizon (short-term and long-term) for scenarios for finding and liquidity risk is included (ClearBank 2022b) -Stress testing linked to the ICAAP, ILAAP and RRP exercises (ClearBank 2021) -Stress testing programme for principal risks and uncertainties (ClearBank 2020) -Stress testing referenced in corporate governance, part of the going concern statement, the directors’ statement, and in the roles and responsibilities of the Board Risk Committee (ClearBank 2022a) |
Monzo Bank | -Stress testing and scenario modelling comprises a key element of the risk management approach (Monzo Bank 2020), part of the Risk and Control Reporting (Monzo Bank 2021a) -Stress tests used for capital risk, with scenarios and stress testing is analysed as part of mitigation and control for climate risk (Monzo Bank 2021a) -The business plan is stress tested, capturing external shocks, showing also the available management actions (Monzo Bank 2021a) -A reverse stress test of the business plan is reported, including specific scenarios, such as a cyber-attack, liquidity (ILAAP) a market and a combination of stresses is reported, showing the total impact in monetary terms, with stress testing for operational resilience and overall detailed assumptions (Monzo Bank 2021a) -Link of stress for capital and liquidity resilience and Pillar 2B and capital buffers is explained (Monzo Bank 2022), with liquidity stress testing and recovery plan (Monzo Bank 2021b) |
Revolut | -Stress testing employed for the Interest Rate Risk on the Banking Book (IRRBB), capital and liquidity risk, market risk and model risk (Revolut Ltd. 2021) -Scenario analysis and stress testing are referenced but not explained in detail (Revolut Ltd. 2021) |
Starling Bank | -Stress testing is used in strategic planning, risk appetite development and in the ICAAP and ILAAP, referenced in risk appetite statements for capital risk and in the counterparty risk and credit valuation adjustments (CVA) calculations (Starling Bank 2018b, 2019a, 2019b) -Stress testing is part of mitigating controls for liquidity and capital risk (Starling Bank 2018a) -Brexit risk and funding and liquidity risk scenarios are referenced (Starling Bank 2019a, 2019b) -Horizon of macroeconomic scenarios is presented, with forward looking element and forecast, for IFRS 9 as well (Starling Bank 2019a) -Extensive stress testing of different scenarios is the 4th component of the ERMF (Starling Bank 2019a), part of the Risk Management Process of the ERMF for mitigation of principal risks and uncertainties (Starling Bank 2021, 2022b) -Stress and scenario tests for market risk, operational resilience, COVID-19 impact, Pillar 2 Buffer calculation and for ECL are included (Starling Bank 2020) -Stress testing is referenced in going concern and directors’ statements (Starling Bank 2019a, 2020) -Stress testing and its components are detailed in the risk framework, including a sub-section for each of the Principal Risks, under Risk Mitigation, covering Credit Risks, Financial Risks (Liquidity and Funding, Market: Foreign Exchange, Interest Rate in the Banking Book-IRRBB, Capital), Operational Risks (for operational resilience), with their results and assumptions detailed in the financial statement notes (Starling Bank 2022a) |
Zopa | -Link of stress testing with ICAAP, ILAAP, RRP and PRA buffer assessment is included, with the risk appetite development for capital and liquidity risk explained (Zopa Group 2021) -Stresses are used to test principal uncertainties with stress testing part of the risk culture (Zopa Group 2022a, 2022b) -Stress testing is used for to capture the financial risks from climate change (Zopa Group 2022a, 2022b) -Examination of scenario aligned to the BoE Solvency Stress Test is included, with detailed assumptions and results for ECL (Zopa Group 2022b) |
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Pantos, S. Designing Stress Tests for UK Fast-Growing Firms and Fintech. Risks 2023, 11, 31. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11020031
Pantos S. Designing Stress Tests for UK Fast-Growing Firms and Fintech. Risks. 2023; 11(2):31. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11020031
Chicago/Turabian StylePantos, Stavros. 2023. "Designing Stress Tests for UK Fast-Growing Firms and Fintech" Risks 11, no. 2: 31. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11020031
APA StylePantos, S. (2023). Designing Stress Tests for UK Fast-Growing Firms and Fintech. Risks, 11(2), 31. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11020031