On a Simplified Method of Defining Characteristic Function in Stochastic Games
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Cooperative Stochastic Games
2.1. Model
- is the set of players.
- is the finite set of states.
- is the game in normal form associated with state . The set of players N is common for any state . Let be a finite set of actions of player in state , be an action of player in this state; be a payoff function of player i in state .
- is a transition function from state when action profile is realized, where is a probability distribution over set .
- is an initial state distribution.
- is a common discount factor.
2.2. Approximated Characteristic Function for State Games
- in state :
- in state :
- for state :
- for state :The first (second) element in any entry of the matrix is the probability of transition from the particular state and action profile to state (state ). One can easily notice that the probabilistic transitions are defined in state when players choose action profiles , and , and in state when players choose action profiles . All other transitions are deterministic.
2.3. New Approximated Characteristic Function for Stochastic Games
3. Strongly Subgame-Consistent Core in Stochastic Games
3.1. Imputation Distribution Procedure
- for any ;
- , where is the expected discounted sum of payments to player i in stochastic subgame starting from state ω, according to procedure β.
3.2. Strongly Subgame-Consistent Core
- Find the sum of over the set of players, we obtain
- We prove that or in vector form , where . We have
4. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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S | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
28 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
19 | 12 | 6 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |
28 | 12 | 10 | 10 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |
19 | 12 | 10 | 10 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
S | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
252.07 | 92.41 | 62.01 | 64.00 | 9.47 | 9.00 | 9.00 | |
245.86 | 95.17 | 77.87 | 60.00 | 10.52 | 10.00 | 10.00 | |
252.07 | 120.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 20.00 | 10.00 | 10.00 | |
245.86 | 120.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 20.00 | 10.00 | 10.00 |
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Parilina, E.; Petrosyan, L. On a Simplified Method of Defining Characteristic Function in Stochastic Games. Mathematics 2020, 8, 1135. https://doi.org/10.3390/math8071135
Parilina E, Petrosyan L. On a Simplified Method of Defining Characteristic Function in Stochastic Games. Mathematics. 2020; 8(7):1135. https://doi.org/10.3390/math8071135
Chicago/Turabian StyleParilina, Elena, and Leon Petrosyan. 2020. "On a Simplified Method of Defining Characteristic Function in Stochastic Games" Mathematics 8, no. 7: 1135. https://doi.org/10.3390/math8071135
APA StyleParilina, E., & Petrosyan, L. (2020). On a Simplified Method of Defining Characteristic Function in Stochastic Games. Mathematics, 8(7), 1135. https://doi.org/10.3390/math8071135