1. Introduction
In this paper, we let 
 be the second-order Peano arithmetic 
without the schema of (countable) Choice. Discussing the structure and deductive properties of 
, one of founders of modern proof theory Georg Kreisel ([
1], § III, page 366) wrote that the selection of subsystems “is a central problem”. In particular, Kreisel notes, that
[…] if one is convinced of the significance of something like a given axiom schema, it is natural to study details, such as the effect of parameters.
Recall that parameters in this context are free variables in various axiom schemata in , , , and other similar theories. Thus the most obvious way to study “the effect of parameters” is to compare the strength of a given axiom schema S with its parameter-free subschema . (The asterisk will refer to the parameter-free subschema in this paper).
Some research in this direction was accomplished in the early years of modern set theory. In particular Levy [
2] proved that the generic collapse of cardinals below 
 (called the Levy collapse, see Solovay [
3]) results in a generic extension of 
 in which 
 fails, where 
 is the parameter-free subschema of the (countable) 
Choice schema  in the language of 
. This result by Levy implies the formal consistency of 
.
Later Guzicki [
4] established that the Levy-style generic collapse below 
 results in a generic extension of 
 in which 
 (in the language of 
) fails, but the parameter-free subschema 
 holds, so that 
 is strictly weaker than 
, or saying it differently, 
 is consistent. (This can be compared with an opposite result for the 
dependent choice schema 
, in the language of 
, which happens to be equivalent to its parameter-free subschema 
 by a simple argument given for instance in [
4]).
We may note that the Levy and Guzicki results above involve uncountable cardinals up to  (Levy) and  (Guzicki), so that the consequent consistency results are based on set theoretic tools far beyond the axiomatic system  itself. This discrepancy motivated us to conduct this research, aimed at cardinal-preserving constructions of models with the same properties, with the final goal to obtain the consistency results as above on the basis of the consistency of  alone.
Outside of the domain of 
, some results related to parameter-free versions of the Separation and Replacement axiom schemata in 
 also are known from [
5,
6,
7]. This gives us an additional 
motivation to include the 
 Comprehension schema  in our study, which is a direct 
 counterpart of the 
 Separation and Replacement schemata.
To conclude, our paper is devoted to further clarification of the role of parameters in the Choice and and Comprehension schemata 
 and 
 in 
. 
The main integrated result is that the parameter-free versions of both 
 and 
 are 
strictly weaker than the full versions of the schemata (Theorems 1 and 2 below), but still the parameter-free version 
 of 
 is not provable in 
 (Theorem 3). Special attention will be paid to the evaluation of those proof theoretic tools used in the arguments. That is, we show that the formal consistency of 
 suffices. This is 
the main contribution of this paper. It has a crucial advantage comparably to the above-mentioned earlier results and approaches by Levy [
2] and Guzicki [
4], which involve cardinal-collapse forcing notions and thereby definitely cannot be rendered on the basis of the consistency of 
.
The following Theorems 1–3 are the main results of this paper.
Theorem 1.  In , let  be the constructible universe. Then:
- (i)
- There is a cardinal-preserving generic extension of  in which  (that is,  for ordinal-definable relations) holds, but the full  fails in the domain of reals. 
- (ii)
- If  is consistent then  does not prove . 
 Theorem 1 is entirely new. Part (i) greatly surpasses the above-mentioned result of Guzicki [
4] by the requirement of cardinal-preservation. This is a conditio sine qua non for Claim (ii) to be obtained by a similar technique, because the involvement of uncountable cardinals in the arguments, as in [
4], is definitely beyond the formal consistency of 
.
In the next theorem,  is the subtheory of  in which the full schema  is replaced by its parameter-free version , and the Induction principle is formulated as a schema rather than one sentence.
Theorem 2.  In , let  be the constructible universe. Then:
- (i)
- There is a cardinal-preserving generic extension of , and a set  in this extension, such that  and M models . 
- (ii)
- If  is consistent then  does not prove . 
 This is a new result as well, appeared in our recent ArXiv preprint [
8].
The next theorem, albeit not entirely new in part (i), is added in for good measure, because its proof involves basically the same type of generic extensions.
Theorem 3.  In , let  be the constructible universe. Then:
- (i)
- There is a cardinal-preserving generic extension of  in which  fails. 
- (ii)
- If  is consistent then  does not prove . 
 Part (i) of this theorem essentially follows from a result by Enayat [
9], where it is shown that using the finite-support infinite product of Jensen’s minimal-
-real forcing [
10] results in a permutation model of 
 with an infinite Dedekind-finite 
 set of reals, and the existence of such a set implies the refutation of 
. Part (ii) is new.
The first claims of all three theorems will be established by means of a complex iteration of the Sacks forcing which resembles the generalized iteration by Groszek and Jech [
11], but is carried out in a pure geometric way that avoids any formalism of forcing iterations. We call this technique 
arboreal Sacks iterations. The associated coding by degrees of constructibility is also involved, more or less along the lines discussed in ([
12], p. 143).
To conclude, 
the main novelty of all three theorems is that the unified forcing technique of arboreal Sacks iterations is used to define generic cardinal-preserving models of set theory and second-order Peano arithmetic with different effects related to parameters in the Choice and Comprehension schemata in 
, to subsequently prove that the parameter-free versions of the schemata are weaker than the full versions. This leads to further development of the research line outlined by Georg Kreisel [
1], see a quote above. 
The other principal novelty is that we demonstrate, by claims (ii) of all three theorems, that the ensuing consistency results can be obtained on the basis of the consistency of 
 alone, rather than on the basis of full-scale set theoretic forcing technique. Claims (i) of Theorems 1 and 2 are 
new as they stand; claim (i) of Theorem 3 is a corollary of a known result.
It remains to note that topics in subsystems of second order arithmetic remain of big interest in modern studies, see e.g., [
13,
14,
15], and our paper contributes to this research line.
The paper is organized as follows. After a short review of 
 preliminaries in 
Section 2, we take some space to briefly describe the aforementioned cardinal-collapse models by Levy [
2] and Guzicki [
4] in 
Section 3 and 
Section 4.
Our basic forcing notion 
 is introduced in 
Section 5; it consists of 
iterated perfect sets. The structure of 
-generic extensions 
 of 
 is studied in 
Section 6 and 
Section 7. In particular, Theorem 4 provides the cardinal preservation, and Theorem 5 presents several important results on the degrees of constructibility of reals and the relation of true 
-successor in the generic extensions considered.
The proof of Theorem 3(i) is carried out in 
Section 8 modulo an important lemma (Lemma 11) established in 
Section 9. Basically, a generic extension that proves Theorem 3(i) will be obtained as a certain subextension of a 
-generic extension 
, which is the content of Theorem 6.
Claims (i) of Theorems 1 and 2 are established in 
Section 10 and 
Section 11, via certain other subextensions of a 
-generic extension, studied by Theorems 7 and 8 respectively.
Finally 
Section 12 contains the proof of claims (ii) of all three theorems. To accomplish this proof, we will redo the proofs of claims (i) of all three theorems in some uniform manner. This will involve a rather well-known Theorem 9 on the equiconsistency of 
 and the set theory 
 without the Power Set axiom.
The paper ends with a usual conclusion-style material in 
Section 13.
A flowchart follows on page 4, 
Figure 1 for the convenience of the reader.
  2. Second Order Peano Arithmetic Preliminaries
Following [
1,
16,
17] we consider the second order Peano arithmetic 
 as a theory in the language 
 with two sorts of variables—for natural numbers and for sets of them. We use 
 for variables over 
 and 
 for variables over 
, reserving capital letters for subsets of 
 and other sets. The axioms are as follows in (1)–(4):
- (1)
- Peano’s axioms for numbers. 
- (2)
- The  Induction-  schema:  - , for every formula  -  in  - , and in  -  we allow parameters, i.e., free variables other than  k- . (We do not formulate Induction as one sentence here because the Comprehension schema  -  will not be assumed in full generality in  Section 11- ). 
- (3)
- Extensionality for sets of natural numbers. 
- (4)
- The Comprehension schema : , for every formula  in which x does not occur, and in  we allow parameters. 
 is also known as 
 (see e.g., an early survey [
16]), as 
 (see e.g., Simpson [
17] and Friedman [
18]), as 
 (in [
19] or elsewhere). Note that the schema of Choice (see below) is not included in 
.
The following schemata are not assumed to be parts of , yet they are often considered in the context of and in connection with .
- The Schema of Choice : 
- , for every formula , where we allow parameters in , and , as usual. 
We use  instead of AC, more common in  studies, because AC is the general axiom of choice in the  context.
- Dependent Choices DC: 
- , for every formula , and in  we allow parameters. 
We let 
 be the parameter-free sub-schema of 
 (that is, 
 contains no free variables other than 
k). We define the parameter-free sub-schema 
 the same way. The parameter-free sub-schema 
 can be defined as well, but this does not make much sense because 
 is known to be equivalent to 
 by a simple argument, see e.g., [
4].
In set-theoretic setting, 
 and 
 can be considered in the assumption that 
 is a set-theoretic binary relation on 
, whose type can be restricted in this or another way depending on the context. In particular, 
 assumes that 
 is an 
 (ordinal-definable) relation. (See [
20] on ordinal definability). In addition, say 
 or 
 means the restriction to the type of lightface 
 (parameter-free) or resp. boldface 
 (with parameters in 
 allowed) formulas.
  3. A Cardinal-Collapse Model Where the Parameter-Free  Fails
Here we recall an old model by Levy [
2] in which the parameter-free 
 fails for a certain (lightface) 
 relation. This is basically any model of 
. To obtain this model, Levy makes use of the collapse below 
, i.e., a Cohen-style generic sequence 
 of (generic) collapse maps 
 is adjoined to the Gödel-constructible universe 
. Consider the set 
 and the class 
 of all sets hereditarily 
F-ordinal-definable in 
. Then 
N is a model of 
.
We may note that the set  of all reals in N is equal to the set .
To prove that  fails under , Levy considers the relation  ,  and f codes a well-ordering of length .
Then, first,  fails for R under  by obvious reasons, and second, R can be presented as a lightface  relation.
To prove the second claim, we may note, following Levy, that  is equivalent to the following relation:
, f codes a well-ordering, whose length we denote by , and, for every countable transitive set X which models  minus the Power Set axiom, if  then it is true in  that “there are at least  infinite cardinals ”.
To see that  is a  relation, Levy uses well-founded relations on  as a substitution for countable transitive sets. Since the well-foundedness is a  property, the definition of  can be converted to a  form.
From a more modern perspective, we may note that 
 is a 
 relation, where 
 is the transitive set of all 
hereditarily countable sets, and then make use of the conversion theorem (see e.g., Theorem 25.25 in [
20]) saying that 
 relations on the reals are the same as 
 relations.
  4. A Cardinal-Collapse Model Where the Parameter-Free  Holds but the Full  Fails
The Guzicki model with such an effect appeared in [
4]. It is similar to Levy’s model of [
2], yet it makes use of the Levy collapse below 
. To obtain such a model, we adjoin, to the Gödel constructible universe 
, a Cohen-style (finite-support) generic sequence 
 of (generic) collapsing maps 
. Consider the set 
 and the class 
N of all sets hereditarily 
F-real-ordinal definable in 
. Then 
N is a model of 
.
The set  of all reals in N is equal to .
To check that 
 fails in 
N for a 
 relation, let 
 code a strictly increasing map 
 whose range is cofinal in 
. Accordingly the sequence of cardinals 
 is cofinal in 
. This allows to accomodate the arguments in 
Section 3, with minor changes 
mutatis mutandis, and prove that 
 fails in 
N for a 
 relation similar to 
R but defined with 
p as a parameter.
To see that the parameter-free , and even  for all ordinal-definable relations holds in N, let  be an ∈-formula with an ordinal  as the only parameter. Assume that  holds in N. Then for every k there exist ordinals  such that a set  satisfying  in N exists in . Let  be the least such an ordinal. The sequence  immediately belongs to . Yet using the homogeneous character of the product collapse forcing that yields f, one can prove that in fact the sequence  in fact belongs to . Therefore , and accordingly for any k there is a set  satisfying  in N. It remains to note that .
  5. Iterated Perfect Sets
Here we begin the proof of Theorems 1–3. The proof involves the engine of generalized iterated Sacks forcing developed in [
21,
22] on the base of earlier papers [
11,
23,
24] and others. We consider the constructible universe 
 as the ground model.
Arguing in  in this section, we define, in 
, the set
      
      of all non-empty tuples 
, 
, of ordinals 
, partially ordered by the extension ⊂ of tuples. 
 is a tree without the minimal node 
 (the empty tuple), which we exclude.
 Our plan is to define a generic extension  of  by an array  of reals , in which the structure of “sacksness” is determined by this set , so that in particular each  is Sacks-generic over the submodel . Then Theorems 1–3 will be obtained via submodels of the basic model .
Let  be the set of all countable and finite initial segments (in the sense of ⊂) . If  then  is the set of all initial segments of .
Greek letters  will denote sets in .
Characters  are used to denote elements of .
For any  we consider initial segments  and  and  defined analogously.
We consider  as identical to  so that both  and  for  are homeomorphic Polich compact spaces. Points of  will be called reals.
Assume that . If  then let  denote the usual restriction. If  then let . To save space, let  mean ,  mean , etc.
But if  then we put .
To describe the idea behind the definition of iterated perfect sets, recall that the Sacks forcing consists of perfect subsets of , that is, sets of the form , where  is a homeomorphism.
To obtain a product Sacks model, with two factors (the case of a two-element unordered set as the length of iteration), we have to consider sets  of the form  where H is any homeomorphism defined on  so that it splits in obvious way into a pair of one-dimensional homeomorphisms.
To obtain an iterated Sacks model, with two stages of iteration (the case of a two-element ordered set as the length of iteration), we have to consider sets  of the form , where H is any homeomorphism defined on  such that if  and  then .
The combined product/iteration case results in the following definition.
Definition 1  (iterated perfect sets, [
21,
22])
. For any   is the collection of all sets  such that there is a homeomorphism  satisfyingfor all  and , . Homeomorphisms H satisfying this requirement will be called projection–keeping. In other words, sets in  are images of  via projection–keeping homeomorphisms.We put .
 Remark 1.  Note that ⌀, the empty set, formally belongs to Ξ, and then , and we easily see that  is the only set in .
 For the convenience of the reader, we now present five lemmas on sets in 
 established in [
21,
22].
Lemma 1  (Proposition 4 in [
22])
. Let . Every set  is closed and satisfies the following properties:- 1. 
- If  and  then  is a perfect set in . 
- 2. 
- If , and a set  is open in X (in the relative topology) then the projection  is open in . In other words, the projection from X to  is an open map. 
- 3. 
- If , , , and  then . 
 Proof (sketch).  Clearly  satisfies P-1, P-2, P-3, and one easily shows that projection–keeping homeomorphisms preserve the requirements.    □
 Lemma 2  (Lemma 5 in [
22])
. Suppose that , , ,  is any set, and . Then . Lemma 3  (Lemma 6 in [
22])
. If , , , then . Lemma 4  (Lemma 8 in [
22])
. If , , a set  is open in X, and  then there is a set ,  clopen in X and containing . Lemma 5  (Lemma 9 in [
22])
. Suppose that , , ,  and . Then  belongs to .In particular , since obviously .
 Corollary 1.  Assume that , , , , and . Then .
 Proof.  The bigger set  belongs to  by Lemma 5. In addition,  by Lemma 2 (with , ). It follows that , because . We conclude that  by Lemma 5. Finally, we have  by construction.    □
 Corollary 2.  Assume that  are pairwise disjoint, , and  for each k. Then the set  belongs to ,  and  for all k.
 Proof.  For each k, there exists a projection–keeping homeomorphism . Define  by  for all k. Then H is projection–keeping and .    □
 Still arguing in , we let  be the group of all permutations  of the index set , i.e. all bijections  such that . Any such a permutation  induces a transformation acting on several types of objects as follows.
- If , or generally , then . 
- If  and  then  is defined by  for all . That is, formally , the superposition. 
- If  and  then . 
- If  then . 
The following lemma is obvious.
Lemma 6.  If  then .
Moreover π is an order preserving automorphism of .
   6. The Forcing Notion and the Basic Extension
This section introduces the forcing notion we consider and the according generic extension called the basic extension.
We continue to argue in . Recall that a partially ordered set 
 is defined in 
Section 5, and 
 is the set of all at most countable initial segments 
 in 
. For any 
 let 
.
 The set  will be the forcing notion.
To define the order, we put  whenever . Now we set  (i.e. X is stronger than Y) if and only if  and .
Remark 2.  We may note that the set  as in Remark 1 belongs to  and is the -largest (i.e., the weakest) element of .
 Now let  be a -generic set (filter) over .
Remark 3.  If  in  then X is not even a closed set in  in . However we can transform it to a perfect set in  by the closure operation. Indeed the topological closure  of such a set X in  taken in  belongs to  from the point of view of .
 It easily follows from Lemma 4 that there exists a unique array , all  being elements of , such that  whenever  and . Then  is a -generic extension of , which we call the basic extension.
For the sake of convenience, let .
Theorem 4  (Thm 24 in both [
21,
22])
. Every cardinal in  remains a cardinal in . Every  is Sacks generic over the model . Proof (idea).  The forcing  has the following property in , common with the ordinary one-step Sacks forcing:
        
- (∗)
- if sets  are open dense in , and , then there is a stronger condition , , and finite sets  pre-dense in  below Y, in the sense that any stronger , , is compatible with some . 
This property, established in [
21,
22] by means of a splitting/fusion technique, easily implies the preservation of all 
-cardinals in 
-generic extensions of 
.    □
 Here follow several lemmas on reals in 
-generic models 
, established in [
21]. In the lemmas, we let 
 be a set 
-generic over 
.
Lemma 7  (Lemma 22 in [
21])
. Suppose that sets  satisfy . Then . Lemma 8  (Lemma 26 in [
21])
. Suppose that  is an initial segment in , and . Then . Lemma 9  (Corollary 27 in [
21])
. If  then  and even . Lemma 10  (Lemma 29 in [
21])
. If  is an initial segment of , and , then either  or  for some .   7. Structure of the Basic Extension
We apply the lemmas above in the proof of the next theorem. Let  denote the Gödel well-ordering on  so that  if and only if . Let  mean that  but , and  mean that  and .
Say that y is a true-successor of x (where ) if and only if  and any real  satisfies .
Theorem 5.  Let  be a set -generic over , and . Then we have the following:
- (i)
- if  and  then  
- (ii)
- if  and  then  
- (iii)
- if  and  then  or  for some ,  
- (iv)
- if , , then  is a true -successor of  
- (v)
- if , and  is a true -successor of , then there is  such that  
- (vi)
- if , then  is a true -successor of  
- (vii)
- if  is a true -successor of , then there is  such that  
 Proof.  (i) Apply Lemma 7 with  and .
(ii) Apply Lemma 8 with .
(iii) If there are elements , , such that , then let  be the largest such one. Let  (a finite initial segment of ). By Lemma 10, either , or there is  such that . In the “either” case, we have  by (i), so that  by the choice of . In the “or” case we have , hence  by (ii). However, this contradicts the choice of  and .
Finally if there is no , , such that , then the same argument with  gives .
(iv) The relation  is implied by Lemmas 7 and 8. If now  then  or  for some  by (iii), and in the latter case in fact , hence , and then .
(v) As , by Lemma 10 there is  such that  and . If  strictly then  by the true -successor property, hence  by (ii), contrary to the choice of . Therefore in fact . Then we have  still by the true -successor property and (i), (ii). This implies  for some , because if say  then  is strictly between  and , contrary to the true -successor property.
(vi) Similar to (iv). Recall that . This implies . On the other hand,  holds by Lemma 8 with . If now  then  or  for some  by (iii), and in the latter case in fact , hence then , contrary to the choice of z.
(vii) As , by Lemma 10 (with ) there is  such that . If  strictly then  by the true -successor property, hence , contrary to Lemma 8 with . Therefore in fact . This implies  for some , because if, say,  then  is strictly between  and , contrary to the true -successor property.    □
 Now consider the following formula:
 is a tuple of reals  such that  and each  () is a true -successor of .
Thus  separates tuples of true successor iterations, of length n.
Remark 4.   is a  relation, absolute for any transitive model of  containing the true , and component-wise -invariant in the argument . Indeed to see that  is  note that ‘being a true -successor’ is  by direct estimation. To see the absoluteness note that both ‘being a true -successor’ and  are relativized to the lower -cone of the arguments. The invariance is obvious.
 Corollary 3  (of Theorem 5). Let  be a set -generic over .
- (i)
- If , , and - then  holds in . 
- (ii)
- Conversely if  and  holds in  then there is  such that  component-wise, that is, , , , …, . 
   8. A Model in Which the Parameter-Free  Fails
Here we prove Theorem 3(i). Let us fix a set , -generic over  and consider the according -generic array  and the -generic extension . The goal is to define a sub-extension of  in which the parameter-free  fails.
- Let  be the set of all finite or -countable initial segments  such that there is a number  satisfying  for all . 
- Let  be the set of all restrictions of the form , , of the generic array . 
- Let  be the class of all sets -ordinal-definable in . Thus  iff x is definable in  by a set-theoretic formula with parameters in . 
Here 
 is the class of all ordinals, as usual. See [
20,
25] on ordinal definability.
- Let  be the class of all sets , hereditarily -ordinal-definable in , i.e., it is required that x itself, all elements of x, all elements of elements of x, etc., belong to the above defined class  in . 
The following theorem implies Theorem 3(i). Indeed the model  is a cardinal-preserving extension of  by Theorem 4.
Theorem 6.  If a set  is -generic over  then  is a model of  in which the parameter-free/  fails.
It follows that  is a model of .
 Proof.  That classes of the form 
 model 
 see [
20], Chapter 13.
Note that if  then  via the initial segment , and hence  as well. It follows by Corollary 3(i) that  is true in , where . Our goal will be to show that the parameter-free formula , the right-hand side of , fails in , meaning that  fails in  for the formula .
Suppose to the contrary that there is  satisfying . This obviously results in a sequence  of tuples  of reals  satisfying , that is,  and each  () is a true -successor of .
By definition there is an -formula  with free variables , a parameter of the form , where , and some ordinals as parameters—such that if  and  then  is true in  iff . (The case of several parameters of the form , , can be easily reduced to the case of one parameter).
As , there is a number  such that  for all . Fix this m and consider the tuple . By Corollary 3(ii), there is a tuple , such that  component-wise, that is,  for all .
Note that 
 by the choice of 
m. There is a number 
 such that still 
 but the shorter tuple 
 belongs to 
, and hence 
. Then by Corollary 3 the 
-degree 
 is definable in 
 by the next formula, in which 
.
        
To conclude,  and the -degree  is definable in  by an -formula with  and ordinals as parameters. But this contradicts Lemma 11 that follows in the next Section. The contradiction refutes the contrary assumption above.
We finally note that  is a  formula by Remark 4.    □
   9. The Non-Definability Lemma
Here we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 11.  If a set  is -generic over , , and  then the -degree  cannot be defined in  by an -formula with  and ordinals as parameters.
 Proof.  Suppose to the contrary that 
 is a formula as indicated, and it holds in 
 that 
. Then there is a “condition” 
 such that
        
        where 
 is the 
-forcing relation over 
, and 
 is the canonical 
-name for the generic filter 
G. Let 
, so that 
.
We argue in . Thus 
. See 
Section 5 on permutations of 
.
 As  are countable initial segments of , it does not take much effort to define, in , a permutation  satisfying the following:
        
- (A)
-  is the identity 
- (B)
- , and if  then . 
Coming back to (
2) above, we put 
, 
. Note that 
 by Lemma 6, where 
. We claim that
        
To prove the claim, let  be -generic over , and . We have to check that, in , .
The set 
 is 
-generic over 
 and obviously 
. It follows from (
2) that 
 in 
. Yet 
 (since 
), 
 by (A), and finally 
 by construction. Thus, indeed 
 in 
, as required. This completes the proof of (
3).
The next step is to establish
        
- (C)
-  and  are compatible in . 
We check this claim 
arguing in , so that 
 and 
, where 
. It follows from (A), (B) that the set 
 satisfies 
, and in addition 
. Let 
. Then 
 belongs to 
 by Corollary 1. Thus 
, hence (C) holds. This implies (
3) since 
 is obvious.
But it follows from (
2) and (
3) that 
 and 
 force contradictory statements (because 
, and hence 
). The contradiction obtained completes the proof of the lemma. This accomplishes the proof of Theorem 6 as well.    □
   10. A Model in Which the Parameter-Free  Holds but the Full  Fails
Here we prove Theorem 1(i). The model will be a modification of the model studied in 
Section 8. We still fix a set 
, 
-generic over 
 and consider the 
-generic array 
 and the 
-generic extension 
. We are going to define a sub-extension of 
 in which the parameter-free 
 holds but the full 
 fails.
- Let  be the set of all finite or -countable initial segments  such that for any  there is a number  satisfying  for all  satisfying . 
- Let  be the set of all restrictions of the form , , of the generic array . 
- Let  be the class of all sets -ordinal-definable in . Thus  if and only if x is definable in  by a set-theoretic formula with sets in  as parameters. 
- Let  be the class of all sets , hereditarily -ordinal-definable in . 
The following theorem implies Theorem 1(i). Indeed it follows from Theorem 4 that the model  is a cardinal-preserving extension of .
Theorem 7.  If a set  is -generic over  then  is a model of  in which the parameter-free/  holds, even  (with ordinals as parameters) holds, but the full  fails. It follows that  is a model of .
 Proof.  Let 
 be the formula ‘
’. (See the definition of 
 in 
Section 7). Note the parameter 
 in this formula. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 6, if 
 then 
 and 
. It still follows by Corollary 3(i) that 
 is true in 
, where 
. Moreover, arguments similar to the proof of Theorem 6, which we leave for the reader, show that the formula 
, the right-hand side of 
, fails in 
. Thus 
 (with real parameters) fails in 
.
It remains to prove that  (with ordinals as parameters) holds in . Suppose towards the contrary that  is an -formula with ordinals as parameters, such that  fails for  in . Thus there exists a condition  satisfying
        
- (†)
-  “it holds in  that  but ”. 
Here  is the -forcing relation over , and  is the canonical -name for the generic filter G, as above.
As 
 holds in 
, there is a sequence 
 of reals 
, satisfying 
, 
. By definition, for any 
k there is a set 
 such that 
 (meaning that only 
 and ordinals are admitted as parameters), and the sequence 
 belongs to 
 as well. Furthermore, as the forcing relation is definable in 
, there exist sequences 
 of conditions 
 (possibly 
), and 
 of sets 
, such that
        
Now, 
arguing in , we let 
, 
, and 
. Thus 
 and all 
 belong to 
. Clearly there exists a sequence of permutations 
 (see 
Section 5), 
, such that the sets 
 are pairwise disjoint and disjoint with 
.
Let , so that  in  by Lemma 6, where . Define ; . It follows by Corollary 2 that the set  belongs to  and ,  for all k.
On the other hand, the sets  belong to  (because so do ) and are pairwise disjoint (because so are the sets ). However  is closed in  under countable disjoint union, hence .
We still 
work in . Starting with (
4) and arguing as in the proof of Lemma 11 (the proof of 3 on page 13), we deduce that, for all 
k,
		  
		and hence
        
        because 
 and 
.
Finally, if 
H is 
-generic then the class 
 has a well-ordering, say 
, also 
-ordinal-definable in 
. See e.g., [
20], Section 13, the class 
 is identical to 
 as in [
20]. Therefore, if 
H is any 
-generic set over 
 containing 
, then, arguing on the basis of (
5), we can define 
 in 
 such that, for each 
k, 
 is equal to the 
-least set 
 in 
, satisfying 
. This proves that 
 for any such 
H, and hence
        
But this contradicts (†) above since .    □
   11. Models in Which the Parameter-Free  Holds but the Full  Fails
Here we sketch a proof of Theorem 2(i). See a full proof in our recent ArXiv preprint [
8]. Thus the goal is to define a set 
 in a cardinal-preserving generic extension of 
, which is a model of 
 (with the parameter-free Comprehension 
) in which the full 
 fails.
Following the arguments above, assume that 
 is a set 
-generic over 
, define 
 (
) and the array 
 as above, and consider the set
      
Here , , . 
Thus 
 and 
. (Not necessarily 
.) We put
      
The next theorem implies Theorem 2(i) since it follows from Theorem 4 that the set  belongs to a cardinal-preserving extension of .
Theorem 8.  If a set  is -generic over  then  is a model of  (with the parameter-free Comprehension )in which the full  holds but the full  fails.
 Proof (sketch, see [8] for a full proof).  That  is a model of  (with parameters) follows by the Shoenfield absoluteness theorem, because  is Gödel-closed downwards by construction. That the parameter-free  holds in  follows by the ordinary permutation technique by a method rather similar to the verification of  in the proof of Theorem 7 above.
Finally,  fails to satisfy the full . Indeed the reals  () do not belong to , since  by construction. On the other hand, each  is analytically definable in  as the set containing the numbers  such that the structure of true -successors above  has a split at -th level, and possibly containing or not containing 0. Note the role of  as a parameter in this definition of  in . The ensuing definability formula for  is  by direct estimation, because it is based on the  definability of the relation of ‘being a true -successor’.    □
 Another model of 
, in which 
 fails even in the most elementary form of the nonexistence of complements of some its members, is also presented in [
8]. It has the form 
, where 
 is a Cohen-generic sequence over 
. Note that the complements 
 are 
not adjoined to 
M, so that 
 is violated in 
M even in the form 
, with 
 as a parameter. On the other hand, the parameter-free 
 holds in 
M by ordinary permutation arguments.
   12. Working on the Basis of the Consistency of 
This section is devoted to claims (ii) of our main Theorems 1–3. We recall that the consistency of  is a common assumption in claims (ii). As the proofs of claims (i) of the theorems, given above, contain a heavy dose of the forcing technique, first of all we have to adequately replace  with a more -like, forcing-friendly theory. This will be , a subtheory of  obtained as follows:
- (a)
- the Power Set axiom PS is excluded; 
- (b)
- the Axiom of Choice AC is replaced with the well-orderability axiom WA saying that every set can be well-ordered; 
- (c)
- the Replacement schema, which is not sufficiently strong in the absence of PS, is replaced with the Collection schema; 
See, e.g., [
26] for a comprehensive account of main features of 
.
Two more principles are considered in the context of  namely
- : 
- every set is finite or countable, 
- : 
- every set is Gödel-constructible, i.e., the axiom of constructibility. 
Theorem 9.  Theories  and  are equiconsistent. In fact they are interpretable in each other.
 Proof.  This has been a well-known fact since while ago, see e.g., Theorem 5.25 in [
16]. A more natural way of proof is as follows.
Firstly the theory 
 (i.e., 
 without 
WA and Collection) is interpreted in 
 by the 
tree interpretation described e.g., in [
16], § 5, especially Theorem 5.11, or in [
17], Definition VII.3.10 ff. Kreisel [
1], VI(a)(ii), attributed this interpretation to the category of “crude” results. Secondly the whole theory 
 is interpeted in 
 by means of the same tree interpretation, but restricted to only those trees that define sets constructible below the first 
gap ordinal, see a rather self-contained proof in [
27]. This second part belongs to the category of “delicate” results of Kreisel [
1], VI(b)(ii).    □
 Theorem 9 allows us to replace the consistency of  in claims (ii) of our Theorems 1–3 by the equivalent consistency of , which is a much more forcing-friendly theory.
This makes it possible to argue in the frameworks of  in the following proof of Theorem 3(ii). The proof is an adaptation of the proof of the statement (i) of the same Theorem 3, on the basis of .
Proof of Claims (ii) of Theorems 1–3.  We argue on the basis of . In other words, all sets are countable and constructible, so that the ground universe behaves like  in many ways. Yet, to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding, we accept the following.
 Definition 2.  The ground universe of  is denoted by . Accordingly  will be the collection (a proper -class) of all ordinals in .
 Emulating the construction in 
Section 5, we define proper classes 
 and 
, and sets 
, 
, 
, etc., similar to 
Section 5. But coming to Definition 1, we face a problem. Indeed, each space 
 and any homeomorphism 
 is now a proper class, hence 
 as by Definition 1 is a class of proper classes, which cannot be considered. Therefore we have to 
parametrize homeomorphisms by sets.
Definition 3.  ( form of Definition 1).
Arguing in , let . Definethis is a countable dense subset of  in . Let  be any map (a set in ). Let  be its extension defined on  by  whenever the limit exists, so  is a continuous map defined on , a topologically closed “subset” or rather subclass of  (also a proper class).
We define  to be the class of all maps  such that ,  is  and  is a projection–keeping homeomorphism.
Finally if  then let .
Then  and  are proper classes, of course.
 It is quite obvious that in the 
 setting 
 coincides with the collection of all sets 
, 
. This allows us to use the map 
 as a 
parametrization of 
 in 
, so that 
 is 
the set of codes for the 
 and each particular 
 is 
the set of codes for 
. We will use 
 as 
a forcing notion, that is, put 
, with the order 
 if and only if 
 in the sense of 
Section 5.
Note that both (∗) and the order are definable proper classes in .
Conditions  should be informally identified with corresponding objects (parametrically defined proper classes) .
The property (∗) in the proof of Theorem 4 transforms to the following property of the forcing  has a property in :
        
- (∗−)
            
- if a parametrized sequence of classes  is such that each  is open dense in , and , then there is a stronger condition , , and finite sets  pre-dense in  below Y. 
In other words, 
 is a 
pretame forcing notion in 
 in the sense of [
28] or [
29].
It follows (see e.g., [
29]) that any 
-generic extension of 
 is still a model of 
, and the forcing and definability theorems hold similar to the case of usual set-size forcing. Furthermore all constructions and arguments involved in the proofs of Theorems 6–8 above (i.e., claims (i) of Theorems 1–3), as well as the results of [
21,
22] cited in the course of the proofs, can be reproduced mutatis mutandis on the basis of the theory 
. In particular, Theorem 6 takes the form asserting that the 
-part of a certain subextension of any 
-generic extension of 
 satisfies 
.
Metamathematically, this means that the formal consistency of  implies the consistency of . However the consistency of  is equivalent to the consistency of  by Theorem 9. This concludes the proof of Claim (ii) of Theorem 3.
Pretty similarly, Theorems 7 and 8 take appropriate forms sufficient to infer the consistency of resp.
		from the consistency of 
, as required. This completes the proof of Claims (ii) of Theorems 1–3.    □
  13. Conclusions, Remarks, and Problems
In this study, the method of generalized arboreal iterations of the Sacks forcing is employed to the problem of obtaining cardinal-preserving models of 
, and models of 
 and the second-order Peano arithmetic 
, in which the parameter-free version of the Comprehension or Choice schema holds but the full schema fails. These results (Theorems 1–3 above) contribute to the ongoing study of both subsistems and extensions of 
 as in [
13,
14,
15,
17,
30,
31] among many others, as well as to modern studies of forcing extensions in class theories and 
-like theories as in [
26,
32,
33,
34].
From our study, it is concluded that the technique of generalized arboreal iterations of the Sacks forcing succeeds to solve important problems in descriptive set theory and second-order Peano arithmetic related to parameter-free versions of such crucial axiom schemata as Comprehension and Choice, by our Theorems 1–3.
From the results of this paper, the following remarks and problems arise.
Remark 5.  Identifying the theories with their deductive closures, we may present the concluding statements of Theorems 1–3 as resp. Studies on subsystems of  have discovered many cases in which  holds for a given pair of subsystems , see e.g., [17]. And it is a rather typical case that such a strict extension is established by demonstrating that  proves the consistency of S. One may ask whether this is the case for the results in (6). The answer is in the negative: namelyby a result in [18], also mentioned in [19]. This equiconsistency result also follows from a somewhat sharper theorem in [35], 1.5.  Remark 6.  There is another meaningful submodel of the basic model . Namely, consider the set  of all finite or countablewell-foundedinitial segments , , instead of the sets W (as in Section 8) and  (as in Section 10). Define a corresponding submodel  accordingly. Then  holds in  but  fails. Yet a better model is defined in [31], in which  holds but even  (the best possible in this case) fails.  Remark 7.  It will be interesting to study problems considered in this paper in the frameworks of non-ZF-oriented set theories like Quine’s New FoundationsNF[36], various non-well-founded and anti-foundational theories (see [37]), or (as suggested by one of the anonymous reviewers) the ideal set theory or the ideal calculus as in [38]—which is essentially a nave set or class theory with a rather vague axiomatic. Yet it seems to us that those theories haven’t so far developed an adequate instrumentarium to study and answer such sort of questions.  We proceed with a list of open problems.
Problem 1.  Is the parameter-free countable choice schema  in the language  true in the models defined in Section 11?  We expect that 
 fails in the first model in 
Section 11 via the relation 
  codes 
k-incomparable reals minimal over 
, and it’s a separate problem how to modify this model to allow 
.
Problem 2.  Can we sharpen the result of Theorem 8 by specifying that , rather than , is violated? The combination  plus  over  would be optimal for Theorem 2. Can we similarly sharpen the result of Theorems 6 and 7 by specifying that , resp.,  are violated?
 As conjectured by V. Gitman, Jensen’s iterated forcing may lead to the solution of Problem 2 by methods outlined in [
31]. Such a construction makes use of the consecutive “jensenness”, known to be a 
 relation, instead of the consecutive “sacksness”, which can help to define the counterexamples required at minimally possible levels.
Problem 3.  As a generalization of Problem 2, prove that, for any ,  does not imply . In this case, it would be possible to conclude that the full schema  is not finitely axiomatizable over . There are similar questions related to Theorems 6 and 7, of course. Compare to Problem 9 in ([16], § 11).  We expect that methods of inductive construction of forcing notions in 
 that are similar to the iterated Jensen forcing as in [
31] but carry 
hidden automorphisms, recently developed in our papers [
39,
40,
41,
42,
43], may lead to the solution of Problem 3.
Problem 4  (Communicated by Ali Enayat). A natural question is whether the results of this note also hold for second order set theory (the Kelley–Morse theory of classes), with suitable reformulations of the Choice and Comprehension schemata.
 This may involve a generalization of the Sacks forcing to uncountable cardinals, as e.g., in Kanamori [
44], as well as the new models of set theory recently defined by Fuchs [
45], on the basis of further development of the methods of 
class forcing introduced by S. D. Friedman [
28].