Next Article in Journal
The Economy-Wide Impact of Harnessing Human Capital Development and the Case of Ethiopia: A Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Model Analysis
Previous Article in Journal
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Victim or a Hero of the COVID-19 Crisis?
 
 
Font Type:
Arial Georgia Verdana
Font Size:
Aa Aa Aa
Line Spacing:
Column Width:
Background:
Article

Corporate Concentration and Market Dynamics in Hungary’s Food Manufacturing Industry Between 1993 and 2022

by
Mahdi Imani Bashokoh
1,*,
Gergely Tóth
2 and
Omeralfaroug Ali
3
1
Doctoral School in Economics and Regional Science, Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Sciences, 7400 Kaposvár, Hungary
2
Institute of Rural Development and Sustainable Economy, Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Sciences, 7400 Kaposvár, Hungary
3
Agribiotechnology and Precision Breeding for Food Security National Laboratory, Institute of Physiology and Animal Nutrition, Department of Animal Physiology and Health, Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Sciences, 7400 Kaposvár, Hungary
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Economies 2025, 13(5), 136; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies13050136
Submission received: 12 March 2025 / Revised: 7 May 2025 / Accepted: 9 May 2025 / Published: 15 May 2025

Abstract

:
The changes in market structures in post-socialist economies have led to a significant increase in interest in the dynamics of corporate concentration and its broader socio-economic impacts. This study aimed to assess Hungary’s food industry over a 30-year period (1993–2022), with a primary focus on corporate concentration, by analyzing nine main sectors and their 38 subsectors using grounded theory, trend analysis, and sparse partial least squares-discriminant analysis. The findings reveal that the Hungarian food industry has been moderately to highly concentrated across all sectors (three and six major sectors, respectively). Two distinct periods of increasing corporate concentration were identified: 1996–1998 and 2004–2007, coinciding with post-communist economic reforms and Hungary’s accession to the European Union. These structural shifts led to a decline in the number of active firms, a reduction in workforce size, and increased challenges for smaller competitors; meanwhile, larger domestic companies expanded, and ownership structures transitioned toward privatization and internationalization. In the later years, market concentration showed a declining trend and then gradually stabilized.

1. Introduction

The food industry is crucial to many economies, especially in the European Union (EU, including Hungary as a member state), where it leads in turnover, value added, and employment. The output growth rate of the Hungarian food industry surpasses the EU28 average, whereby the Eurostat data indicates 23% growth from 2010 to 2017, compared to the EU’s 5.6% within the same period (Hegyi et al., 2023; Hungarian Ministry of Finance, 2019). Food producers, core members of the food system, are intricate and multifaceted networks that extend beyond simply providing nourishment, significantly impacting health, diets, economic development, environmental resilience, and sociocultural stability. Hence, undermining their role could compromise the progress of sustainable development (Fanzo et al., 2021; Pawlak & Kołodziejczak, 2020).
Since the mid-20th century, corporatization and concentration have been steadily growing, especially in leading countries, leading to dual polarization, whereby large corporations dominate economies, with small and micro-businesses occupying a small part (Hutorov et al., 2022). These patterns have become a barrier to implementing effective and sustainable solutions within the global food system (Clapp, 2024). In recent decades, a few corporations appeared to dominate food production, distribution, and processing (Blažková & Dvouletý, 2017; Rowe, 2024; Soung-Hun, 2008), shifting economic power away from traditional agriculture and food systems. This concentration highlights the sector’s critical role in ensuring food safety and availability, a fundamental human right. Consequently, numerous studies have investigated the concentration of corporate power in this sector, examining its implications for food security, environmental sustainability, and socio-economic equity from various perspectives (Bonny, 2017; Clapp, 2024; Fanzo et al., 2021; Greenberg, 2017; Hendrickson et al., 2020; P. H. Howard, 2020; Keenan et al., 2023; Levins, 2013; Pawlak & Kołodziejczak, 2020; van Dijk et al., 2021; Vorley, 2003; Zhu, 2024). Studies using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) (Clark, 2022; Haas et al., 2016; Johnston et al., 2024) show that monopolistic practices by large corporations negatively affect small producers and market competition. These concentrated corporations also influence public policies, shaping the labor market concentration, as well as workers and environmental compliance (Cao et al., 2023; Lanier Benkard et al., 2021). Although numerous studies, both empirical and review-based, have examined the high concentration of large domestic and international corporations in agriculture and food sectors (Clapp, 2021, 2022), further investigations are needed to understand its broader economic and social implications. Corporate decisions (based on private and/or government policies) on production levels, investment locations, mergers, acquisitions, and other strategies are crucial for supply chain security, highlighting the need to understand their influence on global markets (Ericsson et al., 2024).
Despite Hungary’s role as a key supplier of food products, particularly meat and grain products to the EU, with exports value equivalent to €1311 million in cereals and related products, €513 million in meat and meat products, and €402 million in animal feed (Hungarian Ministry of Finance, 2019), the impact of corporate concentration on its food industry remains under-researched. Hungary’s agricultural sector, covering nearly two-thirds of the country’s land (Statista, 2024), contributed to 3.7% of the national GDP in 2022, as well as exports to over 100 countries (Golya, 2024). However, companies in Hungary’s food industry face ongoing changes in competition and market dynamics. While research has examined the decline of firms’ numbers and the corporate concentration within the food retail sector (Juhász et al., 2008), broader trends across the entire Hungarian food industry have been less thoroughly investigated (Nes et al., 2021). Within the literature, a few Hungarian and non-Hungarian studies have examined specific areas like the grocery (Špička, 2016), (Kurmai, 2016)) or dairy markets (Čechura et al., 2015), but no long-term study covers all sectors (Juhász et al., 2008; Perekhozhuk et al., 2013), including both food and beverages. According to Bakucs et al. (2018), assessing all sectors would provide better insight into the impact of corporate consideration on various factors related to the food market. A further marked pattern is that broader trends across the entire food industry are less explored (Nes et al., 2021); consequently, less knowledge is available regarding its impact on firm size, company entry and exit, employment levels, and long-term ownership patterns (Blažková, 2016; Bonny, 2017; Ericsson et al., 2024; Kwon et al., 2023).
Hence, the present study primarily aimed to explore corporate concentration over a long-term (1993–2022) trend in Hungary’s food market (comprising all active industries from both food and beverages) by analyzing its impact on competition (firm entry and exit), as well as worker status. In addition, it examines how concentration affects strategical priorities, ownership structures, sector dynamics, and firm size over three decades. Findings provide insights into market dynamics and recommendations for policymakers. A secondary objective of this paper is to study the effect of sector dynamics on each other, focusing primarily on categories like sector type and firm size.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Food Systems

Global food demand is projected to increase by 35% to 56% between 2010 and 2050, adjusting modestly to a range of 30% to 62% with climate change impact and implying a shift in the hunger risk to about −91% to +30% (van Dijk et al., 2021). This trend implies modifications in food systems, which are interconnected networks responsible for producing, processing, and delivering food to consumers (World Food Programme, 2024). Within this complex system, agricultural input companies are foundational elements in the industrial food supply chain; however, the current food system is failing to effectively address the social, economic, and environmental challenges (Montenegro de Wit et al., 2021; Mooney & Group, 2015). This imbalance has intensified inequalities and promoted unsustainable practices, further limiting the system’s capacity to address global challenges like coronavirus, the war in Ukraine, or the global recession (Hackfort et al., 2024; Keenan et al., 2023). Welthungerhilfe’s (WHH) article “How Corporations Determine What We Eat” highlights critical issues, such as price fixing, resource concentration, and innovation primarily through acquisitions. It also discusses the collateral effects of market concentration and the pressure for above-average returns, shedding light on how corporate power shapes food choices and availability (P. Howard, 2021).
According to Vorley (2003), the structure of the global food system resembles an hourglass: a vast number of producers (farmers) and consumers at the wide ends, while the middle narrows and is dominated by a limited number of large corporations that govern critical stages of the system. These corporations act as influential gatekeepers, wielding substantial power upstream by dictating how agricultural goods are cultivated and processed, and downstream by determining the availability, pricing, and distribution channels of food products.

2.2. Genealogy of the Hungarian Food Industry

The food industry is a fundamental pillar of the economy, as it satisfies one of humanity’s most basic needs: physiological sustenance. In Hungary, it employs about 3.2% of the total domestic workforce, contributes approximately 2.7% to national investments, and accounts for 8.8% of exports. Following Hungary’s accession to the EU in the early 2000s, the profitability of its agri-food sector was challenged by intensified competition under EU regulations, outdated production technologies relative to Western European counterparts, limited competitiveness, accumulated financial debt, and the erosion of traditional markets. However, in the second decade of the 21st century, the sector gradually recovered and stabilized, underscoring its significance as a key contributor to Hungary’s economic output and its vital role in promoting economic growth and stability (Földi et al., 2023). Subsequently, we will explore the historical evolution of Hungary’s food industry from its inception to the present day, aiming to elucidate the key transformations and identify the factors that have shaped and driven its development over time.
The Hungarian food industry experienced substantial growth post-1867, with modernization (in the late 19th and early 20th centuries) and increased export strength (via a mix of large and small export-oriented firms/producers) by the 1930s. Post-1945 land reform dismantled large estates, and the 1950s state-driven collectivization further shaped the sector. From 1969 to 1991, agriculture quality improved (supported by Soviet markets and domestic growth goals); however, the industry faced stagnation by the 1980s, observed in marginal growth, financial issues, and limited development (Felkai & Kuti, 2022; Földi et al., 2023; Szczepaniak et al., 2014). The late 1980s and early 1990s brought major economic changes, leading to privatization, more foreign ownership, and declining employment as automation and outsourcing increased. By 2003, the food sector’s share in the national economy had fallen significantly, with more efficient operations replacing large socialist enterprises (Felkai & Kuti, 2022; Síki & Tóth-Zsiga, 1997). Since the early 2000s, Hungary’s food industry has faced capital flight, debt, market loss, fragmentation, and reduced profitability, worsened by EU accession and recent shocks like the pandemic and economic instability (Tanulmányok et al., 2009). Despite this, Hungary’s food industry has shown above-average growth in EU output from 2010 to 2017, with a 23% increase compared to the 5.6% of the EU. In 2021, notwithstanding moderate GDP contributions from agriculture, the food sector, including beverages, rose slightly to account for 6.8% of total gross value added, signaling a gradual recovery in competitiveness and performance (Hegyi et al., 2023; Szczepaniak et al., 2014). The total turnover of the Hungarian food industry has multiplied recently, now approximately €10 billion. This rise in profitability has been accompanied by increased productivity and dynamic wage growth across the sector. For instance, the average gross monthly salary in various subsectors has risen from approximately €526 to over €1580. Domestic consumers allocate 30% of their income to food products, while exports contribute to over one-third of revenue. Thus, this sector continues to show increasing efficiency and effectiveness, evident not only in nominal metrics but also in real terms (Felkai & Kuti, 2022). Although the sector’s improved performance and results have indicated a positive trend since 2010, it still lags behind other manufacturing and competitive industries within the global food sector in both domestic and international markets.

2.3. Historical Background of Corporate Concentration

The influence of large corporations on the economy has long been a topic of interest for researchers, policymakers, and the public. Evidence shows increasing industry concentration in the U.S. and Europe since the 1980s (Autor et al., 2020; P. H. Howard, 2020) and globally since the late 20th century (Murphy, 2008). While contemporary discussions often emphasize the unique dynamics of the modern era, historical perspectives suggest that rising concentration may be an inherent aspect of industrial development. Thinkers like Marx, Marshall, and Lenin highlighted this trend, noting that rapid technological advancements and industrial growth are defining features of concentration and capitalism. Early studies by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in the 1920s also observed the expansion of mass production, whereby novel developments often reflect enduring trends (Kwon et al., 2023; Recent Economic Changes in the United States, 1929).
The concentration of the food industry has deep historical roots, beginning in the Middle Ages with unequal land distribution in Europe, but gaining momentum through colonialism and globalization. From the late 1400s to the 1800s, colonial powers used plantation economies to extract wealth via export crops like sugar, coffee, and cocoa, produced on expropriated lands with unfree labor. This system marginalized local food production, concentrating power among a few landowners and enabling foreign corporations to dominate tropical crop trade, a trend that persists today (Clapp, 2023; Friedmann et al., 1989). In the 19th century, food and agricultural concentration expanded to include staple crops, driven by the colonial displacement of Indigenous populations and advancements in agricultural technologies across North America, Europe, and Australia. By the late 19th century, a few firms dominated the global grain trade and agricultural inputs and outputs. The 20th century witnessed further consolidation, with small-scale American farms replaced by fewer, larger, and highly specialized industrial farms, driven by mechanization, chemical inputs, and post-WWII technological advancements. Since then and until today, corporate entities have established dominance over nearly every aspect (from production to pricing) of agriculture and the food system, which has intensified significantly since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (Gruchy, 1985; Lusiani & Divito, 2024; MacDonald, 2020).

2.3.1. Factors of Corporate Concentration

Several factors have contributed to the rise in corporate concentration across industries (including the agrifood and extractive sectors), such as the nature and pace of technological change. Rapid technological progress tends to exhibit larger firm sizes and greater sector concentration (Autor et al., 2017), amplified by the digital infrastructure and the intellectual property protections; therefore, this allows firms specializing in digital and software technologies to dominate markets by restricting competition (Clapp & Purugganan, 2020; Katz, 2019; Khan, 2017). The drive for increased power and control over market dynamics is another key driver of corporate concentration. Firms aim to grow their market share and maximize returns, often through the strategic pursuit of mergers and acquisitions (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017), especially in industries facing declining sales or financial instability. In such cases, larger firms expand their market share or diversify their product portfolios, while struggling firms may voluntarily merge to reduce operational costs by eliminating redundant activities, further consolidating the market (Keenan et al., 2023; Striffler, 2024). The role of financialization has further magnified these trends, providing additional incentives for corporate consolidation. Financialization, characterized by the growing influence of financial motives, markets, and institutions, prioritizes shareholder value in corporate decision-making processes. Firms are driven to maximize investor returns to avoid financial decline, making mergers and acquisitions a prevalent strategy to safeguard profitability and meet investor expectations amid global competition and evolving financial markets (Burch & Lawrence, 2013; Clapp, 2022; Clapp & Isakson, 2018).

2.3.2. Concentration in the European Food Industry

Globally, the top ten processed food companies account for over one-third of sales among the top 100 firms, generating significant revenues (Clapp, 2024). For example, four firms dominate 70% of grain trade, while the corn and soybean seed markets have 80% and 75%, respectively. Even higher concentrations are seen in specialized markets like poultry genetics, nearly 100% (Clapp, 2022; Striffler, 2024). In the food processing sector, while slightly less concentrated than others, it is dominated by major firms like Nestlé, Unilever, and Coca-Cola. Similarly, the European food industry demonstrates significant corporate concentration across several sectors. In the dairy market, Arla Foods (Denmark) controls 30% of Northern Europe’s milk market, while Lactalis (France) and Nestlé (Switzerland) are also major producers of milk-based products and infant formula (Mordor Intelligence, 2024; Wynne-Jones, 2024). For meat processing, Danish Crown (Denmark) is a leading pork exporter, Tönnies (Germany) covers over 20% of Germany’s market, and LDC (France) dominates the poultry segment across Europe (Expert Market Research, 2024; Mordor Intelligence, 2024). Barilla (Italy) leads the European pasta market (holds 35%), Hovis leads in prepackaged bread sales in the UK (30% share) and in confectionery, and Ferrero (Italy) and Lindt & Sprüngli (Switzerland) command substantial shares, particularly in premium and iconic product categories (Wynne-Jones, 2024). In the beverage market, Heineken (Netherlands) holds 10% of the global beer market, and Nestlé leads in bottled water and instant coffee with brands like Perrier, San Pellegrino, and Nescafé (Mordor Intelligence, 2024). In the sugar and candy sector, market concentration is dominated by ten European companies, with the highest share held by three firms: Ferrero Group (Luxembourg and Italy), Nestlé (Switzerland), and Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG (Switzerland) (Snack Food & Wholesale Bakery, 2025). In the pet food industry, the market is dominated by ten companies, among which United Petfood from Belgium, Partner in Pet Food, a multinational manufacturer headquartered in Hungary; Agrolimen SA from Spain; and two German companies, Deuerer and Heristo AG, hold the largest market shares in the sector (Wall, 2023).

2.3.3. The Consequences of Corporate Concentration

Heffernan’s analysis highlights the “hourglass” repetition structure of the global food system, where a powerful concentration exists in the middle of the structure, affecting the supply chain (Vorley, 2003). Therefore, a few dominant corporations control the intermediary stages, including farming practices, processing standards, distribution, pricing, and market access. This consolidation creates significant power imbalances with far-reaching implications for economic equity, food security, and environmental sustainability (Haas et al., 2016; Williams, 2022). As an example, corporate concentration enables wealth extraction from consumers and communities, benefiting shareholders and executives. Excessive market power, driven by a focus on short-term shareholder returns, leads to higher prices, lower wages, fewer quality jobs, reduced innovation, and weakened supply chains. It exacerbates racial wealth inequality (at both individual and community levels (Aalto-Setälä, 2002; Brumfield et al., 2020; Palladino, 2019)) and fosters anticompetitive practices like price-fixing and market manipulation, further marginalizing farmers and consumers (Clapp, 2024). Furthermore, key stakeholders who suffer under this system are workers, enduring low wages, hazardous conditions, and vulnerability, particularly among immigrants. The exploitation of workers and farmers underscores the pervasive influence of corporate consolidation. For example, over half of U.S. food crops are produced under duress, with cases like 100 migrant children working dangerous jobs at a Wisconsin meatpacking plant (Clapp, 2021, 2022).
In addition, farmers face diminished autonomy, limited market competition, and suppressed profits due to agribusiness dominance (Hendrickson et al., 2020; Shi et al., 2010). This is a typical consequence of few buyers and little control over pricing or practices, enabling agribusinesses to enforce low commodity prices and mandate specific inputs (Osiichuk & Wnuczak, 2023). Consumers, in turn, encounter high prices and fewer choices (Torshizi & Clapp, 2021). Corporate-driven practices also harm the environment and animal welfare by prioritizing profit over sustainability (Kwon et al., 2023). Industrialized farming, dependent on fossil fuels, water, and chemicals, accounts for over 25% of global greenhouse gas emissions, reduces biodiversity, and has led to the loss of 75% of crop genetic diversity in the 20th century (Clapp, 2018, 2023). Corporate concentration also undermines democratic processes and creates a rigid, vulnerable food system. Large corporations use lobbying, advertising, and legal actions to protect their interests, often at the expense of systemic improvements (Kaditi, 2013; Striffler, 2024). This rigidity makes the system ill-equipped to handle disruptions, such as redirecting staple crops to non-food uses or supply chain breakdowns due to conflicts or disasters, leading to global price spikes (Striffler, 2024).

3. Materials and Methods

3.1. Data Collection and Categorization

In this study, the Hungarian food industries dataset was collected from 3 primary sources: (1) Central European University (CEU) collected a dataset on a national level; (2) the HUN-REN Hungarian Research Network database (https://hun-ren.hu, accessed on 6 May 2025); and (3) the STATISTA database (https://www.statista.com, accessed on 6 May 2025). This dataset was collected on an annual basis within a 30-year timeframe, exactly from 1993 to 2022. The start of the dataset timeframe (1993) was primarily based on availability, accessibility, validity, reliability, and comprehensiveness, avoiding unreliable earlier data of the post-communist era. While the initial intention was to cover data up to the year 2024, the institute’s database only included comprehensive and verified information—such as revenue, turnover, profitability, and other corporate indicators—up to the year 2022. Therefore, this study concludes its analysis in 2022, as data collection for the subsequent years remains incomplete. About 34 sectors and different subsectors were identified and were collectively categorized into 9 main sectors, as follows: (1) animal feed, (2) animal products, (3) beverages, (4) cereals and their products, (5) food processing, (6) horticulture, (7) oils and fats, (8) spices and seasonings, and (9) sugar and candies. Detailed sector categorization can be seen in Figure 1.
This investigation aimed at assessing the long-term impacts of corporate concentration on various data relevant to the Hungarian market food sectors; therefore, the number of active companies and the number of workers were determined, as well as priority, company size, and ownership (state-owned enterprise, international fund enterprise, private enterprise, or mixed venture). The variable “priority” identifies the top four companies within each food industry sector (those exhibiting the highest level of concentration) based on their monthly and annual revenues and market share. These firms, due to their significant economic influence, are classified as “priority” for the focused analysis of corporate concentration and its implications.
These variables with corporate concentration provide a broad understanding of the complexity of the market. For instance, the number of active companies can reflect the market status with a time trend. The number of workers can be used as a proxy for the company size, as large firms own more resources and have more impact on the supply chain, leading to high performance compared to small firms (Yu et al., 2018). Ownership can also impact the concentration and firm performance, in which mixed ownership can enhance the decision-making process, although it can also emerge as a source of conflict (Eddleston et al., 2008).

Data Design

With respect to the collected and categorized dataset, three timeframes were created in decade style: (1) 1993–2002, (2) 2003–2012, and (3) 2013–2022. In addition, besides the above-mentioned 9 industry types and three timeframes, we have categorized the CR4 (representing the four most concentrated companies with the highest market share) of company No and the firm/company size. In this regard, the company size was categorized into 7 variables: (1) 0–4 persons, (2) 5–10 persons, (3) 11–20 persons, (4) 21–50 persons, (5) 51–300 persons, (6) 301–1000 persons, and (7) >1000 persons. Hence, the data design includes four categorical variables and seven continuous variables. The categorical variables and the numbers of active companies and workers can be seen in Table 1.

3.2. Data Assessment and Statistical Analysis

3.2.1. Assessment of Corporate Concentration

The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), introduced by Hirschman (Hirschman, 1945) and Herfindahl (Herfindahl, 1963), serves as a tool to measure corporate concentration. For a market with n firms, where the market share of the ith firm is s i , the HHI is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares:
H H I = i = 1 n s i 2
Market shares are often expressed as fractions, whereas this study used percentages (0 < s i ≤ 100). Consequently, the HHI ranges from 0 to 10,000. It reflects the distribution of firm sizes within a market, approaching zero for numerous small firms of equal size and reaching its maximum value of 10,000 for a single dominant firm. The HHI increases as the number of firms decreases or their market share disparity grows (Ericsson et al., 2024; Haas et al., 2016; Johnston et al., 2024). Although the precise numeric thresholds for market concentration levels are not universally fixed, general guidelines exist. For instance, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (2010) classify markets into three categories:
  • Unconcentrated Markets: HHI below 1500
  • Moderately Concentrated Markets: HHI between 1500 and 2500
  • Highly Concentrated Markets: HHI above 2500
The European Commission (2004) also uses the HHI to evaluate market concentration and horizontal mergers, with some methodological variations. Since the HHI calculation squares each firm’s percentage market share, smaller firms have limited influence on the overall HHI. Their contribution diminishes rapidly as their market share decreases. Therefore, a complete HHI can often be estimated using the market shares of the largest firms and the total market size to approximate the cumulative share of smaller participants (Cao et al., 2023; Ericsson et al., 2024; Haas et al., 2016; Johnston et al., 2024).

3.2.2. Statistical Analysis

The quantitative data collected over 30 years were analyzed on the basis of overall/total and/or three-time frames. Both the Spearman’s rho rank (ordinal variables: year, company size, and CR4 or priority) and Pearson’s (continuous variables: enterprise ownership, number of active companies, the number of workers, and the corporate concentration) correlations were performed using IBM SPSS version 29, with p-values above 0.05 representing significant differences. A multivariate analysis of the dataset was also conducted. Sparse Partial Least Squares Classification (Discriminant Analysis, sPLS-DA) was performed (Chung & Keles, 2010). According to Chung and Keles (2010), this sPLS-DA method has been proven to resolve issues, especially the absence of marked predictor variable selection, that are associated with Principal Component Analysis and PLS-DA analysis. Two-way cluster analysis was also carried out to achieve possible natural grouping, but only as an explorative tool. Both of these test types were performed via R project version 4.1.2 (2017) and the mixOmics package (6.18.1) (Rohart et al., 2017). Volcano plots were also performed using the R project with the EnhancedVolcano package (Blighe et al., 2024). These analyses are key tools in statistics, providing a robust statistical method to decipher complex associations in high-dimensional datasets. Combining dimensionality reduction with classification helps identify distinct patterns related to different experimental conditions or sample categories (Metabolon, 2025). Very briefly, these analyses highlight variates that contributed to variation between components, benefiting the overall understanding of the dataset.

4. Results

4.1. Descriptive Statistics

4.1.1. Overall (30 Years) Trend

Figure 2 presents the long-term (30 years) descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) and correlation matrix. The results indicate high corporate concentration (average = 3517.9 and standard deviation = 638.2). The overall outcomes show that most variables are correlated positively and/or negatively with each other, with the majority of annual trends showing many negative correlations with time (e.g., state-owned enterprise, mixed venture, company/firm size, firm priority, number of workers, and corporate concentration). In contrast, the number of active companies and international fund enterprises showed positive trends over time (r = 0.786 and 0.466, respectively). Corporate concentration (CR4 = 3517.9, indicating a highly concentrated market) was also positively correlated with priority (r = 0.447, p-value < 0.01); however, no other significant correlations with corporate concentration were observed, not even with a time of 30 years as a whole.

4.1.2. Short-Term Timeframes

Figure 3 assessed data fluctuations over time, presenting descriptive data and correlations for three periods (1993–2002, 2003–2012, and 2013–2022). During the first decade, three significant correlations were observed between corporate concentration and other variables, including company size, number of workers, and number of active companies. These correlations were statistically significant, as the p-value remained below the threshold of 0.05. The overall firm concentration rate during this period was recorded at 3407.3, indicating a highly concentrated market structure according to the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). In the second decade, the firm concentration rate increased further to 3794.9, reflecting a highly concentrated market structure based on the HHI. During this period, significant correlations between firm concentration and other variables were identified. Notably, a negative correlation was observed between firm concentration and variables such as company size, number of workers, number of active companies, and year. Conversely, corporate concentration exhibited a positive and significant correlation with variables such as CR4 (priority) and state. Although the market remained highly concentrated, the interplay between these variables illustrates the evolving dynamics of the industry during the second decade. In the third and most recent 10-year period (2013–2022), the corporate concentration rate declined slightly to 3351.6, but it remained within the range indicative of a highly concentrated market based on the HHI. Out of the eight variables considered for potential correlations, only one significant association was identified: a negative correlation was observed between firm concentration and the number of workers, suggesting that as the market concentration increased, the number of workers employed in the sector decreased. However, no significant correlations were found between firm concentration and the remaining variables, as their p-values exceeded the threshold of 0.05. This stabilization in market concentration during the third decade, accompanied by minimal significant associations, could reflect the impact of regulatory measures or structural adjustments within the market.

4.2. Annual Trends

Multiple trends of the Hungarian food manufacturing industry can be seen in Figure 4. The number of workers exhibits a clear cyclical pattern, peaking in the late 1990s (around 450,000 workers) before experiencing a significant decline after 2000, whereas substantial decreases were observed in 1996, 1997, 2003, and 2006. The number of workers continued to decline after 2007, reaching its lowest value (approximately 3000 workers), which was followed, in 2016, by a gradual slight increase in employment. Concerning active companies, an increase was noticed in 1995, followed by fluctuations within the period of 2002 to 2008, and showed steady, slight growth from 2008. On the other hand, corporate concentration showed marked growth (>5000) in 1996 but significantly dropped after 1996 and exhibited a further steep increase in 1998. Post-1998, it fluctuated over time, with a reduction observed in the early 2000s and between 2006 and 2009. These depressions in corporate concentration occurred in periods characterized by the decline in workforce numbers; as a result, the inverse relationship between active companies and the number of workers with corporate concentration suggests that market power is becoming increasingly concentrated within a smaller number of dominant firms.
Figure 5 illustrates the shift of the ownership structure of CR4, namely the four companies with the highest market share and concentration in the food manufacturing sector, over a 30-year period. The state- and mixed-enterprises showed downtrends since 1993, with a marked decreasing tendency of the state-owned enterprise identified in 1996 and 2007. Meanwhile, mixed- and state-owned corporations decreased over time, and international- and private-funded enterprises increased, with both accounting for over 90% in 1997.

4.3. Assessment of Trends over Different Periods

Results of the sPLS-DA-based three time periods are presented in Figure 6. The score plot demonstrates clear separation between 2013–2022 and 1993–2002. This separation is driven by changes in multiple variates over time: the number of workers (decreased) and the company size (decreased) on the first loading, and the number of active companies (increased), corporate concentration (decreased), and the number of workers (decreased) on the second loading.
When the shifts in different variables over time were assessed (see Figure 7), dataset fluctuations were observed. Among those contributors highlighted in Figure 4, only the firm size provided a remarkable decrease within the second decade, but a lesser degree of decrease was noted within the third decade. However, state enterprises and mixed ventures revealed stronger decreases over time.

4.4. Assessment of Trends Within Different Sectors

Figure 8 shows the sPLS-DA results of the Hungarian food sectors over 30 years, wherein certain sectors indicated separations: animal products separated from most sectors except for animal feed, beverages, and cereals and their products; spices and seasonings distanced from all groups except for oil and fats and food processing; and sugar and candies separated from animal feed, animal products, and cereals and their products. Key variables contributing to these variations across sectors were number of workers (highest in animal products and lowest in spices and seasonings), the number of active companies (highest in food processing but lowest in oils and fats), and corporate concentration (highest in oils and fats but lowest in animal products) on the first loading, and the private (highest in spices and seasonings but lowest in sugar and candies) and international (highest in sugar and candies but lowest in spices and seasonings) fund enterprises on the second loading.

4.5. Assessment of Trends Contributed to Various Priorities

The depicted sPLS-DA score plot in Figure 9 indicates variations in trends related to the CR4 priorities for 30 years, namely between the very high and low priorities. This separation is strongly driven by the first loading, whereby the number of workers and international increased in very high priority. Corporate concentration was the strongest variable on the second loading, which was most increased in the very high priority category. However, when the shift fold was assessed as very high over low priority (Figure 10), the number of workers and company size displayed a high change (above 1-fold increase), while state-owned enterprises showed a decrease.

4.6. Assessment of Trends Within the Firm’s Size

The sPLS-DA results for different CR4 firm sizes over 30 years are presented in Figure 11. The score plot displays separation between low (<50 persons) and high (>50 persons) firm sizes, with firms characterized by more than 1000 persons being the most distanced along the first component. These distinctions among firm sizes are attributed to worker numbers (highest 301–1000 persons and lowest 0–4 persons) and the number of active companies (highest 301–1000 persons but lowest 11–20 persons) on the first loading, as well as the CR4 priority (highest above 1000 and lowest 0–4 persons) on the second loading. With regard to corporate concentration, firms with low sizes provided the highest concentration, while the lowest concentration was identified in the firms with 301–1000 persons.
The results of the volcano plot (Figure 12), based on the 300–1000 firm size over the 5–10 firm size, showed that worker numbers remarkably decreased, alongside active companies, state-owned enterprises, mixed ventures, international fund enterprises, and priorities.

5. Discussion

5.1. Corporate Concentration Trends

Overall, the trends can be summarized as follows: the classifications within the data distinctly differentiate the time periods, shaped predominantly by structural variables (e.g., corporate concentration) and operational factors (e.g., workforce size and the number of active firms).

5.1.1. Periodic Trend of Corporate Concentration

Despite the average assessment of 30 years not providing interactions with any variable except the priority, the overall approach indicated fluctuations in periodic trends related to CR4 (see Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 6). From the perspective of changes in corporate concentration levels over the decades, it is evident that the first decade (1993–2002) began with the lowest level of concentration. Following the onset of reforms in 1988, known as the post-communist era, this industry was characterized by lower corporate concentration (Csaba, 2022; Péter & Weisz, 2007). However, between 1996 and 1998, Hungary’s food manufacturing industry experienced a sharp increase in corporate concentration, contributing to the highly concentrated market structure (average = 3407.3) according to the HHI. This suggests that the market structure was characterized by a small number of dominant firms (Giacomini, 2011), despite some significant interactions with operational variables. Notably, within this decade, the high concentration markedly reduced the numbers of active firms and workers, demonstrating a direct relationship between corporate concentration and the number of active competitors and employees in the industry (Autor et al., 2017, 2020; Cao et al., 2023). In the second decade (2003–2012), the industry recorded the highest level of corporate concentration (average = 3794.9) among the three decades, reflecting a shift toward greater market integration. According to the data, during the period 2004–2007, the industry experienced a sharp rise in concentration rates, accompanied by a corresponding decline in the number of active competitors and employed workers, as well as the firm size (Clark, 2022; Johnston et al., 2024; Karamchedu & Syndicus, 2022; Obiora, 2023). The decline of these variables reflects the consolidation of market power and a decline in market diversity (Khadse, 2016). Interestingly, the corporate concentration values were much higher at the beginning of the second decade than at its end, as proven by the substantial negative correlation with years. Furthermore, the market ownership structure appeared to interact with corporate concentration, whereby a strong positive association was observed between CR4 and state-owned enterprises between 2003 and 2012, suggesting a dynamic concentration shift across enterprise types, wherein high concentration shifted systematically towards state-owned enterprises. However, this was likely a temporal trend over time, as no association was identified within 2013–2022. During the most recent decade, concentration levels experienced a slight decline and subsequently stabilized, with minimal changes throughout this period. The stabilization can be partially attributed to the effects of government regulatory policies in recent years (Cseres, 2019). As corporate concentration has increased in recent decades, the data also highlight the growing influence of private and international ownership, which has significantly driven globalization and structural diversification in the market. This trend has shifted market ownership toward a predominantly private and international structure (Tsolomyti et al., 2021).
There are similarities and differences between Hungary’s food manufacturing industry and that of other comparable post-communist EU nations like Poland and the Czech Republic. Similar to Hungary, these nations underwent substantial corporate restructuring in the 1990s and early 2000s as a result of foreign capital inflows and privatization. However, because of a more cautious approach to foreign acquisitions in important food subsectors, Poland was able to maintain a more decentralized ownership structure for a longer length of time (Anita, 2017; Jambor & Gorton, 2025). In contrast, the Czech Republic observed a similar rate of consolidation as Hungary, but with more robust institutional support for cooperatives and small producers, which helped to lessen the adverse effects of concentration on rural employment (Nes et al., 2021). These parallels highlight how different national policies and institutional reactions influenced the extent and effects of concentration, even though Hungary followed a generally regional pattern.
In summary, corporate concentration depicts periodic shifts across decades: the first decade (1993–2002) saw the lowest concentration levels, with a sharp increase between 1996 and 1998; the second decade (2003–2012) recorded the highest concentration levels, marked by significant consolidation and a shift towards state-owned enterprises; the most recent decade (2013–2022) experienced a slight decline and stabilization in concentration levels, influenced by government regulations and increased private and international ownership.

5.1.2. Effects of Corporate Concentration Trends on Operational Factors

Based on Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 6, operational factors like worker numbers and the number of active companies fluctuated over time; however, both the number of active companies and the number of workers showed a negative association with firm concentrations over the course of three decades. These relationships emphasize the impact of corporate concentration on operational factors over the years. In the aftermath of communism’s collapse, although foreign investment faced local agricultural and food processing lobbies, Hungary has deeper integration into the global food economy (Jansik, 2004). As a consequence of these ownership changes, a significant number of factories either shut down or became partially operational, leading to a decline in both the number of active companies and the workforce. This period is widely referred to as the post-communist economic recession (András, 2014; Diprima, 2023). During 1995–1998, the industry experienced an unprecedented level of corporate concentration, significantly reducing the number of active companies and diminishing workforce participation. This transformation can be attributed to massive foreign investment, the entry of multinational corporations, and the adoption of advanced technologies, which collectively outcompeted traditional, family-owned businesses (Gorton & Guba, 2000; Hamar, 2004; Jansik, 2004; E. Kiss, 2014; Van Zuilekom & Morrison, 2013). By 1998, foreign-owned companies accounted for almost 51% of total food sales and controlled 68% of the industry’s assets. The leading foreign investors included the Netherlands (0.15 million EUR), Austria (0.06 million EUR), Germany (0.06 million EUR), Switzerland (0.05 million EUR), the United States (0.04 million EUR), and the United Kingdom (0.04 million EUR) (Fehér & Fejős, 2006), with Germany and Austria dominating this period (Jansik, 2002). This trend is attributed to the historical economic ties, cultural linkages, and shared economic interests. Between 1999 and 2004, government-imposed regulations aimed at controlling market concentration and supporting smaller private enterprises successfully curbed corporate consolidation (Fink, 2006). As a result, the number of active companies increased, fostering a more balanced competitive environment.
On 1 May 2004, Hungary officially joined the EU, triggering a second wave of intense corporate concentration in the food industry and marking the most significant shift since 1993. Between 2004 and late 2007, this consolidation was primarily driven by a surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) and the entry of new multinational corporations. However, this heightened market concentration once again resulted in a decline in the number of active enterprises and a reduction in labor force participation. Following Hungary’s EU accession, the country’s food policy framework has been increasingly shaped by the stringent EU food regulations, mainly through imposing food trade regulations, and evolving consumer expectations have become imperative. Adhering to these strict regulatory standards is no longer merely a matter of government oversight but rather a crucial determinant of long-term competitiveness and market expansion (Fehér & Fejős, 2006; Kalotay, 2006; László & Adrienn, 2008). Post-2008 and until 2022, the implementation of corporate concentration control regulations by the EU, alongside enhanced oversight by EU and national regulatory bodies, led to a gradual decline in corporate concentration, stabilizing the market over time. Some of these regulatory laws/policies include key steps and policies of the Hungarian government to create justice in the food market to control market monopoly include the implementation and clarification of antitrust and fair competition regulations (Cseres, 2019); supervision and control by national and EU competition authorities after joining the EU (László & Adrienn, 2008); the enforcement of trade law and anti-unfair practices (UTPs) in the agricultural and food supply chain (Daskalova, 2020); the establishment of support programs to encourage small- and medium-sized enterprises, including financial facilities; tax exemptions (Brennan, 2016); the implementation of regulatory schemes; and competition policies aimed at reducing market concentration by the Hungarian government and the EU (Csaba, 2022).
These regulatory interventions facilitated the revival of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), increased market competition, and contributed to an overall improvement in working conditions (Brennan, 2016). Herein, local and family-owned SMEs in Hungary have survived competition with international corporations by specializing in niche products, leveraging cultural and traditional branding that emphasizes their heritage as family-run and locally rooted businesses, and by adopting regional branding strategies, including forming strategic alliances with well-established national and international brands (Jambor & Gorton, 2025). On the other hand, consumer protection laws implemented by the EU have raised consumer expectations. As a result, compliance with these stringent regulatory standards has become not merely a matter of governmental oversight but a key determinant of long-term competitiveness and market expansion in response to evolving consumer needs and demands, so it has improved the situation for concentrated and big companies (Greenberg, 2017). A further key factor in this regulatory control and the subsequent enhancement of market competition was the Hungarian Competition Authority, which enforced competition and trade control laws. A pivotal moment in this regulatory shift occurred on 1 January 2012 (Réger & Horváth, 2020), with the enforcement of Hungary’s new constitution, overseen by Directive 2019/633, one of the first EU legislative measures specifically addressing unfair trading practices between businesses. This directive, amended in April 2018, aimed to strengthen oversight across the agricultural and food supply chain. These regulatory frameworks prohibited anti-competitive practices by large corporations, ensuring greater transparency and fair competition (Daskalova, 2020).
Very briefly, corporate concentration trends negatively impacted the numbers of active companies and workers over three decades. Post-communism, foreign investment led to factory closures and workforce declines. EU accession in 2004 triggered another wave of concentration, reducing active enterprises and labor force participation. Regulatory interventions post-2008 stabilized the market, revived SMEs, and improved competition and working conditions. Compliance with stringent EU regulations became crucial for long-term competitiveness and market expansion.

5.2. Market Share Structure over Time

The overall period trends were proven, among which the state and number of active firms were the most responsive trends over time, providing negative and positive associations. These trends, besides those of worker numbers and active companies, are shown to contribute to the periodic distinctions, especially between the first and third decades (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). Herein, the state-owned enterprise demonstrated a strong trend over time, declining from 10.9% to 0.03%. Such a trend is likely a consequence of the increase in both private and international fund enterprises, replacing the predominant large socialist enterprises—state-owned or mixed ventures (Adam, 1995; Felkai & Kuti, 2022; Síki & Tóth-Zsiga, 1997; Tesche & Tohamy, 1994). Since the mid-1990s, there has been a clear increment in this trend, with 87 out of 138 state-owned enterprises in Hungary’s food industry converting into commercial companies. Among them, 41 firms were partially or fully privatized, predominantly through foreign capital participation (J. Kiss, 1995), which surpassed $80 billion by the end of 1998, positioning the country as the leading recipient of FDI per capita in the Central and Eastern European regions (Jansik, 2000; Juhász & Stauder, 2006; E. Kiss, 2014). This leadership emerged from several policies and events, such as the historical role of Hungary as a key exporter of food products to the Soviet Union, the earliest commercialization-driven privatization strategy, and the establishment of laws benefiting investors (low-cost raw materials and tax incentives). Gradually, the ownership status of CR4 in Hungary’s food industry came under the control of international and private companies. In the recent decade, the collective share of both state and mixed ventures declined to less than 1%, indicating trends like globalization and diversity in food manufacturing industries (Diprima, 2023).
The key finding of this section is that the number of state-owned enterprises in Hungary’s food industry declined significantly over time, from 10.9% to 0.03%, due to increased private and international investments. By the late 1990s, many state-owned enterprises were privatized, making Hungary a leading recipient of FDI per capita in Central and Eastern Europe. In the recent decade, the share of state and mixed ventures fell below 1%, reflecting trends of globalization and diversification in the industry.

5.3. Trends Related to Various Categories

The results show corporate concentration fluctuated over time, impacting other operational factors. Over 30 years, market concentration in nine major Hungarian food sectors varied, with the highest (approximately, averages ranged between 3500 and 6500) in oil and fats, sugar and candies, and spices and seasonings (see Figure 8), which is a result of low competition, low worker numbers, a low number of active companies, and large firm size among CR4 with the highest control in the market (Deconinck, 2021; Pjanić et al., 2018; Soung-Hun, 2008). These sectors are dominated by international, private, and mixed ventures, while state-owned corporations decreased over time across different sectors (Diprima, 2023; Csaba, 2022; Csanádi, 2007; Bunce & Csanádi, 1993). The animal products sector, on the other hand, was the least concentrated (moderate average concentration = 2051), which is probably a result of high competition, worker numbers, and large firm size (see Figure 8), correlating negatively with corporate concentration in this study (Figure 3). Studies by Autor et al. (2017, 2020) and Cao et al. (2023) corroborate our findings. Furthermore, the horticulture and animal sectors were also moderately concentrated, highly driven by enterprise ownership structure—high intranational funds and high state-owned corporates, respectively. These outcomes are similar to those reported by Lennert and Farkas (2020) and Toth and Fertő (2017). Based on these findings, sPLS-DA is a useful tool to evaluate long-term variable relationships, offering a deeper insight than simple correlation methods by eliminating irrelevant variables to boost prediction performance.
According to the results in Figure 9, corporates with very high priority are distinct from those with low priority, having the highest CR4 corporate concentration (average > 4000) and positive relationships (Figure 2 and Figure 3). However, these very high-priority corporations also had high worker numbers and sizes (recording more than 2-fold increments), despite the overall negative association with the corporate concentration trend. Notably, this trend between priorities and CR4 differs from food sectors’ outcomes over time periods. The ownership transitions of the first decade, combined with the EU’s enforcement of strict quality and regulatory standards, contributed to rising operational costs and inflationary pressures (Bornstein, 1999; Jansik, 2004). However, this trend shifted in the second decade, during which a strong positive correlation (r = 0.941) emerged between strategic prioritization and corporate concentration, particularly in technologically advanced and export-oriented subsectors (Clapp, 2023; Zhu, 2024). This indicates a time-bound transformation in the impact of concentration, highlighting the evolving and dynamic nature of ownership structures and their adaptability to external market and policy demands (Lanier Benkard et al., 2021; Bakucs et al., 2018). Therefore, it might be useful to investigate how periodic fluctuations affect not only corporate strategy but also workforce dynamics in future studies.
It is notable that the size of the top four companies varied across 1993–2002 and 2013–2022 (see Figure 6), illustrating the larger size of the top four companies in 1993–2002. This variation, overall, was a downward linear trend (R2 = 0.642, see Figure 13) over time, although fluctuations were observed. For instance, upward trends were observed in 2000, 2004, 2006, and between 2015 and 2017. These temporal upward trends can be attributed to factors such as the decline in the number of competitors (Kurmai, 2016), mergers and acquisitions of smaller companies by larger firms (Clapp, 2018), changes in enterprise ownership/fund (Andrew, 2022; Torshizi & Clapp, 2021), reduced competition (Obiora, 2023), and increased market control by the most dominant companies (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; Zhu, 2024). Figure 12 corroborates these earlier proposals (especially the ownership), as declines were observed in state- and mixed-funded corporates over time (Anita, 2017). Furthermore, the numbers of workers and active firms appear to contribute to variations across different sizes of firms (see Figure 11), wherein these variables increase in firms with larger sizes (especially 301–1000 persons), supporting their relationships with the firm size, as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Despite the overall (30-year) analysis not revealing an association, the short-term timeframes provided negative correlations that were proven during the first and second decades. Notably, the results in Figure 11 depict a high concentration in firms with 5–20 persons (average > 6000), distinguishing them from firms with large sizes (characterized by a relatively lower degree of high concentration, with average < 3500), except for the firms with more than 1000 persons (average > 5000).
Overall, the market concentration in nine major Hungarian food sectors fluctuated, with the highest concentration in oil and fats, sugar and candies, and spices and seasonings due to low competition and large firm sizes. The animal products sector was the least concentrated, driven by high competition and worker numbers. Ownership transitions and EU regulations influenced operational costs and inflation, with significant variations in the size of top companies over time. Regulatory interventions and market dynamics shaped the evolving nature of corporate concentration and its impact on operational factors.

6. Conclusions

This study comprehensively examined corporate concentration trends of all nine main sectors (composed of 38 subsectors) of the Hungarian food industry over a 30-year period (1993–2022). The findings indicate that following the post-communist economic reforms, the Hungarian food industry experienced high to extremely high concentration across all nine sectors, primarily driven by private investment and acquisitions by international corporations. Two major surges in concentration occurred between 1996 and 1998 (due to foreign investments and the entry of international brands post-reform) and 2004 and 2007 (a result of a second wave of foreign investments, stricter production and competition regulations, and Hungary’s accession to the EU). These surges resulted in a significant decline in market competition (numbers of active workers and operating companies) and firm size over time. However, despite some stabilization in recent years, the industry remains highly concentrated, with private and international firms dominating. Overall, this study highlighted the complex dynamics of corporate concentration and its long-term impacts on the industry (sectors, firm size, priority to economic, and operational factors), which is characterized by less marked relationships and responses compared to short-term timeframes. In addition, the CR4 dynamics, alongside operational factors, have shaped the sector’s type and firm size, resulting in variances across aspects.
Based on the present findings, it is necessary for the Hungarian and EU officials to assess the efficiency of current strategies in decreasing corporate concentration. Probably, several aggressive regulations can be implemented to enhance the development of a more ideal and balanced sector and reduce the hazards associated with excessive corporate concentration in Hungary’s food industry. For instance, in order to regulate mergers and avoid monopolistic domination, stronger antitrust laws ought to be put into place. Also, small- and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) can become more competitive by receiving certain tax breaks and financial incentives. In addition, supporting cooperative business models would create a more democratic supply chain and empower small producers. Furthermore, it should be mandatory or encouraged for big businesses, especially those that are owned by foreigners, to incorporate domestic suppliers into their value chains. It would also be easier to uncover covert types of corporate concentration if ownership structures were made more transparent and thorough reporting requirements were enforced. Last but not least, establishing multi-level oversight systems that include the government, labor unions, and civil society groups may improve accountability and prevent the misuse of market power.
The present study results also add to current policy discussions about agriculture subsidies, antitrust laws, and food sovereignty. The trends in corporate concentration that have been observed indicate how powerful market players can erode national sovereignty over food systems and threaten smaller farmers. The study also suggests that poorly targeted subsidy programs could make already-existing structural disparities worse. In order to foster fairness and resilience in the agri-food industry, these findings highlight the necessity of more inclusive subsidy policies and strengthened antitrust enforcement.

7. Future Research Directions

This study provides valuable insights into the evolution of corporate concentration in the Hungarian food industry and its broader implications for economic policy and market dynamics in transitioning economies. Given these findings, future studies should explore the following: (1) Corporate concentration trends in post-communist countries and their similarities/differences; (2) comparative analyses between post-communist and Western European economies, assessing the impact of corporate concentration on the food industry; (3) the effects of corporate concentration on workers’ rights and employment conditions; (4) the relationship between corporate concentration and sustainability in the food industry; and (5) the impact of periodic fluctuations on corporate strategy and workforce dynamics. By understanding the dynamics of these trends, a better strategy can be developed to navigate the future of industry competition, whereby all market participants flourish, even with big corporations dominating the market.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, M.I.B., G.T. and O.A.; Methodology, M.I.B. and O.A.; Formal analysis, O.A. and M.I.B.; Investigation, M.I.B. and O.A.; Data curation, O.A. and M.I.B.; Writing—original draft, M.I.B. and O.A.; Writing—review & editing, M.I.B., O.A. and G.T.; Supervision, G.T.; Funding, G.T. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The presented data is available upon request.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

References

  1. Aalto-Setälä, V. (2002). The effect of concentration and market power on food prices: Evidence from Finland. Journal of Retailing, 78(3), 207–2016. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  2. Adam, J. (1995). The transition to a market economy in Hungary (6th ed., Vol. 47). Europe-Asia Studies. [Google Scholar]
  3. András, S. (2014). Foreign direct investments in food industry in Hungary. International Journal of Business and Management Studies, 3(3), 285–296. [Google Scholar]
  4. Andrew, H. (2022). Addressing consolidation in agriculture. Center for Agriculture and Food Systems, Issue Brief, 1(9), 1–20. [Google Scholar]
  5. Anita, B. (2017). OECD guidelines on corporate governance of state-owned enterprises from Hungarian state-owned enterprises’ point of view. Pro Publico Bono–Public Administration, 5(1), 6–25. [Google Scholar]
  6. Autor, D., Dorn, D., Katz, L. F., Patterson, C., & Van Reenen, J. (2017). Concentrating on the fall of the labor share. American Economic Review, 107, 180–185. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  7. Autor, D., Dorn, D., Katz, L. F., Patterson, C., & Van Reenen, J. (2020). The fall of the labor share and the rise of superstar firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(2), 645–709. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  8. Bakucs, L. Z., Fertö, I., Hockmann, H., & Perekhozhuk, O. (2018). Market power: An investigation of the Hungarian dairy sector. Available online: https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/42320686/Perekhozuk_KTI_09-libre.pdf?1454870203=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DMarket_power_An_investigation_of_the_Hun.pdf&Expires=1747213042&Signature=QX7otuM8qDGmIBnUzCPPrfS9TK-U9Ejj8-5DEocMhiyEhOtaRHJ62HpMhFup57OwbGiEjeLRmNLUTq~R2rf-VC6hbliO~ryRBVlzr7HJVUIchl7ak6KNwYqFw84EMgJG9y4luL20E11YZPzrFSUuOjoIO3YXsYs7wusoIERD49oM66dVU0vi0aPTbgmYHs3INA588QDS4cE7m0lfbmhWVCG~4SDTY85qlpmYShAAZ31o7Szm~MZHmdEZxYkorC0z0B4Cv3n4-x2ZX8ijqAthVUvu6~z7j0Bc8Bz~0OcolvaoT4j4OSGHsM7TPBbJfD1E0u6tESNudsDKm9REbINShg__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  9. Blažková, I. (2016). Convergence of market concentration: Evidence from czech food processing sectors. Agris On-Line Papers in Economics and Informatics, 8(4), 25–36. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  10. Blažková, I., & Dvouletý, O. (2017). Drivers of ROE and ROA in the czech food processing industry in the context of market concentration. Agris On-Line Papers in Economics and Informatics, 9(3), 3–14. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  11. Blighe, K., Rana, S., Turkes, E., Ostendorf, B., Grioni, A., & Lewis, M. (2024). EnhancedVolcano: Publication-ready volcano plots with enhanced colouring and labeling. R package version 1.24.0. Available online: https://bioconductor.org/packages/release/bioc/html/EnhancedVolcano.html (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  12. Bonny, S. (2017). Corporate concentration and technological change in the global seed industry. Sustainability, 9(9), 1632. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  13. Bornstein, M. (1999). Framework issues in the privatisation strategies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Post-Communist Economies, 11(1), 47–77. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  14. Brennan, J. (2016). Rising corporate concentration, declining trade union power, and the growing income gap: American prosperity in historical perspective. Levys Economics Institute. Available online: https://www.levyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/e_pamphlet_1.pdf (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  15. Brumfield, C., Tesfaselassie, A., Geary, C., & Aneja, S. (2020). Concentrated power, concentrated harm: Market power’s role in creating & amplifying racial & economic inequality. Available online: https://www.georgetownpoverty.org/issues/concentrated-power-concentrated-harm/ (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  16. Bunce, V., & Csanádi, M. (1993). Uncertainty in the transition: Post-communism in Hungary. East European Politics and Societies, 7(2), 240–275. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  17. Burch, D., & Lawrence, G. (2013). Financialization in agri-food supply chains: Private equity and the transformation of the retail sector. Agriculture and Human Values, 30(2), 247–258. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  18. Cao, X., Cao, L., & Gary Krueger, P. (2023). Market concentration and political outcomes market concentration and political outcomes market concentration and political outcomes. Available online: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/economics_honors_projects/115 (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  19. Chung, D., & Keles, S. (2010). Sparse partial least squares classification for high dimensional data. Statistical Applications in Genetics and Molecular Biology, 9(1), 17. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
  20. Clapp, J. (2018). Mega-mergers on the menu: Corporate concentration and the politics of sustainability in the global food system. Global Environmental Politics, 18(2), 12–33. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  21. Clapp, J. (2021). The problem with growing corporate concentration and power in the global food system. In Nature food (Vol. 2, Issue 6, pp. 404–408). Springer Nature. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  22. Clapp, J. (2022). The rise of big food and agriculture: Corporate influence in the food system. In A research agenda for food systems. Edward Elgar. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  23. Clapp, J. (2023). Concentration and crises: Exploring the deep roots of vulnerability in the global industrial food system. Journal of Peasant Studies, 50(1), 1–25. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  24. Clapp, J. (2024). Countering corporate and financial concentration in the global food system. In Regenerative farming and sustainable diets (pp. 187–193). Routledge. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  25. Clapp, J., & Isakson, R. (2018). Speculative harvests: Financialization, food, and agriculture. (Agrarian Change & Peasant Studies). Fernwood. Available online: https://practicalactionpublishing.com/book/2046/speculative-harvests (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  26. Clapp, J., & Purugganan, J. (2020). Contextualizing corporate control in the agrifood and extractive sectors. Globalizations, 17(7), 1265–1275. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  27. Clapp, J., & Scrinis, G. (2017). Big Food, Nutritionism, and Corporate Power. Globalizations, 14(4), 578–595. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  28. Clark, T. J. (2022). Corporate power and concentration in united states agriculture [Master’s thesis, The University of Utah]. [Google Scholar]
  29. Csaba, L. (2022). Unorthodoxy in Hungary: An illiberal success story? Post-Communist Economies, 34(1), 1–14. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  30. Csanádi, M. (2007). Party-state systems and their dynamics as networks. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications, 378(1), 83–91. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  31. Cseres, K. J. (2019). Rule of law challenges and the enforcement of EU competition law a case—Study of Hungary and its implications for EU law. Forthcoming in Competition Law Review, 14, 1–28. [Google Scholar]
  32. Čechura, L., Žáková Kroupová, Z., & Hockmann, H. (2015). Market power in the European dairy industry. Agris on-line papers in economics and informatics, 7(4), 39–47. Available online: https://online.agris.cz/archive/2015/04/04 (accessed on 6 May 2025). [CrossRef]
  33. Daskalova, V. (2020). Regulating unfair trading practices in the EU agri-food supply chain: A case of counterproductive regulation? Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 13(21), 7–53. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  34. Deconinck, K. (2021). Concentration and market power in the food chain. (OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, Vol. 151). OECD Publishing. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  35. Diprima, G. (2023). The determinants and impact of foreign direct investments. An analysis of Hungary’s FDI inflow [Master’s thesis, Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia]. Available online: https://unitesi.unive.it/retrieve/64fe28b8-0247-41b8-b06d-642dd83ddbe9/866993-1273964.pdf (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  36. Eddleston, K. A., Otondo, R. F., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2008). Conflict, participative decision-making, and generational ownership dispersion: A multilevel analysis. Journal of Small Business Management, 46(3), 456–484. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  37. Ericsson, M., Löf, A., Löf, O., & Müller, D. B. (2024). Cobalt: Corporate concentration 1975–2018. Mineral Economics, 37(2), 297–311. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  38. European Commission. (2004). Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings. Official Journal C, 31, 5–18. Available online: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52004XC0205%2802%29 (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  39. Expert Market Research. (2024). Top 6 companies in the Europe frozen food market. Expert Market Research. Available online: https://www.expertmarketresearch.com/articles/top-europe-frozen-food-companies (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  40. Fanzo, J., Bellows, A. L., Spiker, M. L., Thorne-Lyman, A. L., & Bloem, M. W. (2021). The importance of food systems and the environment for nutrition. American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 113(1), 7–16. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  41. Fehér, I., & Fejős, R. (2006). The main elements of food policy in Hungary. Zemedelska Ekonomika-Praha, 52(10), 461–470. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  42. Felkai, B. O., & Kuti, B. A. (2022). Situation and development trends of the food industry. Elelmiszervizsgalati Kozlemenyek, 68(4), 4254–4262. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  43. Fink, P. (2006). FDI-led growth and rising polarisations in Hungary: Quantity at the expense of quality. New Political Economy, 11(1), 47–72. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  44. Földi, P., Parádi-Dolgos, A., & Bareith, T. (2023). Examination of the performance of food industry enterprises between 2010 and 2021. Regional and Business Studies, 15(2), 59–71. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  45. Friedmann, H., Mcmichael, P., & Friedmann, H. (1989). Agriculture and the state system: The rise and decline of national agricultures* 1870 to the present. Wiley-Blackwell, 29(2), 93–117. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  46. Giacomini, T. (2011). How corporate concentration gives rise to the movement of movements: Monsanto and la via campesina (1990–2011). University of Guelph. Available online: http://hdl.handle.net/10214/3010 (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  47. Golya, G. ((2024,) February 3). Hungary—Country commercial guide; International Trade Administration. Available online: https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/hungary-agricultural-sectors (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  48. Gorton, M., & Guba, F. (2000). Foreign direct investment (FDI) and the reconfiguration of dairy supply chains in Hungary. University of Newcastle upon Tyne. Available online: https://www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/matthew.gorton/dualweb.pdf (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  49. Greenberg, S. (2017). Corporate power in the agro-food system and the consumer food environment in South Africa. Journal of Peasant Studies, 44(2), 467–496. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  50. Gruchy, A. G. (1985). Corporate concentration and the restructuring of the American economy. Journal of Economic Issues, 19(2), 429–439. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  51. Haas, A. R., Edwards, D. N., & Sumaila, U. R. (2016). Corporate concentration and processor control: Insights from the salmon and herring fisheries in British Columbia. Marine Policy, 68, 83–90. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  52. Hackfort, S., Marquis, S., & Bronson, K. (2024). Harvesting value: Corporate strategies of data assetization in agriculture and their socio-ecological implications. Big Data and Society, 11(1), 1–15. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  53. Hamar, J. (2004). FDI and industrial networks in Hungary. In The emerging industrial structure of the wider Europe (pp. 175–188). Routledge. [Google Scholar]
  54. Hegyi, J., Troján, S., Kacz, K., & Varga, A. M. (2023). Development of the financial situation of Hungarian food industry enterprises—Changes between 2017 and 2021. Economic and Regional Studies/Studia Ekonomiczne i Regionalne, 16(3), 348–366. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  55. Hendrickson, M. K., Howard, P. H., Miller, E. M., & Constance, D. H. (2020). The food system: Concentration and its impacts a special report to the family farm action alliance. Available online: https://www.wfpusa.org/coronavirus/ (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  56. Herfindahl, O. C. (1963). Concentration in the steel industry (1950). Columbia University. Available online: https://archive.org/details/herfindahl-concentration-in-the-steel-industry-1950-publish/ (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  57. Hirschman, A. (1945). National power and the structure of foreign trade. California Library Reprint Series. University of California Press. [Google Scholar]
  58. Howard, P. (2021, November 8). How corporations determine what we eat. Welthungerhilfe (WHH). Available online: https://www.welthungerhilfe.org/news/latest-articles/2021/concentration-in-global-food-and-agriculture-industries (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  59. Howard, P. H. (2020). Concentration and power in the food system: Who controls what we eat? (pp. 1–232) Bloomsbury Academic, an Imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. Available online: https://www.torrossa.com/it/resources/an/5203342 (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  60. Hungarian Ministry of Finance. (2019). The food industry is one of the most promising sectors of the Hungarian economy. Available online: https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/download/4/fb/71000/The%20food%20industry%20is%20one%20of%20the%20most%20promising%20sectors%20of%20the%20Hungarian%20economy.pdf (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  61. Hutorov, A., Lupenko, Y., Ksenofontov, M., Bakun, Y., Vlasenko, T., & Sirenko, O. (2022). Strategical development of agri-food corporations in the competitive economic space of Ukraine. Independent Journal of Management & Production, 13(1), 037–055. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  62. Jambor, A., & Gorton, M. (2025). Twenty years of EU accession: Learning lessons from Central and Eastern European agriculture and rural areas. Agricultural and Food Economics, 13(1), 1. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  63. Jansik, C. (2000). Foreign direct investment in the Hungarian food sector. Hungarian Statistical Review, SN4(78), 78–104. Available online: http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/138506 (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  64. Jansik, C. (2004). Food industry FDI-An integrating force between western and eastern European agri-food sectors. Eurochoices, 3(1), 12–17. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  65. Jansik, C. (2002). Determinants and influence of foreign direct investments in the Hungarian food industry in a central and eastern Europan context: An application of the FDI-concentration map method. Agrifood Research. Available online: http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:951-687-135-6 (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  66. Johnston, P., Frydman, A., Loffredo, J., Péloquin-Skulski, G., Peloquin, G., & Mit, S. (2024). Company towns? Labor market concentration, antitrust opinion and political behavior. MIT Political Science Department Research Paper, 9, 26. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  67. Juhász, A., Seres, A., & Stauder, M. (2008). Business concentration in the Hungarian food retail market. Studies in Agricultural Economics, 108, 1–13. Available online: https://ideas.repec.org/a/ags/stagec/46443.html (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  68. Juhász, A., & Stauder, M. (2006). Concentration in Hungarian food retailing and supplier-retailer relationships. 16. Available online: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  69. Kaditi, E. A. (2013). Market dynamics in food supply chains: The impact of globalization and consolidation on firms’ market power. Agribusiness, 29(4), 410–425. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  70. Kalotay, K. (2006). New Members in the European Union and foreign direct investment. Thunderbird International Business Review, 48(4), 485–513. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  71. Karamchedu, A., & Syndicus, I. (2022). Identifying economic and financial drivers of industrial livestock production-the case of the global chicken industry. Tiny Beam Fund, 2022, 40548. [Google Scholar]
  72. Katz, M. L. (2019). Multisided platforms, big data, and a little antitrust policy. Review of Industrial Organization, 54(4), 695–716. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  73. Keenan, L., Monteath, T., & Wójcik, D. (2023). Hungry for power: Financialization and the concentration of corporate control in the global food system. Geoforum, 147, 103909. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  74. Khadse, A. (2016). Dairy and poultry in India-growing corporate concentration, losing game for small producers. Available online: https://globalforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/india-case-study.pdf (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  75. Khan, L. M. (2017). Amazon’s antitrust paradox. The Yale Law Journal, 126(3), 567–907. [Google Scholar]
  76. Kiss, E. (2014). Foreign direct investment in Hungary: Industry and its spatial effects. Eastern European Economics, 45(1), 6–28. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  77. Kiss, J. (1995). Privatization and foreign capital in the Hungarian food industry. Eastern European Economics, 33(4), 24–37. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  78. Kurmai, V. (2016). Market competition and concentration in the world market of concentrated apple juice. Acta Agraria Debreceniensis, 69, 129–135. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
  79. Kwon, S. Y., Ma, Y., & Zimmermann, K. (2023). 100 Years of Rising Corporate Concentration. Available online: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3936799 (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  80. Lanier Benkard, C., Yurukoglu, A., & Zhang, A. L. (2021). Concentration in product markets. National Bureau of Economic Research, w28745. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  81. László, V., & Adrienn, B. (2008). Major changes in Hungarian agricultural economy as a result of EU-membership. Gazdalkodas: Scientific Journal on Agricultural Economics, 52(22), 2–17. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  82. Lennert, J., & Farkas, J. Z. (2020). Transformation of agriculture in Hungary in the period 1990–2020. Studia Obszarów Wiejskich, 56, 33–72. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  83. Levins, R. A. (2013). Corporate concentration limits growth in sustainable agriculture. Available online: http://www.leopold.iastate.edu/news/calendar/2009-03-01/2009-shivvers-memorial-lecture-richard-levins-why- (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  84. Lusiani, N., & Divito, E. (2024). Concentrated markets, concentrated wealth. Available online: https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/concentrated-markets-concentrated-wealth/ (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  85. MacDonald, J. M. (2020). Tracking the consolidation of U.S. agriculture. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 42(3), 361–379. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  86. Metabolon. (2025). Partial least-squares discriminant analysis (PLS-DA). metabolon.com. Available online: https://www.metabolon.com/bioinformatics/pls-da/ (accessed on 1 May 2025).
  87. Montenegro de Wit, M., Canfield, M., Iles, A., Anderson, M., McKeon, N., Guttal, S., Gemmill-Herren, B., Duncan, J., van der Ploeg, J. D., & Prato, S. (2021). Editorial: Resetting power in global food governance: The UN food systems summit. In Development (Basingstoke) (Vol. 64, Issues 3–4, pp. 153–161). Palgrave Macmillan. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  88. Mooney, P., & Group, E. (2015). CRFA—The changing agribusiness climate: Corporate concentration, agricultural inputs, innovation, and climate change. Canadian Food Studies/La Revue Canadienne Des Études Sur l’alimentation, 2(2), 117–125. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  89. Mordor Intelligence. (2024). Europe plant based food and beverages market size & share analysis—Growth trends & forecasts (2024–2029). Mordor Intelligence. Available online: https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/europe-plant-based-food-and-beverage-market (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  90. Murphy, S. (2008). Globalization and corporate concentration in the food and agriculture sector. Development, 51(4), 527–533. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  91. Nes, K., Colen, L., & Ciaian, P. (2021). Market power in food industry in selected EU member states. Publications Office of the European Union. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  92. Obiora, K. (2023). Corporate concentration, market structures, and inflationary persistence in Nigeria; Central Bank of Nigeria. [CrossRef]
  93. Osiichuk, D., & Wnuczak, P. (2023). Do corporate consolidations affect the competitive positioning of non-financial firms in China? Sage Open, 13(4), 21582440231213206. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  94. Palladino, L. (2019). The American corporation is in Crisis—Let’s rethink it. Boston Review. Available online: https://www.bostonreview.net/forum/lenore-palladino-rip-shareholder-primacy/ (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  95. Pawlak, K., & Kołodziejczak, M. (2020). The role of agriculture in ensuring food security in developing countries: Considerations in the context of the problem of sustainable food production. Sustainability, 12(13), 5488. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  96. Perekhozhuk, O., Hockmann, H., Fertö, I., & Bakucs, L. Z. (2013). Identification of market power in the Hungarian dairy industry: A plant-level analysis. Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization, 11(1), 1–13. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  97. Péter, E., & Weisz, M. (2007). Recent trends in the food trade sector of Hungary, the example of the lake Balaton resort area. Journal of Central European Agriculture, 8(3), 381–396. [Google Scholar]
  98. Pjanić, M., Vuković, B., & Mijić, K. (2018). Analysis of the market concentration of agricultural enterprises in AP Vojvodina. Strategic Management-International Journal of Strategic Management and Decision Support Systems in Strategic Management, 23(4), 40–45. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  99. Recent Economic Changes in the United States. (1929). Committee on recent economic changes. National Bureau of Economic Research. [Google Scholar]
  100. Réger, Á., & Horváth, A. M. (2020). Abuse of dominance in the case-law of the Hungarian competition authority—A historical overview. Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 13(21), 99–128. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  101. Rohart, F., Gautier, B., Singh, A., & Lê Cao, K.-A. (2017). mixOmics: An R package for ‘omics feature selection and multiple data integration. PLoS Computational Biology, 13(11), e1005752. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  102. Rowe, B. S. (2024). Addressing concentration and consolidation to transform the food system. Drake Journal of Agricultural Law, 29(1), 80–111. [Google Scholar]
  103. Shi, G., Chavas, J., & Stiegert, K. (2010). An analysis of the pricing of traits in the U.S. corn seed market. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 92(5), 1324–1338. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  104. Síki, J., & Tóth-Zsiga, I. (1997). A magyar élelmiszeripar története. MezőGazda Kiadó. [Google Scholar]
  105. Snack Food & Wholesale Bakery. (2025). The top candy companies in Europe. snackandbakery.com. Available online: https://www.snackandbakery.com/candy-industry/top-companies-europe#entireList (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  106. Soung-Hun, K. (2008). Market concentration of the processed food in Korea. Journal of Rural Development, 31(5), 25–47. [Google Scholar]
  107. Statista. (2024). Agricultural land area in hungary 2010–2024. Statista. Available online: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1301421/hungary-agricultural-land-area/ (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  108. Striffler, S. (2024). Corporate Concentration in the Food Industry. In Oxford research encyclopedia of food studies. Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  109. Szczepaniak, I., Mroczek, R., Lámfalusi, I., Felkai, B. O., & Vágó, S. (2014). Development of the Polish and Hungarian food industry from 2000 to 2011. Research Institute of Agricultural Economics, 2014, 265–292. [Google Scholar]
  110. Špička, J. (2016). Market concentration and profitability of the grocery retailers in central Europe. Central European Business Review, 5(3), 5–24. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  111. Tanulmányok, A., I, ván, K., Lukácsik, B., Felkai Beáta, M., Gáborné, O., Valéria, B., Raál, S., Tóth, É., Vágó, P., Közreműködött, S., László, B., Péter, N., & Szerkesztette, T. (2009). Az élelmiszerfeldolgozó kis-és középvállalkozások helyzete, nemzetgazdasági és regionális szerepe (Vol. 9); Agrárgazdasági Tanulmányok. Available online: http://repo.aki.gov.hu/id/eprint/321 (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  112. Tesche, J., & Tohamy, S. (1994). Economic liberalization and privatization in Hungary and Egypt. In Working paper series/economic research forum, 9410. Economic Research Forum. [Google Scholar]
  113. Torshizi, M., & Clapp, J. (2021). Price Effects of Common Ownership in the Seed Sector. Antitrust Bulletin, 66(1), 39–67. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  114. Toth, J., & Fertő, I. (2017). Innovation in the Hungarian food economy. Agricultural Economics/Zemědělská Ekonomika, 63, 43–51. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  115. Tsolomyti, G., Magoutas, A., & Tsoulfas, G. T. (2021). Global corporate concentration in pesticides: Agrochemicals industry. In Springer proceedings in business and economics (pp. 289–297). Springer International Publishing. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  116. U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. (2010). Horizontal merger guidelines. Available online: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  117. van Dijk, M., Morley, T., Rau, M. L., & Saghai, Y. (2021). A meta-analysis of projected global food demand and population at risk of hunger for the period 2010–2050. Nature Food, 2(7), 494–501. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  118. Van Zuilekom, F., & Morrison, A. (2013). Analysing foreign direct investment externalities in the central eastern european region: Evidence from the Hungarian food industry. Utrecht University. Available online: https://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/12996 (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  119. Vorley, B. (2003). Corporate concentration from farm to consumer. Available online: www.iied.org (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  120. Wall, T. ((2023,, July 5)). 10 top European pet food companies in 2022. Available online: https://www.petfoodindustry.com/news-newsletters/pet-food-news/article/15541758/10-top-european-pet-food-companies-in-2022 (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  121. Williams, M. J. (2022). Care-full food justice. Geoforum, 137, 42–51. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  122. World Food Programme. (2024). Food systems. World Food Programme (WFP). Available online: https://www.wfp.org/food-systems (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  123. Wynne-Jones, S. (2024). Top 20 most popular food brands in Europe. European Supermarket Magazine. Available online: https://www.esmmagazine.com/a-brands/top-20-most-popular-food-brands-in-europe-251584 (accessed on 6 May 2025).
  124. Yu, W., Chavez, R., Jacobs, M. A., & Feng, M. (2018). Data-driven supply chain capabilities and performance: A resource-based view. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 114, 371–385. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  125. Zhu, X. (2024). Corporate concentration of power in the global food system: Dynamics, strategies and implications (pp. 815–822). Atlantis Press. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
Figure 1. Main and subsectors of the food manufacturing industries in Hungary.
Figure 1. Main and subsectors of the food manufacturing industries in Hungary.
Economies 13 00136 g001
Figure 2. The overall (30 years duration) means and standard deviations (SD), along with the correlation heatmap of the dataset variables, whereby the color intensity increases at high r values. The red and blue colors indicate positive and negative correlations between variables, respectively. *, correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **, correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).
Figure 2. The overall (30 years duration) means and standard deviations (SD), along with the correlation heatmap of the dataset variables, whereby the color intensity increases at high r values. The red and blue colors indicate positive and negative correlations between variables, respectively. *, correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **, correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).
Economies 13 00136 g002
Figure 3. The dataset means, standard deviations (SD), and the correlation heatmap of variables over three different decades. Color intensity increases with high r values, with red and blue colors indicating positive and negative correlations, respectively. *, correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **, correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed); a, cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.
Figure 3. The dataset means, standard deviations (SD), and the correlation heatmap of variables over three different decades. Color intensity increases with high r values, with red and blue colors indicating positive and negative correlations, respectively. *, correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **, correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed); a, cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.
Economies 13 00136 g003
Figure 4. Annual change in the sums of total active companies, total number of workers, and average corporate concentration during the period from 1993 to 2022.
Figure 4. Annual change in the sums of total active companies, total number of workers, and average corporate concentration during the period from 1993 to 2022.
Economies 13 00136 g004
Figure 5. Annual enterprise’s share percentage among the CR4 corporates.
Figure 5. Annual enterprise’s share percentage among the CR4 corporates.
Economies 13 00136 g005
Figure 6. sPLS-DA results (score plot and loadings) based on the 3-timeframe dataset, with ellipses representing 95% confidence intervals. The loadings indicate the direction by which each variate contributed to the overall variation. The 1st and 2nd components explain 51% and 13.7% of the total variance, respectively.
Figure 6. sPLS-DA results (score plot and loadings) based on the 3-timeframe dataset, with ellipses representing 95% confidence intervals. The loadings indicate the direction by which each variate contributed to the overall variation. The 1st and 2nd components explain 51% and 13.7% of the total variance, respectively.
Economies 13 00136 g006
Figure 7. Volcano plots indicate the shift (expressed in fold) in the dataset variables between the different timeframes as follows: (a) 2013–2022/1993–2002 and (b) 2013–2022/1993–2002.
Figure 7. Volcano plots indicate the shift (expressed in fold) in the dataset variables between the different timeframes as follows: (a) 2013–2022/1993–2002 and (b) 2013–2022/1993–2002.
Economies 13 00136 g007
Figure 8. sPLS-DA results (score plot and loadings) for sector categories, with ellipses representing 95% confidence intervals. The loadings indicate the direction by which each variate contributed to the overall variation. The 1st and 2nd components explain 25.1% and 20.2% of the total variance, respectively.
Figure 8. sPLS-DA results (score plot and loadings) for sector categories, with ellipses representing 95% confidence intervals. The loadings indicate the direction by which each variate contributed to the overall variation. The 1st and 2nd components explain 25.1% and 20.2% of the total variance, respectively.
Economies 13 00136 g008
Figure 9. sPLS-DA results (score plot and loadings) based on the categories of CR4 priorities, with ellipses representing 95% confidence intervals. The loadings indicate the direction by which each variate contributed to the overall variation. The 1st and 2nd components explain 33.4% and 25.4% of the total variance, respectively.
Figure 9. sPLS-DA results (score plot and loadings) based on the categories of CR4 priorities, with ellipses representing 95% confidence intervals. The loadings indicate the direction by which each variate contributed to the overall variation. The 1st and 2nd components explain 33.4% and 25.4% of the total variance, respectively.
Economies 13 00136 g009
Figure 10. Volcano plots indicate the shift (expressed as fold) in the dataset variables between the different priority categories: very high priority/low priority.
Figure 10. Volcano plots indicate the shift (expressed as fold) in the dataset variables between the different priority categories: very high priority/low priority.
Economies 13 00136 g010
Figure 11. sPLS-DA results (score plot and loadings) for CR4 firm sizes, with ellipses representing 95% confidence intervals. The loadings indicate the direction by which each variate contributed to the overall variation. The 1st and 2nd components explain 26.2% and 26.1% of the total variance, respectively.
Figure 11. sPLS-DA results (score plot and loadings) for CR4 firm sizes, with ellipses representing 95% confidence intervals. The loadings indicate the direction by which each variate contributed to the overall variation. The 1st and 2nd components explain 26.2% and 26.1% of the total variance, respectively.
Economies 13 00136 g011
Figure 12. Volcano plots indicate the shift (expressed in fold) in the dataset variables between the different company size categories: 301–1000 persons/5–10 persons.
Figure 12. Volcano plots indicate the shift (expressed in fold) in the dataset variables between the different company size categories: 301–1000 persons/5–10 persons.
Economies 13 00136 g012
Figure 13. The total active companies on an annual basis, as well as their linear relationship with years.
Figure 13. The total active companies on an annual basis, as well as their linear relationship with years.
Economies 13 00136 g013
Table 1. Brief information on active companies and the number of workers in various investigation categories during the period from 1993 to 2002.
Table 1. Brief information on active companies and the number of workers in various investigation categories during the period from 1993 to 2002.
CategorySub-CategoryActive CompaniesNumber of Workers
Decades1993–20024825429,575
2003–20125249326,430
2013–20226414338,781
SectorAnimal feed153165,016
Animal Products 3502412,580
Beverages2545177,964
Cereals and their products4247149,477
Food processing90450,416
Horticulture222479,585
Oils and fats40742,365
Spices and seasonings34924,406
Sugar and candies77992,977
CR4 of company size and0–4 persons618
Company No5–10 persons101265
11–20 persons2011089
21–50 persons8114178
51–300 persons756154,745
301–1000 persons21496,140
>1000 persons7278,998
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Imani Bashokoh, M.; Tóth, G.; Ali, O. Corporate Concentration and Market Dynamics in Hungary’s Food Manufacturing Industry Between 1993 and 2022. Economies 2025, 13, 136. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies13050136

AMA Style

Imani Bashokoh M, Tóth G, Ali O. Corporate Concentration and Market Dynamics in Hungary’s Food Manufacturing Industry Between 1993 and 2022. Economies. 2025; 13(5):136. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies13050136

Chicago/Turabian Style

Imani Bashokoh, Mahdi, Gergely Tóth, and Omeralfaroug Ali. 2025. "Corporate Concentration and Market Dynamics in Hungary’s Food Manufacturing Industry Between 1993 and 2022" Economies 13, no. 5: 136. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies13050136

APA Style

Imani Bashokoh, M., Tóth, G., & Ali, O. (2025). Corporate Concentration and Market Dynamics in Hungary’s Food Manufacturing Industry Between 1993 and 2022. Economies, 13(5), 136. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies13050136

Note that from the first issue of 2016, this journal uses article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Metrics

Back to TopTop