GAT-LA: Graph Attention-Based Locality-Aware Sampling for Modeling the Dynamic Evolution of I2P Routing Topologies
Abstract
1. Introduction
- We propose a dynamic network modeling framework specifically for I2P cyber ranges. By formulating the selection of representative nodes within a localized observation domain as an adaptive learning task, this framework provides a structured approach to capturing the temporal evolution manifested in the localized observation domain.
- We design a region center initialization strategy that implements a cold-start for local modeling through an automated scoring mechanism for representative anchors. This strategy further supports a manual configuration mode to accommodate diverse research requirements such as goal-oriented optimization for regional performance.
- We implement a locality-aware sampling mechanism, termed GAT-LA, which integrates multi-head attention with stability constraints to enhance the approximation of the observed local network characteristics and temporal smoothness within a downscaled simulation domain.
2. Related Work
2.1. Modeling of Fundamental Topologies and Resource Reconnaissance
2.2. Systematic Modeling and Simulation of Tor
2.3. Preliminary: Overview of I2P
3. Methodology
3.1. Data Preparation from the Real I2P Network
3.2. Problem Definition
3.3. Region-Centric Initialization
3.4. GAT-Based Locality-Aware Sampling Strategy
- Input: A graph representing the network topology at time t, and an augmented feature vector for each node . The vector is constructed as , where the first five dimensions correspond to the normalized metrics listed in Table 1, while , , and are the node-specific indicators derived in Section 3.3.
- Output: A scalar performance score for each node , representing its predicted service efficacy within the current observation cycle. This score quantifies the relative capability of each node in maintaining stable service delivery, thereby providing the probabilistic basis for the subsequent sampling process.
4. Experimental Results
4.1. Experiment Setup
- Reference Group (Ground Truth): Consists of the ground-truth data collected directly from the monitoring probes in the real I2P network.
- GAT-LA: The proposed approach that executes daily iterative evolution using the methodology described in Section 3.
- Static GAT-LA (Baseline I): This group is initialized on the first day using the RCI strategy and GAT-based feature fusion but maintains a static topology for the remainder of the period. It is designed to illustrate the performance degradation of static modeling over time.
- Heuristic-Dynamic (Baseline II): A model that performs daily resampling based exclusively on the heuristic scoring formula discussed in Section 3.3, without GAT-based feature fusion. This baseline verifies the superiority and necessity of the learned attention mechanism in the proposed framework.
4.2. Evaluation Metrics
4.3. Experiment Results
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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| Metric | Description | Data Source/Path |
|---|---|---|
| router_bandwidth | Indicates the shared bandwidth capability of the node. | routerInfo Caps: K, L, M, N, O, P, X |
| tunnel_create_time | The average response time required for tunnel establishment. | viewprofile: tunnelCreateResponseTime (TotalTime/EventCount) |
| capacity | Maximum number of tunnels the node can participate in per hour under ideal conditions. | viewprofile: Capacity |
| speed | The sustained peak throughput achieved by the node over the last 60 s. | viewprofile: Speed |
| integration | The number of newly discovered peers actively reported by this node recently. | viewprofile: Integration |
| Metric | Description | Acquisition Method |
|---|---|---|
| Time to receive the first byte of the response (s) | Automated browser script | |
| Time to complete the 5 MB file download (s) | Automated browser script | |
| Total duration for full page and resource loading (s) | Automated browser script | |
| Percentage of successfully completed requests (%) | Script-based statistics | |
| Ratio of successful internal tunnel creations (%) | I2P local API: /stats | |
| Average data transfer rate during the cycle (KB/s) | I2P local API: /stats |
| Group | (s) | (s) | (%) | (KB/s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GAT-LA | 0.15 | 0.22 | 2.10 | 14.2 |
| Baseline I | 0.65 | 1.24 | 14.20 | 88.5 |
| Baseline II | 0.32 | 0.48 | 5.80 | 35.6 |
| K | 50 | 100 | 150 | 200 | 250 | 300 | 350 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.85 | 0.52 | 0.35 | 0.24 | 0.22 | 0.21 | 0.2 |
| Configuration | (%) | |
|---|---|---|
| 0.78 | ||
| 0.42 |
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Tan, R.; Wang, H.; Tan, Q.; Xie, Y.; Zhang, P.; Hu, B. GAT-LA: Graph Attention-Based Locality-Aware Sampling for Modeling the Dynamic Evolution of I2P Routing Topologies. Technologies 2026, 14, 141. https://doi.org/10.3390/technologies14030141
Tan R, Wang H, Tan Q, Xie Y, Zhang P, Hu B. GAT-LA: Graph Attention-Based Locality-Aware Sampling for Modeling the Dynamic Evolution of I2P Routing Topologies. Technologies. 2026; 14(3):141. https://doi.org/10.3390/technologies14030141
Chicago/Turabian StyleTan, Runnan, Haiyan Wang, Qingfeng Tan, Yushun Xie, Peng Zhang, and Bo Hu. 2026. "GAT-LA: Graph Attention-Based Locality-Aware Sampling for Modeling the Dynamic Evolution of I2P Routing Topologies" Technologies 14, no. 3: 141. https://doi.org/10.3390/technologies14030141
APA StyleTan, R., Wang, H., Tan, Q., Xie, Y., Zhang, P., & Hu, B. (2026). GAT-LA: Graph Attention-Based Locality-Aware Sampling for Modeling the Dynamic Evolution of I2P Routing Topologies. Technologies, 14(3), 141. https://doi.org/10.3390/technologies14030141

