# PDSCM: Packet Delivery Assured Secure Channel Selection for Multicast Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks

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## Abstract

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## 1. Introduction

- Creation of data forwarding attacks in wireless mesh networks;
- Computation of network metrics including ongoing delivery ratio and predictable delivery ratio;
- Construction of route discovery phase using the PDSCM protocol;
- Implementation of secure multicast routing using twin- and quad-based computing and the orthogonal projection algorithm;
- Detection of data forwarding attacks and alternate path-finding mechanism.

## 2. Literature Survey

## 3. Network Metrics

#### 3.1. Ongoing Delivery $({O}_{D}$) Ratio

#### 3.2. Predictable Delivery (${P}_{D})$ Ratio

## 4. Description of Data Forwarding Attack

## 5. The Proposed PDSCM Protocol

#### 5.1. Network Model

#### 5.2. PDSCM Algorithm

Algorithm 1 PDSCM algorithm to ensure secure next-hop forwarder in a multicast mesh network using PDSCM protocol. |

Step 1: Input the network parameters. ${I}_{P}:Initialparameter,allegationlist,L:location\_information,{C}_{C}:channelcapacity;$ Step 2: If the next-hop neighbor is not in the $allegationlist$, then the compute node’s initial parameter $node.{I}_{P}=L,{C}_{C};$ Step 3: Compute ${P}_{D},{O}_{D}$ metrics ${O}_{D}=$ $\frac{{P}_{R}}{{P}_{S}}$ where ${P}_{D}$ of a communication link is measured from continuous observations of each one-hop forwarding node for an expected packet delivery ratio. Step 4: Perform secure forwarder node selection *$\text{as discussed in detail in}Section5.4.$ Step 5: If a vindictive node is found, then add its node ID to the $allegationlist$. Step 6: Compute authentication signature for the accuser node using RSA encryption, which is used for signature generation and verification based on node ID along with the data packets. Step 7: Send an allegation message in the network. The allegation message includes the node ID of both the accused node and the accuser along with the signature of the accuser. Step 8: Perform signature verification for the accuser during the allegation message exchange. Step 9: Upon successful validation of an allegation message, the accused nodes are marked as vindictive by adding a corresponding node entry to the $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}$, and the same node is removed from the current data transmission path. Step 10: End. |

#### 5.3. Initialization Phase

- 1.
- Every node in the network shares the hello packet and builds the neighbor list to maintain the current neighbors periodically.
- 2.
- The initial next-hop forwarder selection is based on the initial parameter (${I}_{P}$) metric, which is computed based on the location information ($L$) of the neighboring nodes and the channel capacity (${C}_{c}$) of the wireless link from its neighbors to itself, as mentioned in PDSCM algorithm.
- 3.
- Every node in the network constructs a list of qualified forwarder nodes based on the ${I}_{P}$ metric. Whenever communication takes place, the nodes compute the packet delivery capability of their neighboring nodes and measure ${P}_{D}$, ${O}_{D}$ metrics periodically.
- 4.
- Each node maintains an allegation list that keeps vindictive information; consequently, the honest nodes eliminate the malicious nodes from the path, and the list gets updated periodically.
- 5.
- To ensure the authentication of nodes in the network, nodes share their signatures enclosed with their node ID along with the data packets. The authentication signature algorithm based on RSA is used for signature generation and verification.

#### 5.4. Path Discovery Phase

- 1.
- If the source node wants to initiate a data transmission and does not have a path to reach the receivers, it broadcasts a JREQ message to a group of receivers.
- 2.
- The JREQ message contains various fields, viz., source address, multicast group address, Seqno, predictable delivery (${\mathrm{P}}_{\mathrm{D}}$) ratio and ongoing delivery $({\mathrm{O}}_{\mathrm{D}}$) ratio fields. The ${P}_{D}$ and ${O}_{D}$ fields are used to identify the sending and receiving packet ratio at each node. The forwarder node then sends the JREQ message to the group of receiver nodes.
- 3.
- When the set of receiver nodes receive JREQ messages, they verify the message sequence number to ensure the packet’s freshness. If the sequence number is new, then the receivers send a JREP message to the source node through the forwarders based on the best ${(P}_{D}$, ${O}_{D})$ values recorded among the set of neighbor nodes, as its upstream node towards the source.
- 4.
- The JREP message contains the source address, multicast group address, REPID and return path information. The REPID is a unique ID to identify the JREP message and the return path information field contains path information to send the JREP message back to the source.
- 5.
- When the source node receives JREP message from the recipients, it then starts transmitting the data.

#### 5.5. Secure Forwarder Selection Phase

#### 5.5.1. Vindictive Boundary Detection

#### Strategy for Identification of the Vindictive Node

#### Confidence Interval for the Detection of Malicious Nodes

#### 5.5.2. Orthogonal Projection and Estimation

**Step 1**. Compute transposition of ${P}_{{n}_{j}}$, which is denoted by ${{P}_{{n}_{j}}}^{T}$(4).

**Step 2.**Compute multiplication of matrices $\left({P}_{{n}_{j}}{{P}_{{n}_{j}}}^{T}\right)$ and $\left({{P}_{{n}_{j}}}^{T}{P}_{{n}_{j}}\right)$ (5).

**Step 3.**Compute ${P}_{{n}_{j}}^{\prime}=I-\left({P}_{{n}_{j}}{{P}_{{n}_{j}}}^{T}\right)$ $({{{P}_{{n}_{j}}}^{T}{P}_{{n}_{j}})}^{-1}$(6),

**Step 4.**Compute $R$ = $\left({{P}_{{n}_{j}}^{\prime})}^{T}\right({P}_{{n}_{j}}^{\prime})$ (7)

**Step 5.**Compute the inverse matrix ${R}^{-1}$ (8).

**Step 6.**Compute the orthogonal projection matrix $D$=$\left({P}_{{n}_{j}}^{\prime}{R}^{-1}\right){{P}_{{n}_{j}}^{\prime}}^{T}$ (9).

**Step 7.**Compute the final output matrix ${D}_{t+1}$, to obtain the orthogonal projection with the next iteration at time ‘$t+1\u2019$ as follows in Equation (10),

^{th}iteration, by validating the final projection value with the boundary limitation based on Equation (2), the ${O}_{D}$ values that are bounded outside of the normal node ranges are marked as vindictive values. Finally, the honest accuser node (a node that accuses the vindictive node) declares the corresponding upstream forwarder node as a malicious node as per the computed knowledge. Therefore, the malicious node is declared as a vindictive node by broadcasting an allegation message in the network. Figure 2 shows the format of an allegation message.

## 6. Results and Discussion

## 7. Conclusions

## Author Contributions

## Funding

## Institutional Review Board Statement

## Informed Consent Statement

## Data Availability Statement

## Conflicts of Interest

## References

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Channel/Link | P_{D} | O_{D} |
---|---|---|

8- > 5 | 1 | 0.701 |

32- > 5 | 1 | 0.673 |

**Table 2.**The sample data ($\mathit{X}$, $\mathit{\sigma}$, lower and upper limit confidence interval of ${\mathit{O}}_{\mathit{D}}$).

Link | X | $\mathit{\sigma}$ | Lower Limit | Upper Limit |
---|---|---|---|---|

1- > 34 | 0.714286 | 0.334664 | 0.379622 | 1.04895 |

Parameter | Value |
---|---|

Radio-propagation model | Random waypoint model |

MAC type | Mac/802_11 |

Antenna model | Antenna/omni antenna |

Routing protocol | PDSCM |

Simulation area | 800 × 800 square meters |

Nodes | 100 |

Initial energy in joules | 100 |

Data packet size | 512 bytes |

Receiving power | 0.6 W |

Transmission power | 0.9 W |

Traffic type | CBR |

Simulation time | 200 s |

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**MDPI and ACS Style**

S, S.; Daniel, E.; Durga, S.; Eunice R, J.; J, A.
PDSCM: Packet Delivery Assured Secure Channel Selection for Multicast Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks. *Technologies* **2023**, *11*, 130.
https://doi.org/10.3390/technologies11050130

**AMA Style**

S S, Daniel E, Durga S, Eunice R J, J A.
PDSCM: Packet Delivery Assured Secure Channel Selection for Multicast Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks. *Technologies*. 2023; 11(5):130.
https://doi.org/10.3390/technologies11050130

**Chicago/Turabian Style**

S, Seetha, Esther Daniel, S Durga, Jennifer Eunice R, and Andrew J.
2023. "PDSCM: Packet Delivery Assured Secure Channel Selection for Multicast Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks" *Technologies* 11, no. 5: 130.
https://doi.org/10.3390/technologies11050130