To What Extent Do Regional Effects Influence Firms’ Capital Structure? The Case of Southern Italian SMEs’
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Determinants of SMEs’ Capital Structure: From Firm- to Country- and Region-Effects
2.1. Firm-Level Determinants of Capital Structure Decisions
2.2. From Country-Level Factors to Cross-Regional Variation in Small Firms’ Financing Patterns
3. Data
- (a)
- Not all firms were present for every year of the period under study; and
- (b)
- not all the individual data were available every year of the period under study.
4. Methodology
- (1)
- Total financial debt/equity (TFD/EQU);
- (2)
- short-term financial debt/equity (SFD/EQU);
- (3)
- long-term financial debt/equity (LFD/EQU); and
- (4)
- total bank debt/equity (TBD/EQU).
- (a)
- Size (SIZE) was approximated by the annual average number of employees (EMPLOYMENT).9
- (b)
- Age (AGE) was measured by the number of years from the establishment of the firm to the observation year.
- (c)
- Growth rate (GROWTH) was measured by the annual percentage variation in total assets.
- (d)
- Profitability was expressed by the return on investment (ROI), measured by the gross profit on investment (equity plus total debt).10
- (e)
- Asset structure (TANGIBILITY) was the share of fixed assets out of total assets. Fixed assets were measured by the total net fixed assets, i.e., the costs of fixed assets minus accumulated depreciation.
- (f)
- Riskiness (RISK) was approximated by the standard deviation of the profit rates (ROI).
+ β7 REGi,j,h + αi + αj + αh + μi,j,h
+ β6 RISKi,j,h + β7 REGi,j,h + αi + αj + αh + μi,j,h
5. Descriptive Statistics: Some Distinctive Features of the Financial Structure of Southern Italian SMEs
6. Results of Empirical Analysis
7. Concluding Remarks
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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1 | The law supporting the so-called “extraordinary intervention” for promoting growth in Southern regions was repealed in 1992; in the same year, the government ended the operations of Agensud (ex Cassa per il Mezzogiorno), the public agency established in 1950 and devoted to funding infrastructure in the Mezzogiorno areas. |
2 | The existence of a long-term North-South economic divide in Italy is well known and has led to a rich literature on the subject. The intensive interventions designed since the fifties to promote the growth of Mezzogiorno have substantially failed to achieve the convergence of the Southern area with the other regions of the Country. |
3 | Although the trade-off theory has been especially criticized for overemphasizing deadweight costs associated with bankruptcy; see (Miller 1977; Myers 1984). |
4 | A contrasting hypothesis is formulated by Rajan and Zingales (1995) for larger firms. As they are subject to lower information asymmetry, they are encouraged to use equity financing; therefore, a negative relationship between leverage and size is predicted (Rajan and Zingales 1995). |
5 | The EU recommendation 2003/3061/CE contains the criteria distinguishing micro, small, and medium-sized firms, applied from the year, 2005. |
6 | The removed observations cover firms with a total of around 80,000 employees; obviously, most of these are very small firms. |
7 | The latter being the threshold used by EU official bodies to distinguish SMEs from large firms. |
8 | Several studies use both market and book values for the measurement of leverage. The choice to use the book value is generally justified by the argument that the optimal level of leverage depends on the trade-off between the benefits and costs of debt financing. As benefits mostly consist in cash savings arising from the debt tax shield, they can be reliably measured by book values only. |
9 | Alternative specification of the “size” variable were total sales or total assets. The findings using both total sales or total assets as a proxy for size did not differ significantly from findings using employment; thus, we chose to keep only one specification for size, and decided not to show the estimations with the total sales total assets variables, for the sake of brevity. |
10 | Preliminary elaborations using different profitability ratios (ROA, ROE) yield findings similar to those examined in the paper; they are not shown here for the sake of brevity. |
11 | 11 Naturally, the logarithmic transformation limits our analysis to those observations showing positive profit rates and this choice cannot but affect the estimation. Nevertheless, we believe that these effects need not be given undue consideration as both the restriction of the data set to those firms providing complete balance sheets and the management of outliers reduces their impact; for the purposes of our analysis of the determinants of the capital structure, such effects can thus be considered only partially relevant. |
12 | This finding reaffirms the conclusions of the previous analysis. For example, in a study based on a wide sample of US companies, MacKay and Philips (2005) found that industry effects explain far less of the variation in financial structure than do firm fixed effects. Cassar and Holmes (2003) also found that industry effects have very limited impacts on firm leverage and that they do not improve the explanatory capacity of the model. |
13 | On the basis of wide representative samples of manufacturing firms, previous studies have shown that the equity-to-assets ratios is systematically higher in Southern Italian firms than in other Italian regions (see, for instance, Mediocredito Centrale 1997, 2000; Capitalia 2002). |
14 | The surveys cited above show that in previous periods, Southern Italian manufacturing firms exhibited a greater share of short-term debt and a lower share of long-term debt than firms in other Italian regions (Mediocredito Centrale 1997, 2000; Capitalia 2002). |
15 | It is useful to remind ourselves that from in the studies previously cited, the ratio of total financial debt to equity for Southern firms was, in the 1990s, around 80%; and it was lower by around 10% than that for firms located in other regions. In particular, the ratio of bank debt to equity was below 65%; and the difference with firms in the other Italian regions rapidly decreased at the end of the decade to around 10% (see survey by Mediocredito Centrale 2000). |
ITALY | SOUTH | % SOUTH | |
---|---|---|---|
2001 | 36,978 | 5406 | 14.6 |
2002 | 35,388 | 4887 | 13.8 |
2003 | 33,171 | 4396 | 13.3 |
2004 | 34,227 | 4589 | 13.4 |
2005 | 34,504 | 4425 | 12.8 |
2006 | 34,000 | 4428 | 13.0 |
2007 | 33,261 | 4178 | 12.6 |
2008 | 34,081 | 4145 | 12.2 |
2009 | 32,437 | 3898 | 12.0 |
2010 | 30,990 | 3578 | 11.5 |
2011 | 30,445 | 3542 | 11.6 |
2012 | 29,379 | 3385 | 11.5 |
2013 | 28,607 | 3114 | 10.9 |
SMALL FIRMS | 360,518 | 47,793 | 13.3 |
MEDIUM FIRMS | 66,950 | 6178 | 9.2 |
TOTAL SME | 427,468 | 53,971 | 12.6 |
2001–2013 | 2001–2007 | 2008–2013 | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ITALY | SOUTH | ITALY | SOUTH | ITALY | SOUTH | |
EQU_VAD | ||||||
SMALL FIRMS | 337.5 | 483.8 | 300.3 | 437.1 | 409.4 | 586.0 |
MEDIUM FIRMS | 434.9 | 529.6 | 388.4 | 490.8 | 525.1 | 613.3 |
TOTAL | 353.1 | 490.1 | 314.8 | 445.8 | 427.5 | 580.6 |
EQU/EMP | ||||||
SMALL FIRMS | 3830.0 | 5139.3 | 3108.6 | 4260.3 | 5078.4 | 6765.0 |
MEDIUM FIRMS | 5620.3 | 5994.6 | 4531.7 | 5018.3 | 7539.6 | 7857.3 |
TOTAL | 4106.4 | 5236.6 | 3328.4 | 4651.4 | 5463.2 | 5893.6 |
EQU/TA | ||||||
SMALL FIRMS | 71.4 | 68.7 | 74.1 | 70.3 | 67.6 | 66.2 |
MEDIUM FIRMS | 69.9 | 69.2 | 73.0 | 71.1 | 65.5 | 66.4 |
TOTAL | 71.1 | 68.8 | 73.9 | 70.4 | 67.2 | 66.2 |
FIX/TA | ||||||
SMALL FIRMS | 19.1 | 29.7 | 17.4 | 28.6 | 17.4 | 28.6 |
MEDIUM FIRMS | 21.8 | 31.2 | 19.6 | 29.1 | 20.2 | 30.6 |
TOTAL | 19.7 | 29.9 | 20.2 | 28.7 | 18.0 | 29.1 |
2001–2013 | 2001–2007 | 2008–2013 | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ITALY | SOUTH | ITALY | SOUTH | ITALY | SOUTH | |
TFD/VAD | ||||||
SMALL FIRMS | 372.4 | 506.3 | 381.6 | 492.3 | 356.5 | 519.1 |
MEDIUM FIRMS | 482.3 | 654.9 | 501.3 | 668.0 | 448.3 | 637.7 |
TOTAL | 387.2 | 523.3 | 398.0 | 509.2 | 368.7 | 551.1 |
TFD/EQU | ||||||
SMALL FIRMS | 108.5 | 102.9 | 126.3 | 111.5 | 126.3 | 111.5 |
MEDIUM FIRMS | 112.4 | 118.1 | 130.2 | 127.6 | 93.8 | 105.9 |
TOTAL | 109.8 | 104.6 | 126.9 | 113.4 | 89.5 | 94.0 |
SFD/DFT | ||||||
SMALL FIRMS | 91.2 | 85.5 | 92.7 | 88.0 | 92.7 | 89.1 |
MEDIUM FIRMS | 78.7 | 75.9 | 79.6 | 76.8 | 77.0 | 74.1 |
TOTAL | 89.0 | 83.9 | 90.4 | 86.2 | 87.0 | 80.2 |
TBD/TFD | ||||||
SMALL FIRMS | 47.9 | 43.2 | 49.1 | 43.1 | 46.4 | 43.4 |
MEDIUM FIRMS | 58.3 | 61.0 | 61.3 | 63.3 | 54.2 | 58.2 |
TOTAL | 49.6 | 45.4 | 51.1 | 45.8 | 47.7 | 45.0 |
ITALY | SOUTH | ||||||||||
AVERAGE | ST. DEV. | MIN. | MAX. | N° OBS | AVERAGE | ST. DEV. | MIN. | MAX. | N° OBS | ||
SMEs | SMEs | ||||||||||
SIZE | 29.5 | 36.5 | 0.5 | 249.9 | 427,468 | SIZE | 24.5 | 31.4 | 0.5 | 249.7 | 53,971 |
AGE | 31.8 | 11.7 | 6.0 | 182.0 | 427,468 | AGE | 28.3 | 10.5 | 11.0 | 113.0 | 53,971 |
GROWTH | 4.6 | 1.1 | −6.8 | 7.1 | 218,880 | GROWTH | 4.6 | 1.1 | −3.9 | 6.7 | 24,548 |
ROI | 4.1 | 120.7 | −65,839.9 | 24,814.9 | 427,468 | ROI | 0.7 | 95.7 | −4346.7 | 17,919.7 | 53,971 |
TANGIBILITY | 21.5 | 19.9 | 0.0 | 99.8 | 427,468 | TANGIBILITY | 32.5 | 21.9 | 0.0 | 99.6 | 53,971 |
RISK | 5.3 | 75.8 | 0.0 | 46.5 | 424,680 | RISK | 4.8 | 34.4 | 0.0 | 6166.6 | 52,315 |
SMALL FIRMS (10–49 employees) | SMALL FIRMS (10–49 employees) | ||||||||||
SIZE | 16.8 | 11.8 | 0.5 | 49.9 | 360,518 | SIZE | 15.4 | 11.6 | 0.5 | 50.0 | 47,793 |
AGE | 30.9 | 11.3 | 12.0 | 182.0 | 360,518 | AGE | 27.9 | 10.0 | 12.0 | 113.0 | 47,793 |
GROWTH | 4.5 | 1.1 | −6.8 | 7.1 | 161,557 | GROWTH | 4.1 | 1.0 | −2.6 | 6.1 | 19,108 |
ROI | 4.3 | 130.8 | −65,839.9 | 24,814.9 | 360,518 | ROI | 0.5 | 99.8 | −4346.7 | 17,919.7 | 47,793 |
TANGIBILITY | 24.6 | 20.5 | 0.0 | 99.8 | 360,518 | TANGIBILITY | 32.4 | 22.5 | 0.0 | 99.6 | 47,793 |
RISK | 5.5 | 85.4 | 0.0 | 46,544.9 | 357,883 | RISK | 5.0 | 36.4 | 0.0 | 6116.6 | 46,715 |
MEDIUM SIZED FIRMS (50–249 employees) | MEDIUM SIZED FIRMS (50–249 employees) | ||||||||||
SIZE | 98.8 | 46.7 | 50.0 | 249.9 | 66,950 | SIZE | 94.8 | 44.5 | 50.0 | 249.7 | 6178 |
AGE | 36.7 | 12.5 | 6.0 | 182.0 | 66,950 | AGE | 32.1 | 12.9 | 11.0 | 88.0 | 6178 |
GROWTH | 5.1 | 0.9 | −3.8 | 7.0 | 57,323 | GROWTH | 5.2 | 0.9 | −1.3 | 6.7 | 5440 |
ROI | 2.6 | 27.8 | −2426.1 | 3182.3 | 66,950 | ROI | 2.0 | 57.0 | −268.1 | 3182.3 | 6178 |
TANGIBILITY | 24.3 | 16.3 | 0.0 | 95.5 | 66,950 | TANGIBILITY | 32.5 | 16.8 | 0.0 | 95.0 | 6178 |
RISK | 4.1 | 10.6 | 0.0 | 1718.6 | 66,950 | RISK | 3.8 | 9.5 | 0.0 | 458.7 | 6140 |
ALL FIRMS (Absolute Values of Variable) | PROFITABLE FIRMS (Natural Logarithm Transformed Variable) | |||||||||||||||
ITALY | SOUTH | ITALY | SOUTH | |||||||||||||
[1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | |
DFT/EQU | SFD/EQU | LFD/EQU | DBT/EQU | DFT/EQU | SFD/EQU | LFD/EQU | DBT/EQU | DFT/EQU | SFD/EQU | LFD/EQU | DBT/EQU | DFT/EQU | SFD/EQU | LFD/EQU | DBT/EQU | |
SIZE-AGE | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.003 | 000 | 0.007 | 0.035 | 0.029 | 0.044 | 0.051 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.021 | 0.085 |
INTERACTION | (0.000) *** | (0.000) *** | (0.000) *** | (0.000) *** | (0.001) *** | (0.001) *** | (0.000) *** | (0.001) *** | (0.002) *** | (0.003) *** | (0.005) *** | (0.005) *** | (0.005) *** | (0.006) *** | (0.011) * | (0.010) *** |
GROWTH | 3.258 | 2.478 | 0.881 | 2.762 | 1.945 | 0.437 | 1.459 | 1.767 | 0.019 | 0.016 | 0.031 | 0.027 | 0.034 | −0.015 | 0.067 | 0.046 |
(0.302) *** | (0.268) *** | (0.102) *** | (0.231) *** | (0.773) ** | (0.679) | (0.288) *** | (0.557) *** | (0.002) *** | (0.003) *** | (0.006) *** | (0.006) *** | (0.007) *** | (0.008) * | (0.017) *** | (0.016) *** | |
ROI | −0.040 | −0.032 | −0.008 | −0.026 | −0.060 | −0.039 | −0.021 | −0.215 | −0.017 | −0.035 | 0.029 | −0.065 | 0.007 | −0.016 | 0.062 | 0.001 |
(0.003) *** | (0.003) *** | (0.001) *** | (0.003) *** | (0.014) *** | (0.012) *** | (0.005) *** | (0.010) *** | (0.002) *** | (0.002) *** | (0.004) *** | (0.004) *** | (0.005) | (0.006) *** | (0.011) *** | (0.011) | |
ASSET | −1.055 | −1.138 | 0.084 | −0.643 | −1.074 | −1.062 | −0.205 | −0.536 | −0.007 | −0.012 | 0.002 | −0.004 | −0.009 | −0.014 | −0.005 | −0.003 |
TANGIBILITY | (0.024) *** | (0.021) *** | (0.008) *** | (0.019) *** | (0.058) *** | (0.051) *** | (0.021) | (0.042) *** | (0.000) *** | (0.000) *** | (0.000) ** | (0.000) *** | (0.001) *** | (0.001) *** | (0.001) *** | (0.001) ** |
RISK | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.000 | 0.044 | 0.052 | 0.031 | 0.021 | 0.014 | −0.020 | −0.015 | −0.026 | −0.039 | −0.014 | −0.006 | −0.020 | −0.029 |
(0.021) *** | (0.019) *** | (0.000) | (0.016) *** | (0.037) | (0.032) | (0.014) | (0.027) | (0.002) *** | (0.002) *** | (0.004) *** | (0.004) *** | (0.005) ** | (0.006) | (0.012) * | (0.011) ** | |
REGIONAL | −15.230 | −14.996 | 0.005 | −2.851 | −0.060 | −0.102 | 0.120 | 0.023 | ||||||||
DUMMY | (6.367) ** | (8.635) ** | (2.138) | (3.855) | (.057) | (0.052) * | (0.132) | (0.124) | ||||||||
R2 within | 0.040 | 0.038 | 0.0165 | 0.048 | 0.029 | 0.027 | 0.012 | 0.049 | 0.113 | 0.117 | 0.028 | 0.056 | 0.058 | 0.063 | 0.022 | 0.040 |
between | 0.018 | 0.038 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.026 | 0.045 | 0.001 | 0.013 | 0.003 | 0.015 | 0.006 | 0.000 | 0.008 | 0.030 | 0.004 | 0.001 |
overall | 0.015 | 0.029 | 0.014 | 0.011 | 0.026 | 0.044 | 0.002 | 0.025 | 0.008 | 0.019 | 0.009 | 0.006 | 0.010 | 0.032 | 0.005 | 0.008 |
F | 466.6 | 457.6 | 180.5 | 570.5 | 43.4 | 41.3 | 19.3 | 75.3 | 854.1 | 893.9 | 130.7 | 333.1 | 46.3 | 50.3 | 13.0 | 27.5 |
F(for all ui) | 16.6 | 15.8 | 11.7 | 16.1 | 14.3 | 13.9 | 10.8 | 13.0 | 23.2 | 19.4 | 10.6 | 12.3 | 19.2 | 15.3 | 10.1 | 10.2 |
OBS | 217,895 | 217,895 | 217,895 | 217,895 | 27,412 | 27,412 | 27,412 | 27,412 | 140,281 | 141,236 | 98,936 | 118,920 | 15,398 | 15,339 | 11,966 | 13,881 |
GROUPS | 38,663 | 38,663 | 38,663 | 38,663 | 5275 | 5275 | 5275 | 5275 | 32,784 | 33,114 | 26,306 | 29,786 | 4065 | 4055 | 3356 | 3745 |
SMALL FIRMS (10–49 Employees) | MEDIUM SIZED FIRMS (50–249 Employees) | |||||||||||||||
ITALY | SOUTH | ITALY | SOUTH | |||||||||||||
[1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | |
DFT/EQU | SFD/EQU | LFD/EQU | DBT/EQU | DFT/EQU | SFD/EQU | LFD/EQU | DBT/EQU | DFT/EQU | SFD/EQU | LFD/EQU | DBT/EQU | DFT/EQU | SFD/EQU | LFD/EQU | DBT/EQU | |
SIZE.-AGE | 0.035 | 0.027 | 0.055 | 0.050 | 0.026 | 0.028 | 0.038 | 0.085 | 0.026 | 0.027 | 0.003 | 0.061 | 0.041 | 0.049 | −0.048 | 0.162 |
INTERACTION | (0.002) *** | (0.003) *** | (0.007) *** | (0.009) *** | (0.006) *** | (0.007) *** | (0.013) *** | (0.011) *** | (0.006) *** | (0.003) *** | (0.014) | (0.018) *** | (0.017) ** | (0.018) *** | (0.048) | (0.049) *** |
GROWTH | 0.019 | 0.015 | 0.035 | 0.025 | 0.034 | 0.013 | 0.069 | 0.041 | 0.019 | 0.022 | 0.022 | 0.033 | 0.026 | 0.027 | 0.071 | 0.051 |
(0.002) *** | (0.003) *** | (0.007) *** | (0.006) *** | (0.008) *** | (0.091) | (0.017) *** | (0.016) *** | (0.006) *** | (0.007) *** | (0.013) * | (0.016) ** | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.051) | (0.053) | |
ROI | −0.069 | −0.024 | 0.038 | −0.049 | 0.012 | −0.014 | 0.077 | 0.013 | −0.044 | −0.058 | 0.004 | −0.103 | −0.021 | −0.028 | 0.027 | −0.041 |
(0.002) *** | (0.002) *** | (0.005) *** | (0.004) *** | (0.006) | (0.007) ** | (0.013) *** | (0.011) | (0.003) *** | (0.004) *** | (0.007) | (0.009) *** | (0.010) ** | (0.011) *** | (0.028) | (0.029) | |
ASSET | −0.007 | −0.012 | 0.002 | −0.004 | −0.008 | −0.014 | −0.006 | −0.003 | −0.008 | −0.012 | 0.001 | −0.027 | −0.015 | −0.018 | −0.001 | 0.000 |
TANGIBILITY | (0.000) *** | (0.000) *** | (0.000) ** | (0.000) *** | (0.001) *** | (0.001) *** | (0.001) *** | (0.001) ** | (0.000) *** | (0.000) *** | (0.001) | (0.001) ** | (0.001) *** | (0.001) *** | (0.004) | (0.004) |
RISK | −0.022 | −0.017 | −0.024 | −0.043 | −0.011 | −0.003 | −0.005 | −0.024 | −0.014 | −0.009 | −0.031 | −0.023 | −0.033 | −0.017 | −0.092 | −0.059 |
(0.002) *** | (0.002) *** | (0.006) *** | (0.005) *** | (0.006) * | (0.007) | (0.013) | (0.012) ** | (0.004) *** | (0.004) ** | (0.008) *** | (0.010) ** | (0.011) ** | (0.012) | (0.030) | (0.092) * | |
REGIONAL | −0.186 | −0.201 | −0.190 | 0.187 | 0.101 | 0.089 | 0.198 | −0.215 | ||||||||
DUMMY | (0.083) ** | (0.092) ** | (0.209) | (0.165) | (0.078) | (0.087) | (0.180) | (0.223) | ||||||||
R2 within | 0.114 | 0.115 | 0.029 | 0.054 | 0.048 | 0.055 | 0.027 | 0.035 | 0.125 | 0.135 | 0.026 | 0.072 | 0.123 | 0.117 | 0.031 | 0.067 |
R2between | 0.006 | 0.013 | 0.004 | 0.000 | 0.008 | 0.030 | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.014 | 0.008 | 0.001 | 0.011 | 0.025 | 0.007 | 0.002 |
R2overall | 0.002 | 0.021 | 0.006 | 0.008 | 0.007 | 0.029 | 0.005 | 0.008 | 0.014 | 0.028 | 0.012 | 0.014 | 0.022 | 0.038 | 0.017 | 0.018 |
F | 640.3 | 643.7 | 93.6 | 231.5 | 29.3 | 33.8 | 12.2 | 18.5 | 234.9 | 257.4 | 33.0 | 109.7 | 21.4 | 20.3 | 4.1 | 10.1 |
F(for all ui) | 21.9 | 18.4 | 9.8 | 12.4 | 18.1 | 14.1 | 10.7 | 10.2 | 23.1 | 19.3 | 11.0 | 11.1 | 21.7 | 19.1 | 6.9 | 8.6 |
OBS | 106,896 | 106,438 | 71,587 | 89,749 | 12,235 | 12,181 | 9269 | 10,935 | 34,208 | 34,166 | 26,673 | 29,749 | 3102 | 3098 | 2638 | 2887 |
GROUPS | 27,335 | 27,294 | 21,143 | 24,559 | 3519 | 3509 | 2858 | 3213 | 7849 | 7842 | 6747 | 7355 | 809 | 806 | 722 | 776 |
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Butzbach, O.; Sarno, D. To What Extent Do Regional Effects Influence Firms’ Capital Structure? The Case of Southern Italian SMEs’. Int. J. Financial Stud. 2019, 7, 3. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs7010003
Butzbach O, Sarno D. To What Extent Do Regional Effects Influence Firms’ Capital Structure? The Case of Southern Italian SMEs’. International Journal of Financial Studies. 2019; 7(1):3. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs7010003
Chicago/Turabian StyleButzbach, Olivier, and Domenico Sarno. 2019. "To What Extent Do Regional Effects Influence Firms’ Capital Structure? The Case of Southern Italian SMEs’" International Journal of Financial Studies 7, no. 1: 3. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs7010003
APA StyleButzbach, O., & Sarno, D. (2019). To What Extent Do Regional Effects Influence Firms’ Capital Structure? The Case of Southern Italian SMEs’. International Journal of Financial Studies, 7(1), 3. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs7010003