Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Financial Performance: Evidence from America’s Best Corporate Citizens
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Concept and Measurement of CSR
2.2. CSR and Financial Performance
2.3. CSR and Other Socially Responsible Activities
3. Sample and Research Design
3.1. Sample Selection
3.2. Research Design
3.2.1. CSR and Operating Performance
+ β7SG&Ai,t + β8Salei,t + β9Liquidityi,t + ΣINDi + ΣYEARt + ϵi,t
3.2.2. CSR and Other Socially Responsible Activities
+ β7NOLi,t + β8ΔNOLi,t + β9FIi,t + β10PPEi,t + β11INTANGi,t + β12R&Di,t +
β13ABSDAi,t + ΣINDi + ΣYEARt + ϵi,t
β7Big4i,t + β8Delayi,t + β9ICWi,t + β10Liquidityi,t +ΣINDi + ΣYEARt + ϵi,t
4. Results
4.1. BCC Inclusion and Operating Performance
4.1.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.1.2. Regression Results
4.2. CSR Rankings and Operating Performance
4.2.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.2.2. Regression Results
4.3. CSR and Other Socially Responsible Activities
4.3.1. CSR and Tax Avoidance
4.3.2. CSR and Financial Reporting Quality
4.4. Econometric Diagnostic Tests
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Top 25 BCC Firms
No. | Firm Names | No. of Times a Firm Appears on the BCC List | |
1 | Pepsi Bottling Group Inc. | 14 | |
2 | 3M Company | 14 | |
3 | Abbott Laboratories | 14 | |
4 | Accenture plc | 14 | |
5 | Baxter International Inc. | 14 | |
6 | Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. | 14 | |
7 | Cisco Systems, Inc. | 14 | |
8 | Colgate-Palmolive Co. | 14 | |
9 | Eaton Corporation plc | 14 | |
10 | Gap, Inc. | 14 | |
11 | General Mills, Inc. | 14 | |
12 | Hess Corporation | 14 | |
13 | Intel Corp. | 14 | |
14 | Johnson Controls Inc. | 14 | |
15 | Microsoft Corporation | 14 | |
16 | NIKE, Inc. | 14 | |
17 | Weyerhaeuser Co. | 14 | |
18 | Xerox Corp. | 14 | |
19 | Hormel Foods Corp. | 13 | |
20 | Kimberly-Clark Corp. | 13 | |
21 | Merck & Co Inc. | 13 | |
22 | Verizon Communications Inc. | 13 | |
23 | AT&T Inc. | 12 | |
24 | Coca-Cola Co. | 12 | |
25 | International Business Machines Corp. | 12 | |
No. | Firm name | Location | No. of times a firm appears on BCC list |
1 | Pepsi Bottling Group Inc. | USA | 14 |
2 | 3M Company | USA | 14 |
3 | Abbott Laboratories | USA | 14 |
4 | Accenture plc | Ireland | 14 |
5 | Baxter International Inc. | USA | 14 |
6 | Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. | USA | 14 |
7 | Cisco Systems, Inc. | USA | 14 |
8 | Colgate- Palmolive Co. | USA | 14 |
9 | Eaton Corporation plc | Ireland | 14 |
10 | Gap, Inc. | USA | 14 |
11 | General Mills, Inc. | USA | 14 |
12 | Hess Corporation | USA | 14 |
13 | Intel Corp. | USA | 14 |
14 | Johnson Controls Inc. | Ireland | 14 |
15 | Microsoft Corporation | USA | 14 |
16 | NIKE, Inc. | USA | 14 |
17 | Weyerhaeuser Co. | USA | 14 |
18 | Xerox Corp. | USA | 14 |
19 | Hormel Foods Corp. | USA | 13 |
20 | Kimberly-Clark Corp. | USA | 13 |
21 | Merck & Co Inc. | USA | 13 |
22 | Verizon Communications Inc. | USA | 13 |
23 | AT&T Inc. | USA | 12 |
24 | Coca-Cola Co. | USA | 12 |
25 | International Business Machines Corp. | USA | 12 |
Appendix B. Variable Definitions
Variables | Definitions |
Measures of CSR | |
BCC | An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is included in the list of the 100 Best Corporate Citizens, and is zero otherwise. |
CSR | In CSR rankings, firms’ overall weighted scores are sorted into annual quintiles and then normalized to a scale ranging from 0 to 1. |
Employee | Employee relations annual quintile ranking, which measures how companies treat and invest in their workforce, incorporates metrics such as workplace safety, health policies, diversity and inclusion, gender pay equity, union rights, and labor standards. |
Climate | Climate change annual quintile ranking, which measures a company’s strategy, transparency, and performance regarding climate-related issues. |
Environment | Environment annual quintile ranking, which measures environmental stewardship in areas such as water usage, waste management, and biodiversity. |
Human Rights | Human rights annual quintile ranking, which measures company policies and practices to protect human rights across operations and supply chains. |
Governance | Governance annual quintile ranking, which measures the strength and transparency of a company’s leadership, oversight, and ethical standards. |
Financial | Financial annual quintile ranking, which measures responsibility and stability, particularly in relation to sustainable practices. |
Measures of firm performance | |
OPerft+1 | Operating profit before taxes and depreciation divided by the sum of the book values of long-term debt and equity in year t + 1, measured as EBITD /(DLTT+ SEQ). |
OPerft+1,t+3 | The average of operating profit before taxes and depreciation over divided by the sum of the book values of long-term debt and equity, over years t + 1, t + 2, and t + 3. |
Measures of tax avoidance | |
Cash ETR | Cash effective tax rate, calculated as income taxes paid divided by pre-tax income minus special items (TXPD/(PI − SPI)). The measure is truncated to the [0, 1] interval. |
GAAP ETR | Effective tax rate, calculated as income tax expense divided by pre-tax income minus special items (TXT/(PI − SPI)). The measure is truncated to the [0, 1] interval. |
Measures of financial reporting quality | |
ABSDA | Absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, estimated as the residual from TAit = α0 + α1/ASSETSit-1 + α2ΔSALESit + α3PPEit + α4ROAit + εit |
RAM | Real activity manipulation, measured as abnormal cash − abnormal production + abnormal discretionary expense. |
ICW | An indicator variable that equals 1 if the company has an internal control weakness, and is 0 otherwise. |
AuditFee | Natural logarithm of audit fees. |
Other variables | |
LogTA | Natural logarithm of total assets. |
ROA | Return on assets (IB/AT). |
BM | Book-to-market ratio (BKVLPS/PRCCF). |
LEV | Financial leverage (DLTT/AT). |
R&D | Research and development expense (RXD/AT). |
SG&A | Selling, general, and administrative expense (XSGA/AT). |
Sale | Firm sales (SALE/AT). |
Liquidity | Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets (CHE/AT). |
Time | An indicator variable that equals 1 for years after 2016, where 2016 is the median year of the sample period spanning from 2009 to 2022. |
OCF | Operating cash flows (OANCF/AT). |
EQINC | Equity income in earnings (ESUB/AT). |
NOL | Net operating loss carryforward indicator, equal to one if tax loss carryforward (TLCF) is non-zero, and zero otherwise. |
ΔNOL | Change in net operating loss carryforwards (TLCFt − TLCFt − 1)/AT. |
FI | Foreign income (PIFO/AT). |
PPE | Property, plant, and equipment (PPENT/AT). |
INTANG | Intangible assets (INTAN/AT). |
Big4 | An indicator variable that equals 1 if the company hires a Big 4 auditor, and is 0 otherwise. |
Delay | Audit delay (SIG_DATE_OF_OP FISCAL_YEAR_END_OP). |
1 | The relation between CSR rankings and average three-year-ahead operating income is positive but insignificant. |
2 | We acknowledge that our empirical evidence cannot fully rule out the possibility that the positive relationship between CSR and future financial performance is driven by firms that anticipate strong future performance and therefore choose to invest more in CSR. However, given the observed persistence in CSR engagement among certain firms and decreased gap in CSR performance among BCC firms according to 3BL, it is difficult to rationalize that companies would continue to allocate resources to CSR initiatives if such investments yielded no financial benefits. |
3 | The seven pillars are used for the years 2009–2018; starting in 2019, Philanthropy is replaced by Stakeholders and Society and ESG. |
4 | The weights provided in parentheses are based on the 2018 methodology. Over time, the weights assigned to each pillar have changed, with decreasing emphasis on the Governance and Financial pillars. Starting in 2019, Philanthropy was replaced by two new components: Stakeholders and Society and ESG. Due to this discontinuity, we exclude Philanthropy, Stakeholders and Society, and ESG from our CSR component ranking analysis. Untabulated results indicate no significant relationship between these component rankings and future financial performance. |
5 | Our sample ends in 2022, as we require one-year-ahead operating income to be available. |
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Panel A: Sample Composition | |||
Details | Firm-year | Firm | |
Observations obtained from Best Corporate Citizens list from 2009 to 2023 | 1400 | 249 | |
Less: Observations without required data for construct variables | 275 | 49 | |
Total before matching: | 1125 | 200 | |
Add: 1:2 match on Russell 1000 firms | 2173 | 624 | |
Total after matching: | 3298 | 824 | |
Panel B: Sample composition by industry | |||
SIC Digit | Industry | BCC | Non-BCC |
1 | Mining | 64 | 177 |
2 | Construction | 332 | 269 |
3 | Manufacturing | 312 | 488 |
4 | Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services | 165 | 479 |
5 | Wholesale Trade | 59 | 190 |
6 | Retail Trade | 55 | 254 |
7 | Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate | 90 | 234 |
8 | Services | 28 | 54 |
9 | Public Administration | 20 | 28 |
Total | 1125 | 2173 |
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
BCC = 1 | BCC = 0 | Differences | ||||||||
Obs. | Mean | Median | Obs. | Mean | Median | Mean | Median | |||
OPerft+1 | 1125 | 0.263 | 0.225 | 2173 | 0.205 | 0.176 | 0.058 *** | 0.049 *** | ||
OPerft+1,t+3 | 937 | 0.268 | 0.227 | 1640 | 0.199 | 0.175 | 0.069 *** | 0.053 *** | ||
LogTA | 1125 | 10.240 | 10.313 | 2173 | 9.952 | 9.978 | 0.288 *** | 0.335 *** | ||
ROA | 1125 | 0.068 | 0.064 | 2173 | 0.060 | 0.048 | 0.009 *** | 0.016 *** | ||
BM | 1125 | 0.353 | 0.284 | 2173 | 0.430 | 0.383 | −0.077 *** | −0.099 *** | ||
LEV | 1125 | 0.256 | 0.246 | 2173 | 0.285 | 0.268 | −0.029 *** | −0.023 *** | ||
R&D | 1125 | 0.028 | 0.009 | 2173 | 0.020 | 0.000 | 0.007 *** | 0.009 *** | ||
SG&A | 1125 | 0.157 | 0.139 | 2173 | 0.106 | 0.066 | 0.051 *** | 0.073 *** | ||
Sale | 1125 | 0.774 | 0.645 | 2173 | 0.693 | 0.521 | 0.081 *** | 0.124 *** | ||
Liquidity | 1125 | 0.130 | 0.096 | 2173 | 0.115 | 0.072 | 0.014 *** | 0.024 *** | ||
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Matrix | ||||||||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | ||
(1) | OPerft+1 | |||||||||
(2) | OPerft+1,t+3 | 0.482 | ||||||||
(3) | LogTA | −0.004 | −0.008 | |||||||
(4) | ROA | 0.459 | 0.219 | −0.069 | ||||||
(5) | BM | −0.195 | −0.082 | 0.314 | −0.166 | |||||
(6) | LEV | 0.024 | 0.011 | 0.158 | −0.114 | −0.203 | ||||
(7) | R&D | −0.149 | −0.129 | −0.285 | −0.231 | −0.248 | −0.178 | |||
(8) | SG&A | 0.117 | 0.068 | −0.415 | 0.103 | −0.350 | −0.165 | 0.374 | ||
(9) | SALE | 0.306 | 0.129 | −0.187 | 0.281 | −0.171 | −0.114 | −0.102 | 0.440 | |
(10) | LIQUIDITY | −0.075 | −0.022 | −0.392 | −0.087 | −0.272 | −0.263 | 0.594 | 0.355 | −0.030 |
Variables | (1) | (2) |
---|---|---|
OPerft+1 | OPerft+1, t+3 | |
BCC | 0.035 *** | 0.047 *** |
(3.48) | (4.56) | |
LogTA | 0.013 | 0.006 |
(1.55) | (1.16) | |
ROA | 0.705 *** | 0.658 *** |
(5.71) | (7.16) | |
BM | −0.083 *** | −0.067 *** |
(−3.09) | (−2.63) | |
LEV | 0.054 | 0.044 |
(1.23) | (1.14) | |
R&D | −0.032 | −0.507 ** |
(−0.09) | (−2.39) | |
SG&A | 0.026 | 0.092 |
(0.23) | (1.19) | |
Sale | 0.114 *** | 0.098 *** |
(5.38) | (4.66) | |
Liquidity | −0.024 | 0.043 |
(−0.29) | (0.82) | |
Year | YES | YES |
Industry | YES | YES |
Observations | 3298 | 2577 |
Adj. R-squared | 0.328 | 0.432 |
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics | |||||||||||||||||
Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Deviation | First Quartile | Median | Third Quartile | |||||||||||
OPerft+1 | 1125 | 0.263 | 0.179 | 0.154 | 0.225 | 0.316 | |||||||||||
OPerft+1,t+3 | 937 | 0.268 | 0.195 | 0.157 | 0.227 | 0.310 | |||||||||||
CSR | 1125 | 109.72 | 42.15 | 75.55 | 97.03 | 146.55 | |||||||||||
Employee | 1125 | 103.72 | 96.91 | 32.00 | 77.00 | 145.00 | |||||||||||
Climate | 1125 | 94.91 | 83.30 | 30.00 | 71.00 | 136.00 | |||||||||||
Environment | 1125 | 89.14 | 86.89 | 28.00 | 68.00 | 125.00 | |||||||||||
Human Rights | 1125 | 104.73 | 100.57 | 31.00 | 72.00 | 157.00 | |||||||||||
Governance | 1125 | 225.35 | 224.74 | 29.00 | 184.00 | 343.00 | |||||||||||
Financial | 1125 | 287.63 | 214.12 | 112.00 | 247.00 | 420.00 | |||||||||||
LogTA | 1125 | 10.240 | 1.120 | 9.477 | 10.313 | 11.148 | |||||||||||
ROA | 1125 | 0.068 | 0.071 | 0.031 | 0.064 | 0.106 | |||||||||||
BM | 1125 | 0.353 | 0.297 | 0.149 | 0.284 | 0.495 | |||||||||||
LEV | 1125 | 0.257 | 0.152 | 0.159 | 0.246 | 0.336 | |||||||||||
R&D | 1125 | 0.028 | 0.042 | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.039 | |||||||||||
SG&A | 1125 | 0.157 | 0.131 | 0.052 | 0.139 | 0.221 | |||||||||||
Sale | 1125 | 0.774 | 0.482 | 0.446 | 0.645 | 0.999 | |||||||||||
Liquidity | 1125 | 0.130 | 0.125 | 0.037 | 0.096 | 0.176 | |||||||||||
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Matrix | |||||||||||||||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | ||
(1) | OPerft+1 | ||||||||||||||||
(2) | OPerft+1,t+3 | 0.85 | |||||||||||||||
(3) | CSR | 0.14 | 0.09 | ||||||||||||||
(4) | Employee | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.34 | |||||||||||||
(5) | Climate | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.41 | 0.04 | ||||||||||||
(6) | Environment | −0.01 | −0.02 | 0.42 | 0.10 | 0.33 | |||||||||||
(7) | Human Rights | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.42 | 0.06 | 0.17 | 0.24 | ||||||||||
(8) | Governance | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.24 | −0.02 | −0.01 | −0.09 | 0.06 | |||||||||
(9) | Financial | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.14 | −0.10 | −0.12 | −0.15 | −0.14 | 0.05 | ||||||||
(10) | LogTA | −0.10 | −0.11 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.16 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.06 | −0.06 | |||||||
(11) | ROA | 0.51 | 0.42 | 0.11 | 0.00 | 0.07 | −0.02 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.18 | −0.02 | ||||||
(12) | BM | −0.49 | −0.47 | −0.10 | 0.03 | −0.06 | 0.03 | −0.06 | −0.03 | −0.15 | 0.11 | −0.47 | |||||
(13) | LEV | 0.03 | 0.04 | −0.14 | −0.05 | −0.06 | −0.07 | −0.05 | −0.03 | −0.05 | −0.05 | −0.06 | −0.23 | ||||
(14) | R&D | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.22 | 0.09 | 0.03 | −0.11 | −0.02 | 0.12 | −0.24 | −0.11 | |||
(15) | SG&A | 0.32 | 0.28 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 0.05 | −0.07 | −0.30 | 0.31 | −0.39 | −0.05 | 0.34 | ||
(16) | Sale | 0.47 | 0.45 | 0.02 | 0.01 | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.11 | −0.32 | 0.34 | −0.27 | −0.14 | −0.08 | 0.49 | |
(17) | Liquidity | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.09 | −0.01 | −0.09 | 0.20 | −0.20 | −0.21 | 0.49 | 0.35 | 0.09 |
Panel A: Main Effects | ||
(1) | (2) | |
Variables | OPerft+1 | OPerft+1, t+3 |
CSR | 0.038 ** | 0.026 |
(2.11) | (1.37) | |
LogTA | 0.000 | 0.003 |
(0.03) | (0.28) | |
ROA | 0.628 *** | 0.397 *** |
(4.94) | (3.47) | |
BM | −0.161 *** | −0.186 *** |
(−3.75) | (−3.80) | |
LEV | 0.099 | 0.055 |
(1.49) | (0.79) | |
R&D | −0.577 * | −0.845 ** |
(−1.73) | (−2.18) | |
SG&A | 0.076 | 0.133 |
(0.60) | (0.95) | |
Sale | 0.134 *** | 0.115 ** |
(3.09) | (2.54) | |
Liquidity | 0.000 | 0.045 |
(0.00) | (0.58) | |
Year | YES | YES |
Industry | YES | YES |
Observations | 1125 | 937 |
Adj. R-squared | 0.533 | 0.507 |
Panel B: Interaction with Time | ||
(1) | (2) | |
Variables | OPerft+1 | OPerft+1, t+3 |
CSR | 0.060 *** | 0.038 |
(2.66) | (1.64) | |
Time | −0.063 ** | −0.062 * |
(−2.36) | (−1.80) | |
CSR x Time | −0.049 * | −0.036 |
(−1.84) | (−1.26) | |
LogTA | −0.000 | 0.002 |
(−0.05) | (0.21) | |
ROA | 0.623 *** | 0.391 *** |
(4.96) | (3.46) | |
BM | −0.162 *** | −0.187 *** |
(−3.80) | (−3.86) | |
LEV | 0.100 | 0.054 |
(1.57) | (0.79) | |
R&D | −0.566 * | −0.839 ** |
(−1.72) | (−2.18) | |
SG&A | 0.073 | 0.130 |
(0.58) | (0.92) | |
Sale | 0.133 *** | 0.114 ** |
(3.05) | (2.53) | |
Liquidity | 0.001 | 0.047 |
(0.01) | (0.61) | |
CSR + CSR x time | 0.011 | 0.002 |
F-test | 0.25, p = 0.617 | 0.01, p = 0.920 |
Year | YES | YES |
Industry | YES | YES |
Observations | 1125 | 937 |
Adj. R-squared | 0.535 | 0.507 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variables | OPerft+1 | ||||||
Employee | 0.382 * | 0.038 * | |||||
(1.75) | (1.79) | ||||||
Climate | 0.014 | 0.013 | |||||
(1.14) | (1.11) | ||||||
Environment | 0.010 | 0.004 | |||||
(0.53) | (0.20) | ||||||
Human Rights | −0.002 | −0.009 | |||||
(−0.17) | (−0.47) | ||||||
Governance | 0.013 | 0.015 | |||||
(0.71) | (0.82) | ||||||
Financial | 0.000 | 0.003 | |||||
(−0.02) | (0.24) | ||||||
LogTA | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.000 |
(0.10) | (0.25) | (0.34) | (0.41) | (0.33) | (0.36) | (−0.03) | |
ROA | 0.638 *** | 0.627 *** | 0.631 *** | 0.630 *** | 0.635 *** | 0.633 *** | 0.632 *** |
(5.05) | (4.92) | (4.94) | (4.94) | (5.00) | (4.95) | (5.01) | |
BM | −0.165 *** | −0.162 *** | −0.163 *** | −0.161 *** | −0.160 *** | −0.161 *** | −0.165 *** |
(−3.69) | (−3.69) | (−3.68) | (−3.68) | (−3.72) | (−3.57) | (−3.66) | |
LEV | 0.087 | 0.090 | 0.089 | 0.089 | 0.088 | 0.089 | 0.089 |
(1.34) | (1.40) | (1.37) | (1.35) | (1.33) | (1.35) | (1.39) | |
R&D | −0.593 * | −0.585 * | −0.590 * | −0.583 * | −0.588 * | −0.589 * | −0.593 * |
(−1.79) | (−1.70) | (−1.70) | (−1.71) | (−1.70) | (−1.71) | (−1.78) | |
SG&A | 0.074 | 0.080 | 0.086 | 0.089 | 0.091 | 0.095 | 0.074 |
(0.58) | (0.64) | (0.68) | (0.72) | (0.73) | (0.74) | (0.57) | |
Sale | 0.132 *** | 0.133 *** | 0.132 *** | 0.132 *** | 0.131 *** | 0.132 *** | 0.129 *** |
(3.10) | (3.07) | (3.06) | (3.04) | (3.08) | (3.00) | (3.07) | |
Liquidity | −0.006 | 0.009 | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.000 | 0.005 | −0.009 |
(−0.09) | (0.12) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.00) | (0.07) | (−0.12) | |
Year | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Industry | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Observations | 1125 | 1125 | 1125 | 1125 | 1125 | 1125 | 1125 |
Adj. R-squared | 0.5331 | 0.5281 | 0.5283 | 0.5280 | 0.5286 | 0.5281 | 0.5323 |
Panel A: BCC Inclusion and Tax Avoidance | ||
(1) | (2) | |
Variables | Cash ETRt+1 | GAAP ETRt+1 |
BCC | 0.037 ** | 0.036 ** |
(2.54) | (2.17) | |
LogTA | 0.007 | 0.012 |
(1.08) | (1.48) | |
BM | −0.078 ** | −0.015 |
(−2.47) | (−0.61) | |
LEV | −0.048 | −0.038 |
(−1.02) | (−0.83) | |
OCF | 0.093 | 0.484 *** |
(0.79) | (3.96) | |
EQINC | 0.010 | 0.033 ** |
(0.70) | (2.26) | |
NOL | −0.078 | 0.022 |
(−1.49) | (0.35) | |
ΔNOL | 0.032 | 0.047 |
(0.93) | (0.92) | |
FI | 0.034 | −0.396 ** |
(0.19) | (−2.49) | |
PPE | −0.108 ** | −0.227 *** |
(−2.05) | (−3.66) | |
INTANG | 0.090 | 0.273 |
(0.49) | (1.04) | |
R&D | −0.614 *** | −0.752 ** |
(−2.83) | (−2.40) | |
ABSDA | −0.085 * | 0.170 * |
(−1.73) | (1.79) | |
Year | YES | YES |
Industry | YES | YES |
Observations | 3298 | 3298 |
Adj. R-squared | 0.1690 | 0.1300 |
Panel B: CSR Ranking and Tax Avoidance | ||
(1) | (2) | |
Variables | Cash ETRt+1 | GAAP ETRt+1 |
CSR | −0.002 | 0.030 ** |
(−0.09) | (2.07) | |
LogTA | 0.017 * | 0.004 |
(1.93) | (0.59) | |
BM | −0.046 | −0.018 |
(−1.21) | (−0.52) | |
LEV | −0.019 | −0.027 |
(−0.30) | (−0.59) | |
OCF | −0.140 | 0.311 ** |
(−0.83) | (2.28) | |
EQINC | 1.300 | 2.350 ** |
(0.67) | (2.07) | |
NOL | −0.051 | 0.088 * |
(−1.13) | (1.79) | |
ΔNOL | −0.015 | −0.054 * |
(−0.43) | (−1.66) | |
FI | −0.284 | −0.385 ** |
(−1.23) | (−2.16) | |
PPE | −0.119 | −0.153 ** |
(−1.42) | (−2.51) | |
INTANG | 0.639 *** | 0.306 |
(2.61) | (1.57) | |
R&D | −0.936 *** | −0.954 *** |
(−2.99) | (−3.86) | |
ABSDA | −0.040 | 0.028 |
(−0.80) | (0.72) | |
Year | YES | YES |
Industry | YES | YES |
Observations | 1125 | 1125 |
Adj. R-squared | 0.153 | 0.148 |
Panel A: BCC Inclusion and Financial Reporting Quality | ||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Variables | ABSDAt+1 | RAMt+1 | ICWt+1 | AuditFeet+1 |
BCC | −0.005 | 0.050 | −0.002 | 0.165 *** |
(−1.10) | (0.79) | (−0.38) | (5.55) | |
LogTA | −0.007 *** | −0.052 * | −0.003 | 0.598 *** |
(−2.84) | (−1.75) | (−1.28) | (35.26) | |
Sale | 0.021 *** | −0.466 *** | 0.002 | 0.279 *** |
(3.17) | (−4.67) | (0.31) | (5.82) | |
OCF | −0.001 | 1.646 *** | −0.065 * | −1.111 *** |
(−0.03) | (4.33) | (−1.79) | (−5.30) | |
BM | 0.016 * | −0.249 *** | −0.022 | −0.063 |
(1.70) | (−3.22) | (−1.27) | (−1.64) | |
LEV | 0.032 | −0.122 | −0.020 | 0.373 *** |
(1.48) | (−0.51) | (−1.46) | (3.39) | |
Big4 | 0.002 | 0.221 | −0.007 | 0.413 ** |
(0.09) | (1.07) | (−0.31) | (2.01) | |
Delay | −0.014 *** | −0.016 | −0.010 ** | −0.417 *** |
(−3.28) | (−0.35) | (−2.14) | (−3.95) | |
ICW | 0.001 | −0.373 * | 0.373 *** | 0.160 ** |
(0.04) | (−1.68) | (6.28) | (2.04) | |
Liquidity | −0.037 | 0.881 *** | −0.015 | −0.106 |
(−1.64) | (4.04) | (−0.74) | (−0.75) | |
Year | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Industry | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Observations | 3298 | 3298 | 3298 | 3298 |
Adj. R-squared | 0.335 | 0.113 | 0.141 | 0.696 |
Panel B: CSR Ranking and Financial Reporting Quality | ||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Variables | ABSDAt+1 | RAMt+1 | ICWt+1 | AuditFeet+1 |
CSR | −0.001 | 0.214 | −0.008 | 0.044 |
(−0.06) | (1.15) | (−0.80) | (1.15) | |
LogTA | −0.007 * | −0.064 | −0.000 | 0.597 *** |
(−1.688) | (−1.19) | (−0.06) | (18.84) | |
Sale | 0.014 | −0.630 *** | 0.026 * | 0.306 *** |
(1.39) | (−3.21) | (1.69) | (3.56) | |
OCF | −0.021 | 0.900 | 0.019 | −0.862 * |
(−0.39) | (0.85) | (0.22) | (−1.96) | |
BM | 0.015 | −0.660 *** | 0.033 | −0.119 |
(0.75) | (−3.23) | (1.36) | (−1.32) | |
LEV | 0.011 | −0.491 | −0.000 | 0.594 *** |
(0.47) | (−0.79) | (−0.01) | (3.16) | |
Big4 | 0.002 | 0.004 | −0.041 | 0.038 |
(0.09) | (0.02) | (−1.00) | (0.25) | |
Delay | −0.001 | 0.076 | 0.017 | 0.027 |
(−0.14) | (1.01) | (1.59) | (0.60) | |
ICW | −0.028 | −0.416 | 0.428 *** | 0.221 ** |
(−1.40) | (−1.09) | (4.74) | (2.48) | |
Liquidity | −0.005 | 1.404 *** | 0.027 | −0.314 |
(−0.18) | (3.54) | (0.78) | (−1.39) | |
Year | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Industry | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Observations | 1125 | 1125 | 1125 | 1125 |
Adj. R-squared | 0.465 | 0.167 | 0.212 | 0.813 |
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Share and Cite
Huang, K.; Li, Y.; Oyewale, K.; Tworoger, E. Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Financial Performance: Evidence from America’s Best Corporate Citizens. Int. J. Financial Stud. 2025, 13, 119. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs13030119
Huang K, Li Y, Oyewale K, Tworoger E. Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Financial Performance: Evidence from America’s Best Corporate Citizens. International Journal of Financial Studies. 2025; 13(3):119. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs13030119
Chicago/Turabian StyleHuang, Kelly, Yanglin Li, Kabir Oyewale, and Emily Tworoger. 2025. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Financial Performance: Evidence from America’s Best Corporate Citizens" International Journal of Financial Studies 13, no. 3: 119. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs13030119
APA StyleHuang, K., Li, Y., Oyewale, K., & Tworoger, E. (2025). Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Financial Performance: Evidence from America’s Best Corporate Citizens. International Journal of Financial Studies, 13(3), 119. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs13030119