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Review

A Typology of Climate Obstruction Discourses: Phenomenon, Action, Source

by
Marie-Félixe Fortin
1,*,
Annabelle Olivier
2,
Sarah-Jane Vincent
3,
Naomi Laflamme
1,
Rebecca Soland
1 and
Alexandre Gajevic Sayegh
1
1
Department of Political Science, Université Laval, Quebec, QC G1V 0A6, Canada
2
Department of Political Science, University of British Colombia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1, Canada
3
Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Climate 2025, 13(9), 190; https://doi.org/10.3390/cli13090190
Submission received: 30 June 2025 / Revised: 3 September 2025 / Accepted: 12 September 2025 / Published: 16 September 2025
(This article belongs to the Section Policy, Governance, and Social Equity)
Versions Notes

Abstract

Climate inaction has traditionally been attributed to skepticism and denial. However, strategies obstructing climate action have become more nuanced, shifting from direct denial to complex forms of delay. This study presents a typology of discursive strategies of climate obstruction that expands the existing literature while comprehensively classifying tactics that hinder climate action. We argue that climate obstruction better encapsulates the broad strategies used to delay climate action than climate skepticism. Our typology comprises three categories, each distinguished by the target of obstruction. First, Phenomenon Obstruction (Target 1) includes discourses to obstruct the fact that climate change is occurring and human-caused as well as the severity of its impacts. Second, Climate Action Obstruction (Target 2) encompasses discourses targeting solutions to tackle climate change, such as promoting unproven solutions or greenwashing, shifting responsibility, casting doubt on climate policy productivity, looking for policy perfectness, and appealing to cultural and partisan identity to oppose climate action. Last, Source Credibility Obstruction (Target 3) undermines the credibility of climate actors or climate research, pertaining to its method and data as opposed to questioning the existence of the phenomenon itself (Target 1), and casting such actors as conspirators. Based on a review of 138 scholarly publications, this framework equips scholars to analyze how these strategies manifest across political discourse, news media, and social media.

1. Introduction

Despite increasing scientific warnings and climate vulnerabilities, societies have failed to combat climate change effectively over the last few decades. Climate obstruction is among the primary explanations for this failure [1,2,3]. It encompasses a wide array of strategies that ultimately delay or hinder the adoption of climate policies and diminish support for such policies. Climate obstruction can be conveyed through direct actions, such as financing and producing false research or lobbying against climate policies, for example, but it can also manifest in discourses [3,4,5,6]. Today, a vast constellation of climate obstruction discourses coexists in public, political, and media environments [7,8,9,10]. In this context, it is crucial to examine these discourses to understand their roots and implications for climate politics. Above all, a more profound understanding of climate obstruction discourses can help to better oppose obstructive arguments and to communicate climate action more effectively, which are key to tackling this significant barrier to climate action. This paper aims to contribute to the body of knowledge on climate obstruction discourses.
Specifically, this study provides a new typology of strategies used in discourses that obstruct climate action—hereby called discursive strategies of climate obstruction [DISCO]. Our typology is based on a review of 138 double-coded scholarly publications that analyze discourses of climate obstruction. It aggregates, synthesizes, and categorizes discourses, identified by previous research, that obstruct both climate mitigation and adaptation. This typology can be applied to diverse national contexts; however, it is not necessarily designed for the Global South, where distinct political and developmental dynamics require different analytical approaches (this limitation reflects our methodological approach, as we included articles that examine only Western contexts. Socioeconomic conditions, development priorities, and climate vulnerabilities in the Global South differ significantly, potentially making some categories of our framework inappropriate for these contexts) [11]. While previous contributions have proposed rich and detailed typologies—such as Lamb et al. [12] on climate delay and Van Rensburg [13] on climate skepticism—our framework expands the scope by incorporating a broader range of strategies that target not only the phenomenon of climate change but also proposed solutions and the credibility of key stakeholders.
This systemic classification of DISCOs draws from the concept of framing to offer a novel contribution: categorizing obstruction discourses based on their primary “target”. For Entman [14] (p. 52), to frame is to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”. Hence, we distinguish obstruction frames according to the specific item targeted by the obstruction discourse. The targets we identify are threefold: the issue (anthropogenic climate change), its solutions (climate action and climate policies), and its sources and stakeholders (actors involved in climate research, communication, and advocacy). Our typology proposes three primary categories, which encompass all arguments against each target (see Table 1): Phenomenon Obstruction (Target 1), Climate Action Obstruction (Target 2), and Source Credibility Obstruction (Target 3).
Our typology, by aggregating current knowledge on climate obstruction and differentiating DISCOs based on their direct target, improves existing categorizations of climate obstruction discourses in two ways. On the one hand, by providing an overview of the literature on DISCOs and organizing what has been found so far, this typology helps to better structure the current knowledge on how climate obstruction unfolds in discourses. It enables a more refined understanding of arguments that delay climate action and hinder support for it. Ultimately, this breakdown of climate obstruction arguments can help identify specific ways to dismantle them, as different rhetorics require different solutions. This is necessary for researchers, as well as for practitioners, policymakers, climate advocates, and other individuals seeking to identify such discourses, challenge obstruction arguments, and oppose them.
On the other hand, this typology is a novel analytical tool for further research on climate obstruction. Building from the framing theory, it appears particularly relevant for framing analyses. For example, this typology could be mobilized in research examining how climate obstruction unfolds in legislatures, political debates, newspaper articles, social media publications, or industry statements. Research examining the more recurrent types of argument, the factors driving the use of specific arguments, or the impacts of different DISCOs on public opinion or policy adoption, for example, could build upon this typology. We argue that our classification provides more granularity to this field of study by enabling a more detailed analysis of discourses found in public or private spheres. Additionally, since our typology encompasses, we think, all climate obstruction arguments found in the literature over the last decades and in multiple Western countries, it provides a framework that could be mobilized in comparative analyses. Indeed, it has the potential to serve as a tool for comparing climate obstruction discourses across different periods or Western political contexts.
Two key distinctions should be noted about this typology. First, we argue that climate obstruction can be either intentional or unintentional. Our typology includes all discursive strategies that lead to climate obstruction, not just those explicitly aimed at obstructing climate change. This allows for the identification of a wider range of obstruction strategies and avoids making assumptions about the intentions of actors engaging in DISCO. By focusing on the discourses’ effects rather than their goals, we avoid drawbacks, subjectivities, and complexities that may occur when interpreting actors’ intentions.
Second, we use the term climate obstruction to encompass all forms of opposition to climate change, its solutions, and its stakeholders. Unlike terms like climate denial, doubt, or skepticism, which typically focus on the rejection of climate science and are often associated with earlier phases of opposition [13,15], obstruction captures a broader and more current range of practices that hinder progress in tackling climate change. These other concepts also tend to be limited in scope, focusing primarily on epistemic disagreements rather than political, economic, or strategic resistance. Furthermore, although climate delay and obstruction are conceptually close, we treat delay as an effect of obstruction strategies rather than a synonym.

2. Methods

We employed an abductive approach to develop the following typology. We began by drafting a first version of a typology of climate obstruction strategies, regrouping them according to their target, which enables the best differentiation between strategy types. Next, we identified 418 scholarly publications in English and French through a keyword search on Google Scholar (see Table A1 in Appendix A for the keyword searches) and a snowball sampling method using the references of previously selected articles. The first search aimed to gather as many sources as possible on the subject matter. Subsequently, to add methodological rigor, we performed a second search on Web of Science with a different set of keywords (see Table A2 in Appendix A for the keyword searches). The triangulation of sources was performed to minimize the risk of missing consequential articles. We then reviewed the titles and abstracts of the publications found on these two platforms to select 222 publications that addressed climate obstruction in general, both actions and discourses.
We read and double-coded all 222 publications to retain only those providing empirical data or a theoretical conceptualization of climate obstruction discourses. Double coding refers to the process in which both authors independently code the same materials to ensure inter-coder reliability and reduce subjective bias. We conducted manual coding, where each of us read and coded every publication in separate spreadsheets, then compared and discussed our coding to reach a consensus on the identification and classification of discursive strategies. We excluded philosophical publications; those that did not offer any novel contribution (empirical or theoretical) on climate obstruction discourses, and those that did not contain any discursive elements (e.g., publications solely on climate obstruction action or attitudes). It was at this stage that we updated the first version of our typology to include strategies that we had not identified at the beginning of the process and decided to focus on climate obstruction discourses.
This yielded 138 scientific articles and books to construct our typology. To do so, we read and double-coded them again, following the same systematic process described above, to identify all discursive strategies, arguments, and narratives of climate obstruction mentioned in their empirical results or theoretical contributions. We constructed the proposed typology with all the DISCOs inventoried and classified at this last stage of the process.

3. Typology Presentation

3.1. Phenomenon Obstruction (Target 1)

The first category of DISCO targets the phenomenon of climate change itself (T1). Following Haltinner & Sarathchandra [15], we use the term “skepticism” to capture both outright denial and doubt—two distinct but related forms of rejection. While denial involves the categorical rejection of climate change, doubt introduces uncertainty about its occurrence. The three strategies in T1 are well-established in the literature and trace back to Rahmstorf’s [16] classification of trend, attribution, and impact skepticism. First, our typology integrates discourses of (S1) Trend skepticism, which denies or questions the existence of climate change. Clear examples are “[…] claims that climate change is not occurring at all, that the earth is in fact cooling, or that warming has stopped […]” [17] (p. 7). Next, discourses of (S2) Responsibility skepticism do not deny the existence of climate change, but question the human responsibility in current climate change, often claiming it is a natural phenomenon. These discourses often attribute climate change to natural factors, such as solar activity [1,18], warmer oceans [19,20], or long-term natural cycles [21,22,23,24]. Finally, (S3) Severity skepticism accepts the premise of anthropogenic climate change but challenges the extent of its negative consequences for human societies. This frame has been previously classified as “impact skepticism” [13,16], “neo-skepticism” [25], and “extent of consequences” [26]. This frame is also mentioned by McCright & Dunlap [27], where climate change is portrayed as beneficial to well-being, health, and agriculture. Together, these three forms of skepticism—trend, responsibility, and severity—constitute fundamental obstruction strategies directly targeting the existence, causes, or consequences of climate change.

3.2. Climate Action Obstruction (Target 2)

The second category of DISCO encompasses discourse attempting to obstruct climate action (T2) by multiple means such as promoting greenwashing and/or counterproductive policies (S4), blaming other actors to shift responsibility for climate action onto them (S5), and discrediting the legitimacy of proposed or actual climate policies (S6–S8).
(S4) False solutions refers to the discourse of greenwashing and the promotion of false solutions. Greenwashing is a framing strategy that falsely conveys the environmental performance or the beneficial environmental impact of a product, a service, a practice, or a policy [7,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37]. Multiple fossil fuel companies have engaged in this rhetoric, notably by promoting “green coal” or “alternative diesel fuel” [35]. We define “real” solutions as those that effectively contribute to combating climate change (e.g., by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, adapting to climate impacts, or educating individuals about the phenomenon, its causes, and its consequences). Conversely, false solutions are anchored in the status quo, hindering climate action by perpetuating societies’ dependence on fossil fuels and avoiding targeting the causes of climate change, such as the energy system and consumption patterns. Technological fundamentalism and market fundamentalism are examples of S4 [8,17,25,29,38,39,40]. The former states that human innovation will provide effective technologies, like geoengineering, with the capacity to mitigate GHG emissions, rendering political intervention unnecessary [39,40]. For example, the promotion of carbon capture and storage [CCS] technologies falls into this category because most CCS technologies are proven to be ineffective and expensive [41,42]. The latter refers to (an absolute) trust in the self-regulating capabilities of the market, combined with the idea that climate action is unnecessary [43]. (There is an essential distinction between market-based solutions and market fundamentalism. The former can play a crucial role in climate action, and promoting such solutions is not a DISCO. In contrast, the latter is climate obstruction, as it delays climate action by arguing that the market will regulate itself on its own and deeming climate policies unnecessary.) To illustrate, market fundamentalism posits that it is more effective to wait for the market to phase out fossil fuels or promote renewable energy on its own, without the need for climate agreements or regulations, for example [44,45]. The problem here is with discourses that overly rely on markets’ abilities to regulate themselves and spontaneously lead to solutions. However, markets have not only notoriously failed to internalize negative externalities (a market failure), but there have been very visible hands on the market that favored fossil fuels for decades. Therefore, our reliance on markets can only be targeted (such as with market-based solutions like carbon pricing, which require legislation) and measured (such as to tip the scales in favor of renewables, while abandoning fossil fuels, in the contexts the markets are not already doing so). The market fundamentalist belief that a market, where the most powerful actors are members of a fossil fuel industrial complex, will lead to satisfactory solutions at a necessary pace to effectively curb climate change should be considered a form of climate obstruction. Another way S4 appeared in the literature was in arguing that a fuel mix of fossil fuels and renewable energy is necessary due to the challenges involved in a large-scale energy transition and all related expenses [37,46]. Fossil fuels will be necessary going forward, to the extent that, with the deployable renewable technologies existing today, we can decarbonize around 95% of our energy systems [47]. Therefore, 5% will still require fossil fuels, and the petrochemical sector will still require fossil fuels for the foreseeable future. The promotion of an energy mix involving fossil fuels and renewables is thus a false solution insofar as this future usage of fossil fuels, comparatively a small fraction of what it is today, is invoked to justify maintaining current levels of oil and gas production, or worse still, to justify projects that would expand this production.
Our analysis of (S5) Responsibility shifting reveals four examples of this DISCO. The first blames individual consumers for the climate crisis and therefore demands changes in their lifestyle as a mitigation strategy, relieving the need for policy mitigation [1,12,25,35,46]. The second can be referred to as “whataboutism” as it is developed by Lamb et al. [12]. Here, actors obstruct climate action by referencing the lack of actions of other strong emitters such as China and India [9,29,48,49,50,51]. The third places responsibility to the global community and rejects unilateral and individual actions [13,26,36,39,52,53,54]. The fourth argument directs the responsibility for climate action to future generations [17]. It argues, for example, that they will be better off to face climate challenges [55]. Overall, S5 is a DISCO because shifting responsibility aims to legitimize inaction or delays, usually by “implying that others should take the lead before we consider action ourselves” [12] (p. 3).
(S6) Counterproductiveness of climate action DISCO emphasizes the purported counterproductiveness of climate action. These critiques typically revolve around four principal types of argument: doomism (6a), non-priority (6b), inefficiency (6c), and harmfulness (6d). Doomism (6a) contends that climate action is futile because there is no hope—either because it is too late to have a meaningful impact or because societal capacities are insufficient to address the crisis [10,12,17,50,53,55,56,57,58,59,60]. The second type of argument claims that climate action is not a priority (6b) and that there are more pressing issues that should receive the attention or the funding, such as welfare [1,8,9,13,17,20,44,52,61,62]. It can also be used to justify a focus on adaptation policies instead of mitigation policies [29,52,54]. Actors engaged in the third type of argument state that climate action is inefficient (6c), therefore legitimizing inaction [17,26,32,52,59,61,63,64]. Based on a cost–benefit logic, they argue that time and money should not be spent on mitigation policies that produce such marginal results. Finally, the harmfulness argument (6d) asserts that the costs of climate action, such as “significant economic losses” and “restrictions on individual liberties”, outweigh its benefits [1,9,17,21,27,37,52,56,61,65].
DISCO using (S7) Policy imperfection discredits climate action policies by emphasizing their imperfections. This discursive strategy encompasses three types of arguments: the lack of public consultation (7a), the policies’ failure to achieve social acceptability (7b), and calls for policy perfection (7c). While the calls for public consultation, social acceptability, and policy improvement are legitimate, some actors use these arguments to “disorient and discourage ambitious climate action” [12] (p. 3). The first type of argument (7a) criticizes insufficient public consultation in proposed climate policy, highlighting limited public involvement and the exclusion of dissenting voices, which undermines democratic accountability [2,10,40]. Similarly, the argument about social acceptability (7b) claims that proposed policies are failing to achieve public acceptability, which undermines their legitimacy in a democratic society [12,32]. Again, such criticisms are not strategies of delay in themselves: in fact, they are important to ensure that climate policies are democratically legitimate and consistent with the principles of procedural climate justice. However, they become so when they are instrumentalized solely to emphasize the downsides of a policy, discouraging its implementation, rather than serving as constructive criticism to improve the policy process and make it more democratic, inclusive, and transparent [12]. The social acceptability of projects, such as renewable energy or public transport projects, can evolve over time. Insisting on an initial lack of social acceptability to reject a proposal can undermine projects that are desirable and could gain acceptability in time [66]. According to Lamb et al. [12], the calls for policy perfection (7c) requires flawless policies, delaying their implementation by setting unattainable standards [32,67]. This objective of perfection delays ambitious climate action, as obstructionists prefer pragmatic, modest, and measured responses, but not as effective [13,54].
(S8) Appeal to identity, partisanship, system, and culture refers to DISCO invoking national, cultural, or partisan identities to reject climate action and defend a political and economic system embedded in carbon-intensive activities [7]. For instance, the defense of the “American way of life”—centered on economic prosperity and consumption—acts as a DISCO by portraying climate policies as threats to industrial capitalism, associated lifestyles, but also masculinities tied to industrial labor and fossil fuel consumption [1,12,52,68,69]. In essence, discourses encompassed by S8 frame climate action as a threat to ideals such as individual freedom, free market, minimal state intervention, and capitalism itself [17,31,45,58,70]. For some far-right skeptics, climate solutions can be seen as a leftist narrative to justify state control, ultimately to dismantle capitalism in favor of utopian socialism or communism [8,29,45,58,71].

3.3. Source Credbility Obstruction (Target 3)

The last category of DISCO, Source Credibility Obstruction (T3), attacks the credibility of the actors of climate science, communication, and advocacy as well as climate research itself. T3 comprises three DISCOs (S9, S10, and S11). We differentiate the ninth and the tenth strategies based on who is attacked: the actors’ credibility (S9) or the credibility of climate science research (S10). A distinct subcategory includes discourses depicting climate research as a conspiracy (S11).
(S9) Attack actors’ credibility encompasses the attack made toward the individuals or groups that produce and communicate climate science and solutions. The targets are usually climate experts, politicians, environmentalists, advocacy groups, the media, or the “elites”—climate actors for short [21,23,29,32,72]. To begin, S9 features all personal attacks, also called ad hominem attacks, directed at climate actors, such as labeling them as alarmist, hysterical, irrational, deceptive, fraudulent, or misleading [1,17,21,37,53,56,70,73,74,75]. For instance, claiming that scientists intentionally cherry-pick evidence and alter or exaggerate climate reports is a direct attack on their integrity [6,17,18,27,43,49,61,76,77]. Next, S9 encompasses discourses questioning their expertise [78], motivations [52,79], or funding sources [45,58]. Last, S9 includes discourses that discredit climate actors by emphasizing the “biases” of such actors, portraying them as being “sold” to or corrupted by a political party or ideology [2,6,17,18,20,43,57,70]. Characterizing climate actors as “watermelons” is an example of such a tactic, which casts them as green on the outside, but red on the inside, meaning that environmentalism is used to disguise their communist agenda [1,65,80].
(S10) Attack on the credibility of climate research covers the DISCO attacking the production per se and the results of climate research. Here, most critiques are made toward the credibility of the data, models, and methods by emphasizing their low reliability [13,17,18,19,43,81], low validity [21], uncertainty [2,6,27,75], or the lack of consensus regarding them [21,79,82,83]. Namely, the term “junk science” is frequently used to criticize the scientific knowledge process and results [27,43,70].
We created a standalone DISCO for (S11) Conspiracy to distinguish between the attacks on the credibility of climate stakeholders and climate research and the ones that depict them as a conspiracy or a cult. We made such a choice because S9/S10 and S11 are distinct rhetorical strategies with different implications. The former aims to undermine trust in climate actors and science and discredit them. The latter goes beyond by using a conspiratorial frame, which makes them inherently illegitimate, rather than wrong or misleading [43]. Such a frame refers to an organized secret plot by two or more powerful actors—a conspiracy [84]. DISCOs portraying climate change as a conspiracy argue that a network of actors—such as environmentalists, bureaucrats, political leaders [61], and fanatical scientists [24,60]—has structural interests in perpetuating the idea that climate change exists to secure such interests [43]. It accuses this network of actors of various faults such as contributing to the return to a fascist or totalitarian order [85]; exploiting climate change as a “ploy to impose strong government intervention [...] and suppress free enterprise” [52] (p. 6); arranging a wealth transfer from developed countries to poorer ones [69]; or being agents of the “hidden cabal of deep state” [58]. Actors mobilizing S11 label climate change as a “Climategate” [21,86] or a “scale big lie from the green industrial complex” [1].
While the examples of DISCO provided for each of the following categories are all found in the literature, following our extensive review, one may argue that they should be the object of further discussion. This is beyond the scope of this paper. Our goal is only to offer the best possible categorization for these examples of discourses, and not to argue for the examples themselves.

4. Discussion and Conclusions

Overall, this new typology seeks to systematically categorize the discursive strategies of climate obstruction—DISCO, found in 138 double-coded scientific articles and books. We mobilize the concept of obstruction, as developed by Ekberg et al. [1], to create a typology inspired by the work of Van Rensburg [13] and Lamb et al. [12]. This research builds on the literature on climate obstruction and political communication by drawing from the concept of framing to develop a novel contribution: introducing a classification based on the primary target of obstruction discourses—namely, the phenomenon of climate change itself, climate action, or the credibility of its sources. Distinguishing climate obstruction strategies according to the direct target of the discourse enables a more refined categorization of an array of obstruction strategies. In that sense, this typology can serve as a tool for future research analyzing media content and political discourse, enabling a more granular framing analysis. Previous articles have highlighted the need to analyze discourses of climate obstruction, emphasizing the prominent role of social media, traditional media, and political debates in promoting climate action delay [23,32,41,52]. We argue that studying discursive strategies is crucial, as they define problems and their causes, legitimize political actions and delegitimize others, and convey and normalize ideas that accelerate or delay policy changes. Additionally, these strategies necessarily evolve in response to political, social, and economic factors or shocks, underlining the need for a tool to comprehend how climate obstruction discourses evolve over time. In addition, future research could employ this typology to develop counter-strategies to overcome the identified DISCO and facilitate the implementation of climate action. Our typology is a useful tool for such aims. It can also serve to compare how climate obstruction discourses unfold in different Western political contexts.
However, it is not without limitations. First, it focuses exclusively on discursive forms of obstruction and does not encompass obstruction through action, such as the fabrication of scientific evidence or the orchestration of astroturfing campaigns. Second, it is rooted in a Western context, drawing primarily on case studies from North America and Europe. Future research could further refine this typology by examining non-Western contexts or integrating actors’ actions into a broader framework of climate obstruction.
Nevertheless, we hope that this typology will help us pay heed to the vast array of obstruction discourses today. Climate obstruction—along with akrasia from individual, social, and political actors [3,87,88]—is one of the chief explanations for why we have failed to act upon climate change over the last few decades. It is of paramount importance that we better understand the phenomenon itself and its implications for climate politics. These are actions, often intentional, primarily intended to delay or impede the deployment of climate policy and diminish social support for it. By better understanding it and communicating about it, we may more effectively remove the most important barriers to climate action, thereby making it easier to act upon change. In turn, this might help address the akrasia aspect of the problem, as individuals may no longer perceive climate action as an insurmountable task [89]. Moreover, every form of climate obstruction will require a targeted response, and this goal can be achieved by analyzing the different types of climate obstruction discourses, such as statements from political parties or industry groups. This typology should help in the design of these more specific measures, should they target climate skepticism (like different toolkits for increasing climate literacy), greenwashing (like the Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition and the Green Claims Directives, in Europe, and the Competition Act, in Canada), arguments about the counterproductivity of climate policy (like reports that highlight the economic advantages of climate action), or any other form of climate obstruction.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, A.G.S., M.-F.F., A.O., S.-J.V., N.L. and R.S.; methodology, M.-F.F., A.O., S.-J.V., N.L. and R.S.; writing—original draft preparation, M.-F.F., A.O., S.-J.V., N.L., R.S. and A.G.S.; writing—review and editing, A.G.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research was funded by the Fonds de Recherche du Québec—Soutien aux équipes de recherche.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
DISCODiscursive strategies of climate obstruction
GHGGreenhouse gas
CCSCarbon capture and storage

Appendix A. Keyword Searches

Table A1. Keyword search on Google Scholar.
Table A1. Keyword search on Google Scholar.
CombinationConcept 1 (eng)Concept 2 (eng)Concept 3 (eng)Concept 1 (fr)Concept 2 (fr)Concept 3 (fr)
1climatesceptic *typologyClimato-scepticis *- typologie
2climatesceptic *analysisClimato-scepticis *-analyse
3climatesceptic *implicationsClimato-scepticis *-implication
4climatesceptic *minsinformationClimato-scepticis *-désinformation/mésinformation
5climatesceptic *delayClimato-scepticis *-retarder
6climatesceptic *strategiesClimato-scepticis *-stratégie
7climatedenial *typologyclimatdéni */négation *typologie
8climatedenial *analysisclimatdéni */négation *analyse
9climatedenial *implicationsclimatdéni */négation *implication
10climatedenial *minsinformationclimatdéni */négation *désinformation/mésinformation
11climatedenial *delayclimatdéni */négation *retarder
12climatedenial *strategiesclimatdéni */négation *stratégie
13climateobstruction *typologyclimatobstruction *typologie
14climateobstruction *analysisclimatobstruction * analyse
15climateobstruction *implicationsclimatobstruction *implication
16climateobstruction *minsinformationclimatobstruction *désinformation/mésinformation
17climateobstruction *delayclimatobstruction *retarder
18climateobstruction *strategiesclimatobstruction *stratégie
Request (for all combinations): Concept 1 AND Concept 2 AND Concept 3. The * are used as truncations to find multiple variations of a word’s root.
Table A2. Keyword search on Web of Science.
Table A2. Keyword search on Web of Science.
Concept 1Concept 2Concept 3
Climat *Sceptic *Typolog *
Denial *Analys *
Obstruction *Implication *
Déni *Strateg *
Négation *
Mesinformation *
Delay *
Misinformation *
Skeptic *
Desinformation *
Disinformation *
Request: (climat *) NEAR/10 (sceptic * OR skeptic * OR denial * OR obstruction * OR deni OR negation * OR misinformation * OR delay * OR misinformation * OR disinformation * OR disinformation *) NEAR/10 (typolog * OR analys * OR implication * OR strateg *). The * are used as truncations to find multiple variations of a word’s root.

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Table 1. Typology of discursive strategies of climate obstruction.
Table 1. Typology of discursive strategies of climate obstruction.
T1. Phenomenon Obstruction
S1. Trend skepticism
S2. Responsibility skepticism
S3. Severity skepticism
T2. Climate Action Obstruction
S4. Greenwashing or false solutions
S5. Responsibility shifting
S6. Counterproductiveness of climate action
 (a) Doomism
 (b) Non-priority
 (c) Inefficient
 (d) Harmful
S7. Policy imperfectness
 (a) Lack of public consultation
 (b) Social acceptability
 (c) Policy perfection
S8. Appeal to identity, partisanship, system, and culture
T3. Source Credibility Obstruction
S9. Attack the credibility of actors
S10. Attack the credibility of climate science research
S11. Climate science is a conspiracy
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Fortin, M.-F.; Olivier, A.; Vincent, S.-J.; Laflamme, N.; Soland, R.; Gajevic Sayegh, A. A Typology of Climate Obstruction Discourses: Phenomenon, Action, Source. Climate 2025, 13, 190. https://doi.org/10.3390/cli13090190

AMA Style

Fortin M-F, Olivier A, Vincent S-J, Laflamme N, Soland R, Gajevic Sayegh A. A Typology of Climate Obstruction Discourses: Phenomenon, Action, Source. Climate. 2025; 13(9):190. https://doi.org/10.3390/cli13090190

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Fortin, Marie-Félixe, Annabelle Olivier, Sarah-Jane Vincent, Naomi Laflamme, Rebecca Soland, and Alexandre Gajevic Sayegh. 2025. "A Typology of Climate Obstruction Discourses: Phenomenon, Action, Source" Climate 13, no. 9: 190. https://doi.org/10.3390/cli13090190

APA Style

Fortin, M.-F., Olivier, A., Vincent, S.-J., Laflamme, N., Soland, R., & Gajevic Sayegh, A. (2025). A Typology of Climate Obstruction Discourses: Phenomenon, Action, Source. Climate, 13(9), 190. https://doi.org/10.3390/cli13090190

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