Is VIX a Contrarian Indicator? On the Positivity of the Conditional Sharpe Ratio † †
Abstract
1. Introduction
- Expected rate of return on the market portfolio;
- Sharpe Ratio for the market portfolio;
- Volatility for the market portfolio;
- Riskfree rate of interest.
- Assuming the historical arithmetic average is an unbiased estimate of the expected rate of return, .
- The historical risk premium is assumed constant. This implies where the current riskfree rate of interest r (e.g., 3 mo. T-Bill rate) is added to the historical average risk premium
- If the historical Sharpe Ratio is assumed constant, then where
- 0.448 is the historical Sharpe Ratio, computed in this case as ;
- = the measure of prospective S&P volatility (e.g., the VIX implied vol on S&P 500 index1.
The argument proffered in favor of the third approach is that it permits variation in both the riskfree rate as well as volatility to “inform” a current estimate of the expected rate of return. Thus, solving for from (2), we havewhich clearly indicates a positive relationship between expected return and (systematic) risk.
2. Literature Review
2.1. The Opposing Point of View
2.2. Investor Sentiment
2.3. The Volatility Risk Premium
2.4. An International Perspective
2.5. Empirical Results Supportive of the Current Paper’s Maintained Hypothesis
- Harvey (1991) examined the conditional risk of 17 countries within a financially integrated global market. He found that the expected return on a country’s securities portfolio is influenced by its exposure to global risk factors. The compensation for each unit of this risk is referred to as the world price of covariance risk.
- In closely related work, Martin (2017) derived the relationshipwhere is the stochastic discount factor at date He uses the SVIX index to represent the risk-neutral volatility. Whereas the SVIX index equally weights option prices by strike, the VIX index weights option prices by giving relatively more weight to out-of-the-money puts and less weight to out-of-the-money calls. Consequently, the VIX index places more emphasis on left-tail events. Our preference for the use of VIX in this work follows from the recognition that VIX is commonly known among equity market participants. In the relevant regression for intercept and independent variable SVIX, “[t]he null hypothesis that and is not rejected at any horizon”. The article concludes, “These empirical results suggest that the SVIX index can be used as a direct proxy for the equity premium”.
- Copeland and Copeland (1999) observed that variations in the Market Volatility Index (VIX) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange are significant predictors of daily market returns. They noted that after an increase in the VIX, large capitalization stock portfolios tend to outperform small capitalization stock portfolios, and value-based portfolios generally outperform growth-based portfolios. Conversely, following a decrease in the VIX, the opposite patterns emerge. This suggests that market timing might be possible, at least for enhancing portfolio yield.Although the analysis there focused on the distinction between “value-based portfolios” relative to “growth-based portfolios”, it is in the spirit of the empirical results we report below.
- In an early research paper, Johnson (2012) focused on the VIX term structure instead of the VIX itself to enhance our understanding of the equity premium. While Johnson demonstrated the VIX alone has limited predictive power for future S&P 500 returns, the VIX term structure can predict next-quarter S&P 500 returns with an adjusted of 5.2%.
- Lettau et al. (2007) explored the connection between asset values and risk. They investigated whether the substantial increase in asset values at the end of the 20th century could be reasonably attributed to macroeconomic factors, particularly the significant and prolonged decline in macroeconomic risk. They found that this explanation was largely plausible.
- The next paper comes to us from the option literature, which has spent considerable amount of time modeling the relationship between the stock return and volatility-generating process. One of the latest papers to consider its empirical contents is S. Heston et al. (2023), which harkens back to the physical dynamic of S. L. Heston (1993) processes:where denotes the equity premium as a function of the variance rate In this set of equations, the sign of a coefficient in which we are interested here is that of , as shown in Table 1.Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
- Chow et al. (2020) analyzed the components of the VIX by breaking it down into four key elements: Realized variance (RV), variance risk premium (VRP), realized tail (RT), and tail risk premium (TRP). Their research indicates that the unbiased premiums of both variance risk and tail risk are significant predictors of future S&P 500 returns.
- Liu et al. (2023) focus on the issue of addressing the market’s expected risk premium by “combining risk-neutral variance from the options market with the traditional time-series return predictability”, finding the combination outperforms either type of information alone. In their paper,where denotes the Martin (2017) bound.
- In an indirectly related paper, Miljkovic and SenGupta (2018) “analyze S&P 500 market fluctuations and forecast jumps in S&P 500 prices [using] Daily VIX and Squared VIX close prices”.
2.6. Ex Ante, Rather than Ex Post, Empirical Results
3. Data
- S&P 500 Index,
- VIX 30-day Implied Volatility on the S&P 500 Index,
- Rates on three-mo. Treasury Bills.
4. The Econometric Models
5. Empirical Tests
5.1. Yale Economist James Choi’s Use of VIX as a Negative Market Timing Signal
“When the VIX … rises above 30%, I start thinking about modestly reducing my stock exposure. … But be aware that high-volatility episodes are usually short-lived, … be attentive and ready to come back into the market quickly as soon as volatility has calmed down.”
5.2. Empirical Tests of Equation (6)
- There exists occasionally a confluence of two crises. One example of that is the 2001 Recession with the events of 9/11. According to the NBER, the 2001 recession ranged from March 2001 through November 2001 and thus clearly overlaps with 9/11.
- The virtual coincidence of VIX Peak and S&P 500 trough during September 2001 should be tempered by the recognition the stock market was closed between 9/11 and 17 September.
- The discrepancy in the dates for Persian Gulf I could be explained by the two sub-crises entailed in that particular set of event which have historically been distinguished by the distinction between the two combat operations of “Desert Shield” and “Desert Storm”.5
- Perhaps the more surprising result is that for the Financial Crisis—Great Recession: The number of days distinguishing the two events there is relatively large, with VIX peaking 109 days before the S&P bottomed out.
- The fact the stock market bottoms out at or near a VIX peak is of little prospective guidance, since it is only possible ex post to recognize the date of the VIX peak for any particular crisis.
5.3. Empirical Tests of Equation (7)
5.4. Empirical Tests of Equation (8)
5.5. Discussion
- We demonstrate a policy of receding from the market whenever VIX exceeds 30% constitutes suboptimal investment behavior.
- Although a likely self-evident result, we show that contemporaneously, a positive (negative) market return is associated with a decrease (increase) in the level of VIX.
- More relevant, we show that of the ten crises since 1990, the peak value of VIX is relatively proximate to that crisis’ S&P trough.
- Finally, we show that the greater the immediate-past level of VIX, the subsequent market return is more positive. Moreover, consistent with theory but only weakly significant, we show that such subsequent returns are lower if the market has had a five-year record of positive returns, thus documenting the effect of decreasing relative risk aversion.
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Ibbotson & Harrington “Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation® (SBBI®): 2021 Summary Edition”
| Geometric Average | Arithmetic Average | Standard Deviation | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equity REITs | 11.4 | 12.9 | 17.7 |
| Large-Cap Stocks | 10.8 | 12.3 | 17.2 |
| Small-Cap Stocks | 12.7 | 14.9 | 22.2 |
| Long-term Corp Bonds | 8.5 | 9.0 | 10.1 |
| Long-term Gov’t Bonds | 8.2 | 8.8 | 12.0 |
| Inter-term Gov’t Bonds | 6.8 | 7.0 | 6.4 |
| U.S. Treasury Bills | 4.5 | 4.6 | 3.5 |
| Inflation | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.0 |
| 1 | As noted in the literature survey below, we are keenly aware VIX contains a volatility risk premium that separates it from the “expected volatility on the S&P 500.” To focus on the issue of the Sharpe Ratio, in this paper, we abstract from the volatility risk premium. It is also fair to say researchers have looked into the matter of the manipulation of the VIX Index’s value by certain market participants. While any manipulation, if it occurs, is unacceptable, in this research, we assume VIX is free of first-order-effect manipulation—meaning any manipulation does not distort the values in a meaningful manner. |
| 2 | One strand of the literature of which we will abstain is the distinction between risk and “ambiguity”. This distinction was raised by Brenner and Izhakian (2018), who concluded, “Introducing ambiguity alongside risk provides stronger evidence on the role of risk in explaining expected returns in the equity markets”. |
| 3 | |
| 4 | The expression in parentheses, would only become negative at the implausibly high value for of 2.84, which did not occur in the data. |
| 5 | Per wikipedia.com, “The Gulf War was an armed conflict between Iraq and a 42-country coalition led by the United States. The coalition’s efforts against Iraq were carried out in two key phases: Operation Desert Shield, which marked the military buildup from August 1990 to January 1991; and Operation Desert Storm, which began with the aerial bombing campaign against Iraq on 17 January 1991 and came to a close with the American-led Liberation of Kuwait on 28 February 1991”. Available online: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War (accessed on 1 March 2022). |
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| Coefficient | Value |
|---|---|
| 2.637 | |
| (1.062) |
| No. of Weeks | No. of Episodes | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 15 | |
| 2 | 3 | |
| 3 | 2 | |
| 4 | 1 | |
| 5 | 3 | |
| 7 | 1 | |
| 9 | 1 | |
| 10 | 2 | |
| 36 | 1 | |
| Total | 29 |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| No. of Episodes of Superior Returns to 100% Equity | 25 |
| No. of Episodes of Inferior Returns to 100% Equity | 4 |
| Average (Superior) 100%-Equity Episodic Performance | 0.21% |
| Std. Dev. of Performance over All Episodes | 1.08% |
| Maximal Episodic Underperformance to 100% Equity | −0.02% |
| Data Period | Length of Period | Data Frequency | Beta Coefficient | t-Stat on Beta Coefficient | |
| 22/12/17 | 15/12/22 | 5 years | Daily | −0.466 | −44.3 |
| 17/12/18 | 15/12/22 | 4 years | Daily | −0.481 | −39.65 |
| 17/12/20 | 15/12/22 | 2 years | Daily | −0.466 | −24.98 |
| 17/12/18 | 17/12/20 | 2 years | Daily | −0.488 | −29.87 |
| 22/12/17 | 16/12/22 | 5 years | Weekly | −0.519 | −17.16 |
| 18/12/20 | 16/12/22 | 2 years | Weekly | −0.535 | −10.84 |
| 14/12/18 | 18/12/20 | 2 years | Weekly | −0.492 | −9.684 |
| 31/12/12 | 30/11/22 | 10 years | Monthly | −0.589 | −14.38 |
| 31/12/12 | 30/11/17 | 5 years | Monthly | −0.57 | −9.519 |
| 29/12/17 | 30/11/22 | 5 years | Monthly | −0.6 | −10.51 |
| Date of Crisis’ Peak VIX (2) | Peak VIX Value (3) | Date of Crisis’ S&P 500 Trough (4) | Time Lead/Lag, in Days (5) = (4) − (2) | S&P 500 Value (6) | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Persian Gulf I | 23/8/1990 | 36.47 | 11/10/1990 | 49 | 295.46 |
| 2 | Asian Financial Crisis | 30/10/1997 | 38.2 | 27/10/1997 | −3 | 876.99 |
| 3 | LTCM Collapse | 10/9/1998 | 45.29 | 31/8/1998 | −10 | 957.28 |
| 4 | 2000 Election Uncertainty | 30/11/2000 | 29.65 | 30/11/2000 | 0 | 1314.95 |
| 5 | 2001 Recession | 3/4/2001 | 34.72 | 4/4/2001 | 1 | 1103.25 |
| 6 | 9/11 | 20/9/2001 | 43.74 | 21/9/2001 | 1 | 965.8 |
| 7 | Persian Gulf II | 27/1/2003 | 34.69 | 11/3/2003 | 43 | 800.73 |
| 8 | Great Recession | 20/11/2008 | 80.86 | 9/3/2009 | 109 | 676.53 |
| 9 | 2020 Pandemic | 16/3/2020 | 82.69 | 23/3/2020 | 7 | 2237.4 |
| 10 | Ukraine | 7/3/2022 | 36.45 | 8/3/2022 | 1 | 4170.7 |
| Data Period | Length of Period | Data Frequency | Periodic S&P 500 Average Return | Annualized Return | Deannualized Beta Coefficient | -Stat on Beta Coefficient | ||
| 22/12/17 | 15/12/22 | 5 years | Daily | 0.039% | 10.26% | 0.0086 | 1.87 | |
| 17/12/18 | 15/12/22 | 4 years | Daily | 0.052% | 14.00% | 0.0084 | 1.60 | |
| 17/12/20 | 15/12/22 | 2 years | Daily | 0.014% | 3.68% | 0.0162 | 1.46 | |
| 17/12/18 | 17/12/20 | 2 years | Daily | 0.090% | 25.45% | 0.0070 | 1.07 | |
| 22/12/17 | 16/12/22 | 5 years | Weekly | 0.181% | 9.83% | 0.0300 | 1.39 | |
| 18/12/20 | 16/12/22 | 2 years | Weekly | 0.069% | 3.66% | 0.0552 | 1.08 | |
| 14/12/18 | 18/12/20 | 2 years | Weekly | 0.396% | 22.80% | 0.0197 | 0.65 | |
| 12/31/12 | 30/11/22 | 10 years | Monthly | 0.98% | 12.42% | 0.1185 | 2.20 | |
| 31/12/12 | 30/11/17 | 5 years | Monthly | 1.09% | 13.89% | 0.1788 | 1.78 | |
| 29/12/17 | 30/11/22 | 5 years | Monthly | 0.86% | 10.82% | 0.1684 | 1.99 | |
| Data Period | Length of Period | Data Frequency | Deannualized Beta Coefficient | -Stat on Beta | Coefficient | -Stat on | Five-Yr. Previous Data Begins | ||
| 26/12/17 | 26/12/22 | 5 years | Monthly | 6.48% | 0.0017 | 2.00 | — | — | — |
| 22/12/17 | 26/12/22 | 5 years | Monthly | 7.21% | 0.0017 | 2.01 | −0.025 | −0.671 | 1/12/12 |
| 26/12/12 | 26/12/22 | 10 years | Monthly | 3.69% | 0.0012 | 2.13 | — | — | — |
| 22/12/12 | 26/12/22 | 10 years | Monthly | 4.97% | 0.0010 | 1.77 | −0.026 | −1.256 | 1/12/07 |
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Ronn, E.I.; Xu, L. Is VIX a Contrarian Indicator? On the Positivity of the Conditional Sharpe Ratio †. Econometrics 2025, 13, 18. https://doi.org/10.3390/econometrics13020018
Ronn EI, Xu L. Is VIX a Contrarian Indicator? On the Positivity of the Conditional Sharpe Ratio †. Econometrics. 2025; 13(2):18. https://doi.org/10.3390/econometrics13020018
Chicago/Turabian StyleRonn, Ehud I., and Liying Xu. 2025. "Is VIX a Contrarian Indicator? On the Positivity of the Conditional Sharpe Ratio †" Econometrics 13, no. 2: 18. https://doi.org/10.3390/econometrics13020018
APA StyleRonn, E. I., & Xu, L. (2025). Is VIX a Contrarian Indicator? On the Positivity of the Conditional Sharpe Ratio †. Econometrics, 13(2), 18. https://doi.org/10.3390/econometrics13020018

