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ISPRS Int. J. Geo-Inf. 2018, 7(9), 345;

Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective—A Note on Selfish Routing Games with Cognitive Agents

Research Group Geoinformation, Institute of Geodesy, Graz University of Technology, A-8010 Graz, Austria
Department of Geography, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 1 August 2018 / Revised: 17 August 2018 / Accepted: 20 August 2018 / Published: 23 August 2018
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This paper presents an analysis of the effects of cognitive agents employing selfish routing behavior in traffic networks with linear latency functions. Selfish routing occurs when each agent traveling on a network acts in a purely selfish manner, therefore the Braess Paradox is likely to occur. The Braess Paradox describes a situation where an additional edge with positive capacity is added to a given network, which leads to higher total system delay. By applying the concept of cognitive agents, each agent is able to make a range of non-selfish and selfish decisions. In addition, each agent has to cope with uncertainty in terms of travel time information associated with the traffic system, a factor in real-world traffic networks. This paper evaluates the influence of travel time uncertainty, and possible non-selfish decisions of the agents on overall network delay. The results indicate that both non-selfish behavior and uncertainty have an influence on overall travel delay. In addition, understanding the influence of cognitive agents on delay can help to better plan and influence traffic flows resulting in “closer to optimal” flows involving overall lower delays. View Full-Text
Keywords: Braess Paradox; agent-based simulation; cognitive agents Braess Paradox; agent-based simulation; cognitive agents

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Scholz, J.; Church, R.L. Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective—A Note on Selfish Routing Games with Cognitive Agents. ISPRS Int. J. Geo-Inf. 2018, 7, 345.

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ISPRS Int. J. Geo-Inf. EISSN 2220-9964 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
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