First, we performed a descriptive analysis through mean, maximum value, minimum value, standard deviation, and correlation between each variable. The purpose of this analysis is to complete our main test, and to see the extent to which these variables differ from their mean, the maximum and minimum values of each variable. The following table represents the results of descriptive and correlational statistics between variables.
Based on
Table 2 above, we obtain information that the mean COEC measured using the CAPM model is 0.180192, with a maximum value of 4.61 and a minimum value of 0.00. The standard deviation is 0.287494. In addition to the cost of equity capital, we obtain information that the mean information asymmetry measured using Voltrade and PNSY is 0.026 and 0.85, respectively. The maximum values are 0.218 and 1.00, respectively. The minimum values are 0.003 and 0.078, respectively. The standard deviation is 0.020 and 0.16, respectively. We also obtain information on the mean ownership structure measured using institutional, public, and foreign ownerships of 0.70, 26.89, and 0.41, respectively. The maximum values are 0.99, 1.17, and 0.99, respectively. The minimum values are 0.179, 0.002, and 0.001, respectively. Standard deviation is 0.28, 0.18, and 0.18, respectively. Other information related to the mean of control variables SIZE, LEV, ROA, LogSales, and RTVOL are 6.44, 0.45, 0.038, 6.16, and 0.133, respectively. The maximum values are 7.98, 4.5, 0.92, 8.02, and 4.44, respectively. The minimum values are 4.12, 0.00, −1.216, 1.81, and 0.00, respectively. The standard deviations are 0.79, 0.295, 0.12, 0.805, and 0.313, respectively.
Table 3 provides information on correlational relationships between variables. Information asymmetry that we measured using Voltrade and PNSY, respectively, has a correlational relationship with the cost of equity capital that we measure using CAPM of 0.31 and −0.28. The ownership structures that we measured using institutional, public, and foreign ownerships has a correlational relationship with a cost of equity capital of −0.03, 0.04, and 0.0057.
Based on this data, we analyze that the correlational relationship between voltrade and the cost of equity capital is positive. According to our expectations, the higher the voltrade, the higher the cost of equity capital. The results of this study are in line with the studies of [
3,
46]. We found a negative relationship between price non-synchronization (PNSY) and cost of equity capital in our study. Ref. [
47] argued that a low
R2 reflects the poor quality of the information environment, as well as a high level of asymmetry. The higher the price non-synchronization (PNSY) number indicates a low
R2 and of course the poor quality of information and high information asymmetry. Through this measurement, our study proves that the higher the price non-synchronization (PNSY), the lower the cost of equity capital. The ownership structure that we propose through institutional, public, and foreign ownership structures in general has very little relationship with the cost of equity capital. Institutional ownership or blockholders of more than 5% can reduce the cost of equity capital. On the other hand, foreign and public ownerships in our study have a positive relationship with the cost of equity capital.
4.1. Information Asymmetry and Cost of Equity Capital
We perform tests to answer the first hypothesis. We do this test to determine the extent to which information asymmetry can increase the cost of equity capital. First we did the Breusch Pagan LM Test, and the Hausman test to choose the right model. Second, we analyzed the test results to obtain the right model. The results of the Breusch Pagan LM Test and the Hausman test obtained a significance of 0.000. Based on the result, we chose the Fixed Effect model as the appropriate model.
Based on
Table 4 we were informed that our main variable asymmetry of information that we measure using Voltrade reflect the significance of 0.0000, significant at the level of 1% with a positive direction. Meanwhile, PNYS shows that the significance of 0.0000 is significant at the 1% level in the negative direction. Almost all of our control variables showed no significance, except for the monthly stock return volatility. RTVOL shows the significance of 0.0000 or significance at the 1% level in the positive direction.
The results of this study are consistent with our expectations, that information asymmetry has a significant effect on the cost of equity capital. In this case, asymmetry can increase the cost of equity capital. These results confirm the studies conducted by [
1,
3,
4], and agency theory and pecking order theory put forward by [
26,
27]. Our results also confirm the first hypothesis that information asymmetry can increase the cost of equity capital.
Agency theory assumes that information asymmetry arises from information gap between principals and agents. This information gap occurs because one party has more information than the other party. Investors can act as principals and company management as agents. When the principal or agent has more information, information asymmetry will arise. Regarding information asymmetry, pecking order theory also assumes that a company that focuses on the capital structure of share issuance will have a high level of information asymmetry, and further drive the high cost of equity capital.
Our results indicate that the conditions of the Indonesian capital market are in line with both the agency theory and the pecking order theory. The high level of information asymmetry and the low protection of investors have boosted the high cost of equity capital in Indonesia. In addition, Indonesia is noted to have a high cost of equity capital compared to other ASEAN countries (see [
60]).
The RTVOL control variable fits our expectations. Return volatility greatly affects the cost of equity capital, and high return volatility can increase the cost of equity capital. This is consistent with [
61] that capital markets in developing countries have high volatility, high information asymmetry, high transaction costs, and lack of protection for investors. Our results provide evidence that firm size is not a variable that can control the effect of information asymmetry on the cost of equity capital. These results are not in line with the studies of [
41,
57]. The sample we analyzed provides evidence that the size of the company that we propose using the natural logarithm of total assets has no effect on the cost of equity capital. Therefore, we did additional testing by dividing the sample by the size of the company. The leverage control variable in our study also found evidence that it does not affect the cost of equity capital. The results of this study are contradictory to the studies of [
43,
44,
45]. Therefore, we also perform additional tests by framing the sample based on the level of leverage.
Our results provide paramount empirical implications. First, in an effort to address the problem of information asymmetry and the high cost of equity capital in the Indonesian and perhaps global capital markets, we recommend using a tit-for-tat approach. The tit-for-tat approach is based on retaliation, good is rewarded with kindness, and bad is rewarded with malignance. In the context of agency problems, when the company’s performance is poor, the principal as an investor will punish the agent in the form of selling shares. Conversely, when the company’s performance is good, the principal as an investor will give an award in the form of buying shares or holding them from being sold. Through this tit-for-tat approach, agency problems between the principal and the agent will be minimized because the agent will maintain their performance.
Second, the company must determine the trade-off in its capital structure. The trade-off balances the selection of sources of capital from debt and equity. The high level of choice of sources of capital from debt will risk bankruptcy. Likewise, choosing a source of capital from equity will increase the cost of equity capital. It is important in this case that the company determines the trade-off between debt and equity in a balanced manner.
4.2. Ownership Structure and Cost of Equity Capital
We conducted tests to answer the third, fourth, and fifth hypotheses. This test is conducted to determine the extent to which ownership structure affects the cost of equity capital. First, we did the Breusch Pagan LM Test, and the Hausman test to choose the right model. Second, we analyzed the test results to obtain the right model. The results of the Breusch Pagan LM Test and Hausman test obtained a significance of 0.000 and 0.0031. Based on the results, we chose the Fixed Effect model as the appropriate model.
Based on
Table 5, we obtain information that our main variables, institutional ownership and foreign ownerships, have a significant effect on the cost of equity capital that we measured using the CAPM model. The significance of institutional ownership is 0.0151, or is significant at the 1% level, and the significance of foreign ownership is 0.0761, or significant at 10%. In this test, we obtain information on the direction of the coefficient in which institutional ownership has a positive direction, which means that the ownership structure can increase the cost of equity capital. This is in line with the theory of Entrenchment Theory. The high cost of equity capital caused by excessive control from blockholders will actually cause a conflict between minority and majority shareholders, thus increasing the cost of equity capital. Our research supports the results of [
31].
Meanwhile, foreign ownership has a negative coefficient direction. This means that the higher the foreign ownership, the lower the cost of equity capital. The results of this study support the Interest Alignment Theory. Our results are also in line with the results of [
30], in which foreign ownership is more vigilant in protecting their interests than domestic investors. Ref. [
29] also argues that foreign ownership demands good governance practices, so that the health level of the company is better maintained. In the end, it will lower the cost of equity capital.
Our results also confirm the second and fourth hypotheses that we proposed, where institutional ownership and foreign ownership have an effect on the cost of equity capital. Our results prove that public ownership has no effect on the cost of equity capital. Our results also prove that we stand between the two theories we support, Entrenchment Theory and Interest Alignment Theory.
Entrenchment Theory assumes that ownership structure can increase the cost of equity capital, while Interest Alignment Theory assumes that ownership structure can reduce the cost of equity capital. In the contexts of Indonesia, the ownership structure consists of family, institutional, foreign, or public ownership. The stock market conditions in Indonesia support both theories. For the Indonesian stock market, the presence of foreign ownership can reduce the cost of equity capital. Unfortunately, foreign ownership in Indonesia has not been dominant. Only certain companies have foreign ownership structures (e.g., Astra International, Nippon Indosari Corpindo, Jakarta, Indonesia). In addition, the conditions of the Indonesian stock market also prove that the institutional ownership structure, or blockholders, will actually increase the cost of equity capital. The presence of this ownership can create conflicts between shareholders. This conflict will create high monitoring costs and ultimately increase the cost of equity capital. Unfortunately, blockholder ownership of more than 5% in Indonesia is found in almost all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. This condition is what we identify as an indicator of the high cost of equity capital in Indonesia compared to other ASEAN countries.
4.3. Sensitivity Analysis
In an effort to extend the main test, we performed additional testing. First, we divided the companies based on their total assets. Companies with total assets greater than the average were grouped in the first group, and companies below the average were in the second group. This test was carried out to see the extent to which large or small companies can affect the cost of equity capital. We performed this test to answer the fifth and sixth hypotheses. Second, we divided the companies based on their profits. Companies in the first group are companies with positive profits and the second group are companies with negative profits. We performed this test to answer the seventh and eighth hypotheses. Third, we also divided the companies based on their level of leverage. Leverage reflects the level of the company’s financial risk, the higher the leverage the higher the cost of equity capital. Companies with leverage levels above the average we group into the first group, and companies below the average we grouped into the second group. We performed this test to answer hypotheses nine and ten.
For this purpose, we compiled the following model:
Model 3:
where
COEC is the cost of equity capital that we measure using the CAPM model.
OWN is an ownership structure that we proxied through institutional ownership, public and foreign ownership.
ASYM is an information asymmetry that we proposed through Voltrade, while PNSY,
SIZE,
LEV,
ROA,
LogSales, and
RTVOL were control variables. The following
Table 6 represents the results of these additional tests. These tests are based on ordinary least square analysis.
Based on
Table 6, in companies with large or above-average company categories, we obtained information that our main variable, i.e., information asymmetry, that we measure using Voltrade and PNSY, has coefficients of 2.699815 and 0.057727, respectively, with a significance of 0.1225 and 0.8159. Meanwhile, for companies with a small or below average category, we obtained information that the main variable of information asymmetry that we measured using Voltrade and PNSY was −0.396720 and −0.629106, respectively, with a significance of 0.7132 and 0.0000 or significance at the 1 percent level. Based on that, we conclude that asymmetry for small companies greatly affects the cost of equity capital. Unlike the case for large companies, information asymmetry does not affect the cost of equity capital. We consider that large companies have a wide level of disclosure and have low information asymmetry, so that the cost of equity capital is not affected. Our research confirms the results of [
41,
57], as well as our proposed fifth hypothesis.
Table 6 also informs us that for the group with the category of large companies, the main variable of ownership structure that we measure using institutional, public and foreign ownerships has coefficients respectively at −0.643516, −0.862899, and −0.096452 with a significance of 0.3281, 0.2094, and 0.5170. Meanwhile, the small company group has a coefficient of 0.000939, 0.6250, and 0.5933, respectively, with a significance of 0.4082, 0.6250, and 0.5933, respectively. Based on this, we conclude that the ownership structure of both large and small companies does not affect the cost of equity capital. Thus, the sixth hypothesis that we put forward cannot be proven.
The second additional test was done by dividing the companies by profit. Companies in the first group are companies with positive profits and the second group are companies with negative profits. We suspect that companies with positive profits have attractiveness to investors, so they have a low cost of equity.
Table 7 below represents the test results based on this profit.
Based on
Table 7, in the negative profit group, we obtained information on the main variable of information asymmetry that we measured using Voltrade and PNSY had coefficients of 10.49489 and −0.556977, respectively, with a significance of 0.0000 and 0.0038 or significance at the 1 percent level. Meanwhile, in the positive profit group, the main variable of information asymmetry that we measured using Voltrade and PNSY had coefficients of 0.472193 and −0.520625, respectively, with a significance of 0.2968 and 0.0000, or significance at the 1 percent level. In this test we get an idea that the level of return has a significant effect on information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital. In companies with negative earnings, information asymmetry has a significant effect on the cost of equity capital. Meanwhile, companies that are classified as positive profit have relatively no effect. This means that companies with positive profits have low information asymmetry, so they do not significantly affect the cost of equity capital. It is different for companies with negative profits. These companies have high asymmetry that affects the cost of equity capital. These results also confirm our proposed seventh hypothesis.
In the ownership structure with negative earnings, we obtain information that the coefficients of institutional, public, and foreign ownerships are −0.000716, 0.005303, and 0.226314, respectively, with a significance of 0.9985, 0.2381, and 0.0913, especially for significant foreign ownership at the 10% level. Meanwhile, in the ownership structure with positive profits, we obtain information that the coefficients of institutional, public, and foreign ownerships are 0.000777, 0.000529, and −0.000381, respectively, with a significance of 0.4346, 0.5825, and 0.2340. Based on this, we conclude that in companies with negative profits, foreign ownership can affect the cost of equity capital. Foreign ownership in this case can increase the cost of equity capital. Thus, the results of this additional test contradict the studies of [
29,
30]. Our research proves that at the level of companies with negative profits, entrenchment theory is more appropriate to describe the effect of foreign ownership structures and their cost of equity capital. At the same time, our research also confirms the results of [
33,
34] and answers our proposed eighth hypothesis. Our third test divided companies based on their level of leverage. Companies with the above average leverage levels were grouped into the first group, and companies below the average were grouped into the second group. We suspect that companies that have a high degree of leverage will also have a high cost of equity capital. On the other hand, companies with a low level of leverage will have a low level of cost of equity capital.
Table 8 represents these additional tests with leverage levels.
Based on
Table 8, for the low leverage group, we obtained information on the main variable of information asymmetry that we measured using Voltrade and PNSY and had coefficients respectively of 0.462173 and −0.401525, with a significance of 0.3976 and 0.0000 or significance at the 1 percent level. Meanwhile, in the high leverage group, we obtained information that the main variable of information asymmetry that we measured using Voltrade and PNSY had coefficients of 1.630450 and −0.67474, respectively. The significance of Voltrade and PNSY is 0.0696 or significant at the 10 percent level and 0.0000 or significant at the 1 percent level, respectively. Based on this, we conclude that information asymmetry affects companies with high levels of leverage. This is in line with the studies of [
43,
44,
45]. Companies with a high degree of leverage also reflect a high level of risk. The results of these tests also confirm our proposed ninth hypothesis.
Table 8 also provides another main variable, i.e., ownership structure. In the low leverage group, we obtained information on ownership structure measured using institutional ownership, public ownership, and foreign ownership at coefficients of 0.000318, 7.31 × 10
−5, and −0.000145, respectively, with a significance of 0.8299, 0.9620, and 0.7309. While in the high leverage group, the coefficients are 0.001144, 0.000593, and −0.000405, respectively, with a significance of 0.4309. Based on these results, we conclude that the ownership structure at both low and high leverage levels has no effect on the cost of equity capital. Leverage in our research sample, if it is related to ownership structure, has no effect on the size of the cost of equity capital. These results simultaneously reject our proposed tenth hypothesis.