A Survey on Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in the Communications of the Smart Grid
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Related Surveys
- Kawoosa et al. [6] offer a comprehensive survey of types of attacks and classify them;
- Guduz et al. [7] also classify the attacks and explain the fundamentals of the cyber security in the smart grid;
- Kotut et al. [8] focus on the entire grid, instead of specific components;
- Rawat et al. [9] include a section about challenges and future research directions;
- Komninos et al. [10] focus on issues related to the security of the smart grid and the smart home;
- Yan et al. [11] explore the challenges for a communication infrastructure as part of a complex smart grid system; since this might have millions of consumers and devices, the demand for its reliability and security is highly critical;
- Baig et al. [12] perform a classification according to the different communication layers;
- Wang et al. [13] provide several clear objectives and requirements in the smart grid and an assessment of the security threats.
3. IEC 61850
- Flexibility: the standard has been designed to support different services with different performance requirements;
- Configurability: substation configuration language (SCL) is used to describe the substation’s network and the services offered by all the devices;
- Interoperability: devices from different vendors can provide any service needed in the scope of a substation, which reduces configuration time and reliability issues.
- OSI layer-2 messages with stringent time requirements considered as real-time traffic — process and bus level;
- OSI layer-3 and higher messages with low or no time requirements — station level.
4. Time-Sensitive Networking: The Interoperable Deterministic Ethernet Standard
5. Security Threats in Substation Automation Systems
- Denial of service: IED is virtually disconnected from the network since it cannot send or receive Ethernet frames;
- Spoofing: IED can be physically or virtually spoofed to send erroneous commands or status events to other devices in the network;
- Unauthorized access: IED is accessed by an attacker to modify its configuration or its behavior, or to obtain sensitive data that can compromise the device or the substation;
- Data interception: critical data are intercepted to obtain information about the devices or the substation;
- Man-in-the-middle: communications between IEDs and monitoring systems are intercepted and modified by an attacker to pretend that the attacker is one of the end nodes of the communication;
- Stepping stone: an attacker compromises an IED and takes control of it to launch a logical attack on other IEDs or devices in the network.
- Interruption of monitoring system: IED cannot receive data from MUs or other IEDs, data are corrupted, or it cannot process them as expected;
- Denial of service to control system: IED cannot send control commands to circuit breakers or protection devices, or an attacker has modified its operation;
- Interruption of protection communication: protection device cannot receive commands from IEDs;
- Undesirable protection operation: protection device receives fake commands, or it does not respond accordingly;
- Network interruption: devices in the substation are unable to communicate with each other. This represents a high-risk situation for the integrity of the facility and the service provided;
- Synchronization tampering: control center receives wrongly time-stamped data, which may source false alarms or hide true ones.
6. Time-Sensitive Networking and Security
6.1. Secure IEEE 1588 Precise Time Protocol
6.2. Wire-Speed Cryptography for Real-Time Traffic
7. IEC Security Standards
8. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Glossary
ASCI | Abstract Communication Service Interface |
ASN.1 | Abstract Syntax Notation One |
AVB | Audio Video Bridging |
CDC | Common Data Classes |
DER | Distributed Energy Resources |
DoS | Denial of Service |
GOOSE | Generic Object Oriented Substation Events |
GSE | Generic Substation Events |
GSSE | Generic Substation State Events |
HSR | High-availability Seamless Redundancy |
ICS | Industrial Control Systems |
IEC | International Electrotechnical Commission |
IED | Intelligent Electronic Devices |
IT | Information Technology |
LAN | Local Area Network |
MMS | Messaging Specification |
MU | Merging Units |
NSM | Network and System Management |
OSI | Open Systems Interconnection |
OT | Operational Technologies |
PRP | Parallel Redundancy Protocol |
PTP | Precise Time Protocol |
RBAC | Role-Based Access Control |
SAS | Substation-Automation-Systems |
SCL | Substation Configuration Language |
SCSM | Specific Communication Service Mapping |
SMV | Sampled Measured Value |
SV | Sampled Value |
TSN | Time-Sensitive Networking |
WAN | Wide Area Network |
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Standard | Description | Status |
---|---|---|
IEEE 802.1Q | forwarding and transmission mechanisms and reservation protocols | base standard—pub. in 2018 |
IEEE 802.1AB | specifying the link recovery protocols | base standard—pub. in 2016 |
IEEE 802.1AS | time synchronization for TSN | base standard—pub. in 2020 |
IEEE 802.1AX | link aggregation to increase the throughput | base standard—pub. in 2014 |
802IEEE 802.1CB | frame replication and elimination for reliability | base standard—pub. in 2017 |
IEEE 802.1CM | mechanisms to enable TSN for Fronthaul | base standard—pub. in 2018 |
P802.1CS | link-local registration protocol | ongoing |
P802.1CQ | multi-cast addressing and local address allocation | ongoing |
P802.1DC | provisioning of quality of service in the network | ongoing |
P802.1DF | the profile for TSN service providers | ongoing |
P802.1DG | automotive in-vehicle communication | ongoing |
IEEE 802.1Qbu | frame preemption support | 2016—IEEE 802.1Q-2018 |
IEEE 802.1Qbv | enhancements for scheduled traffic | 2015—IEEE 802.1Q-2018 |
IEEE 802.1Qca | path control and reservation | 2015—IEEE 802.1Q-2018 |
IEEE 802.1Qav | forwarding and queuing enhancements for time-sensitive streams | 2009—IEEE 802.1Q-2018 |
IEEE 802.1Qch | cyclic queuing and forwarding | 2017—IEEE 802.1Q-2018 |
IEEE 802.1Qcc | SRP enhancements and performance improvements | 2018—IEEE 802.1Q-2018 |
IEEE 802.1Qci | per-stream filtering and policing | 2017—IEEE 802.1Q-2018 |
IEEE 802.1Qat | stream reservation protocol (SRP) | 2010—IEEE 802.1Q-2018 |
Application | Message Type | Time Requirement |
---|---|---|
Fast Messages | GOOSE | ≤3 ms |
GSSEs | ≤10 ms | |
Raw Data | SV | ≤3 ms |
Medium-Speed Messages | MMS | ≤100 ms |
Low-Speed Messages | MMS | ≤500 ms |
Time Synchronization | IEEE 1588 | >500 ms |
File Transfer | MMS | >500 ms |
Network Layer | Attack Type |
---|---|
Application Layer | CPU Exhausting, LDoS, HTTP Flooding, Protocol, Stack Buffer Overflow, Data Injection Attacks |
Transport Layer | IP Spoofing, Packet Sniffing, Wormhole, Data Injection, Traffic Flooding, Buffer Flooding, Buffer Overflow, DoS/DDoS, MITM, Covert Attack, Replay Attack |
MAC Layer | Traffic Analysis, Masquerading, ARP Spoofing, MITM, TSA, MAC DoS Attack, Flooding attacks, Jamming Attack |
Physical Layer | Eavesdropping, Smart Meter, Tampering Attacks, TSA, Jamming Attacks |
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Lázaro, J.; Astarloa, A.; Rodríguez, M.; Bidarte, U.; Jiménez, J. A Survey on Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in the Communications of the Smart Grid. Electronics 2021, 10, 1881. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10161881
Lázaro J, Astarloa A, Rodríguez M, Bidarte U, Jiménez J. A Survey on Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in the Communications of the Smart Grid. Electronics. 2021; 10(16):1881. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10161881
Chicago/Turabian StyleLázaro, Jesús, Armando Astarloa, Mikel Rodríguez, Unai Bidarte, and Jaime Jiménez. 2021. "A Survey on Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in the Communications of the Smart Grid" Electronics 10, no. 16: 1881. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10161881
APA StyleLázaro, J., Astarloa, A., Rodríguez, M., Bidarte, U., & Jiménez, J. (2021). A Survey on Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures in the Communications of the Smart Grid. Electronics, 10(16), 1881. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10161881