Contract Mechanisms for Value-Based Technology Adoption in Healthcare Systems
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Methodology and Review Design
- Narrative Reviews
- Aim to interpret, critique, and contextualize literature across broader themes;
- Use flexible and diverse methodologies (e.g., conceptual synthesis and expert judgment);
- Suited for exploring under-defined or complex issues where integration of ideas is critical;
- May involve subjective interpretation but offer deeper conceptual insights.
- Scope and purpose
- Analyze the implications of adopting innovative health technologies and their potential to both mitigate and exacerbate inefficiencies;
- Explore inefficiencies in healthcare systems, including waste, overuse, underuse, misuse, and high spending;
- Examine various types of contract mechanisms and evaluate their potential to facilitate the integration of new technologies while minimizing operational inefficiencies.
- Source Selection
- Limitations
3. Literature Review
- Value in Healthcare Delivery
- Technology as a Double-Edged Sword
- Technology-Driven Spending and Its Consequences
- Overuse in healthcare technology
- Moral hazard as a driver of overuse
- Supplier-induced demand and overuse
- Misuse
- Waste
- Administrative complexity and its consequences in operations management
- Consequences of overuse, waste, and misuse in healthcare systems
- Underuse
- The impact of payments on inefficiencies in healthcare technology adoption
- Payment reform through contract mechanisms for value-oriented technology adoption
- Fee for service as the most common payment model driving inefficiencies in healthcare systems
- Stakeholder risks and inefficiencies in technology use under fee for service
- Case example: artificial intelligence-based diagnostic tools and value realization in practice
- Transitioning from fee-for-service to value-based payments through alternative contract mechanisms
- Performance-based contracting to align incentives with value
- Case example: performance-based contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Promoting high-value care through population- and episode-based payments
- Case example: population-based contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Case example: episode-based contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under cost-sharing contracts
- Case example: cost-sharing contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Differentiated payment mechanisms for sustainable technology adoption
- Case example: differentiated payment contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under firm fixed-price contracts
- Case example: firm fixed-price contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under fixed-price contracts with an incentive fee
- Case example: fixed-price contracts with an incentive fee for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustment
- Case example: fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustment for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under time and materials contracts
- Case example: time and materials contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts
- Case example: indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under wholesale price contracts
- Case example: wholesale price contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under repurchase contracts
- Case example: repurchase contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under revenue-sharing contracts
- Case example: revenue-sharing contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under quantity flexibility contracts
- Case example: quantity flexibility contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under refund contracts
- Case example: refund contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under quantity reduction contracts
- Case example: quantity reduction contracts for AI-driven diagnostics
- Stakeholder perspectives on technology use under service-level agreements
- Case example: contracts with service-level agreements for AI-driven diagnostics
- Other Reform Strategies
4. Conclusions and Future Work
- Future work
Funding
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Aspect | Systematic Review | Narrative Review |
---|---|---|
Purpose | Comprehensive, reproducible search | Thematic, conceptual exploration |
Keyword Selection | Data-driven: extracted from prior studies, pilot searches, and indexing terms | Author-driven: based on researcher expertise, guiding framework, and topic focus |
Transparency | Requires an explicit search strategy (e.g., Boolean logic, databases, or inclusion/exclusion) | The reasoning must still be explained, even when flexibility and expert judgment are applied |
Reviewer’s Role | Minimal influence; aims to reduce bias | Interpretive: reviewers synthesize and interpret existing knowledge |
Contract Mechanism | Patient Risk | Provider Risk | Technology Supplier Risk | Government/Payer Risk |
---|---|---|---|---|
Fee for Service | High | Low | Low | High |
Performance-Based | Low | Moderate | High | Low |
Population-Based Payment | Moderate | High | Moderate | Low |
Episode-Based (Bundled) Payment | Low | High | Moderate | Moderate |
Cost Sharing | Low | Moderate | High | Moderate |
Differentiated Payment | Low | Moderate | High | Moderate |
Firm Fixed Price | Moderate | High | High | Low |
Fixed Price with Incentive Fee | Low | Moderate | Moderate | Low |
Fixed Price with Economic Adjustment | Low | Moderate | Moderate | Low |
Time and Materials | Moderate | Low | Moderate | High |
Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity | Low | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
Wholesale Price | Moderate | Low | Low | Moderate |
Repurchase | Low | Low | High | Low |
Revenue Sharing | Moderate | Moderate | High | Moderate |
Quantity Flexibility | Low | Low | Moderate | Low |
Refund | Low | Low | High | Low |
Quantity Reduction | Low | Low | Moderate | Low |
Service-Level Agreement | Low | Moderate | High | Low |
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Teymourifar, A. Contract Mechanisms for Value-Based Technology Adoption in Healthcare Systems. Systems 2025, 13, 655. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13080655
Teymourifar A. Contract Mechanisms for Value-Based Technology Adoption in Healthcare Systems. Systems. 2025; 13(8):655. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13080655
Chicago/Turabian StyleTeymourifar, Aydin. 2025. "Contract Mechanisms for Value-Based Technology Adoption in Healthcare Systems" Systems 13, no. 8: 655. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13080655
APA StyleTeymourifar, A. (2025). Contract Mechanisms for Value-Based Technology Adoption in Healthcare Systems. Systems, 13(8), 655. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13080655