1. Introduction
The United Nations 2030 SDGs Agenda is an ambitious social program initiative which provides a shared vision for ending poverty and inequality, achieving global peace and prosperity, and preserving the planet. The success of the Agenda is heavily dependent on implementation by all member countries, global partnerships, and substantial financial resources. The Agenda evokes optimism. However, several years into its implementation, the SDGs are in deep trouble. Agenda 2030 has been derailed by the COVID-19 pandemic and prior, new, and emerging issues and concerns [
1]. Some of these include war and conflict in many parts of the world, increasing human rights violations and suffering, and political infighting within powerful governments. These events have diverted attention from this global initiative and severely undermined and threatened its core objective. According to the United Nations [
2], the world is on track to achieve only 15% of 140 SDGs targets reviewed (out of 169 in total). The level of commitment to the Agenda by many countries is also a matter of concern. Munro’s [
3] review of 170 national development plans (NDP) published between 2016 and 2021 highlights that only about 40% mentioned Agenda 2030 or the SDGs. The review also highlighted that many NDPs showed no interconnectedness between the goals and did not promote the Agenda or the SDGs in a prominent place. Additionally, several criticisms have been leveled against the Agenda including: the hegemonic nature of the agenda that reproduces “a universal template grounded in western and neoliberal ideology” [
4] (p. 1) which poorer countries are obliged to embrace given their dependency on western aid and finance, its highly unrealistic timelines [
5,
6], its unrealistic and too ambitious scope [
7], its very high bar making it too hard to achieve [
8], and its many conceptual design weaknesses [
5,
9].
Given the current polycrisis and a world which looks remarkably different since the Agenda was initially conceptualized, courageous reflection, fresh rethinking, and a revised timeline are now needed. The goals related to the elimination of poverty, inequality, and hunger, as well as those focused on promoting more equitable economic growth, environmental protection, and improved health and economic well-being are all in jeopardy [
10]. Goal 16 which focuses on peace and justice, and Goal 17 which should provide solutions to help achieve Goal 16 and other goals are also less than effective. Unless speedy, compassionate, transformational, and innovative thinking and policy action are urgently applied, the contradictions within the Agenda’s goals are addressed, and important changes are made to the manner in which certain goals are to be achieved, the likelihood of achieving the Agenda is highly limited. Attention needs now to be turned to the necessary adjustments to the Agenda that are required given our post COVID-19 financial realities, the global turbulence that abounds, the importance of leaving no one behind, the realization of the disproportionate human, social, and economic costs affecting people belonging to the most vulnerable groups in society, and the inequitable impact of power dynamics at the global level.
Recalibrating the Agenda will not be an easy task by any means. However, the pandemic has clearly shown that radical and quick proactive policy action is possible. Moreover, important lessons have emerged from the pandemic that requires thoughtful and serious reflection on the general nature of the Agenda’s objectives. In moving forward, difficult, and controversial questions must be addressed such as: Will necessary adjustments be made to the Agenda? What type of commitment is needed to ensure that no one is left behind and will the most powerful and wealthy nations yield to the call? How are war, conflict, and global turbulence affecting the core values embedded in the Agenda? Can new forms of funding that provide more power to the private sector and increase the indebtedness of countries help resolve the funding crunch without compromising the Agenda’s social and equality-related objectives? Can global warming really be controlled or is this simply a pipe dream? Is it fair for developing countries to spend financial resources (especially those borrowed at high costs) to advance changes in certain goals (e.g., climate change), while richer and more powerful countries and corporations undermine those efforts (e.g., deforestation, over-consumption of luxury products that pollute and destroy our environment).
This paper examines the challenges associated with the implementation of the Agenda in a post COVID-19 era and in an era where democratic backsliding is occurring all over the world, illiberalism is on the rise, including in developed countries, and social protection mechanisms are being dismantled. It offers ideas on what changes can be made to deal with these conceptual weaknesses, how they can be achieved, who can help spearhead these changes, and how a country’s policy space can be protected and used to respond to many of the crises identified in this paper. The paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 provides context by offering a brief overview on Agenda 2030, summarizes the impact of COVID-19 on the global economy, and explains the integral interlinkages and interrelationships between Agenda 2030 and Planetary Health.
Section 3 examines the challenges impeding the Agenda, namely, the epistemological and ideological framework underpinning the SDGs, the conceptual weaknesses with the SDGs targets and indicators, access to financial resources, data collection deficits, the importance of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) for the SDGs, the impact of exogenous and ecological shocks on development efforts, the democratic pressures in western countries and their impact on global equity, and the realism of the Agenda’s timeline.
Section 4 provides ideas on the changes that can be undertaken, at what level this can be achieved, and by whom.
3. Challenges Impeding Agenda 2030
3.1. Epistemological and Ideological Framework Underpinning the SDGs
Compared to the MDGs, the development of the SDGs involved a considerably more inclusive and collaborative approach with participants from the United Nations, the public, private, and civil sectors, and international financial institutions. Unfortunately, while more inclusive, the consultation process was very limited in time, including the feedback of actors who were not very critical of the overall approach when developing the Agenda, and excluded most of the feedback that was considered too critical [
9]. In essence, the consultation process was limited to ideas that were pre-established by specific actors. Moreover, the inclusion of the private sector in this initiative, while important, was also very selective. The private sector actors at the discussion table were not sufficiently representative in terms of geographical location nor in terms of sectors [
30]. Specifically, this group was predominantly represented by Western transnational companies, who significantly influenced the discussions [
31,
32]. These actors were therefore able to promote technological advancements without discussing tradeoffs [
30], which is highly problematic for an Agenda geared at leaving no one behind. Moreover, the “Pay to Play” approach that was used by the United Nations in developing this Agenda has unfortunately privileged big corporations and rich private sector actors that are mostly based in the West [
33]. The heavy dependence on economic actors, in particular large corporations, introduces a worrying dimension that the MDGs did not have, at least officially. It has also led to the inclusion of financing approaches like blended financing—the combining of grants and private equity to fund SDG-related initiatives—that are meant to cover funding shortages but that also privilege financial success and financial markets over social aspects of development [
34,
35].
Furthermore, this privileging of Western actors from developed countries was not limited to private sector actors. Similar dynamics played out between international Western-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and foundations and local NGOs and civil society groups [
33]. The final outcome of the discourse or arguments brought forth by many of the international NGOs during the design phase were more based on their ideological and epistemological views, agendas, and objectives than on those belonging to non-Western NGOs [
9].
The Agenda also does not attempt to address the structural factors that have led to a significant disequilibrium between developed and developing countries and within developing countries as it relates to macroeconomic stability and entrenched poverty [
32,
36]. While the Agenda applies to developed countries, measures that ensure that developed countries are held to account, are committed to making the necessary changes in their relationship with the developing countries and undertake the necessary actions to eliminate the burdens and inefficiencies present in their aid systems continue to be very weak and limited [
37]. As such, the majority of the responsibility for the achievement of the Agenda’s goals have been placed on the developing countries’ governments and very few mechanisms have been established to hold donors and developed countries to account. In essence, the Agenda recognizes the impact of external factors on countries, especially from an economic, environmental, and aid perspectives, but this recognition does not extend to the need for structural change and to the accountability of external players in the achievement of these goals within a country in question.
With these critiques, it can be observed that the process of developing the SDGs Agenda and the resulting Agenda itself is inherently imbalanced and does very little to limit the use of this power disequilibrium for the benefit of the most powerful and those greatly benefiting from the international economic system. Power imbalances continue to weigh heavily on the development and policy space of governments in developing countries.
3.2. Conceptual Weaknesses with the SDGs Targets and Indicators
Analysis of the Agenda highlights several challenges and conceptual weaknesses:
(1) The Agenda’s scope is quite extensive with too many items and inadequate content for each [
7]. This is overwhelming countries with the sheer volume of data collection. The Agenda is thus more idealistic than practical for the majority of developing countries who are financially constrained. Moreover, it is currently in a bad state as progress has been directly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, climate issues, global inflation, increases in the price of grains and basic food products, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Gaza conflict, and the war in Sudan, to name a few. With only five years remaining, all SDGs are off track [
38].
(2) Data for Tier 1 indicators are only being regularly produced by about half of the signatories to the Agenda, data for Tier 2 indicators are irregularly produced, and Tier 3 indicators are essentially evolving [
39]. This again ties back to the sheer scope of the Agenda and the financial realities globally.
(3) The majority of the indicators are quantitative with only five being capable of collecting qualitative data. This is quite problematic since qualitative indicators provide rich insight to better understand a situation [
9]. The dilemma of course is that qualitative indicators are much more expensive in comparison to quantitative indicators.
(4) Many of the indicators are not specific and are likely to create measurement problems. This will have a domino effect on accountability [
40].
(5) Several indicators are duplicated which raise questions about the quality of the indicator, sensitivity to the action taken, and soundness of measurement with respect to the target [
9].
(6) Many targets and indicators are constructed with wording in the negative rather than positive (e.g.,
treat rather than
prevent,
reduce deaths rather than
save lives) which is troubling [
9].
(7) Adjectives such as
substantial,
relevant,
quality, and
sound were used in many targets. While this permits flexibility and adaptability at the national level, it simultaneously creates measurement problems with respect to global comparisons as the adjectives are subject to different interpretations [
9]. The lack of standardization of adjectives provides significant hurdles for proper measurement and comparisons. Additionally, the color-coding system used to create dashboards in the SDGs annual progress reports uses a combination of colors and adjective descriptors. However, two adjective descriptors, namely, significant (orange) and major (red) are, in effect, synonyms for each other, thus again highlighting potential issues that could occur with measurement. Accordingly, the statement made by the United Nations Secretary-General [
16] namely, that progress on 50 per cent of the targets is weak/insufficient, and only 12 per cent are on track, may not necessarily be accurate.
(8) Only 31% of the targets have two indicators (n = 53 out 169). The majority—63%—have only one indicator (n = 107 out 169). This inherent design weakness is concerning as it does not permit data triangulation [
9].
(9) Several targets carry multiple results statements which is problematic, and which will likely decrease the quality of measurements, comparisons, and accountability [
9]
(10) Setting targets for some 15+ years in advance is quite risky as the future is unknown. Those conceptualizing the Agenda could not have envisioned that our world would change in such a fundamental way with COVID-19, the Russia-Ukraine war, and Israel-Gaza war. According to Kuest and Rist [
41], targets should not exceed a timeframe of more than 4 years.
(11) Several big picture promises are weakened by small picture promises [
9]. For instance, Goal 8.6 talks about reducing youth unemployment when Goal 8.5 has already talked about full and productive employment for all including the youth.
(12) Making the Agenda voluntary and country led permits wealthier and more powerful countries to opt out of the agreement since these countries are generally not dependent on aid. Case in point is the United States who has “shown very little commitment to the SDGs” [
38] (p.11), has not produced a single voluntary national review to date, and has not achieved a single SDG [
38].
3.3. Access to Financial Resources
Success in implementing the SDGs Agenda is heavily dependent on financial resources. However, developing countries were already cash strapped prior to the pandemic and the pandemic, coupled with constant and emerging global turbulence, will worsen the economic plight in these countries. The situation with inadequate infrastructure to collect evidence-based data and obtain baseline data will therefore not be rectified. Moreover, most developing countries simply do not have the fiscal space or latitude to finance emergency responses, much less tap market financing because of low market creditworthiness [
13]. Yet, within the design of the Agenda, countries must take ownership of its implementation. To support financially strapped and/or capacity strapped developing countries in this initiative, international institutions have been asked to provide financial support [
42]. However, this directly increases countries’ indebtedness [
43] and limits their policy space [
44]. There have also been calls for the inclusion of blended finance to help support the financing of the SDGs. Donors, multi-lateral institutions, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as multilateral and regional banks have presented blended finance, or the blending of grants with private equity and concessionary loans, as a solution for the cash-strapped SDGs. While several have noted the benefits of such financing [
45] (among others), research has demonstrated the limited ability of blended finance to support sustainable development, especially in the long run. Some of the limitations of blended finance have been associated with high risks due to levels of indebtedness, wars, climate change, market fluctuations, limited markets, economic shocks, weak regulatory environments, governance challenges, capacity constraints, and fluctuating currencies [
34,
45,
46]. These risks play an important role in the flow of finance even when multilateral banks and development financial institutions provide guarantees and support. For example, Kim and Jun [
45] assess the impact of the Lucas Paradox on the flow of finance and find that even with the support from multilateral banks and other financial institutions, finance emanating from blended processes that include action to minimize the risk for private actors tends to flow mostly from rich countries to other rich countries, with somewhat limited funding going to middle-income countries. As such, these flows tend to leave out low-income countries, lower middle-income countries, and the poor in general [
34,
45].
Other criticisms levied on the concept and approach of using blended finance to minimize the funding gap has to do with the financialization of societies and of social aspects of life. Critics have demonstrated that the blended finance approach tends to favor financial success over contributions to development [
34,
47], allow the investor the power to identify the problem and the relevant solutions [
35,
48], adapt solutions to the rules of the financial market and to profit maximization rather than to the achievement of the SDGs [
35,
49], focus on short-term gains rather than systemic transformations for sustainable development [
35], focus on attracting investment rather than focusing on the poor and the planet [
48], and remove the state from the responsibility of providing services to its people [
48], thus impacting its legitimacy [
50]. More crucially, critics have also noted the disconnect between the developing countries requesting public forms of financing (rather than debts and loans) and the developed countries pushing for blended finance, including concessionary aid [
49]. Finally, some critics, like Ronal [
47] and Mah [
51] have noted the increasing link between the choice of blended finance and the global strategic interests (economic and political) of those promoting and partially funding it.
This trend towards blended finance, while helpful in adding much-needed initial funds to initiatives, raises very important concerns. These concerns go beyond the details related to the functioning of blended finance. They demonstrate a contradiction with the liberal ideology behind the SDGs, the focus on poverty reduction, the focus on legitimacy and good governance, and the focus on inclusion and inclusive growth. The gains in the realization of the weaknesses in trickle-down economics seem to have been forgotten by the ardent promoters of blended finance. Ultimately, placing the onus for ownership of the Agenda on each country without consideration of its developing status and the country’s economic realities essentially suggests that any failure is the responsibility of the country in question. In doing so, it ignores important context, namely, that nearly all developing countries are integrated into the international economic system and are often at the receiving end of the actions of large corporations, more powerful countries, and the international financial system. The assumption that developing countries can implement this momentous Agenda on their own without adjustment of the inherent disequilibrium and power dynamics in the global system is thus quite flawed. The countries and the people that need this social intervention the most will continuously be lagging with respect to implementation, unless important conversations, rethinking, and reconceptualization happen regarding ways to advance the Agenda.
3.4. Data Collection Deficits
The success of Agenda 2030 relies heavily on credible evidence to inform decision-making [
52]. Specifically, it requires knowing more about people’s lives so that decision-making can be strategically leveraged, and policy initiatives prioritized [
9,
53] so that a country’s financial resources can be deployed for the best configuration of activities to advance its economic development, whilst simultaneously working towards the SDGs. This necessitates that proper national statistical systems be set up at the country level to monitor and track progress on the SDGs. Targets 17.18 and 17.19 explicitly speak to this issue [
13]. Such systems are essential so that decision-making can be based on credible, consistent, and comparable statistics for the SDGs [
54]. However, several years into the Agenda, serious data gaps with respect to country coverage and disaggregation, as well as timeliness of data collection, remain challenging and are affecting compilation of metadata [
2]. Additionally, data collection to support Agenda 2030 is often not seen as a national priority in many instances [
55]. Data on Tier 11 indicators which represent more than 40% of the total SDG indicators are also not being regularly produced by many countries [
56], thus again affecting effective measurement of progress on the Agenda.
Presently, the International Labour Office acts as a custodian agency reporting to the United Nations on 14 of the SDG indicators [
54]. In addition, the World Bank has developed a statistical performance index (SPI) with five pillars, namely, (1) data use, (2) data services, (3) data products, (4) data sources, and (5) data infrastructure. However, statistical capacity varies considerably across the globe and access to high quality and credible data remains a global concern even among the top 30 OECD countries who are still experiencing challenges with pillars (3) and (4) [
13]. Thus, although the SPI is very useful, more futuristic policy trackers are still needed. The pandemic also jeopardized and exacerbated the challenges with data collection on the SDGs. Field data collection was severely disrupted, limiting monthly and quarterly statistical reporting [
2]. Concurrently, important lessons have also been learnt, namely, the many health systems are not real-time, important health statistic definitions are not standardized, and better collaboration is needed to fully understand how issues such as employment and income affect health [
13].
3.5. The Importance of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) for the SDGs
Globally, the use of M&E in the public sector is still rather limited. Several issues are affecting the development of an M&E culture, the two most important being fear that M&E may reveal bad management practices and highlight corruption, along with the lack of financial resources needed to nurture and sustain such systems [
1,
14,
57,
58]. In the context of the SDGs, it is particularly important to develop appropriate country-led M&E frameworks [
55] since M&E are critical tools needed for preparation of countries’ voluntary national reviewers which are a mandatory periodic national reporting requirement. Monitoring is essential for tracking ongoing progress in program implementation, outputs, and outcomes [
59], while evaluation is important to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, and equity of progress [
60], along with merit, worth, and significance of national policies and programs and to probe results achieved [
61]. However, countries are still reeling from the blow of COVID-19, and new world crises and shocks are also contributing to their financial distress. As such, it is unlikely that they be able to spend scarce financial resources at this time on strengthening national statistical systems or institutionalizing M&E, in lieu of other national priorities [
14]. Moreover, the challenges brought forth by blended finance, the difficulties associated with investor-led definition of the problem and of solutions, the focus on short-term results, and the challenges that blended finance has faced in quantifying and measuring developmental impact [
46] raises significant concerns for M&E. Still, Agenda 2030 cannot advance without proper and adequate M&E. As such, countries are confronted with a difficult quandary—trying to implement a momentous Agenda and simultaneously putting the systems in place that are needed to collect evidence-based data and perform M&E.
3.6. Impact of Exogenous and Ecological Shocks on Development Efforts
Shocks—are for the most part—events beyond control. They are also inevitable. They often affect countries disproportionately and depending on the magnitude and severity, they can hamper recovery efforts. At best, countries can only try to minimize impacts by learning from previous lessons and incorporating these lessons into visionary proactive strategic planning aimed at building resilience and sustainability to better withstand and cope with the detrimental effects that most shocks unleash on a country’s economy and its populace. Shocks have many negative macroeconomic consequences impacting variables such as GDP and investor confidence. They can also trigger other negative consequences. For instance, COVID-19 triggered high unemployment, increased dependence on state welfare, depleted personal life savings, and considerably exacerbated the mental health condition of citizens because of uncertainty about the future, grief, and suffering [
53]. It also had several cross-border spillover effects that would have been felt by countries that relied heavily on tourism, trade, and commodity exports. The financial distress of countries may also be worsened when countries are exposed to multiple shocks simultaneously. For example, many geological events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, fires, and volcano eruptions occurred together with COVID-19 placing additional strain on already weakened and fragile country economies. These issues added to the economic despair of countries, exacerbating poverty and inequality [
62].
3.7. Democratic Pressures in Western Countries and Their Impact on Global Equity
Countries with democratic political systems and cultures are believed to be more just than other governance systems, especially when highlighting the experience of vulnerable groups and minorities. Democratic institutions are also considered to be accountable and inclusive, two prerequisites for several of the SDGs. Moreover, democratic systems are believed to be the springboard from which global governance can be democratized [
63]. They can also “improve the lives of citizens within the supposedly more malleable world of the state but ameliorate the conditions of the weak within world society as a whole” [
64] (p.14). In essence, democratic governance systems at the local, regional, and international levels are believed to lead to more just and equitable environments and are the bedrock for achieving the SDGs.
However, one of the lessons that the COVID-19 pandemic has taught us quite clearly is that issues of global equity sometimes rub up against issues of economic and political power in Western democratic countries, as was evidenced when several wealthier countries focused on vaccination of their own citizens, rather than sharing vaccines with the rest of the world. In rebuttal to global criticism, the reasoning offered by country leaders was based on their perceived primary responsibility towards their citizens, the same citizens that have the power through voting mechanisms to either elect them or to remove them from office. Several countries started supporting the COVAX process only after they felt that they had achieved their national objective or that they had come close to achieving their national objective [
65]. This again highlights the global politics of powerful nations that are often at play. Unfortunately, we see these same dynamics in the discussions related to the environment. For example, the protection of economic power and the protection of the economic well-being of people who depend on the fossil fuel industry have significantly affected the willingness of several world leaders to take a tough stance on the environment and the fossil fuel industry.
Politicians see their careers as depending on at least an important percentage of the population’s satisfaction with their policies. The test comes periodically and these politicians who operate within a democratic system will have to answer their constituents. In doing so, they will have to place the priorities of these constituents ahead of that of voluntary global agreements and of more ethical and moral actions at the international level. Moreover, this need to respond to their constituents can also affect how much they are willing to protect the power of their country and their citizen companies and organizations, and thus the success of initiatives that attempt to remove power dynamics and power plays, and that attempt to work on more equitable global economic, social, financial, and political systems. Stepping away from a utopian or romanticized view of the link between democracies at the national level and global equity is key to re-evaluating the philosophical underpinnings of the SDGs. Moreover, there needs to be more accountability demanded of the more powerful countries and systems set in place to hold them to account in a meaningful manner. Doing so can help introduce some form of equitability that is immune to feel good politics and to statements that tend to reiterate values, commitments, and world saviorism through development aid while ignoring the country’s own negative contribution to equitable development.
3.8. Realism of the 2030 Timeline
The projected timeline of Agenda 2030 has been criticized for being unrealistic and overly ambitious given the complexity and scope of the Agenda, and the financial, technical, and human resources needed to pragmatically achieve the Agenda’s vision. More than halfway through the timeline, much of the progress achieved prior to the pandemic has been derailed and financial resources which are the key to successful implementation and realization of the Agenda are in scarce supply. By definition, sustainable development seeks to ensure that development is maintained over time. However, current reporting efforts on the SDGs do not actually focus on this aspect but rather on progress made towards individual goals. The interlinkages between the goals and the time dimension in terms of impact has also not been properly conceptualized, demonstrating once more the negligence of the longer-term. Further, although the Agenda has a timeline of 2030, country policies often do not reflect this timeline [
6], thus pointing to a disconnect between the Agenda and commitment to the Agenda. At this juncture, the United Nations and all its partners must pause and reflect thoughtfully and honestly on the accomplishments to date and critically analyze if the initial vision and strategy as imagined is really working. A revised timeline is urgently needed—one that takes account of the financial realities that exist, the current world turbulence, the timelines needed for policy legislation, realistic timelines for implementation of the Agenda with built in contingency planning and potential risk mitigation strategies, and a timeline that actually integrates the fundamental concept of sustainability (i.e., the future) into the equation. As currently framed, the Agenda makes the flawed assumption that all goals can be realized in the same time frame. However, different types of projects have very different timelines. For instance, trees, which are critical for environmental preservation, take decades to grow, while crops for food security can be obtained in a few months. Treating all goals in a similar manner is thus highly unrealistic and does not align with the basic underlying logic needed for project design and implementation. Agenda 2030 is a noble initiative and in our world of chaos this initiative is welcomed. However, snapshot progress is not sustainable. This unfortunately appears to be the trend now.
In conclusion, this section has identified eight major challenges that are impeding progress on Agenda 2030 (see
Table 1). The challenges discussed in this section are by no means exhaustive. It should be noted that the challenges summarized in
Table 1 are in the identical order as discussed in this section. Given that every challenge presents itself differently in different circumstances, it would be impossible and ill-advised to attempt to rank these challenges according to a universal valuation system.
4. Moving Forward
Section 3 highlighted several challenges that are undermining the success of Agenda 2030. With the 2030 timeline fast approaching, inadequate progress has been made and progress already gained has been derailed by COVID-19 and other world events. At this time, the Agenda is in deep trouble. Of paramount importance are honest reflections and fresh conversations to reevaluate the philosophical underpinning of the Agenda. If the SDGs are to move from being normative aspirations, considerable change in how we undertake the work, and a different philosophical strategy is urgently needed. With only five years remaining, poverty, hunger, and inequity are still very evident and being made worse by evolving war and conflict in several parts of the world. Our environment also remains in grave disrepair.
According to Bierman et al. [
66] who undertook a meta-analysis of 3000 scientific studies, there appears to be more talk than action on the SDGs and “profound normative and institutional impact, from legislative action to changing resource allocation, remains rare” (p. 795). The authors further posit that “there is little evidence that goal setting at the global level leads directly to political impacts in national or local politics” (pp. 795–796). For instance, although vulnerability is often discursively prioritized in conversations on the goals, little evidence exists to shows that the world’s most vulnerable countries are adequately represented in global governance and “there are hardly any indications that the SDGs have steered global governance structures towards more inclusiveness, especially regarding least developed countries” [
66] (p.797).
This raises important questions as to what needs to change, how it can be achieved, and by whom. Here are some such questions:
- ▪
Will those that can make a difference yield to the challenge, or will it be business as usual?
- ▪
What international strategy will be used to close gaps to ensure greater equity, better health care for all, access to technology, and so on?
- ▪
Will the richer countries move away from implementing funding processes that strategically benefit them at a great cost to poor people around the world or will they continue to follow a more realistic self-interested approach?
- ▪
Will the right mix of financial resources be mobilized at the international level to help struggling countries to set up appropriate national statistical systems and build and sustain M&E systems since the Agenda’s success depends heavily on evidence-based data to feed into policy making?
In attempting to answer these questions, we can start with the willingness and commitment to reconsider and reimagine the philosophy that underpins the SDGs, especially since we are coming close to the end of the Agenda’s timeline. Given the discussion earlier on the limited type of actors that played a role in the development of the SDGs, it is important that the space be opened up for a critical assessment of the philosophy that underpins it. This can happen if this space becomes as depoliticized as possible and, thus, is open to a wider range of actors who have different ideologies, especially those who hail from the non-Western world. This needs to be achieved at various levels: globally to look at the way that our interconnected world can hinder or help achieve the goals, regionally to assess the impact of specific regional factors and challenges on achieving the goals, and nationally to present local solutions to the problems that are designed based on the history, power, and uniqueness of the country and its regions. This can also be supported by national political decision-makers who have the responsibility to lead their countries and implement policies within their borders, national civil society organizations that can advocate for the population, as well as national private sector actors that are an important part of the development trajectory of a country. Overall, despite the likelihood that these initiatives might introduce a certain level of ambiguity, the combination of all of these actors can help guide global discussions and national development policies that allow for the presence of an important level of policy space for each country and more sustainable change in the long term.
It is also important to consider changes to the global financial architecture. The achievement of the goals depends on minimizing indebtedness, advancing debt restructuring, improving the fiscal policy space, accessing liquidity that does not lead to negative unintended consequences (including the sale of important resources to multinational corporations that do not reinvest in the local economy, pay taxes, negate their environmental footprint, etc.), and so on. In this respect, the Bridgetown Initiative can help with this conversation. This radical initiative which speaks directly to climate change outlines why change is needed to the financial architecture and the type of change needed [
67]. This would require a revision of the manner in which the International Monetary Fund, the various multilateral banks, as well as the World Trade Organization, function and approach questions of indebtedness and free trade. This could be considered very ambitious, but it is necessary. An initiative that brings these actors as well as those who are critical of the current system together in an inclusive manner and that is not beholden to power dynamics can help in assessing what is needed, what is possible, and what needs to be worked on in the long run. Short of important systemic changes in the global economic system, much of the non-economic focused goals such as climate action (SDG 13), poverty (SDG 1), gender equality (SDG 5), and reduced inequalities (SDG10)) will not likely be achieved.
Linked to these two main important changes is the realization and acceptance of climate change and the role of the biggest historical and actual contributors. High income countries are generating the “largest negative spillovers, due to unsustainable consumption, financial secrecy, and the presence of tax havens” [
13], (p 32). Green technology is also displacing climate change and the contributions to it to countries that have the natural resources that are used to build the materials needed in green technology products [
68]. Thus, relying on a more holistic understanding of the climate crisis and the interconnectedness between green technology and environmental degradation is necessary. This can be achieved by improving the role of climate scientists from around the world in the design of the SDGs and their targets. As importantly though, there is the need to open up space for those who are not from the Western world and who are struggling to inform the world of the effect of such actions as green technology on their environments, economies, and societies. Amplifying the voices of these non-Western actors can help develop policies and goals that can better account for the interconnectivity between the various actors. It can also perhaps help have a critical discussion on whether green-washing or climate change displacement can be eliminated if our approach is one that considers the environment as an important entity, as important as humans and similar to the approaches of many indigenous groups around the world. Finally, the current Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage needs to be reviewed and perhaps changed to ensure that it is properly funded, it does not add to the indebtedness of the countries drawing from it, and it does not allow richer countries to dip into it as per the COVAX system discussed above. This overall emphasis on planetary health can help us move the focus on the inherent contradictions within the SDGs towards a more holistic approach that recognizes the importance and relevance of the environment in everything that we do.
Another potential action could include the development of databases that provide the data necessary to understand the cross-goal effect and contradictions [
1,
69]. This can help develop better indicators that can support holistic approaches, especially when it comes to planetary health [
29]. It will require a collaborative system at the international level that is well funded and has power to make policy recommendations and recommendations for changes in the design, targets, and indicators of the SDGs. This collaboration can also help move this more holistic approach beyond national boundaries into the realm of international governance and international decision-making [
29]. However, undertaking such an initiative will require the development and maintenance of adequate data gathering systems in all countries, but especially in many developing countries that do not already have such systems in place. It will also require the development of M&E systems and capacities that can help better capture the reasoning behind advancements and challenges as well as lessons that can be learned to improve on existing policies and programs. Many resources need to be allocated to this task: funds, capacity development, outreach that targets improvements in M&E cultures, policies that establish the importance of M&E and its integration into decision-making, and practices and policies that protect M&E from political interference.
Finally, in the meantime, a new timeline is absolutely essential. However, it must be realistic to take account of the world realities especially as it relates to financial constraints, the lessons learnt from COVID-19, the lessons learnt from the current challenges with the SDGs and among them, the combination of power and divisive, hostile, or destructive actions and agendas, and the war and conflict that are currently ongoing in many parts of the world.
5. Conclusions
Agenda 2030 faces many challenges and has several inherent weaknesses. These challenges must be addressed. Fresh thinking is needed regarding the philosophy underpinning the Agenda so that ambition can be converted to reality. The Agenda requires honest formative evaluation at this stage so that mid-term corrective action can be taken to improve the way forward. Development-centered finances are the key to this initiative but are in short supply. The timeline also requires urgent revision. Donor-provided international assistance must be directed to help countries update their national statistical systems and develop and sustain M&E systems so that national policies are guided by credible evidence-based data. Moreover, these same donors need to tackle power imbalances within the international system, and their contributions to them, so that the resulting effects within developing countries are accounted for and dealt with. Unless these deficits are urgently addressed, very little will change. Urgent action is necessitated now for it would be disingenuous to continue to advocate and believe that we can create a more equitable world, end poverty, sustain our planet, and enjoy peace and prosperity given the current humanitarian catastrophes that are taking place in different parts of the world. The constant destruction of basic and vital infrastructure (which will cost billions to rebuild) is affecting every single SDG. Millions are being displaced and stripped of basic and fundamental human rights, dignity, livelihoods, and face increasing mental health issues, starvation, and poverty. The rest of the world is also being affected indirectly through higher prices for goods, stress, and anxiety for family in war-torn areas, and so on. Democratic backsliding increased aggressive nationalism and illiberalism, and increased disregard for human rights around the world present significant challenges for an Agenda premised on democratic governance, liberalism, free trade, and social development. The United Nations and the Agenda orchestrators must revisit the Agenda and consider an alternative plan, especially one that protects the social aspects of development from financialization. Unless this is done, we will find ourselves at the same crossroads in 2030.