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Article

‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana: Development, Morality, and National Interest

Social Sciences, London Metropolitan University, London N7 8DB, UK
Religions 2026, 17(7), 857; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17070857
Submission received: 5 May 2026 / Revised: 15 July 2026 / Accepted: 16 July 2026 / Published: 18 July 2026

Abstract

The societal impact of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism—that is, how is it ‘progressive’, and what are its effects?—is a significant concern in Ghana, not least because the faith’s demographic significance makes its nature and characteristics a prominent public issue. This paper seeks to assess the influence of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana through the examination of three issues: social development and the prosperity gospel, morality and anti-corruption concerns, and the contribution of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism to Ghana’s national interest. This paper is divided into three sections. The first describes and explains the emergence and rapid growth of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana in the context of three historic ‘waves’ of Pentecostalism: in the 1930s, the late 1970s, and late 1980s/early 1990s. Section two examines (1) the developmental impact of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism, (2) links between ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism, moral decay, and public sector corruption, and (3) the pros and cons of the prosperity gospel. The concluding section of this paper assesses the overall contribution of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism to Ghana’s national interest. The conclusion is that ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism has a dual effect: the prosperity gospel may encourage both corruption and moral decay, while also contributing via spiritual ministry to social welfare.

1. Introduction

The guest editors’ aim in this Special Issue of Religions is to examine the relationship between moral sources, humanitarian action, and national interest. Their starting premise is that ethical responses to humanitarian need are shaped by deeper moral sources, reflecting a complex intersection of religious traditions and non-religious frameworks, including political ideologies, culturally embedded practices, and historically derived moral assumptions.
Engaging with the guest editors’ concerns, this paper focuses on what I refer to, following Miller (2009), as ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana. ‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism is an important contemporary strand of the country’s rich religious ethical traditions. Ghana’s religious ethical traditions collectively and heavily influence moral behaviour, emphasise hospitality, regard hard work as necessary, and believe in the interconnectedness of the living, ancestors, and the divine. These traditions also intertwine with local customs and social structures, influencing attitudes toward marriage, fertility, and economic activities.
The rationale for utilising the term ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism centres on the movement’s blend of active socio-economic development and strict theological or personal morality. Unlike charismatic Christianity (which often lacks a specific mandate for social action), ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism is defined by its grassroots activism and focus on holistic, bottom-up community transformation (N. Haynes 2015).
The key research question that the paper addresses is as follows: What is the societal influence of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana, understood through the examination of three issues: social development and the prosperity gospel, morality and anti-corruption concerns, and its contribution to Ghana’s national interest. Ghana’s national interest refers to the country’s core goals and priorities used to protect its sovereignty, ensure economic prosperity, and promote the welfare of its citizens. These interests are rooted in its 1992 Constitution and are traditionally guided by pillars including Pan-Africanism, regional peace, economic diplomacy, and democratic stability (Sanusi and Adu-Gyamfi 2017).
The research gap that the paper seeks to fill is to assess the societal impact of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana—specifically, how is it ‘progressive’, and what are its effects? The paper’s key theoretical contribution lies in a reconceptualisation of how local religious assemblages reshape democratic spaces and public life in Ghana.
Ghana is a majority Christian country: around 71% of Ghanaians profess to be Christians, 20% are Muslims, and 5% follow African Traditional Religions. In recent decades, Ghana has seen rapid growth of Pentecostalism: in 2026, nearly a third of Ghanaians are members of a Pentecostal church. Table 1 indicates that 31.6% of Ghana’s Christians self-identified as Pentecostal when the last national census took place in 2021, rising from 24.1% in 2000 and 28.3% in 2010 (Ghana Statistical Service 2021). Over time, as Table 1 shows, the growth of Pentecostalism, spearheaded by the expansion of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism, coincided with a significant decrease in the percentage of Ghana’s Roman Catholics, as well as a marginal decline in the country’s mainline/other Protestant population. Many Ghanaians belong to prominent ‘progressive’ Pentecostal churches, including International Central Gospel Church, Royalhouse Chapel International, Perez Chapel International, Action Chapel International, and Lighthouse Group of Churches (J. Haynes 2025b).1
It is sometimes claimed that ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism contrasts with ‘classical’ Pentecostalism, in that the former has extensive civic engagement, prominent prophetic pronouncements, promotion of the ‘prosperity gospel’, also known as ‘the gospel of prosperity’, and pastors’ frequent commentaries on morality, integrity, and ethics (J. Haynes 2024, forthcoming; Interviews 2 and 3). However, there is evidence that classical Pentecostal churches are often as engaged in civic engagement, while the former’s focus in this regard predates that of ‘progressive’ Pentecostals (Omenyo 2006).
‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana, and in Africa2 more generally, is a multifaceted transformation, fundamentally altering the religious landscape, shifting political dynamics, and significantly influencing individual and community life (Gifford 2004; McCauley 2014; White et al. 2026). It is characterised by an ability to maintain traditional Pentecostal beliefs—such as the apocalyptic return of Christ and an emphasis on personal salvation—while simultaneously acting as a significant agent of social transformation in the community: promoting entrepreneurship, education, and social services, typically filling gaps left by the state (Miller 2009). In Ghana, ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism is also concerned with moral revitalisation and elimination of corruption, civic engagement, and community-focused leadership roles for the hitherto under-represented, economic growth, financial literacy, and upward mobility (Freeman 2012; Adadey and Barnabas 2024; Golo and Novieto 2022).
‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism emerged in the wake of two momentous economic and political developments in Ghana: (1) economic collapse in the mid-1970s, followed by sustained neoliberal economic reforms from the early 1980s, in the context of (2) a decade of military rule which ended with democratisation in 1992, a status which continues until the present time. The effects of economic collapse, neoliberal economic policies, and a long period of military rule included widespread instability, insecurity, and uncertainty: hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians lost state jobs as a result of economic reforms, while human rights violations, stringent media controls, and disallowing of political opposition during military rule made democratisation both politically welcome and socially destabilising.
‘Progressive’ Pentecostal churches in Ghana are typically independent churches, led by high-profile, charismatic pastors. Some have huge followings both in Ghana and overseas and, as a result, are known as ‘megachurches’.3 Seeking spiritual comfort and safety in turbulent times, numerous Ghanaians, including many among a growing number of young and educated citizens, turned to ‘progressive’ Pentecostal churches, favouring what they offered: a potent blend of traditional, supernatural, and modern prosperity doctrines (Gifford 2004; Interview 17). Many Ghanaians regard such churches as more attuned to their spiritual needs than their main rivals: the traditional mainline churches, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, and ‘classical’ Pentecostal churches (Asamoah-Gyadu 2014; Quayesi-Amakye 2016). This is a result of their holistic approach, blending Pentecostalism’s characteristic spiritual focus—Holy Spirit empowerment, healing, and deliverance—with significant, tangible social development and community service and activities.
The issue of the societal impact of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism—that is, how is it ‘progressive’, and what are its effects?—is a significant concern in Ghana, not least because the faith’s demographic significance makes its nature and characteristics a prominent public issue (Interviews 19 and 25). This paper seeks to assess the influence of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana through the examination of three key characteristics: the prosperity gospel, morality and anti-corruption concerns, and contributions to national development and the national interest.
This paper is divided into three sections. The first describes and explains the emergence and rapid growth of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana in the context of three historic ‘waves’ of Pentecostalism: in the 1930s, the late 1970s, and late 1980s/early 1990s. Section two examines (1) the developmental impact of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism; (2) links between ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism, moral decay, and public sector corruption—said to cost the country around USD 3 billion per annum;4 and (3) the pros and cons of the prosperity gospel. The concluding section of this paper assesses the overall contribution of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism to Ghana’s national interest.

2. Research Methodology

I began researching for this paper in early 2023. Over the next two-and-a-half years, I visited Ghana for research purposes, with each visit being of one to two weeks’ duration, in February, June and November 2024, and September 2025. These research visits enabled me to learn much about the religious, political, and developmental impact of the Pentecostal/Charismatic movement in Ghana. I personally interviewed 32 knowledgeable and responsive Ghanaians, some more than once (See Appendix A for details of interviews.) Their information relating to religion, politics, and development, and/or Ghana’s Pentecostal/Charismatic movement, was augmented by further email and WhatsApp communications with many interviewees. Interview questions varied according to who the interviewee was, depending on, for example, their institutional affiliation or whether they were a religious professional or a secular scholar. A sample of interview questions can be found at the end of the article.
My kind and gracious interviewees included theologians, religious professionals, representatives of faith-based organisations and civil society organisations, public intellectuals, political scientists, current and former members of government, and journalists. I am very grateful to all for their time and insights. An anonymised list of interviewees is included at the end of the paper. Interviews were semi-structured, lasting between 30 and 60 min, depending on the length of interviewees’ replies and their availability. Following up interviews via email, WhatsApp and LinkedIn, I gained further information from interviewees, which was of great help in clarifying and developing points made earlier in discussions.
I selected interviewees and email and WhatsApp respondents based on their personal involvement and/or knowledge of politics and religion in Ghana. The research material I gained from these interviews and email communications was significantly augmented by information from peer-reviewed journal articles, research monographs, press statements, newspaper articles, Ghanaian and foreign news websites, blogs and social media, including LinkedIn and Facebook. This paper is also informed by insights from grey literature5, a key resource in the ongoing debate about the public impact of Pentecostal/Charismatic Christianity in Ghana.
Regarding research ethics, research for the article was approved by the Research and Development Committee of the Church of Pentecost Ghana on 5 March 2023 and by the SSSP Research Ethics Review Panel of London Metropolitan University on 8 December 2023 (protocol code SSSP-2023-0009).
I am a qualitative scholar. This paper adopts a comparative and qualitative methodological approach. I acknowledge that, while qualitative research methods are useful, they also have limitations. For example, to organise and carry out personal interviews with knowledgeable people is time-consuming and labour-intensive, and it can never be ascertained if all relevant sources of information have been included. Personal interviews and email communications that I conducted with knowledgeable people, nearly all Ghanaians, amount collectively to a priceless resource; without them I would not have been able to complete the paper. Because information from personal interviews and email communications is sometimes difficult to verify, I have sought triangulation of information so that insights gained from personal interviews are, to the best of my knowledge, authoritative. Qualitative research undertaken for this article does not claim to be statistically representative and is of direct relevance only to Ghana.

3. Three ‘Waves’ of Pentecostalism

There is diversity within Pentecostalism, and the fact is that scholars do not agree completely on the strands that can be classified as Pentecostal. It is therefore important to acknowledge this fact and to indicate the classification/typology used and justify how it fits into the article (Omenyo 2006; Gifford 1998).
The history of Pentecostalism in Ghana is often classified into three distinct waves over the past century, each emerging as a spiritual response to the social, economic, and cultural challenges of its time (Yidana 2014). Following the efforts of foreign—mainly American and English—missionaries, Pentecostalism was introduced to the then Gold Coast in the early decades of the 20th century, followed a little later by Gold Coast-founded Pentecostal churches, often referred to as ‘classical’ Pentecostal churches, including Assemblies of God, Ghana, founded in 1931, The Apostolic Church-Ghana, 1935, and The Church of Pentecost, Ghana, 1953. Such churches had foreign/missionary and leadership influence when they started. Thus, it is not entirely accurate to designate them as entirely indigenous (Omenyo and Atiemo 2006).
They emerged in response to many indigenes’ perceptions of the limitations of the foreign missionary churches. ‘Classical’ Pentecostal churches were seen to offer a culturally relevant, spiritually expressive form of Christianity explicitly addressing local worldviews, and incorporating spiritual warfare, healing, and personal experiences with the Holy Spirit (Lende 2023, pp. 37–39). ‘Classical’ Pentecostal churches filled a significant religio-cultural gap left by missionary institutions, whose deficiencies included the overlooking of indigenous spiritual needs and the imposition of imported cultural practices (Amanor 2004; Kemp 1898).
Establishment of ‘classical’ Pentecostalism in Ghana can be located in a wider evangelical expansion of Pentecostalism and Pentecostal spirituality. Craig S. Keener notes that the term ‘Pentecostal’ is often interpreted in two ways: ‘Pentecostal denominations often with a capital P and those who share a basic pentecostal experience or ethos often with a small p, including charismatics, members of Third Wave churches, and others who emphasize similar spiritual experience’ (Keener 2016, pp. 6–7). Central to this understanding, Sawa (2021, p. 2) explains, is the ‘experience described in the Acts of the Apostles, especially the first Pentecost (Acts 2)’, whereby ‘Pentecostalism [is] a pandenominational reality which takes various forms. Naturally, all Christian traditions accept the action of the Holy Spirit but differently interpret the first Church’s experience of Him and whether charismatic gifts are still valid’.
‘Progressive’ Pentecostal churches formed a second ‘wave’ of Pentecostal churches from the late 1970s. Their founders either broke away from, or developed independently of, ‘classical’ Pentecostal and/or traditional mainline churches and denominations. Their focus is on the Holy Spirit’s active, experiential presence in daily life, manifested in prophecy, healing, and glossolalia ‘speaking in tongues’, perceiving prophecies, dreams, visions, and healings as a fundamental aspect of the Christian faith. In addition, pastors preach that the power and authority of Christ is sufficient to overcome the demonic and occult—not just in theory, but in daily life. More generally, many Ghanaians believe that such churches offer a strong, direct connection to a worldview which many share regarding spiritual causes of misfortunes (Interviews 9 and 10). Unlike ‘classical’ Pentecostal churches, which typically have hierarchical institutional structures, ‘progressive’ churches in Ghana characteristically feature a prominent lead pastor and an underdeveloped institutional structure.6
Prominent neo-Pentecostal/Charismatic churches include some of Ghana’s largest ones: Action Chapel International, founded in 1979, International Central Gospel Church, 1984, Perez Chapel International, 1987, Lighthouse Group of Churches UD-OLGC, 1987, and Royalhouse Chapel, 1991 or 1992. Established respectively by Nicholas Duncan-Williams, Mensa Otabil, Charles Agyinasare, Dag Heward-Mills, and Sam Korankye Ankrah, these churches have become megachurches, drawing thousands of worshippers to weekly services, occupying massive, modern physical buildings and compounds, managing their affairs via corporate-style organisation, with very large financial turnovers and considerable public influence (Gifford 2004; Washington et al. 2023).
Pastors leading ‘progressive’ Pentecostal churches are typically proponents of the ‘prosperity gospel’, overtly linking the strength of a person’s Christian faith to material success and well-being. Morny (2017) explains that such churches ‘emerged as a distinct, often independent, vibrant, and emotional alternative to traditional, liturgical “mission” churches and classical Pentecostal churches, frequently incorporating “Word of Faith” prosperity theology’. ‘Word of Faith’ prosperity theology claims that God wants believers to be financially prosperous, physically healthy, and happy. Pastors teach their followers that God’s blessings are guaranteed through positive confession, speaking faith-filled words, active faith, and systematic, preferably copious and regular, financial giving ‘seed-faith’ (Interviews 6, 7, 8). Pastors preaching the prosperity gospel are prominent throughout much of Ghana, including the country’s commercial centre and capital, Accra, and the country’s second city, Kumasi (Daswani 2017).
A third Pentecostal ‘wave’ emerged in the late 1980s/early 1990s. It comprised what are known as ‘neo-prophetic’ churches—also referred to as ‘one-man’ churches due to their emphasis on a single charismatic leader (Manu 2025). Neo-prophetic churches evolved as a distinct, intense strand of the charismatic movement, focusing heavily on prophecy, dramatic deliverance, spiritual warfare, media-driven ministry and, to boost the income of pastors and their churches, commercialised religious items, such as ‘anointing oil’ (Zoe Bible 2025; Interviews 28 and 30). Generally, they are not regarded as part of the ‘progressive’ Pentecostal movement in Ghana because of their primary focus on individual spiritual needs without concern for holistic issues, including social development.

4. ‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism, Corruption, Morality, and Prosperity Theology

‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana merges traditional spiritual and charismatic practices with a modern, neoliberal developmental ideology, often preaching both prosperity theology and social responsibility. Typically, pastors preach a theology of self-empowerment and professional growth, with the aim of transforming individuals both spiritually and economically. There is a strong individualist concern with making money and entrepreneurship via the prosperity gospel as well as wider humanitarianism concerns, manifested in active engagement in social development (Interviews 18 and 31).
Critics also contend that via adhesion to the prosperity gospel, ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism encourages both individual selfishness and lack of concern with community growth, contributing to a reduction in social cohesion. They also allege that ‘progressive’ Pentecostal churches use spiritual and conservative moral influence to encourage conservative traditional approaches in relation to controversial societal and political issues, including homosexuality and same-sex relations, gender equality, and the content of school children’s education (J. Haynes, forthcoming; Adadey and Barnabas 2024; Arthur 2021).
While critics accept that ‘progressive’ Pentecostal churches have their strengths—including spiritual fervour, passion for evangelism, and fulfilling many Ghanaians’ spiritual thirst with New Testament teaching and practice—they also identify characteristics which they consider to be exploitative of church followers: personality cults around a single leader, abuse of power, over-emphasis on witchcraft and/or the spirit world, rather than on Christ, and subordination of biblical truth to African cultural dynamics (Max-Wirth 2024).
Some point to many ‘progressive’ Pentecostal churches’ active engagement in social development, which is said to contrast with the ‘classical’ Pentecostal focus on individual salvation rather than social issues. As a result, it is claimed that the social concerns of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism represent a significant shift in the movement’s engagement with the world (Miller and Yamamori 2007). However, ‘classical’ Pentecostalism’s concern with social development dates back to the colonial era and is both extensive and widespread. Development projects, in primary and tertiary education, health, agricultural extension, and technical education, are found in many areas of Ghana (Benyah 2020).

4.1. The Social Developmental Impact of ‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism

‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism influences social development in Ghana in various ways. First, it offers a parallel ‘pseudo-state’, offering social safety nets, health, education, and welfare, encouraging deep loyalty between leaders and followers that may replace traditional patron–client networks. Second, pastors and churches exercise influence through prophetic politics, involving divine predictions and the framing of national issues through moral, spiritual, and/or ‘prosperity’ lenses (McCauley 2014, 2019; Acheampong 2018; Benyah 2019).
This may involve a shift away from state provisions, while also representing a new source of services that previously did not exist for some communities and congregants; in still others, it replaces the work of customary authorities or of other religious institutions. Some ‘progressive’ Pentecostal ministries, in common with traditional mainline churches, provide schooling, micro-lending services, and marriage counselling (Miller and Yamamori 2007). In addition, due to the state’s limited capacity to provide formal social safety nets, especially for those who work in the informal sector, churches may act as crucial informal welfare providers. This creates a system of patronage, where members rely on the church and its leader for support, for example, help with business start-ups and social needs, reinforcing their loyalty to the pastor. Doing so helps to round out the patron–client exchange between church leaders and congregants, while also serving the encompassing social character of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism, encouraging members to live fully within the church (Gallego and Woodberry 2010; McCauley 2019).
Pastors’ influence starts at the level of church and ministry,7 which provides followers with both material resources and the hope of miracles, as well as spiritual fulfilment, a sense of community, friendship, marriage, and business opportunities. In return, followers provide allegiance, loyalty, and financial support, typically offering much of themselves—time, money, thoughts, behaviour (Seabright 2024; Interviews 19 and 23).
Pentecostal/Charismatic community networks offer solutions—including in relation to healing, deliverance and prosperity—to counter life’s challenges—such as unemployment or illness—which traditional mainline churches are not seen by many Ghanaians as adequately addressing. The prosperity gospel links faith with financial success, motivating members to align personal goals with church visions for collective prosperity, acting as a form of ‘religious engineering’ for societal transformation (Seabright 2024).
When a pastor controls a religious platform, it is an opportunity both to consolidate and to wield power at the community level, including the ability to reorganise the informal institutions that help shape development (Seabright 2024). In this respect, pastors wield significant soft power—defined as the ability to influence through attraction, persuasion, and shared values rather than coercion—which translates into an ability to generate, manage, and utilise financial resources from their congregations. This power dynamic is deeply rooted in the trust and spiritual authority congregants place in their leaders, enabling pastors to mobilise funds for various purposes, including ministry operations, community projects, and in some cases, personal financial gain (Ozturk 2023). Critics claim that, materially, the balance is in favour of the pastors. In essence, churches and ministries are crucial assets for pastors whose personal financial well-being is heavily dependent on a steady income stream from congregants. The modes of distribution thus begin to favour such religious leaders and networks over traditional ethnic ones, in ways that reshape the channels of informal power in Ghana (McCauley 2014).

4.2. Corruption and Moral Decay

Advocating for a return to patriotism and accountability, many Ghanaians believe that the country’s development struggles are rooted in a ‘moral decay’, where civic virtue has been replaced by an obsessive concern for personal gain (Ghana’s Reset Begins with Values, Accountability—President Mahama 2026; Achaw 2025; Interviews 3 and 4).
Public sector corruption is a prominent feature of Ghana’s national life. It is said to be the result of a complex interplay of post-colonial structural weaknesses, a ‘winner-takes-all’ political culture, and weak institutional oversight. Public sector corruption thrives in a context of limited accountability in public procurement, where elites’ theft of state resources for private accumulation is routine (Dawuda 2016; Interviews 7, 10 and 11).
In Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, Ghana scored 43 out of 100, ranking 76th out of 182 countries. This was a slight decline from previous years and the country’s worst ranking in five years, indicating increasing public sector corruption. On the other hand, Ghana scored higher than the African average of around 33, and the country’s score of 43 places it fairly well in a region featuring many countries with poor or very poor anti-corruption attributes (Transparency International 2026).
Public sector corruption in Ghana may be the result of widespread nepotism and many public officials’ openness to bribery, as well as a lack of accountability in public bodies, including the police, judiciary, church, and land administration. Public sector corruption may also be encouraged by institutional weaknesses, relatively low salaries, poor ethical standards, and a patrimonial and partisan culture. Public sector corruption impacts on social cohesion through demands for bribes to receive services or licences, with many citizens finding it essential to pay officials for basic needs, which leads to erosion of public trust (Transparency International 2026; Interviews 1, 3).
Opinion survey data indicate that many Ghanaians believe that public sector corruption would be reduced if people in positions of authority feared transgressing.8 Reducing corruption at the state level would mean improved financial resources for what most Ghanaians want: better healthcare, improved education for their children, increased protection from floods, renovation of the country’s transport infrastructure, including roads and the ailing railway network (Afrobarometer 2019, 2023).
Prominent religious leaders from all of Ghana’s main faiths routinely issue strong statements condemning corruption, framing its elimination as necessary to remove moral decay and encourage national repentance. Christian leaders cite the Bible in their condemnation of corruption, emphasising that it frowns on both givers and receivers of the act of corruption and cautions that corruption brings calamity to society, notably in the administration of justice. To combat corruption, Christian leaders propose that the state establishes anti-corruption policies with teeth and urges prosecution of persons found guilty of the act. Critics say this is all very well—but what is the church doing about corruption within its own ranks? There is a need, at the very least, it is claimed, to intensify teachings on the links between immorality and corruption in the Christian churches, including those characterised as exemplars of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism (Adadey and Barnabas 2024; Arthur 2021; Interviews 6, 7, 10).
While anti-corruption statements from senior Christian figures are no doubt well meaning, they face criticism regarding perceived lack of effective action taken by the church itself to eliminate corruption within its own ranks. Key issues include leaders’ misappropriation of church funds, commercialisation of gospel messages, acceptance of donations from suspected corrupt politicians, and those suspected of involvement in illegal gold mining.9 While many churches in Ghana focus on their spiritual mission, these documented issues highlight a significant, well-recognised problem of unethical practices within some, particularly newer, charismatic and independent church structures (Interviews 29, 30, 31).
The church is a recognised stakeholder in governance in Ghana, with a perceived duty to condemn corruption as antithetical to national development and national interest. Although suggested measures to tackle it are well meaning, given that Ghana is approximately 70 per cent Christian, much of the corruption in the country must be undertaken by Christians, including high-level public servants, as many hold senior public sector positions. Critics contend that it is a case of Christian on Sunday only, with related teachings forgotten during the working week (Interviews 27 and 28).
A prominent Catholic theologian, Sarpong (1974, p. 64), argues that while moral values may be peculiar and differ from one culture or society to another, there are also universal values, including respect, truthfulness, and honesty.10 A prominent Ghanaian philosopher, Kwame Gyekye, contends that moral values are ‘forms or patterns of conduct that are considered most worthwhile and cherished by society … principles of behaviour and objectives of both social and individual actions’ (Gyekye 1996, p. 55).11
To what extent does ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism adhere to what Sarpong regards as the universal values of ‘respect, truthfulness and honesty’? Following Gyekye, does ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism encourage ‘worthwhile’ ‘forms or patterns of conduct’ in relation to both ‘social and individual actions’?
Scholars have written extensively on the relationship between religion and morality in Ghana (Gyekye 1996; Gifford 2004; Quashigah 2015; G. Anderson 2013). Some assert that religion is the most significant determinant of morality, while others are either sceptical or reject this view. Over time, discourse on the sources of morals has found its way into African ethics, with views both from the West and from Africans who maintain that the morality of Africans has a religious base (G. Anderson 2013). For Christians, generally, the foundation of the church is the Bible, which teaches principles such as love and compassion. Christians are encouraged to shun greed, bribery, and corruption, and thus not only improve society’s moral fibre but also the quality of national development.
For Anderson and Inusah (2023, p. 173), moral values are ‘guiding principles, virtues, or standards of behaviour’, widely understood ‘as desirable and important’ and ‘held in high repute by a society or an individual. The values guide the moral agent in his or her interaction with other moral agents’. The authors identify the following moral values which they believe need improving to enhance Ghana’s national development: ‘honour, respect, hospitality, gratitude, truthfulness, obedience, unity, godliness, hard work and courage’. According to Nsia-Peprah (2017, pp. 66–67), ‘unethical leadership’ is the main cause of Ghana’s perceived morality-linked decline, resulting in ‘moral decadence and dysfunctional institutions that facilitate the abuse of government power’.
In order to combat moral decline, ‘progressive’ Pentecostal pastors stress the importance of incorporating Christian values into public life. This is to counter what many see as the pernicious influence of the twin ‘evils’ of Western-derived ‘modernisation’ and ‘secularisation’ which, if followed, are believed to lead to catastrophic loss of traditional culture and values. Western influences are said to undermine traditional African values, especially among the young, with many choosing to adopt alien, ‘foreign’ lifestyles. Yet, there is no evidence that the young in Ghana are becoming less religious. Along with Chad, Ghana is one of only two countries in sub-Saharan Africa where, among young people 18–35 years, religion is more important than it is to older people (Pew Research Center 2018). Given that three-quarters of Ghanaians are aged 35 years or younger, there is no evidence that religion, including ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism, is losing popular appeal, including among the young.
Many Ghanaians are said to regard ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism as a force for good in two ways: (1) promoting hard work, entrepreneurship, community support, and personal responsibility, and (2) increasing economic activity and social upliftment, via church-based/derived education, healthcare, and micro-finance programmes (Benyah 2020).
Critics, on the other hand, see exploitation through the ‘prosperity gospel’, prioritisation of individual material wealth rather than community development, and growing individual selfishness. Some also contend that ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism encourages a ‘Christianised’ state. While this does not imply a formal Christian theocracy, it does include attempts to roll back Western-style secularisation to be replaced with Christian values (J. Haynes 2023; Interviews 24, 27, 31).12 Secularisation, believed by many Ghanaians to be the result of the influence of liberal Western state and non-state actors, is widely thought to be a main cause of moral decline in Ghana. This leads to what appears to be ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism’s strong opposition to Western/secular, as opposed to traditional Christian, values in relation to children’s education, feminism, and homosexual equality and rights. Critics fear that public prominence of Christian values would result in a ‘Christianised’ state. This, it is claimed, would be against the national interest as it would undermine Ghana’s national cohesion through the creation of a hierarchy of ‘acceptable’ and ‘non-acceptable’ Ghanaians (Interviews 21, 27). Prominent among the ‘acceptable’ would be normatively conservative or ‘traditional’ Christians. Prominent among the ‘non-acceptable’ would be pro-Western liberals, as well as secularists, homosexuals, feminists, and religious ‘nones’ (Karikari 2025; Interviews 28, 32).

4.3. Individual and Social Development: Gender, Education, Sexuality

‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana draws on traditional markers of national identity, biblical interpretations, and many Ghanaians’ normative social and cultural conservatism. ‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism contributes to social services delivery, often filling gaps left by the state, while having a clear position in relation to the debate about traditional, African-centred approaches versus Western-style ‘modernisation’/secularisation preferences in relation to gender, education, and sexuality (Prempeh 2024).
In relation to reshaping gender issues, ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism exhibits a dualism: on the one hand, it promotes female leadership and individual agency, while, on the other hand, it supports and sustains patriarchal ideals of female submissiveness. Put another way, ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana seeks to empower females through education and economic autonomy, while demanding their continued subservience to males. This creates a complex, dual identity for women as both empowered leaders and submissive people (Interviews 1, 2, 8).
Progressive Pentecostalism in Ghana promotes female empowerment by encouraging women to take on leadership roles, pursue education, and engage in entrepreneurship, often framing this as spiritual empowerment through the Holy Spirit. Yet, while challenging traditional patriarchy through doctrines of individual salvation, this empowerment often navigates a paradox: blending leadership opportunities with entrenched cultural and biblical expectations of female submissiveness (Adadey and Oladipupo 2026).
Regarding education, ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism has had a transformative impact on Ghana’s primary, secondary, and tertiary education sectors: a major provider of private educational infrastructure and social mobility initiatives. Leading ‘progressive’ Pentecostal churches—including the International Central Gospel Church, Royalhouse Chapel, Action Chapel International, and Perez Chapel International—view education both as a tool for ‘holistic salvation’ spirit, soul, and body and a means of fostering economic empowerment (Benyah 2020). ‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism strongly supports Christian teaching in schools, viewing it as essential for nurturing moral character and maintaining a Christian ethos in the context of what is perceived as an advancing secularisation. In short, advocating for active engagement, ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism views education as a ‘missional’ sphere within which it is crucial to maintain and develop Christian principles (Quayesi-Amakye 2018; Interviews 3, 4, 30).
Turning to sexuality, Bompani (2016) argues that ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism is largely responsible for introducing the politics of sexuality into African affairs, including those of Ghana, through a drive to update laws on homosexuality. The spiritual worldview of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ dovetails in ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism with traditional social teachings to transform homosexuality from a taboo subject into a rallying cry for politicians seeking to appeal to the followers of ‘progressive’ Pentecostals and normatively conservative Ghanaians (Adjepong 2021). Critics claim that strong adhesion to ‘family values’, including fulsome support for the sanctity of marriage and traditional families, leads to a denial of the rights of same-sex couples. Prominent ‘progressive’ Pentecostal leaders, including Emmanuel Barrigah Global Evangelical Church, Bishop Gordon Kissieh Life International Church, Archbishop Charles Agyinasare Perez Chapel International, Prophet Kofi Oduro Alabaster International Ministries, and the Minister of Communications, Samuel Nartey George, an Elder in Perez Chapel International, are prominent supporters of Ghana’s ‘Family Values’ Bill which, critics fear, will lead to harsher penalties ‘just for being gay’ (GPCC Declares Support for President Mahama’s Stance on LGBTQI+ 2026; J. Haynes 2025b, forthcoming).13
‘Progressive’ Pentecostal ties to American evangelical churches and traditional cultural norms reinforce a conservative sexual–cultural agenda in Ghana (Gifford 1998; J. Haynes 2025b, 2025c). Influential ‘progressive’ Pentecostals claim that in order to protect Ghana’s traditional culture, it is necessary to impose new restrictions on LGBTQ+ individuals and their organisations. In their view, the West is pushing for enhanced rights for Ghana’s gay communities as part of a wider attempt to dilute Ghana’s traditional culture in favour of Western-style liberalism and secularism (Assemblies of God Ghana Backs Mahama over Withdrawn US Honorary Degree 2026; GPCC Declares Support for President Mahama’s Stance on LGBTQI+ 2026).
Progressive Pentecostalism’s struggle against westernisation and secularisation has a strong ally in elements of the US Christian Right, encouraging the development of transnational networks and the exchange of ideas, strategies, and tactics. The relationship between the US Christian Right and Pentecostal/Charismatic movements in Ghana is a burgeoning transnational alliance, characterised by shared social conservatism, specifically focused on opposing LGBTQ+ rights and influencing public policy. More generally, while ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana enthusiastically adopts modern technology and media, it also aligns with American conservative evangelicals on issues of sexuality, marriage, and moral regulation (J. Haynes 2025b).
Kaoma (2009, 2013) has researched into and written extensively about the influence of the US Christian Right in Africa, including in Ghana. Kaoma reports that the US Christian Right has recently expanded its African operations, turning attention to Ghana in the 2010s. The key entry point in Ghana, as elsewhere in Africa, was the ‘contestation of LGBTQI+ rights’, whereby ‘all advocates—both pro- and anti-gay rights—incorporate the language of human rights in distinctive and/or novel ways’. Advocates from the US Christian Right ‘emphasize, among other values, religious rights, the traditional family, and culture, and opposition to the liberalization of African sexual norms’. Kaoma argues that this agenda is ‘heavily informed by movement intellectuals rather than movement activists who mobilize congregations and faith-based actors’. Advocates for liberalisation, on the other hand, ‘emphasize the human rights to equality, inclusion, dignity, and individual freedom’. They also seek to reverse social injustices which followed ‘colonialism, neo-colonialism, capitalism, and now the American Christian Right. Both are, in a sense, counter movements to each other, and are heavily influenced by both local African and global actors’ (Kaoma 2023, pp. 339–41).

4.4. The Prosperity Gospel and Individual and Social Development

Ghana is a highly religious, majority Christian country. It may be unsurprising that many, perhaps most, of the country’s Christians look to their faith to provide a route from spiritual and material poverty to spiritual and material abundance. This is not a new phenomenon. The late 1970s and 1980s in Ghana were characterised by severe economic decline, political instability including coups in 1979 and 1981, and widespread scarcity, known locally as ‘kalabule’, that is, corruption and black marketeering (Steel 1988). This period saw a dramatic rise in new Pentecostal and Charismatic churches: a spiritual response to economic and political crises (Benyah 2020). Today, four decades later, Boaheng et al. (2023) point out that the ‘economic situation in contemporary Ghana makes everyone yearn for economic progress. In Ghana, like many other parts of Africa, religion is responsible for providing the economic, spiritual, and health needs of its adherents’.
According to Roberts (2009), more than half of Ghana’s Christians are said to believe the key message of the prosperity gospel: God will grant wealth and good health to those with enough faith and who offer sufficient ‘seed’ donations. The prosperity gospel is said to facilitate a moral and theological environment prioritising material wealth over integrity and encourage and enable exploitative practices and a ‘get-rich-quick-by-any-means-necessary’ mindset (Interviews 21, 22). In emphasising that divine blessing follows generous financial giving known colloquially as ‘seed-sowing’ to pastors and their churches, the prosperity gospel can lead to prosperity gospel pastors amassing huge wealth, although many followers remain in poverty (Seabright 2024; Interviews 13, 14, 15).
Although their interpretations differ somewhat, prominent ‘progressive’ Pentecostal pastors—including Dr Mensa Otabil, International Central Gospel Church, Archbishop Charles Agyinasare Perez, Chapel International, Archbishop Nicholas Duncan-Williams, Action Chapel International, and Bishop Dag Heward-Mills, United Denominations Originating from the Lighthouse Group of Churches—identify the prosperity gospel as God’s preferred route to health and wealth (Gifford 2004; J. Haynes, forthcoming).
It is said that many Ghanaians look to Christianity to provide a road map for personal success, and it is hardly surprising that the prosperity gospel is a leading approach to pursue health and wealth in Ghana (McCauley 2019; Prempeh 2024). Having said that, there is sustained debate about the overall impact of the prosperity gospel on the religious and socio-economic life of Christians and on society more generally. Controversies surrounding the prosperity gospel go hand in hand with a popular belief that Ghana is experiencing a serious decline in both morality and integrity, including among Christian leaders who, many believe, exploit their leadership positions for illicit or illegal personal gain. According to Boaheng et al. (2023), ‘[t]he need to evaluate the impact of this type of teaching is an urgent theological and pastoral concern because it is the most appealing Christian approach to socio-economic breakthrough for contemporary Ghanaian Christians’.
Pastors in numerous ‘progressive’ Pentecostal churches in Ghana preach and teach the prosperity gospel, along with a commitment to social ministry and community support; this is what followers demand (Agana 2016). Although for many Ghanaians very persuasive, the prosperity gospel prompts much debate about the effects it has on the religious and socio-economic life of Christians and society at large. On the one hand, the prosperity gospel attracts many Ghanaians, including the young, educated, and potentially upwardly mobile, to the Christian faith. On the other hand, the prosperity gospel may promote unethical behaviour. Prosperity preachers in Ghana promote what is called a ‘seed-faith’ theology, encouraging followers to give money and valuables to the church to receive a tenfold return. This practice has been described as a form of extortion that takes advantage of the poor (Resource: The Prosperity Gospel 2024).
Based on recent studies and public discourse, ‘progressive’ Pentecostal churches face significant criticism in Ghana regarding their involvement in or contribution to corruption, including through the lens of the prosperity gospel. The intense focus on money, wealth, and the commercialisation of religious services may foster an environment conducive to corruption (Quayesi-Amakye 2018; Interviews 12, 16, 17).
The prosperity gospel in African Christianity has received much academic attention, including in relation to Ghana (Arthur 2021). Scholarly studies reveal diverse views of the concept, both positive and negative. Advocates of the prosperity gospel, often the very pastors that preach it, claim that it is a powerful way to empower the poor and promote hard work (Adu 2024). Heuser (2020, 2021) and Asamoah-Gyadu (2007) identify a theological affinity between prosperity preaching and African indigenous religious worldviews that connects deities with abundant life. A. H. Anderson (2018) and Gifford (2004) argue that the prosperity gospel exploits the poor and vulnerable, while propagating questionable theological views to justify pastors’ pursuit of individual wealth. Sharpe (2014) claims that such pastors typically lack financial transparency and accountability. Critics agree that the prosperity gospel is a ‘gospel of materialism’ with three unwelcome characteristics: a focus on individualist greed rather than collective need, pastors’ financial exploitation of their followers, and a lack of evidence that the prosperity gospel provides a sustainable path out of poverty for the great majority of adherents (Boaheng et al. 2023). In essence, the prosperity gospel is critiqued as an anti-social development theology that breaks away from the classic obligations of reciprocity in Christianity, that is, the redistribution of wealth to the wider community and the greater good.
Arthur (2017) points out that there are different varieties of the prosperity gospel. Following an extensive literature review and 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Accra, Arthur argues that Dr Mensa Otabil’s take on the prosperity gospel is more expansive than many pastors. According to Arthur (2017), Otabil’s approach is comprehensive, combining black liberation theology, personal responsibility, education, hard work, and paid-for teachings on success. He argues that Otabil, by incorporating social developmental projects and good neighbourliness, shifts the discussion on the prosperity theology in Ghana from the ‘pie-in-the-sky’ model espoused by many ‘progressive’ Pentecostal pastors to one that answers the questions of reciprocity in Christianity.
For Otabil, as for prosperity gospel pastors more generally, tithing, that is, giving a minimum of 10 percent of one’s income to the church, is an important component of followers’ pursuit of health and wealth. Tithes are demanded by many ‘progressive’ Pentecostal pastors who in return promise that God will extend blessings both in the here and now and in the afterlife. Sociologically, tithes are a form of giving which can be understood as a part of a moral economy of reciprocity within a community of believers that can ‘pull’ the believer upwards and aid in their moving forward ‘by the spirit’ (N. Haynes 2015).
Ghanaian theological critics of the prosperity gospel include leading figures in the Lausanne Movement,14 notably Apostle Professor Opoku Onyinah, theologian, televangelist, and fifth chairman of The Church of Pentecost 2008–2018, and Dr Femi Adeleye, Director of the Institute for Christian Impact and the Director of Langham Preaching for Africa and the Director of the Institute for Christian Impact ICI in Accra, Ghana (Interviews 1, 25). Apostle Onyinah believes that in Ghana, ‘most Christian teachings now dwell more on prosperity gospel than any other thing’. In a September 2018 interview on Citi TV’s Face to Face programme with Godfred Akoto Boafo, Onyinah, the immediate past chairman of the Church of Pentecost, asserted that ‘[m]any Christians in Ghana are said to have veered off their core mandate and are now majoring on prosperity messages instead … many people think more about prosperity and then centre on teaching blessings’ (Allotey 2018).
Dr Adeleye, a board member of the Lausanne Movement, argues that the prosperity gospel is ‘unbiblical’. The Lausanne Global Consultation on Prosperity Theology issued the ‘Atibaia Statement’ in 2014, which highlighted what it referred to as the prosperity gospel’s ‘excesses’ as incompatible with biblical Christianity (Adeleye 2011; Interview 1). In the view of the Lausanne Movement, the prosperity gospel thrives on a ‘transactional view of [financial] giving’, that is, ‘sowing seeds’, which neglects the biblical message of the cross, while exploiting the poor and enriching individual pastors. In addition, the prosperity gospel may offer a false, materialistic hope that ultimately fails to address the real causes of poverty and leaves many followers disillusioned. Rather than turning to prosperity theology, the Lausanne Movement advocates for a ‘true gospel of grace’, emphasising ‘holistic, integral mission, stewardship, and justice, rather than focusing solely on material wealth as a sign of faith.’ (Atibaia Statement on Prosperity Theology 2014).
Critics of the prosperity gospel, including Apostle Onyinah and Dr. Adeleye, perceive the prosperity gospel as ignoring biblical commands to care for the poor and encouraging greater inequality and idolisation of the pursuit of wealth, without contributing significantly to Ghana’s individual or social development (Interviews 1, 25). Arthur argues that prosperity preaching is hurting Ghana, as its capitalist propensities overwhelm the desire for spiritual growth and moral sanctity towards eternal life. Finally, critics claim that the prosperity gospel does little to help Ghana achieve its sustainable development goals, including a significant reduction in absolute poverty (Asamoah-Gyadu 2020; Williams 2022; Roberts 2009; Interview 7).

5. Conclusions: ‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism and the National Interest

This article seeks to explain a shift in ‘progressive’ Pentecostal outlook in Ghana, which previously focused solely on spiritual activities but has now also taken an interest in social and development issues. The article seeks to build on earlier research in the Global South, while presenting new insights on the relationship between moral sources, humanitarian action, and national interest.
The guest editors’ aim in this Special Issue of Religions is to examine the relationship between moral sources, humanitarian action, and national interest. Engaging with these themes, this paper focuses on ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana, an important contemporary strand of the country’s rich religious ethical traditions.
This paper builds on the fact that Ghana is a deeply religious, albeit constitutionally secular, country: more than 90% of Ghanaians profess to be religious: roughly 71% Christian, 20% Muslim, 5% ATRs (Ghana Statistical Service 2021). Religious beliefs heavily influence national identity, social norms, and political behaviour. Promoting peace and social services, religion intersects with national interest through its influence on public policy, the pursuit of political power, and a strong public moral consensus (Interviews 5, 12, 16, 20).
Ghana’s majority religion, Christianity, is deeply intertwined with governance and national interest concerns and is widely regarded as a crucial pillar of social stability, political legitimacy, and development aspirations. It traditionally emphasises biblical norms, compassion, and faith in action. ‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism, reflecting neo-prophetic and charismatic behaviours, adds spiritual healing and prosperity, reflecting a syncretic approach similar to traditional belief structures (Interviews 18, 26).
I have argued in this paper that the overall impact of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism in Ghana is Janus-faced: on the one hand, one of its most prominent features—the prosperity gospel—is believed by some to encourage both corruption and moral decay. On the other hand, it is widely agreed that ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism contributes significantly to national development and the pursuit of national interest by integrating social welfare, education, and healthcare initiatives with spiritual ministry to complement state efforts, particularly in underserved communities (Benyah 2020).
In conclusion, the following points emerge from the paper. First, ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism plays a formative role in shaping humanitarian imagination and institutional practice, even as humanitarianism and social development have become a professionalised, often secular, domain. The humanitarian and social development activities of ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism operate within a political system structured by state sovereignty and national interest, which impose limits on ethical action while also providing frameworks of responsibility and authority.
Second, Ghana’s national interest concerns include strengthening economic stability, curbing corruption, improving infrastructure, and maintaining democratic stability amid security challenges. Key issues include managing high unemployment, resolving energy debt crises, addressing environmental damage from illegal mining, and ensuring peaceful elections, while fighting political vigilantism. It is not clear the extent to which, if at all, ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism engages with these issues or helps to resolve them.
Third, ‘Progressive’ Pentecostalism acts as a major force in shaping public life in Ghana, blending religious fervour with a ‘transnational outlook’ that fosters global connections, prosperity consciousness, and active social engagement. Fostering entrepreneurship and social services, ‘progressive’ Pentecostalism influences ‘good citizenship’ through conservative social values and significant political influence.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The original contributions presented in this study are included in the article. Further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Appendix A

  • Author’s Personal Interviews
  • Director of Christian Institute, Accra, 8 February 2024.
  • Resident minister of International Central Gospel Church, Accra, 24 September 2025.
  • Senior manager, Pentecost University, Accra, 21 November 2024 and via WhatsApp, 4 December 2024.
  • National Director, Christian non-governmental organisation, via Zoom, 20 October 2025.
  • President’s Faith Representative, written answers to interview questions, 14 November 2025.
  • Pastor, Assemblies of God Church, Ghana, via Zoom, 12 January 2026.
  • Head, Department of Theology/Graduate Studies Coordinator, Pentecost University, Accra, 14 February 2024 and 26 September 2025.
  • Convener/Executive Director of ‘Christian governance organization in Accra-Ghana’ and senior pastor, Accra, via Zoom, 27 October 2025, and 5 February 2026.
  • Senior figure, Methodist Church Ghana, Accra, 17 April 2023.
  • Academic, theologian and priest, former presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church, via Zoom, 4 May 2023.
  • District Minister, Church of Pentecost, Accra, 14 February 2024.
  • Senior figure, Assemblies of God Care-Ghana, Accra, 28 September 2025.
  • Ordained minister of the Presbyterian Church of Ghana and Executive Director of an academic and religious research centre, Accra, 21 April 2023.
  • Assistant Professor at the Centre of African Studies and Centre for Privacy Studies at the University of Copenhagen, Accra, 18 April 2023.
  • Operations Officer, Ghana Pentecostal and Charismatic Council, via Zoom, 20 October 2025.
  • Legon Interdenominational Church Board Member, Advocates for Christ, Accra, 15 February 2024.
  • Head of Department, Department of Organisation & Human Resource Management, University of Ghana Business School and Elder, Church of Pentecost, via Zoom, 2 February 2026.
  • Senior clergyperson of the Evangelical Presbyterian (E.P.) Church of Ghana and senior figure, Christian Council of Ghana, via Zoom, 9 October 2025.
  • Past president of the Ghana Pentecostal and Charismatic Council, past Chairman of the Ghana Evangelism Committee, past General Superintendent of the Assemblies of God, Ghana, via Zoom, 22 January 2026.
  • Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication and former Director General of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, Accra, 7 February 2024 and 26 September 2025, and via WhatsApp, 2 December 2024.
  • Senior figure, Christ Jesus & Elder of City of God Church, Accra, Ghana, and Presidential Candidate for the Progressive Alliance for Ghana Party, Accra, 7 February 2024.
  • Pastor, Church of Pentecost, resident minister, Kusi Donkor Worship Centre and Head of the Pentecost School of Theology and Mission, Pentecost University, Accra, 30 September 2025.
  • Senior figure, National Association of Charismatic and Christian Churches, via Zoom, 22 October 2025.
  • Senior figure, Advisory Board, Alliance for Reproductive Health Rights, Accra, 5 February 2024.
  • Former chairman of The Church of Pentecost, Gomoa Fetteh, Central Region, Ghana, 21 November 2024.
  • Acting Rector/Dean of Theology, Perez University College and senior Pastor, Chapel International, Accra, 24 September 2025.
  • Lawyer, educationalist, and Executive Director of pro-democracy non-governmental organisation, via Zoom, 30 May 2023 and via WhatsApp, 7 August 2023 and 11 October 2024.
  • Elder, Legon Interdenominational Church, and senior figure, Advocates for Christ Ghana, Accra, 16 February 2024.
  • Senior figure, Ghana Pentecostal and Charismatic Council and Pastor, The Apostolic Church, via Zoom, 21 October 2025.
  • Ordained minister of the Church of Pentecost and senior academic, Pentecost University, Gomoa Fetteh, Central Region, Ghana, 14 November 2024.
  • Ghanaian senior academic, Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch University, South Africa, via Zoom, 4 August 2025.
  • Retired Dutch Catholic priest, Accra, 10 February 2024.
  • Author’s Personal Interviews: Sample Interview Questions
  • Interviewee: Senior figure, ‘Kingdom Equip Network’; a Christian governance organisation in Accra
  • Question 1: Please tell me about the Kingdom Equip Network (KEN), how it started, and what its current concerns are.
  • Question 2: In your role as Ghana Contact for Globalethics.net, what do you see as the main ethical problems facing Ghana at the current time?
  • Question 3: Ghana’s constitution is often referred to as a ‘secular’ constitution, that is, without a formal role for religion in governance. I am aware that KEN is concerned about Ghana’s governance. How do you see the role of Christianity in Ghana’s governance going forward? Do you think that the current Constitutional Review is likely to formalise the role of the church in the country’s governance?
  • Question 4: Ghana’s various Christian umbrella entities seek enhanced unity to be more influential in governance, including in relation to, inter alia, galamsey, corruption and unemployment. Do you see these as the most pressing issues facing Ghana at the present time?
  • Question 5: KEN is, I believe, leading efforts to improve ecumenical unity. What practical steps do you think should be taken at the current time to facilitate progress in this regard and what goals do you have in this regard?
  • Interviewee: Senior figure, National Association of Charismatic and Christian Churches
  • Question 1: You will be aware of new protocols requiring prophets to share sensitive revelations about national figures with authorities first. What is the view of NACCC on the new protocols?
  • Question 2: What is NACCC’s view of the current state of ecumenical relations in Ghana
  • Question 3: The NACCC acknowledges the importance of Church unity, emphasising objectivity and sober reflection on national issues. What does NACCC think are the most pressing current national issues?
  • Question 4: How does NACCC think Ghana can best balance spiritual/religious freedom with state interests?
  • Question 5: There are calls for regulation and empowerment of ecumenical councils as a strategic response to ‘sanitise’ the system and preserve the integrity of the Church, in response to the rising number of self-styled prophets and pastors who are said to propagate unbiblical doctrines, exploit the vulnerable and tarnish the image of Christianity. What is the view of NACCC on such ecumenical councils?
  • Question 6: Ghana has a secular constitution while religion—notably Christianity—has a prominent public voice. What does the NACCC think should be the relationship between Church and state: equal partners in national development or one predominating over the other?
  • Interviewee: Elder of Church of Pentecost and Head of Department, Department of Organisation & Human Resource Management, University of Ghana Business School.
  • Question 1: Please tell me about the history and development of the idea of a National Morality and Integrity Council (NMIC).
  • Question 2: How did you come to be personally involved in this project?
  • Question 3: Does the Church of Pentecost (CoP) regard the NMIC as a project to be undertaken in partnership with the state?
  • Question 4: Does the CoP believe that the NMIC should incorporate all Ghanaians, including non-Christians?
  • Question 5: Do you have a timescale for establishment of the NMIC?
  • Interviewee: Former Chairman of the Church of Pentecost
  • Question 1. What do you think is wrong with Ghana’s democracy?
  • Question 2. What should be the personal qualities of candidates for political office in Ghana?
  • Question 3. Would democracy be improved if Ghana was governed according to Christian principles?
  • Question 4. Do you think Ghana’s democracy would be improved if only committed Christians held positions of power and influence
  • Question 5 What should be the role of leaders of the Church of Pentecost in improving Ghana’s democracy?
  • Question 6. Ghanaians generally regard politicians’ corruption and lack of integrity as barriers to Ghana’s further democratisation. How do you think these issues can be improved or resolved?
  • Question 7. In July 2023, the Church of Pentecost, Christian clergy, traditional authorities, and Civil Society Organisations called for the establishment of a National Moral and Integrity Council (NMIC) to curb social vices. Has there been progress on the NMIC?
  • Question 8. Zambia’s president proclaimed the country a ‘Christian nation’ in 1991, a position enshrined in the country’s 1996 constitution. Should Ghana proclaim itself as a ‘Christian nation’ in a revised constitution?
  • Question 9. What is the Church of Pentecost’s position on the national cathedral which, it seems likely, will not be completed during President Akufo-Addo’s tenure?
  • Question 10. What are your hopes for the next four years, under a new government?
  • Interviewee: Senior figure in Perez Chapel International
  • Question 1: Do you think that Ghana is progressing in terms of the country’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)?
  • Question 2: What is the best way, do you think, of enhancing human development in Ghana? Should it be the government’s job, or should the Church also be involved?
  • Question 3: What do you see as the role of Perez Chapel International in human development in Ghana, including in relation to the SDGs?
  • Question 4: What do you think is the best way to further advance the Church’s interests in relation to human development in Ghana?
  • Question 5: How do you see Ghana’s human development in 5–10 years’ time? Do you think that the Church’s role will be important in this regard?

Notes

1
Although these churches do not publish membership figures, they are widely acknowledged to be among the most prominent ‘progressive’ Pentecostal churches in Ghana, headed by high profile, prominent pastors.
2
In this paper, ‘Africa’ refers to sub-Saharan Africa.
3
A megachurch in Ghana is typically a neo-Pentecostal/Charismatic entity with an average weekly attendance of more than 2000 people, rising perhaps to 10,000 or more. Megachurches are found in rapidly growing urban areas, such as Accra, and often operate on multiple sites, offering several services to accommodate large numbers of congregants (Benyah 2020).
4
Adding USD 3 billion annually—similar in scale to the 2026 World Bank investment or the International Monetary Fund bailout—could transform Ghana’s social development by targeting education, health, and sustainable jobs. Key focus areas include reforming education with vocational training, expanding rural infrastructure, strengthening healthcare delivery, and fostering digital entrepreneurship (GACC [Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition] 2025).
5
Grey literature is any information not produced by commercial publishers, including research reports, working papers, conference proceedings, theses, preprints, white papers, blogs, podcasts, social media posts, guidelines, policy documents and reports produced by government departments, academics, business and industry. Sources of information from a more diverse range of voices is often useful in discovering relevant information on emerging areas of research. Such information is not generally peer reviewed, and its quality may be variable. https://library.leeds.ac.uk/info/1110/resource_guides/7/grey_literature%201 (accessed on 26 February 2026).
6
Because of the burgeoning popularity of ‘progressive’ Pentecostal churches, classical Pentecostal churches, including Ghana’s largest church, the Church of Pentecost, with 4.5 million followers c.12% of Ghana’s 35 million citizens, made the decision to adopt many of the attributes of their ‘progressive Pentecostal challengers in an attempt to prevent defections to their newer rivals and boost membership (Prempeh 2024).
7
In Ghana, the terms ‘church’ and ‘ministry’ are frequently used interchangeably, but they have distinct structural, operational, and legal differences. Generally, a church is a community of believers that gathers for worship, while a ministry refers to a specific service, project, or calling that often operates to support the broader church.
8
For many Ghanaians state-level corruption is a key issue, significantly undermining Ghana’s developmental progress. Governmental corruption inhibits development, reduces public trust in democracy, by increasing unrepresentativeness, and with those in demonstrating a lack of transparency (J. Haynes 2025b, forthcoming).
9
Illegal gold mining, known as ‘galamsey’ in Ghana, has significantly harmed the country’s natural environment and jeopardised essential resources such as cocoa, the nation’s key cash crop. Contaminated water, degraded farmland, and polluted soil threaten agricultural livelihoods. Efforts by successive governments to combat this issue have faltered, caught between political will and economic interests of the politically powerful. The Mahama government has promised to prioritise the diminution of illegal gold mining and promote responsible, regulated practices.
10
Most Reverend Peter Kwasi Sarpong born 1933 is a prominent Ghanaian Catholic Archbishop, theologian, and social anthropologist known for his work in promoting African culture and inculturation. He was the Catholic Bishop of Kumasi when he wrote Ghana in Retrospect: Some Aspects of Ghanaian Culture 1974, which explores Asante/Akan traditions.
11
Professor Kwame Gyekye 1939–2019 was a Ghanaian philosopher, and an important figure in the development of modern African philosophy. Gyekye was a professor of philosophy at the University of Ghana, and a visiting professor of philosophy and African-American studies at Temple University, USA.
12
While Ghana is constitutionally a secular state with high religious tolerance, it does not appear to be secularising in the Western sense. Religion, notably Christianity, remains highly influential in public life, politics, and law, with over 90% of citizens identifying as religious (J. Haynes 2025a).
13
The Promotion of Proper Human Sexual Rights and Ghanaian Family Values Bill, often referred to as Ghana’s anti-LGBTQ+ bill, is a proposed law designed to severely restrict LGBTQ+ rights and advocacy. First passed by parliament in February 2024, it was reintroduced in 2025 following the presidential election of John Dramani Mahama, who has signalled support for the law.
14
‘The Lausanne Movement is a global network of evangelical Christian leaders and organizations focused on world evangelization, connecting influencers and ideas to spread the gospel, make disciples, and see ‘kingdom impact’ across all cultures. Its origins are in Billy Graham’s 1974 congress in Lausanne, Switzerland, and the movement unites behind the influential Lausanne Covenant. Its vision is for “the whole church taking the whole gospel to the whole world,” fostering collaboration, prayer, and strategic action for global mission’ https://lausanne.org/about (accessed on 26 February 2026).

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Table 1. Winners and Losers: Decline/increase in membership of Christian denominations in Ghana, 2000 and 2021.
Table 1. Winners and Losers: Decline/increase in membership of Christian denominations in Ghana, 2000 and 2021.
Christian DenominationPercentage of Christians 2000Percentage of Christians 2021 Decrease/Increase
Roman Catholic15.110.0−5.1
Protestant Mainline/Other Protestant18.617.4−1.2
Pentecostal24.131.6+7.5
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